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Kenya has experienced polarisation that has sometimes resulted in conflict. As a remedy, the 
Kenyan constitution, reviewed in 2010, and other legislation prescribes deliberative 
governance as one of the solutions to polarisation in sub-national Kenyan counties. The 
legislation mandates counties to use the mainstream and social media platforms for deliberative 
governance to promote national cohesion and integration. This study examines the growing use 
of WhatsApp groups for such deliberations. It is based on the proposition that the outcomes of 
deliberative governance and its impact on polarisation depends on the quality of deliberation 
and, in particular, on the platform’s (WhatsApp’s), structure and norms. The deliberative norms 
analysed here are based on the Habermasian model of tolerance, inclusivity, diversity, 
incivility, and heterogeneity of viewpoints, whilst the deliberative structure examines 
WhatsApp group’s affordances and composition. Based on these propositions, this study 
empirically explores the impact of deliberative governance on polarisation in WhatsApp group 
platforms in four Kenyan counties. Guided by a critical realism paradigm, the study uses an 
original mixed-methods approach involving a quantitative (online survey) and qualitative 
(WhatsApp-based focus group discussion).  
 
The study revealed that the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp groups participants is 
predominantly young males with high educational attainment, similar to other SNSs 
participatory platforms. The research also suggests that achieving deliberative norms such as 
civility, tolerance, and inclusivity is challenging in WhatsApp groups. Therefore, the quality 
of deliberations in WhatsApp groups falls short of the Habermasian deliberative ideals, and 
this has worsened because WhatsApp has enhanced the sharing of stereotypes, misinformation, 
and conflict frames which have aggravated polarisation. Consequently, deliberations in 
WhatsApp groups have further augmented polarisation around county governance issues. 
Regarding the deliberative structure, the study proposes that the platform’s affordance, the 
composition of participants, the information sources, and the discussion topics in WhatsApp 
groups affect the quality of deliberations and polarisation. Additionally, this study makes a 
significant contribution by using an fresh, integrated methodological approach based on 




Deliberative Governance in a Polarised Context 
1.1 Aim of the Study 
This research study aims to empirically explore the impact of WhatsApp groups on polarisation 
and deliberative governance in four Kenyan counties. The Kenyan constitution, together with 
other legislation such as the County Government Act, 2012, mandates the use of all media for 
deliberative governance at the county level to achieve two things: to promote citizen awareness 
on devolution and good governance, and to promote peaceful co-existence and national 
cohesion. The constitution prescribes deliberative governance as one of the solutions to 
polarisation in Kenya. The assumption is that deliberative governance via social networking 
sites (SNSs) will support the convergence of key stakeholders to deliberate on divisive county 
governance issues. However, the challenge with polarisation in Kenya is that it is deep-rooted, 
pervasive, and historical. It remains unclear whether deliberative governance will succeed 
where various legislative and administrative initiatives have been implemented and failed since 
independence (see Chapter Three, pp. 96-102). The difference between previous initiatives and 
the current process is that the constitution now anchors deliberative governance in law. The 
current legislation spells out the deliberative governance structures, specifies the modalities of 
engagement, and mandates the allocation of facilitation resources by the counties.  
Unlike previous initiatives, the current legislation recognises the role of the media in 
deliberative governance and polarisation and makes two critical assumptions based on a 
positive media effects paradigm. First, it assumes that media represent a public sphere and 
prescribes a top-down approach to deliberative governance using both mainstream and SNS 
media platforms. It also assumes that media platforms will support an appropriate deliberation 
environment characterised by tolerance, civility, diversity, and inclusivity. These 
characteristics mirror Habermasian deliberative norms in the public sphere. In contrast, studies 
have indicated that SNS platforms are incapable of meeting Habermasian deliberative norms. 
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Instead, they have been found to provoke irrational discussion defined by incivility and 
intolerance. Further, they are not necessarily inclusive because of the existing digital divide in 
Kenya. However, no study has linked Habermasian deliberative norms and polarisation in the 
Kenyan context. This is despite the role of SNSs in instigating polarisation and fuelling the 
2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya (see Chapter Three, pp. 132-134). Therefore, it is 
doubtful that SNS platforms will support quality deliberative governance and ameliorate the 
problems of polarisation as envisaged in the current legislation. Furthermore, existing studies 
have linked SNS users with tendencies that encourage polarisation through practices such as 
selective exposure and forming enclave echo chambers (Bright, 2018; Garrett, 2009; Garrett et 
al., 2013; Kim, 2015, 2015; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2010, 2018; Weeks et al., 
2017; Wicks et al., 2014). 
The past two decades have seen the emergence of various SNS platforms with unique 
features across the globe. With more than 12 million users in Kenya, WhatsApp has novel 
interactive affordances and dynamics that can influence group polarisation (see Chapter Four, 
pp. 139). It is the most widely used SNS platform in Kenya and has instigated spontaneous 
bottom-up networks to engage in deliberative governance. It has revolutionised social 
networking, discursive interactions, and political mobilisation in Kenya. The majority of 
Kenyan county governments, citizens, and civil society groups currently use WhatsApp for 
interactive engagement through the formation of groups and networks. As a deliberation 
platform, WhatsApp can be understood in terms of its deliberative structure and its ability to 
support group norms. This study is based on the proposition that the outcomes of deliberative 
governance and its impact on polarisation will depend on the quality of deliberation and the 
platform’s deliberative structure. The WhatsApp group deliberation structure consists of its 
socio-demographic composition, recruitment method, group size, and group ties (see Figure 
1.1). The quality of deliberations (operationalised as deliberative norms) are derived from 
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Habermasian deliberative ideals and include: diversity, inclusivity, tolerance, civility, 
moderation, and heterogeneity of viewpoints (Habermas, 1996, 2003, 2005). How participants 
interact in view of the WhatsApp group’s deliberative structure and the deliberative norms is 
likely to affect polarisation. Another proposition is that the recruitment method used in the 
formation of WhatsApp groups can influence the quality of deliberations on WhatsApp. The 
quality of deliberations can be determined by Habermasian deliberative ideals (Kibet & Ward, 
2018; Mychelle et al., 2016; Kurowski, 2016; Ndlela & Mulwo, 2017; Rastogi & Hendler, 
2016; Omanga, 2019a). 
Based on the above propositions, this study sought to answer a number of research 
questions. The first was to understand the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp groups in 
Kenya. Using a quantitative approach based on an online survey, the study looked at the age, 
gender, and level of education of participants in WhatsApp groups. The study also established 
whether and how WhatsApp group deliberative structures and norms, as earlier elaborated, 
influence group polarisation. Answering this research question involved the use of a mixed 
method design using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. A quantitative method 
was used to establish whether there is a variance in the quality of deliberation based on 
WhatsApp group formation. Through an entirely qualitative approach, the study sought to 
establish whether deliberative governance on WhatsApp groups influences polarisation. 
Answering these research questions was guided by a critical realism paradigm. 
1.2 Justification for this Research Study 
Various existing studies have examined the quality of deliberations based on Habermasian 
deliberative ideals in diverse contexts across the globe. However, very few have examined how 
the quality of deliberations affects group polarisation especially in polarised contexts like 
Kenya. While few research studies have examined the use of WhatsApp groups in Kenya, none 
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has specifically examined their impact on polarisation and deliberative governance processes. 
Further, existing studies on deliberation have a biased focus on other SNS platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter. This research is based on normative deliberative governance ideals as 
stipulated in the Kenyan constitution and other legislative frameworks. These ideals stipulate 
a top-down engagement framework where county government creates strategies, initiates 
interaction, and establishes mechanisms to deliberate on governance issues. Considering its 
unique affordances and WhatsApp usage, a spontaneous bottom-up approach is an emergent 
reality in the contemporary deliberative governance framework. The impact of such a 
spontaneous bottom-up approach on the quality of deliberations and on polarisation remains 
unexplored in the Kenyan context. While various studies on polarisation exists, this study 
empirically tests the applicability of constitutional assumptions in Kenyan counties. The study 
links various concepts related to deliberative governance, deliberative norms and ideals, media 
theories, and group polarisation with results that have theoretical and practical implications. 
Linking these concepts in this study has resulted in empirical evidence that can contribute to 
decisions on governance policy in the future. This study used a novel method of online focus 
group discussion based entirely on the WhatsApp platform (see Chapter Five, pp. 176,177). 
Based on WhatsApp’s securitised end-to-end encryption, this study research proposes the use 
of WhatsApp-based focus group discussions for collecting data among vulnerable population 
groups (Dahir, 2017; Kibet & Ward, 2018; Muendo, 2017; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017; Dotson, 
2016; Okeowo, 2019; Omanga, 2019a; Waterson, 2018).  
1.3 Background and Context of the Study 
1.3.1 Polarisation and Constitutional Change in Kenya 
Since independence, Kenya has been characterised by partisan politics and fragmented ethnic 
identities. The causes of such fragmentation include among others: segregationist colonial 
5 
 
policies, divisive post-independence politics, and contested resource distribution. Following 
Kenya’s independence, the political elite entrenched exclusionary ‘divide and rule’ tactics used 
by colonialists. They deployed divisive ethnic and political rhetoric as a form of mobilisation 
due to a general lack of a cohesive and comprehensive party ideology. The political elite used 
state resources to heighten polarisation, paralyse governance institutions and entrench state 
capture. These factors peaked during periodic general elections resulting in controversial, 
contentious, and extremely polarised electioneering processes (Ahluwalia, 2013; Holmquist & 
Oendo, 2001; Kagwanja & Southall, 2009; Kelsall, 1996; Speich, 2009). 
One relevant example is the post-election violence of 2007/8 which started with a 
heated political discourse and campaigns and ended in significant bloodshed (more than 1,000 
people were killed). From this election, it became increasingly apparent that online and offline 
discussion heightens the state of ethnic polarisation. It also hardens attitudinal views and 
ideological positions that can result into catastrophic violence in the society. It was also evident 
that polarisation in Kenya is deeply-rooted in unresolved historical and socio-political 
grievances that had divided the society into cleavages. Such cleavages are what politicians used 
to drive emotionally charged political processes. Polarisation in this study is conceptualised in 
terms of divergent attitudes, opinions, and views within the context of deliberative governance. 
The focus of the study is on group polarisation which is defined as follows: 
Group polarisation describes a phenomenon where members of a deliberating 
group move toward a more extreme position in the direction the members’ pre-
deliberation tendency (Vicario et al., 2016, p. 23).  
 
According to Sunstein: 
 
Group polarisation arises when members of a deliberating group move toward a 
more extreme point in whatever direction is indicated by the members’ 
predeliberation tendency… group polarisation is the conventional consequence 
of group deliberation (Sunstein, 2008a, p.4). 
 
He further notes that there are two principles that underlie the concept of group polarisation. 
The first relates to the issue of social influences on the group’s behaviour. In effect, polarisation 
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can result in socio-political fragmentation with an implicit and implied conception of ‘us versus 
them’ factions in a group context. The ‘us versus them’ faction reflects a form of binary 
thinking where participants favour their side during deliberations. This characteristic of 
polarisation in Kenya drives the politics and governance process into zero-sum contests where 
perceived losers and winners cannot co-exist on issues (Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2012; Omulo & 
Williams, 2018). 
Following the unprecedented magnitude of the 2007/8 violence in Kenya, a long-term 
solution through constitutional amendment and restructuring was explored. The Constitution 
of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) recommended the devolution of power and 
decentralisation of decision making as one of the remedial actions to resolve polarisation. 
Devolution was instituted in the constitutional review process to address grievances related to 
the ethnic and regional exclusion in state management. Decentralisation was intended to 
streamline political administration and enhance equitable resource governance. According to 
CKRC, it was not enough to institute devolution and decentralisation; instituting an all-
inclusive governance structure required a strategic participatory process. Citizens across all 
regions in Kenya were required to contribute their views in the management of state resources 
via a deliberative governance process. Consequently, deliberative governance was enshrined 
in Kenya’s 2010 constitutional law and other subsequent legislation (Kagwanja & Southall, 
2009; Khadiagala, 2017; Kimani; Bosire; & Likaka, 2013). 
1.3.2 Deliberative Governance Architecture in the Kenyan Context 
Deliberative governance is a process that converges various institutions, groups, agencies, 
activists, and individual citizens to deliberate on a governance policy issue (Hendriks, 2009). 
Deliberative governance is derived from the concept of deliberations which is also advocated 
by Habermas. According to Fearon (1998, p.63): 
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Deliberation refers either to a particular sort of discussion—one that involves the 
careful and serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition—or to 
an interior process by which an individual weighs reasons for and against courses 
of action. 
 
Based on the above definitions, this study operationalises deliberative governance as a 
contestation of governance discourses in the public sphere via sustained interactive digital 
platforms such as WhatsApp groups. The Kenyan constitution prescribes deliberative 
governance as a solution to socio-political polarisation as earlier noted. Based on the CKRC 
recommendations, Kenya’s 2010 constitutional structure re-organises state power into two 
levels: national and county governments. It also redefines the use of state power by different 
political and administrative actors along multiple structural and accountability lines. It 
combines the lateral, horizontal and vertical dimensions of power and authority. Part of the 
administrative powers, resource allocation roles, and policy-making responsibilities of the 
national government were decentralised to the county governments. Citizens’ input via 
deliberative governance was decentralised, entrenched, and formalised in the participatory and 
decision-making structures at the county government level. Deliberative governance is an 
engagement approach that strengthens citizens’ roles and input in governance through their 
direct, institutionalised deliberation in public policy choices (Cornell & D’Arcy, 2014; Kramon 
& Posner, 2011; Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2012; Kanyinga, 2014; Nizam & Muriu, 2015; World 
Bank, 2015). 
 The objects and principles of devolved government under Article 1741 of the Kenyan 
constitution grants powers of self-governance to the people. It legitimises citizen participation 
in the exercise of powers of the state towards better governance. Article 174 further recognises 
and entrenches citizens’ powers to initiate and manage their development agenda. Therefore, 
Article 174 of the constitution establishes a framework of deliberative governance by defining 
the roles and responsibilities of different institutions and actors. Subsequent legislation 
                                                          
1 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 is the lastest version of Kenya’s supreme law that was promulgated on 27 August 2010. 
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including the Public Finance Management Act (Government of Kenya, 2012b), the County 
Government Act (Government of Kenya, 2012a), and the Urban Areas and Cities Act 
(Government of Kenya, 2011) have all incorporated public participation and deliberative 
governance in its core processes. 
The County Governments Act (2012),2 in subsection 91, giving effect to Article 174 of 
the constitution, identifies modalities for deliberative governance. This Act obligates the 
county government to facilitate structures for citizen mobilisation and engagement using: 
‘media platforms and information communication technology-based platforms’. Article 94 of 
the county government Act, 2012 states that the county government shall use the media to: (1) 
‘create awareness and promote deliberations on devolution and governance, (2) promote 
deliberations among citizens for purposes of peace and national cohesion, (3) undertake 
deliberations and advocacy on core development issues such as agriculture, education, health, 
security, economics, sustainable environment among others’ (see Chapter Three, pp. 106).  
The County Governments Act, 2012 assumes that the media is a public sphere where 
meaningful deliberations can occur. Article 94 prescribes the use of deliberative governance to 
promote national cohesion and social integration. Article 94 is predicated on various theoretical 
assumptions that form the basis of this study. These assumptions are rooted in a positive media 
effects paradigm and challenge various fundamental arguments. The legislation prescribes a 
top-down approach to deliberative governance and fails to consider that deliberative 
governance requires a bipartisan approach. The success of such an approach depends on the 
supply- and demand-side factors. The supply-side represented by the county governments 
should ensure functional deliberation structures. The demand-side means that citizens should 
be interested, knowledgeable, and have the efficacy needed for deliberations (Ghai, 2008; 
Halakhe, 2013; Memoli, 2011; Munyua, 2016; Lavalle et al., 2011).  
                                                          
2 The County Governments Act, 2012 is an Act of Parliament that gives effect to Chapter Eleven of the Kenyan Constitution. 
It defines the powers, functions and responsibilities of the County Governments. 
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Quality deliberative governance is based on idealised conditions including a consistent 
supply of reliable information to ensure better discourse and consensus among competing 
interests. Ideally, participants in a deliberative governance process should share their expertise 
and knowledge generously. Participants should treat other participants and their perspectives 
equally and base their collective decisions on all contributions. Quality deliberative governance 
requires a platform that will guarantee the diversity and inclusivity of all stakeholders. The 
platform should support open, tolerant, and civil discussion with well-moderated information 
sharing structures. The only platforms that can guarantee such conditions in deliberations are 
micro deliberative structures such as county government assemblies and citizen juries. This is 
problematic because Article 94 of the County Governments Act, 2012 envisaged deliberative 
governance in macro deliberative structures/public spheres such as social media, and civil 
societies (Erman, 2013; Fischer, 2006; He, 2018; Hendriks, 2006, 2009; Hoareau, 2012; Park, 
Kim, & Rosenbloom, 2017a).  
Another assumption considers the media as a net positive contributor to the process of 
national cohesion and social integration. In contrast, studies have established a twin impact of 
the media in Kenya’s socio-political landscape (see Chapter Four, pp. 126). Evidence has 
implicated the media in ideological polarisation, propagating hate speech, and mobilising 
communities towards the 2007/8 post-election violence. On the other hand, SNSs facilitate the 
identifying and mapping of violence hotspots during periods of elections using ushahidi.3 SNS 
platforms also quicken action towards relief efforts in catastrophe stricken areas (Banjac et al., 
2016; Halakhe, 2013; Simiyu, 2014; Kanyinga, 2014; Masika, 2015). However, the scope of 
this study is limited to deliberations (on SNSs) as online public spheres. The uniqueness of 
SNSs lies specifically in their ubiquitous, interactive and networking affordances. SNSs drive 
extensive networking between users and allow them to articulate and establish interactions 
                                                          




between other users while sharing content within the network (Eke, 2014; Ellison & Boyd, 
2007; Livingstone, 2014; Fenton et al., 2011). The scope of this study is further limited to 
WhatsApp, which is currently the leading SNS platform in Kenya. 
1.3.3 WhatsApp Adoption and Use in Kenya 
WhatsApp has emerged as the most popular SNS in Kenya. As earlier stated, it currently has 
more users than Facebook (7 million), Twitter (2.2 million) and Instagram (3 million) as in the 
first quarter of 2018 (Communications Authority, 2019). WhatsApp was developed with an 
intention to replace carrier-billed text messaging via an SMS platform and was envisaged to be 
a charge-free and advert-free interactive platform. The enhanced features and affordances of 
WhatsApp allow users to send and receive video, images and audio messages using enhanced 
integrated location mapping features. It allows users to construct and share a profile within a 
bounded system, establish and engage with their connections within the network. WhatsApp 
has consequently revolutionised social networking, discursive interactions, and deliberative 
governance in Kenya. It has significantly impacted on people’s identity formation, ideological 
expression, as well as political mobilisation (see Chapter Four, pp. 150-156). Moreover, it is 
cheaper and more user friendly than text messaging and maintains a unique hyper proximity 
with users. Furthermore, its end-to-end encryption4 significantly enhances the perception of 
user privacy. This study argues that WhatsApp groups can be considered as public spheres 
within the Kenyan context. This is based on the understanding of the public sphere as a social 
space where diverse opinions are expressed, county governance problems are discussed, and 
collective solutions are developed interactively (see Chapter Four, pp. 156-157)  (Kibet & 
Ward, 2018; Mychelle et al., 2016; Kurowski, 2016; Ndlela & Mulwo, 2017; Rastogi & 
Hendler, 2016; Omanga, 2019a). 
                                                          
4 End-to-end encryption is basically a digitally secure method of communication where people at both ends are the only who 
can access the messages. 
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Three factors largely explain the potential of WhatsApp to influence deliberative 
governance as a public sphere in Kenya: first is the rapid spread of mobile phones and 
smartphone technology; second, an investment in affordable mobile broadband services 
coupled with the penetration of fast, accessible, and affordable Internet at the household level; 
lastly, the social networking culture and WhatsApp group formation patterns among Kenyans. 
For instance, click-to-join5 public WhatsApp groups established to interact on various issues, 
including politics, governance, and sports are now commonplace in Kenya. This further 
explains the extensive use and reach of WhatsApp as a deliberation platform.  
However, these advantages also bring downsides. WhatsApp has been linked to the 
spread of fake news, conspiracy theories, and stereotypes, and misinformation in Kenya (see 
Chapter Four, pp. 132-134). The ubiquity of WhatsApp groups allows the sharing of politically 
mundane content in very rapid and unrestricted ways. WhatsApp forwarding affordances make 
it difficult to trace or track the origin of inflammatory content due to the end-to-end encryption. 
Its forwarding affordances also mean that misinformed content can be forwarded to many 
unsuspecting users without their consent. Therefore, it is a paradox for Kenya’s legislation to 
prescribe the use of SNS platforms such as WhatsApp to help create a cohesive and integrated 
society. This paradox is rooted in a powerful media effects paradigm that has been the subject 
of scholarly research for more than half a century (Dahir, 2017; Dahir, 2017; Waterson, 2018; 
Mutahi & Kimari, 2017; Muendo, 2017). 
1.4 SNSs, Group Polarisation and Deliberative Governance 
Deliberative governance is derived from the concept of deliberative democracy. It is arguably 
a utopian concept rooted in democratic idealism. It seeks to promote civil discourse amongst 
governance stakeholders in the public sphere. The public sphere is an engagement platform 
                                                          




that facilitates the convergence of citizens for interactive civil discourse (Habermas, 1989). 
Deliberations in the public sphere, according to Habermas, should accommodate the diversity 
and inclusivity of participants impacted by decision-making processes; be marked by tolerance 
and civility in deliberation; encourage constructive dialogue and rational argumentation; be 
moderated to allow the careful consideration of opposing ideas (Habermas, 1996, 2003, 
2005). The wide adoption and use of SNS platforms across the globe have received wide 
scholarly attention in terms of its ability to revitalise and transform the public sphere. 
SNSs are conceptualised as an online public sphere facilitating the convergence of 
diverse people and groups in the public sphere. The convergence of diverse people and groups 
in an online platform can be problematic and chaotic. Some scholars have examined the extent 
to which online digital spaces meet the Habermasian ideals of deliberation. The studies found 
a lack of rational deliberations, incivility, challenges in acknowledging and appreciating other 
users’ perspectives, a lack of inclusivity, improper facilitation of deliberations, and exclusive 
participation structures. However, very few of these studies have gone beyond this to explore 
the impact of the Habermasian deliberative ideals on group polarisation on online platforms. 
The few existing studies are based on the US and other Western contexts (Benson, 2019; 
Chambers, 2003; Corus & Ozanne, 2012; Davidson & Elstub, 2014; Öberg & Svensson, 2012; 
Ofunja et al., 2018; Park et al., 2017a). 
Studies linking SNSs and polarisation argue that deliberation on such platforms exposes 
participants to dissimilar viewpoints which encourages them to reconsider their existing biases. 
Exposure to discordant content is expected to enhance tolerance and appreciation of diversity 
which can contribute positively to depolarisation. When exposed to diverse viewpoints, groups 
may be motivated to uphold their existing beliefs through motivated reasoning. Motivated 
reasoning is where participants look out for evidence that supports their position. Participants 
can experience confirmation bias and emerge from deliberation with more polarised ideologies 
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and attitudes than before. Other studies note that SNS participants tend to gravitate towards 
ideologically homogeneous participants who re-enforce their own opinions. This contributes 
to enclave deliberations which has been associated with selective exposure, echo chambers, or 
filter bubbles (see Chapter Four, pp. 69-76). Research suggests that information selectivity is 
platform-dependent where SNS platforms create optimum affordances to enhance a high choice 
media environment (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2007; Bright, 2018; Garrett, 2009; Garrett et al., 
2013; Kim, 2015; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2010, 2018; Weeks et al., 2017; Wicks 
et al., 2014).  
Selective exposure, echo chambers, and enclave deliberations are detrimental to the 
process of deliberative governance. They increase partisan factions, binary thinking and 
encourage the practice of social comparison which are all associated with group polarisation. 
Social comparison occurs when the group takes certain positions because participants want to 
be perceived favourably by other group participants. Further, echo chambers enhance enclave 
deliberations which increase the ideological distance between the in-group and the out-group. 
In-group is where the group’s participants favour those with similar viewpoints and positions 
and disagree with out-group regardless of the facts (see Chapter Four, pp. 45).  
For instance, participants in echo chambers amplify their partisan views with other like-
minded participants. The views that are shared within such enclave platforms are 
homogeneous, limited and can result in groupthink. Groupthink is characterised by typically 
unchallenged, biased and low-quality decision. It happens when the desire for group harmony 
and ideological conformity shapes the group’s position. Therefore, SNSs can stoke negative 
emotions bordering on apathy, scepticism, and cynicism in relation to deliberative governance. 
Polarisation can also result from the design of technical systems using algorithms and filter 
bubbles (Mccoy et al., 2018; Prior, 2013; Kim, 2015; Somer & Mccoy, 2018; Stroud, 2010; 
Swol, 2009; Wojcieszak, 2011). 
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The contrary perspective is that SNS platforms enhance the chances of incidental 
exposure which negates the influence of selective exposure and polarisation. This is because 
participants do not necessarily filter counter-attitudinal content that contradicts their existing 
views and positions. Individuals will rarely eliminate their interaction with diverse contacts in 
SNSs as an opportunity cost of other gratifications such as entertainment and socialisation. 
Individuals typically ignore ideas and opinions that contradict their beliefs but rarely block or 
unfriend sources of such content. Further, participants with sophisticated political experience 
consume diverse content to either challenge or reinforce their existing knowledge and beliefs. 
The assumption that echo chambers result from the extremely passive role of 
participants in relation to information choice is problematic. It simplifies the complex socio-
psychological dynamics involved in information consumption in digital environments. In 
addition, SNS platforms ultimately create weak ties which have been associated with exposure 
to heterogeneous content. The above arguments indicate that SNS usage patterns and 
behaviours are complex and intricate and contextually determined (Arceneaux & Johnson, 
2007; Stroud, 2018; Lee, 2016; Yamamoto & Kushin, 2014; Garrett et al., 2013; Kahne & 
Bowyer, 2018; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Weeks et al., 2017).  
Similarly, polarisation has negative effects on deliberative governance. Polarisation 
increases the ideological distance among individuals or between groups. Polarisation 
significantly reduces the possibilities of ideological convergence or consensus in deliberations. 
The lack of consensus due to polarisation can stall or stop deliberative governance and 
degenerate into actual conflict in extremely polarised situations. Polarisation can effectively 
decrease group collaboration, participation interest, and trust in deliberative governance 
processes. In polarised environments, political elites and groups are more incentivised to 
exercise partiality and pursue a partisan agenda in governance. Governance institutions are 
severely weakened in a polarised context and this inclines participants to engage in clientelist 
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practices. Polarised contexts make it difficult for governance institutions to engineer inclusive 
policy processes necessary for reform. Polarisation heightens the tension around deliberative 
governance and increases uncertainty and this can become a vicious circle (Lebas, 2018; 
Mccarty et al., 2019; Beam et al., 2018; McCoy et al., 2018; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; 
Wojcieszak, 2011; Stroud, 2010; Semaan, 2019). 
1.5 Research Proposition 
Considering the above arguments on the relationship between deliberative governance and 
polarisation in the public sphere, this study makes the following propositions. The first is that 
the link between deliberative governance and polarisation in the public sphere can be explained 
by its deliberative structure and deliberative norms (see Figure 1.1). Deliberative structures, 
according to this study, consist of key features, structural organisation, and composition of the 
deliberative platform. They consist of structural factors such as: socio-demographic 
composition, recruitment method, group size, and group ties (see Figure 1.1). Deliberative 
norms are informal deliberative guidelines of behaviour and an agreed code of conduct that 
ensures orderliness in group discussions for better outcomes. Deliberative norms are also used 
to define the quality of deliberations in this study. Deliberative norms are derived from the 
Habermasian deliberative ideals and include: diversity, inclusivity, tolerance, civility, 
moderation, and heterogeneity of viewpoints (Habermas, 1996, 2003, 2005) (see Figure 1.1). 
The connection between the deliberative structures and deliberative norms is likely to influence 
whether and how deliberations influence group polarisation. For instance, smaller groups, with 
close ties are likely to be less diverse and inclusive. This implies that they have a higher chance 
of enclave deliberations resulting in echo chambers. However, there is no empirical evidence 
to establish such a relationship because no study has explored the combination of these two 




Figure 1.1: Deliberative Governance, WhatsApp Group Structure, Norms and Polarisation 
 
 




The second proposition is that inherently polarised societies like Kenya are likely to translate 
into equally polarised online public spheres. Therefore, the solution to polarisation is likely to 
depend on the quality of deliberation in online public spheres. The quality of deliberation can 
be established using Habermasian deliberative ideals or what this study considered to be 
deliberative norms (see Figure 1.1). The adoption of deliberative norms is likely to be 
influenced by the group’s composition such as its size, ties, and the socio-demographic 
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characteristics profile as well. No study has examined if and how the recruitment method to 
WhatsApp groups can influence the quality of deliberations. This study argues that recruitment 
of participants to WhatsApp groups can happen through self-selection or random selection (see 
Chapter Two, p. 58).  
The last proposition is that SNS platforms as online public spheres have significant 
differences based on their affordances and adoption within a particular context. Platforms such 
as WhatsApp have introduced novel interactive dynamics that can influence group polarisation 
(see Chapter Four, pp. 137-139). For instance, WhatsApp has an end-to-end encryption that 
can provide a safe haven for making inflammatory comments which can embolden the 
expression of extreme views. Further, the socio-demographic composition of WhatsApp 
groups and its influence on polarisation remains unexplored in the Kenyan context. This study 
makes the proposition that the design, affordance, and composition of WhatsApp groups 
together with the topic under deliberation are potentially polarising factors that need to be 
explored in the context of group polarisation.  
1.6 Research Questions 
In light of the above discussion, this study aims to establish the influence of WhatsApp groups 
on polarisation and deliberative governance in Kenyan counties.  
i. What is the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp groups in Kenya? 
This research question seeks to understand the socio-demographic composition of 
WhatsApp in terms of the age, gender, and level of education of participants in the 






ii. Do the WhatsApp group’s deliberative structures and norms influence polarisation?  
The second research question seeks to understand if and how WhatsApp group 
deliberative structures and norms influence group polarisation. The deliberative 
structures and norms are elaborated in the section above (see Figure 1.1). The research 
question is answered in two ways. Firstly, it uses quantitative methods to establish if 
any association exists between WhatsApp group deliberative structures and norms and 
group polarisation. It uses the Kruskal-Wallis H test, the Pearson Chi square, and the 
Cramer’s V analysis. The second uses qualitative methods through WhatsApp-based 
focus group discussion where deliberative structures and norms are discussed in 
relation to their effect on group polarisation. The respondents’ feedback is classified 
into themes and compared to seven pointers of group polarisation. They are: binary 
thinking, motivated reasoning, in-group and out-group identities, confirmatory bias, 
partisanship, social comparison, and groupthink (see Chapter Four, pp. 179). 
iii. Is there a variance in the quality of deliberation based on WhatsApp group formation? 
This research question used the Cramer’s V analysis to examine if the way the 
WhatsApp group is formed influences the quality of deliberations. The quality of 
deliberations is based on Habermasian deliberative ideals and includes: diversity, 
inclusivity, tolerance, civility, moderation, and heterogeneity of viewpoints (Habermas, 
1996, 2003, 2005) (see Figure 1.1). The formation of WhatsApp groups was classified 
into two based on formality and recruitment method. Formality was further classified 
into two where top-down WhatsApp groups are those formed by the county 
government, county officials, their affiliates and representatives, and bottom-up are 
those formed by citizens on their own initiative and volition to discuss governance 
issues. The recruitment method was also classified into two. Self-selection is where the 
WhatsApp group is formed through addition by a friend, colleague, or participants who 
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know each other while random selection is where participants join the group through a 
click-to-join link. 
iv. Has the quality of deliberation in WhatsApp groups influenced group polarisation? 
This final question uses qualitative research methods to establish whether and how the 
quality of deliberation in WhatsApp groups has influenced polarisation on governance 
issues in Kenyan counties. This research question used WhatsApp-based focus group 
discussions followed by identifying thematic patterns within the responses and linking 
them to key pointers of group polarisation.    
1.7 Overview of Chapters 
To answer the questions outlined above, this thesis is organised into eight chapters. The first 
chapter is the introduction chapter and establishes the aims and justification of the study. The 
second chapter is the literature review chapter and lays out a conceptual framework for the 
study. The first section of the chapter provides a conceptual definition of polarisation and 
deliberative governance. Deliberative governance is a prescriptive solution to polarisation in 
Kenya. However, the outcomes of a deliberative governance process depend on the quality of 
deliberations. This study proposes that the quality of deliberations is affected by two factors 
that characterise the deliberative platforms. The two factors are the deliberative structure and 
deliberative norms. While the deliberative structure depends on the composition and 
affordances of the platform, the deliberative norms are defined by the Habermasian deliberative 
ideals. The chapter concludes with the understanding that the deliberative structure and the 
deliberative norms can influence polarisation depending on the interactive dynamics within the 
group. These dynamics are not only platform dependent but also contextualy determined. This 
explains why some platforms can easily enhance selective exposure and the formation of echo 
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chambers. The chapter concludes by looking at the suitability of SNSs as a public sphere and 
its role in deliberative governance. 
Chapter three is a contextual chapter and examines the background, history, challenges 
of polarisation and deliberative governance in Kenya. The chapter underscores that the history 
of polarisation in Kenya starts with understanding the ethnopolitical context of the post-
colonial state. Polarisation is partly a result of the mismanagement of Kenyan structural 
diversity which consists of loosely integrated multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious and 
multi-racial communities. However, various legislative and administrative initiatives have 
been implemented to manage structural diversity in Kenya without success. Most of these 
initiatives have failed. This is what led to the constitutional review process and its proposition 
to entrench deliberative governance as one way of managing Kenya’s structural diversity. One 
of the clauses enshrined in the Kenyan constitutional framework is that the county government 
should use the media to promote national cohesion and integration. While the impact of 
devolution on polarisation is well documented, the impact of deliberative governance on 
polarisation is unexplored in the Kenyan context. This is especially the case for emergent media 
platforms. 
Chapter four examines the SNSs landscape in Kenya, focusing on its adoption, 
affordances, and use. The role of SNSs is connected with its constitutional mandate requiring 
media use to promote depolarisation through deliberative governance. Therefore, the role of 
SNSs platforms is explored in relations to deliberative governance and polarisation in Kenya. 
SNSs in Kenya has been used to spread hate speech, inflammatory content, incivil  content, 
and stereotypes which have increased polarisation in Kenya. They have been used to incite 
people to violence and enhance intolerance. In contrast, SNSs have also been strategic in 
finding solutions to issues of polarisation and conflict management in Kenya. A good example 
is ‘Ushahidi’ which is a platform empowering citizen to map out, expose and discuss issues 
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like polarisation, hate speech, corruption, violent outbreaks, and human rights violation. 
However, WhatsApp, with its wide usage across the country, remains unexplored in terms of 
its impact on deliberative governance and polarisation.  
The fifth chapter is the methods chapter. The chapter discusses the research paradigm, 
epistemological stance, research methodology and the research design. This study is guided by 
a critical realism paradigm which argues that the choice of methods should be dictated by the 
nature of the research problem. Critical realism offers a flexible approach allowing the 
combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods or techniques. This flexibility, as 
noted in the study, defines various aspects of the research, including the research design, target 
population, sampling design, data collection methods and instruments. The research design, 
which in critical realism adopts both qualitative and quantitative methods, also shapes the data 
collection, data processing and data analysis strategies in this study. With a tabular 
demonstration, sampling is discussed as well of how each objective will be realised. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the ethical framework that guided this study. 
Chapter six reports and discusses the study findings relating to two research questions. 
The first sought to establish the socio-demographic profiles on WhatsApp group participants 
in Kenyan counties. The findings indicate that WhatsApp group participants are predominantly 
male, aged between 18 and 44 years with relatively high academic qualifications. These 
findings mirror the demographic profiles of participants in other SNS platforms in Kenya. The 
second research question examined the influence of WhatsApp deliberative structures and 
norms on group polarisation. The study found that WhatsApp groups with diverse participants 
and heterogeneous viewpoints are more likely to be polarised. Civil and well moderated 
WhatsApp groups deliberations are less likely to be polarised. The effects size analysis found 
a significant association between polarisation and the level of education, group ties, group size, 
moderation, tolerance, heterogeneity of viewpoints, diversity of participants, and civility. 
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These statistically significant associations were further confirmed or refuted by the 
respondent’s feedback from the focus group discussions. 
Similar to chapter six, chapter seven answers two research question of this study. The 
first looks at whether there is a variance in the quality of deliberation based on WhatsApp group 
formation. The second looks at whether deliberative governance in WhatsApp group influence 
polarisation. The study found a variance in the quality of deliberations between top-down, and 
bottom-up WhatsApp groups. The findings suggest that top-down WhatsApp groups are more 
inclusive and have well-moderated deliberations that bottom-up. In contrast, bottom-up 
WhatsApp groups had more tolerance, diversity, civility, and heterogeneity of viewpoints 
compared to top-down WhatsApp groups. WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection 
were found to be more tolerant, well-moderated, and civil. Those formed through random 
selection were more inclusive, had more heterogeneous viewpoints, were more diverse, and 
more polarised. The impact of WhatsApp group deliberation on polarisation was found to 
generally fall into two categories. Pessimistic perspectives reflect on how deliberations in 
WhatsApp has heightened fake news, conspiracy theories, conflict frames, and worsened 
polarisation. Contrary, the optimistic perspectives relate to how WhatsApp group deliberations 
have enhanced consensus, moderated opinions, and lessened polarisation. 
The conclusion chapter provides a nuanced overview of the study with a summary of 
the literature review in relations to the study findings. The chapter also details the limitations 
of the study, the theoretical and practical implications of the study. The recommendations for 
future research on polarisation and practical applications for deliberative governance are also 




Polarisation and Deliberative Governance 
2.0 Introduction 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, there are two core concepts in this study; deliberative 
governance and polarisation. Conceptualising polarisation is context-dependent which means 
that there are different forms of polarisation in various studies including: attitudinal, 
ideological, affective, perceptual, and group polarisation. Group polarisation, which is the 
focus of this study, encompasses most, if not all, other outlined forms of polarisation. Further, 
group polarisation is also likely to manifest seven key indicators of polarisation including: 
binary thinking, motivated reasoning, in-group and out-group identities, confirmatory bias, 
partisanship, social comparison, and groupthink.  
One prescribed solution to apparent rising levels of polarisation is enhancing 
deliberations in governance contexts (Mccoy et al., 2018). However, the link between 
deliberations and polarisation is shaped by two factors; deliberative structure and deliberative 
norms. For instance, SNSs as a deliberative structure (socio-demographic composition, group 
size, group ties) have certain features that render the realisation of effective deliberative 
governance and depolarisation quite challenging. Different scholars have studied these 
challenges in the context of theories such as selective exposure and echo chambers (Dubois & 
Blank, 2018; Garrett, 2009; Messing & Westwood, 2014). Habermas argues for ideal situations 
where adopting specific deliberative norms within appropriate deliberative structures can 
achieve civility, moderation, tolerance, rationality, and inclusivity in discussions (Habermas, 
2005). This chapter, therefore, examines the dynamics related to deliberative structures and 
deliberative norms in SNSs deliberation and how they influence polarisation.  
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2.1 Conceptual Understanding of Polarisation  
Scholars are increasingly concerned about the negative impact of ideological or populist 
rhetoric expressed on digital platforms such as SNSs (Beaufort, 2018; Guerra et al., 2013; 
Herne et al., 2019a; Lebas, 2018; Montalvo & Reynal-querol, 2016; Schmitt, 2016; Stroud, 
2010). These concerns have translated into different perspectives regarding the nature, triggers, 
actors, consequences, and types of polarisation. There are various forms of polarisation 
including: attitudinal, ideological, affective, perceptual, and group polarisation among others 
(Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Guerra et al., 2013; Hare & Poole, 2014; Iyengar & 
Westwood, 2015; Kaylor, 2019; McCoy, & Firat, 2018; Lebas, 2018; Levendusky et al., 2016; 
Prior, 2013; Robison, Mullinix et al., 2016; Tucker et al., 2018). All these forms of polarisation 
are interconnected and influence one another.  
2.1.1 Attitudinal Polarisation 
First, attitude polarisation is a phenomenon where participants’ attitudes strengthen and 
become aligned to more extreme positions in deliberative contexts (Paicheler, 1979). Attitude 
polarisation also occurs when an individual’s beliefs become evaluated and questioned in light 
of new information while retaining their initial beliefs (Himmelroos & Christensen, 2018). It 
is an individual-level phenomenon meaning it is first manifested at the individual level before 
being reflected at the group level. Studies show that when participants are given an opportunity 
to think about a subject/object, their attitudes toward that subject/object are tentatively formed, 
and this becomes the basis of their attitudinal polarisation. That is, attitudes that are initially 
favourable become more favourable, whereas the unfavourable ones become more 
unfavourable (Himmelroos & Christensen, 2018; Paicheler, 2012). Categorization in in-group 
and out-group can elicit an increase in intragroup similarity in the form of group conformity 
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and intergroup difference based on differentiation (Knippenberg & De Vries, 1990). When the 
in-group have more extreme opinions than the out-group, this can result in attitude polarisation. 
2.1.2 Ideological Polarisation 
Ideological polarisation is often conceptualised as the ideological divergence of attitudes to a 
greater extremity after engagement with diverse content (Beam et al., 2018; Guerra, et al., 
2013; Hong & Kim, 2016; Kim, 2015; Mccoy et al., 2018; Prior, 2013; Stroud, 2010). Garcia 
et al., (2015), on the other hand, conceptualises ideological polarisation as the divergence of 
socio-political attitudes towards seemingly unbridgeable ideological opposites and extremes. 
The conceptualisation of polarisation in contexts like the United States is prominently based 
on the ideological dichotomy between the two major political parties, Democrats as liberals 
and Republicans as conservatives (Mccoy et al., 2018). Based on such distinct ideological 
dichotomy and how it shapes positions on key issues (Bimber & Copeland, 2013), polarisation 
is sometimes misconstrued simply as disagreements in group discussion settings.  
Conceptualising polarisation is sometimes context-dependent (Lee, 2016; Prior, 2013). 
In some contexts, it is the outcome of a profound and enduring socio-cultural struggle between 
contending progressive and conservative forces in governance (Mccoy et al., 2018). In contexts 
like the U.S., polarisation consists of a formidable alignment of ideology, ethnicity, and 
religion (Garcia et al., 2015; Guerra, et al., 2013; Lee, et al., 2018; Wojcieszak, et al., 2016). 
However, in countries like Kenya, ethnicity, regionalism, and resource distribution are often at 
the root of polarisation (Kasara, 2013).  
A key feature of the ideological dichotomy (in-group and out-group) that exists in 
polarised contexts is that the otherwise normal multiplicity of differences in a group (i.e. 
religion and ethnicity) increasingly crystallise along partisan dimensions (Garcia et al., 2015). 
This means that any cross-cutting ideological differences between group members become 
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further reinforced and entrenched towards more profound polarisation. Consequently, the 
groups increasingly describe and perceive politics and governance issues in terms of ‘us versus 
them’ (Mccoy et al., 2018). The pernicious and often unintended consequences of ideological 
polarisation especially in politics and governance is that it makes consensus, interaction, 
compromise, and tolerance increasingly tenuous and costly for groups in opposite factions 
(Stroud, 2010). Ideological polarisation can enhance the practice of confirmation bias, where 
SNSs users allocate unequal attention, weights, and significance to information that supports 
their position (Stroud, 2018). 
Therefore, ideological polarisation is differentiated from accepted forms of boundary 
and identity formation by three features: First, ideological polarisation is manifest when a high 
degree of salience is attached to specific issues defined by one’s ideology (Arceneaux & 
Johnson, 2007). Secondly, it reflects preference or attitudinal divergence between groups from 
either side of the stated ideological boundary (Swigger, 2013). Lastly, there is a significantly 
high and clear partisan identification between opposing group factions (Prior et al., 2011). The 
focus of polarisation encompasses the extent to which individuals and groups harbour partisan 
views and consider other factions as the disliked out-group (Esteban & Ray, 2007; Lee, et al., 
2014; Muste, 2014). This is another basis of the ‘us versus them’ or in-group versus out-group 
attitudes that is common in ideologically polarised groups.  
2.1.3 Perceived Polarisation 
Perceived polarisation defines how individuals and groups perceive the ideological and 
attitudinal differences between factions in view of their aspirations, values, and goals. Studies 
on perceived polarisation capture the estimated difference between the ideological and 
attitudinal positions of social groups on different issues (Enders & Armaly, 2019; Yang et al., 
2016). Further, perceived polarisation occurs when participants compare ‘my’ position or ‘my’ 
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group’s position to ‘their’ position and conclude that an unbridgeable chasm exists between 
their ideological positions (Guerra et al., 2013; Kim, 2015). Studies show that the perception 
of polarisation between candidates, factions, and parties is growing across the globe on various 
issues ranging from immigration to climate change (Klar, et al., 2018; Mccoy et al., 2018; 
Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016). The dangers of perceptual polarisation are not clearly known 
but are thought to be key drivers of actual polarisation in individual and group contexts (Park 
et al., 2019). Perceptual polarisation has given rise to what some scholars consider as affective 
polarisation (Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016). 
2.1.4 Affective Polarisation 
Affective polarisation refers to the extent to which citizens feel more negatively toward other 
political parties than toward their own (Iyengar et al., 2019). Affective polarisation is again 
common in the US and other western democracies like the UK where strong party affiliations 
exist between Democrats and Republicans, Labour and Conservatives (Rogowski & 
Sutherland, 2016). Affective polarisation has various effects on politics and governance. 
Studies show that it likely reduces the efficacy of government, increase existing homophily 
amongst social groups, and alter socio-political decisions (Klar et al., 2018; Luttig, 2017; 
Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016). Citizens’ affective evaluations may polarise further in 
response to ideological differences between political candidates. This increases the stakes 
associated with the choice between political candidates and citizens who tend to use motivated 
reasoning to support their preferred candidate. Affective polarisation is also rooted in binary 
perceptions and thinking. Reducing complex political and governance issues or choices to a 
binary set of alternatives is part of human nature. However, it drives polarisation due to an 




2.1.5 Group Polarisation 
Group polarisation is a phenomenon where members of a deliberating group move toward a 
more extreme position in the direction the members’ pre-deliberation tendency (Vicario, et al., 
2016). Group polarisation leads to changing attitudes among participants within the group. It 
occurs due to several mechanisms pertaining to confirmation bias, affect heuristics, motivated 
reasoning, and social comparison (Sunstein, 2008b; Swol, 2009). Pre-existing views are likely 
to be bolstered in like-minded groups because participants tend to value arguments supporting 
their own previously held position (Sunstein, 2008b, 2008a). This means, group polarisation 
can lead to groupthink, which is when a group makes bad decisions because some of its 
members do not want to express opinions or suggest new ideas that some in the group may 
disagree with (Vicario et al., 2016). Groupthink can encourage overestimation of the group’s 
moral justness and power (Karpowitz et al., 2009), having an illusion of unanimous views and 
opinion among group members (Leydet, 2019), and ignoring evidence or views that contradict 
the group’s views (Karpowitz et al., 2009; Lindell et al., 2017). 
In sum, polarisation in scholarly contexts can be understood through divergent 
individual, group, and societal level perspectives. It is also a cognitive concept as reflected by 
attitudinal polarisation, perceptual polarisation, and as affective polarisation. The focus of this 
study is on group polarisation because it encompasses three interconnected dimensions related 
to: (1) the attitudinal divergence which reflects the extent to which group attitudes and 
ideologies reflect contrasting positions; (2) ideological polarisation which defines the link 
between issue positions taken by groups and their actions in polarised contexts, (3) and 
affective/identity-based polarisation which is the systematic differences between the sub-
populations in a group (Goldthwaite et al., 2013; Mukherjee et al., 2013; Ponder & Haridakis, 
2015a; Prior, 2013; Stroud, 2010).  
29 
 
2.2 Conceptual Understanding of Deliberative Governance  
Deliberative governance is the contestation of governance discourses in the public sphere and 
is often seen as a solution to problems created by the various forms of polarisation outlined 
above. Discursive legitimacy in deliberation is achieved when a collective decision is reflected 
through the constellation of discourses occurring in the public sphere (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 
2008). Deliberative governance institutionalises a culture of deliberation among multiple 
stakeholders (Park et al., 2017). As a critical component of a governance framework in politics, 
it seeks to build consensus, minimise conflict, enhance the legitimacy of decisions, and 
decision-makers. Deliberative governance is a process that converges various institutions, 
groups, agencies, activists, and individual citizens to deliberate on a governance policy issue 
(Hendriks, 2009). Convergence occurs through sustained interactive digital platforms, 
collaborative dialogue spaces, county council forums, media, and community centre forums. 
Deliberative governance is derived from the concept of deliberation which Habermas defines 
as the interchange of rational, critical arguments among a group of participants, triggered by a 
common or public problem. The main focus of deliberations is to find a solution acceptable to 
all who have a stake in the issue (Habermas, 1989). Deliberation is defined: 
Deliberation refers either to a particular sort of discussion—one that involves the 
careful and serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition—or to 
an interior process by which an individual weighs reasons for and against courses 
of action (Fearon, 1998). 
 
Although different scholars conceptualise deliberative governance in varied ways, two 
common ideas and characteristics cut across their understanding of this concept. That 
interactions in deliberation spaces are characterised by a set of communicative behaviours that 
promote thorough and in-depth group discussion (Baogang, 2018; Fischer, 2006; Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003; He, 2018; Hendriks, 2009; Hoareau, 2012; Tang, 2015). That participants 
will receive, weigh carefully, and understand the reasons for and against some the underlying 
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propositions presented by others (Fischer, 2006; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Hendriks, 2009; 
Hoareau, 2012; Tang, 2015).  
The concept of deliberative governance originates from the ideas of the nineteenth-
century thinker John Stuart Mill’s ‘government by collective discussion’ (McLaverty & 
Halpin, 2008; Roberts, 2004). More recently, Jurgen Habermas has built on Mill’s deliberation 
concept, proposing the idea of a public sphere (Habermas, 2005; Susen, 2018). According to 
Habermas, democratic governance legitimacy is derived essentially from two practices: a 
formalised and institutionalised deliberative process involving the aggregative citizen’s 
decisions, and informal processes of collective opinion-formation through mainstream and 
digital media platforms (Habermas, 2005). Formalised, institutionalised deliberative process 
requires proper administrative structures and participatory mechanisms for it to be realised. 
However, both formal and informal deliberative processes depend on the groups capacity to 
achieve specific norms including: inclusivity, symmetry, rationality, moderation, equality, and 
civility (Hendriks, 2009). 
Considering the above components deliberative norms, Barnes et al., (2006) proposed 
the concept of discursive representation. Discursive representation occurs when deliberative 
governance in any context reflect diverse groups, diverse discourses, accommodative norms 
and broader inclusive parameters. Discursive representation also prioritises the appreciation of 
all different proposals and ideas in a deliberative governance context. Deliberation consists not 
in mere articulation and expression of self-interest, but in rationalising the views of others too 
(Fischer, 2006). Achieving inclusive and rationalised discussions requires more structured 
deliberative platforms and processes for deliberative governance (He, 2018). 
Deliberative governance happens in structured deliberative platforms such as consensus 
conferences and citizens’ juries (Searing et al., 2007). The rise of digital technology has, 
however, facilitated spontaneous, deliberative, bottom-up platforms and networks in online 
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contexts (Tang, 2015). Deliberative governance via digital spaces has, therefore, redefined 
critical intermediary spaces between governance actors (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2011; Erman, 
2013; He, 2018; Park et al., 2017a). It has also modified and readjusted the spatial boundaries 
between the state and its citizens (Lim & Oh, 2016). Further, it has created a cross-boundary 
negotiated governance process involving different actors and inter-government agencies 
(Fischer, 2012). Despite enhancing digital divides in some contexts (Brundidge et al., 2014), 
digital spaces have created comparatively more interactive and dynamic platforms where 
governance stakeholders deliberate on shared issues (Cornwall, 2002). As a deliberative space, 
it also accounts for a significant level of radical self-help activities outside state mechanisms. 
Over the past decade, national and local governments across the globe have 
experimented with varied designs of deliberative governance (Baogang, 2018; Erman, 2013; 
Hendriks, 2009; Hoareau, 2012; Park et al., 2017). This trend is driven by declining trust in 
governance institutions, and the desire to achieve greater accountability and transparency (He, 
2018; Tang, 2015). Increased awareness through civic education and resource availability has 
also motivated meaningful user involvement in policy decisions that affect them (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003). The problems of representative democracy occasioned by periodic rigging 
of elections account for the widespread adoption of deliberative governance. Sceptics of 
representative democracy have argued that voting is a product of rigged, aggregated and often 
pre-determined political preferences (Amnå, 2006; Norris & Kennedy, 2004; Tormey, 2014). 
This, according to Nabatchi & Amsler (2014), is significantly inferior to the formation of 
collective and rationalised decisions through deliberation governance. 
Furthermore, governance elites are increasingly appreciating the benefits of policy 
deliberation and debate by citizens. The recent reforms in the public management agenda have 
emphasised the strategic place of deliberative governance (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2011). 
Specifically, the focus of contemporary public management reforms is largely centred on 
32 
 
citizen involvement and contribution. In some sub-Saharan countries, the push for deliberative 
governance emanates from international development organisations as a pre-condition for 
financial and other forms of aid (Rasmussen, 2014). However, the demands for deliberative 
governance as a critical attachment to aid has sometimes resulted in the superficial manufacture 
of consensus and legitimacy through tokenism (see Chapter Four, pp. 109,139).  
Nonetheless, deliberative governance extends citizen involvement in governance 
beyond the input of experts and bureaucrats (Fischer, 2006, 2012; Gustafson & Hertting, 2016). 
Various reasons exist to justify inclusivity in deliberative governance and including strategic 
access to a wider base of knowledge and resources from citizens. It also includes the desire to 
mould an inclusive strategy by encouraging stakeholder cooperation and ensure efficient 
implementation of governance policies. Deliberative governance neutralizes coercive forms of 
power, such as strategic manipulation and covert forms of domination (Habermas, 2005). 
Coercive forms of power, according to Parvin (2018), tends to stifle well-reasoned debates. 
Coercive power is grossly inadequate to neutralise inequality in the distribution of power 
amongst policy actors (Fung, 2006). Therefore, deliberative governance represents a shift from 
a technocratic policy-making process to a more inclusive and negotiated (Aulich, 2009). 
Deliberative governance can reconfigure the nature, scope and extent of cooperation of formal 
governance institutions (Lavalle et al., 2011). Indeed, according to some commentators, 
deliberation via digital technology has created a more structured and extensive citizen input in 
the exercise of state power than previously seen (Patsias et al., 2013).  
2.3 Deliberative Structures and Group Polarisation 
The link between group polarisation and deliberative governance can be explained in the 
context of two concepts: deliberative structures and deliberative norms (see Fig 1.1). 
Deliberation in the context of governance can be structured into micro and macro elements, 
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where both are defined by the scale, scope and composition of deliberation (Hendriks, 2006). 
Both micro and macro deliberations structures reflect idealistic characteristics that rarely reflect 
practical deliberations.  In micro deliberation, the discussion is more structured and happens in 
formal forums (see Fig 2.1). Participants in a micro deliberation group are relatively free, 
knowledgeable, and consider each other as co-equals (Hendriks, 2006). This form of 
deliberation ideally involves a pre-set discussion agenda, encourages rationalised arguments, 
and aims to achieve collectively settled outcomes (Chappell, 2010; Hendriks, 2006). Ideally, 
the key emphasis in micro deliberation is the impartiality of group participants and their 
willingness to engage with each other. The assumption that participants in micro deliberation 
are committed, motivated, and willing to achieve consensus in view of the collective good is 
problematic. Micro-level deliberation is argued to shift opinions, increase knowledge, and 
enhance civic participatory interests (Chappell, 2010; Hendriks, 2006; Lafont, 2015).  
Micro deliberation mostly occurs within the confines of conventional governance 
decision-making institutions such as local assemblies or citizen juries (Moscrop & Warren, 
2016; Wojcieszak, 2011). Micro deliberation forums range from small to medium groups in 
general (Hendriks, 2006). The time frame, venue of deliberation, number of participants, and 
expected outcomes are often well-defined in such structures. Based on the highly defined micro 
deliberation structure, it is possible to use moderators, impose rules, achieve consensus, and 
record the contents of the discussion (Chappell, 2010; Lafont, 2015). Micro deliberative forums 
allow participants to meet and engage face-to-face. Further, participants get to know each other 
much better (Lafont, 2015; McLaverty & Halpin, 2008). The norms of deliberations such as 





Figure 2.1: Deliberative Structure; Dichotomy and Characteristics 
 
 
(Source: Author, 2020) 
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When the issue under deliberation is well defined, coordinated, and structured, it is easier to 
ensure all relevant viewpoints are represented (Stockemer, 2014). Micro deliberation is 
relatively infrequent; therefore, few issues can be subjected to extensive and detailed 
deliberation.  
Macro deliberation, on the other hand, entails a broader scale and scope of deliberation 
that mostly happens in informal contexts, otherwise known as public spheres (Hendriks, 2006).  
According to Hendriks (2006), macro deliberations happen in what he terms as ‘wild’ spaces 
in society where engagement is spontaneous and unconstrained. The focus is on unstructured 
forms of deliberation in groups via civil society, social movements, social media, and 
conventional social networks (Hendriks, 2006) (see Fig 2.1). Macro deliberation occurs within 
mutually overlapping and interlocking networks and associations of individuals (Bekkers et al., 
2011). Based on its informal approach and orientation, macro deliberation is not necessarily 
focused on the generation of consensus or binding decisions (Hendriks, 2006). It is more 
concerned with the impact of deliberation and influencing outcome in formal deliberative 
governance processes. Its aim is to mobilise deliberation in the public sphere with the hope of 
eventually influencing collective decisions through petitions to formal institutions, either 
directly or indirectly (Hendriks, 2006). Macro deliberation structures are not unified but consist 
of multiple, over-lapping public spheres. Therefore, the majority of participants belong to more 
than one discursive group (Gimmler, 2001; Rasmussen, 2007, 2014).   
Comparing the characteristics of both structures, it is evident that macro deliberation is 
more focused on influencing opinion formation in a group context. Micro deliberation, on the 
other hand, is mainly oriented towards decision-making (Chappell, 2010; Hendriks, 2006; 
Karpowitz et al., 2009). The formal nature and composition of micro deliberation structures 
shape how group perceive and handle polarising issues (see Fig 2.1). The rules and procedures 
guiding deliberation mean participants in both types of deliberative structures handle 
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controversial and potentially polarising issues differently (Roberts, 2004). For instance, county 
assemblies in Kenya have house rules that determine how arguments are presented, how long 
participants speak, and the language and rules of decorum expected. Such forums are often 
moderated or chaired to ensure appropriate engagement between participants according to the 
assembly rules. The realisation of rational, reciprocal, and tolerant deliberations is higher in 
micro deliberation structures (Friberg-Fernros & Schaffer, 2014; Hendriks, 2006; Lafont, 
2015). The potential for polarisation, however, still exists in micro deliberation structures. The 
difference is in the way heterogeneous positions and opinions are handled and how it affects 
the resolution of partisan positions. In both contexts, the quality of deliberation has a direct 
impact on the legitimacy of deliberative outcomes (Hendriks, 2006).  
Macro deliberation, in contrast, can foster social learning, generate group consensus, 
and undercut polarisation (Abelson et al., 2003; Beauvais & Baechtiger, 2016; Grönlund, 2013; 
Roberts, 2004). This depends on the various factors, including the nature of ties in such groups 
and the level of commitment to deliberation objectives. Macro deliberation can help groups 
overcome deep divisions in society and still facilitate democratisation (Bekkers et al., 2011; 
Chappell, 2010; Stockemer, 2014). Notably, macro deliberative processes in the broader public 
sphere are more concerned with inclusivity in deliberation about general governance outcomes 
(Moscrop & Warren, 2016), and much less with increasing the quality of deliberation. Micro 
deliberative structures make it possible to effectively evaluate relevant information, interrogate 
issues deeply, listen to, and challenge competing views (Chappell, 2010; Hendriks, 2006). The 
more the participants in deliberation, the less feasible it is to have equal opportunities to ask 
questions, receive answers, explain views, and jointly discuss and agree on them. 
The difference between micro and macro deliberation and its influence on polarisation 
also depends on how heterogeneity is configured and handled. First, micro-level deliberation 
can inadvertently generate homogeneous groups (Chappell, 2010; Hendriks, 2006). The ideas 
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and perspectives that thrive within such context can escape reasonable criticism based on other 
points of view (Lafont, 2015). Therefore, such groups may end up with very narrow or extreme 
viewpoints compared to macro-level deliberation. In terms of structural composition, macro 
deliberation structures consist of more diverse participants with diverse opinions compared to 
micro deliberation structures (Searing et al., 2007). Therefore, partisan polarisation is most 
likely to occur in homogeneous contexts as a result of confirmation biases and the conformity 
to group norms. Secondly, in micro deliberations structures, it is easier to manage discussions 
using specific deliberative norms and to ensure engagement happens within bounds of agreed 
norms (Chappell, 2010). Contrary, macro deliberation structures have more participants, more 
diversity, and more opinions to contend with. Active facilitation and moderation can play a 
critical role in shaping the conditions for deliberation by ensuring that diverse voices are heard.  
Macro deliberation might reflect a more inclusive appearance of legitimacy, but it has 
its shortcomings. The misconception that such structures will broaden the scale of deliberation 
within the public sphere due to its open and unrestricted engagement is problematic (Hendriks, 
2006). Macro deliberation can easily degenerate into factions of incivil, adversarial interest 
group and encourage polarisation (Filatova et al., 2019). Macro deliberation structures like 
media enhance inclusivity, shapes the belief, preferences, and opinion formation in governance 
discourse (Chappell, 2010; Hendriks, 2006; Scheufele et al., 2006). They enhance more 
expanded public dialogue based on exchanging heterogeneous views among groups aimed at 
persuading others. Informal dialogues in macro deliberation spaces influence the general 
governance agenda (Bingham et al., 2010; Wojcieszak, 2011). The following section examines 




2.3.1 Group Size, Group Ties and Polarisation 
Macro deliberation structures have comparatively more participants and tend to have a greater 
exposure impact for heterogeneous information which affects polarisation (Dylko, 2017). 
There is a positive correlation between the group size and consensus in deliberations. It is much 
easier for smaller groups to achieve consensus because they can easily maintain multiple 
dynamic interactions with each other (Hipp, 2016), they have a more personalised connection, 
and closer interactive channels within the group (Chan, 2016). Contrary, participants in larger 
groups deliberate extensively due to the comparatively larger pool of participants and 
arguments (Eveland & Hively, 2009). Large groups, such as common in macro deliberation 
structures, can influence a group’s attitude relating to how they exchange, interact with, and 
synthesise heterogeneous opinions (Gerth et al., 2009). In contrast, a small group can easily 
create polarised echo chambers consisting of customised deliberations where each member 
feels comfortable with homogeneous content (Baxter et al., 2011). Whereas large groups are 
positively associated with more enhanced deliberation resources and social support (Ellison & 
Boyd, 2010), discussions can turn progressively unmanageable.  
Extensive traffic of conversation flows in large groups can result in context collapse 
(Gil-Lopez et al., 2018; Marwick, 2014). Context collapse means an infinite number of online 
participants and audiences which can translate to a more chaotic discussions process (Sunstein, 
2008b, 2008a). In this context, deliberations can prove difficult to moderate, and this increases 
proportionate to group size (Killworth et al., 2001). A group’s social diversity is enhanced by 
the creation of large groups with a diverse number of partially incompatible ‘social spheres’ 
due to diverse group members (Binder et al., 2016, p.23). Interactions in small groups are more 
intimate and participants are likely to embrace and become responsive to the group’s agreed 
norms of deliberations (Binder et al., 2012; Klapper, et al., 2016). In contrast, large groups 
result in weak ties with a greater chance of encountering diverse viewpoints that can intensify 
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intolerance (Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011); Erisen & Erisen, 2012). Large groups increase the 
volume and sources of information that participants are exposed to and this raises the chances 
of incidental exposure to heterogeneous content (Allcott & Gentzkow, (2017).  
Studies have also established a link between group size and diversity of unknown 
contacts, otherwise known as ‘friends’ (Hwang et al., 2016; Zhu et al., 2016). Diverse friends 
increase exposure to heterogeneous content in deliberations. However, this is dependent on the 
criteria of recruiting such friends which is sometimes based on ideological homogeneity (see 
the section below). As earlier noted, smaller groups are more likely to form enclaves where 
deliberations results in echo chambers. Fragmentation of participants into ideological in-groups 
and out-groups is more common in large compared to smaller groups (Ruppel et al., 2015). 
Participants in small groups are more likely to hold strongly entrenched partisan opinions 
because of group homogeneity (Conroy et al., 2012; Jeong et al., 2016).  
The group size (Bojanowski & Corten, (2014), the structure of the group (Conroy et al., 
2012; Jeong et al., 2016), and the demographic composition of the groups affect the nature of 
ties in a group (Pattie & Johnston, 2016). Deliberations occur more frequently and openly 
among groups with close and intimate ties (Park, 2014). This is because close group ties are 
usually characterised by attributes such as trust, intimacy, respect, and mutual concern for one 
another (Bekkers et al., 2011; Valenzuela, 2013). Various studies have found that groups with 
close ties have a number of characteristics: frequent deliberations; emotional intimacy and 
intensity; enhanced reciprocity. Further, they are homophilous in nature, meaning they are 
likely to share similar demographic, cultural, or attitudinal characteristics (Haythornthwaite, 
2011; Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Rademacher & Wang, 2014). Ideally, the closer the ties in a group, 
the more homophilous the group, and the more polarised they can be. It is easier to achieve 
echo chambers in smaller groups.  
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Conversely, weak ties involve infrequent interaction (Haythornthwaite, 2011), lower 
levels of emotional intimacy and intensity between participants (Rademacher & Wang, 2014), 
and of course, lower feelings of reciprocity. Nevertheless, weak group ties allow wider access 
to participation resources, unlike in close ties (McLeod & Sotirovic (2001). Apart from 
increasing their chances of encountering relevant, timely information, participants in weak ties 
also have a higher chance of encountering heterogeneous opinions (Kim & Chen, 2016). This 
occurs when deliberative opportunities are designed and structured around groups defined by 
heterogeneous attributes (Schmitt-Beck & Mackenrodt, 2010). Research suggests that large 
groups create a situation where participants with diverse views, different standpoints, develop 
interest and feel comfortable sharing their political opinions and views (Hutchens et al., 2016); 
Eveland & Hively, 2009). 
The combined effect of the group size and the nature of social ties shape the group’s 
interactive culture, adoption of norms, and enforcement of deliberative group norms (Mutz & 
Martin, 2001). Due to the intimacy of close group ties, compliance with the deliberative norms 
such as civility towards other participants is likely to be higher than in groups with weak ties. 
In contrast, deliberative norms such as inclusivity are likely to be higher in groups with weak 
ties because the larger the group, the higher the likelihood that diverse participants will be 
attracted to participate in deliberations. There are conflicting views on whether participants in 
SNSs deliberations will be more tolerant of their online ‘friends’ as opposed to strangers 
(Mukherjee et al., 2013; Winter & Rathnayake, 2017). The strength of social ties in SNSs and 
the structure of information networks provided by online platforms shape the flow of 
governance discourse (Loader & Mercea, (2011). 
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2.3.2 Formal, Informal Deliberative Structures and Polarisation 
Legitimacy in governance is established via both formal and informal deliberative processes 
(Habermas, 2005). In general, macro deliberation platforms like SNSs are considered informal 
platforms. Both formal and informal governance processes should be complementary, whereby 
informal deliberations can identify governance issues outside the domain of formal deliberation 
structures (Rossini & Stromer-Galley, 2019). Depending on the context, formal and informal 
deliberation structures can either be independent or interdependent. Interdependence occurs 
when informal deliberation in the public sphere is eventually channelled into legal, formal, and 
institutionalised deliberations structures.  
This is how deliberations in macro deliberation (informal) structures can result in a 
legally binding decision-making procedures (Rossini & Stromer-Galley, 2019). SNSs platform 
initiatives sponsored by state governments, political institutions, or legislative bodies are 
considered formal platforms of citizen deliberation. Such platforms can integrate a plethora of 
engagement methods for effective deliberations that have been used in governance decision-
making forums through digital consultation and voting (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). 
Effectiveness of formal deliberation forums is generally established in terms of whether they 
have real influence in governance decision-making. When informal deliberations are linked to 
governance institutions, it drives citizens’ perceptions of credibility, efficacy and deliberative 
value (Barisione, 2012).  
SNSs deliberative spaces that have a clear connection to governing institutions are 
considered as strategic and legitimate deliberation spaces by participants (Tang, 2015). 
Participants feel empowered and efficacious when governance institutions establish, recognise 
or sponsor an informal forum of deliberation (Mbuyisa, 2014). Participants who engage in 
formal SNSs deliberation platforms are likely to believe that their deliberation efforts will 
impact on governance decision-making; resulting in higher efficacy. Informal SNSs 
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deliberation platforms with clear governance agendas tend to attract more interested, 
knowledgeable, and already engaged participants. This leads to the often-criticised self-
selection bias and prevents inclusivity and diversity of deliberations (Bohn et al., 2014; Hong 
& Kim, 2016; Karnowski et al., 2017). This is reflected in the profile of participants who 
discuss politics, who according to various studies are predominantly white, male, well 
educated, and are high-income earners (Brodie,et al., 2009; Henn & Foard, 2014; Tanczer, 
2016; Tanner et al., 2013; Thelwall, 2008).  
Contemporary research is generally focused on formal discussion environments 
sponsored by political institutions. Research into informal discussion spaces are typically 
conducted through surveys that inquire about people’s behaviour and perceptions about their 
everyday interactions and investigated its effects (Hendriks, 2006; Livingstone & Thumim, 
2003; Mcclurg, 2003). The growing attention to informal governance deliberation spaces is 
due to the pervasive nature of SNSs platforms. Research on informal SNSs deliberation spaces 
using varied methodological approaches suggest several desirable outcomes despite the lack of 
clear structures and intent (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013; Hendriks, 2006; Lim & Oh, 2016). 
Informal SNSs platforms have been found to widen people’s access to different governance 
perspectives compared to formal platforms (Rossini & Stromer-Galley, 2019). Such informal 
groups facilitate the connection among participants with weak social ties, often being more 
diverse than one’s close affiliates. 
2.3.4 Socio-demographic Characteristics and Polarisation 
Socio-demographic profiles of micro and macro deliberative structures are likely to differ. The 
methods of recruiting participants in both deliberative structures determine their socio-
demographic composition (see the section below). The socio-demographic composition of a 
deliberative platform is critical because ideal deliberation in governance is where the 
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participant’s argument and reasoning occur among diverse but equals participants (Abelson et 
al., 2003; Clark et al., 2015). This is based on the expectation that rationality and reason as 
opposed to the existing distribution of resources and power in the group will decide the 
outcome of deliberations. However, the Habermasian deliberative ideals which emphasise 
rational discourse have been faulted as being susceptible to privileges and inequalities that may 
arise from socio-demographic differences (Jezierska, 2019a, 2019b; Magsino, 2017; Ofunja et 
al., 2018). As some social demographic groups dominate deliberations, their perspectives are 
likely to define the group’s priorities in terms of what and how some issues are discussed.  
One explanation for dominant groups during deliberations is the resource theory which 
accounts for the imbalance in resources such as civic skills, knowledge, time, and access to 
digital technology (Brodie et al., 2009; Innes & Booher, 2004; Mahlouly, 2013). The 
recruitment of participants through random selection is likely to succeed among high-resourced 
individuals. The resource theory is closely associated with the individual’s socio-economic 
status (Xenos et al., 2014). Socio-economic status is connected to an individual’s resources 
because their social position is likely to shape one’s opportunity, motivation, and ability to 
engage in deliberative governance (Chan, 2017). Gender, age, and the level of education are 
indicators of socio-economic status and result from the (dis)advantages in resource 
endowment. In addition, the dynamics related to the people’s age, gender and level of education 
have been found to influence polarisation (Sunstein, 2008b, 2008a). The differences in the 
composition of SNSs are influenced by a combination of the socio-structural dynamics defined 
by both genders (Clark et al., 2015). Based on socialisation dynamic and the interests in specific 
gendered issues, women and men are likely to experience differences in polarisation.  
Studies suggest that Women’s networks are likely to be homophilous, consisting mainly 
of close ties (Karpowitz et al., 2016a; Baldassarri et al., 2016). Women tend to interact more 
with those with whom they have a direct relationship in SNSs (Herring, 2015), and this 
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increases their chances of forming in-group or exercising social comparison. Men, however, 
interact more with those who share their affiliations on politics and are more inclined to form 
enclave deliberation groups within such networks (Herne et al., 2019a). Both genders are more 
predisposed to practice motivated reasoning on the issues they have interests in (Han & 
Federico, 2018). The propensity for motivated reasoning is connected with studies showing 
that the perception of expertise is a strong predictor of participation in SNSs deliberations 
(Leighley & Vedlitz, 2017; Mcclurg, 2003; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009). Men, compared to 
women, are perceived to have more expertise and knowledge in political and governance issues 
(Halberstam & Knight, 2016). Seemingly, such expertise can translate to extreme positions, 
motivated reasoning or confirmation biases during group deliberations. Women tend to have 
smaller, apolitical, and agreeable networks that host less political and governance discussions 
(Lindell et al., 2017). Studies suggest that gender differences in SNSs deliberations also have 
to do with supposed personality characteristics. For instance, men tend to score higher in 
assertiveness, aggressiveness, and openness to new ideas in relations to political discussions in 
offline and online platforms. In contrast, women tend to score higher on agreeableness, anxiety, 
extraversion, and openness on personal views (Gurel et al., 2014; Clark et al., 2015; Farinosi 
& Taipale, 2018). The traits on which women score higher, especially agreeableness and 
extraversion, predict a higher affinity to social comparison and group polarisation.  
Research suggests that women are also more susceptible to social influence while men 
are more willing to take social risks, fight, and brook disagreement (Clark et al., 2015). These 
structural, social, and gendered differences are likely to draw both genders into binary thinking 
and factions in deliberations. The ‘us versus them’ faction between genders reflects a form of 
binary thinking where participants favour their side in deliberations and can result in group 
polarisation. Personality differences concerning the level of agreeableness suggest that women 
may be particularly sensitive to disagreement (Aktas et al., 2014). Therefore, women are 
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perceived to experience a more significant suppressing effect from disagreements during 
deliberations, which affects their level of polarisation.  
Regarding age, differing priorities across different age groups have been found to 
influence political polarisation (Bright, 2018; Herne et al., 2019b; Spohr, 2017). Studies in the 
US suggest that age has an impact on ideological polarisation and party affiliation, both of 
which are independent of generational factors (Barberá, 2014; Boxell et al., 2017; Hare & 
Poole, 2014; Robison & Mullinix, 2016; Scala & Johnson, 2017). Longitudinal studies in the 
US show that older age groups who are less likely to use social media are more polarised than 
younger age groups (Boxell et al., 2017). Their study further notes that polarisation has grown 
the most among older Americans that are the least likely to use the internet or social media 
(Boxell et al., 2017). While socio-demographic characteristics such as age, ethnicity, and 
gender significantly influence the chances of being in an echo chamber (Barbera, 2019; Hong 
& Kim, 2016; Lee et al., 2018), political interest has the most influence (Lee et al., 2014; 
Marozzo & Bessi, 2018). Those with a keen interest in politics and governance are most likely 
to be influencers who others turn to for news and information even in SNSs platforms. 
Compared with the less politically inclined, such participants are media junkies who consume 
politics and governance across various platforms (Prasetya & Murata, 2020). Based on this 
diverse consumption, they are less likely to be in an echo chamber. However, the association 
between age and polarisation remains one of the least studied areas in contexts outside the US 
and other western countries. 
Studies on the association between education and polarisation are mixed. Highly 
educated participants have been found to use motivated reasoning strategies more compared to 
the less educated (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017). Educated people are able to seek, interpret, 
evaluate, and even connect information that supports their prior beliefs and positions 
(Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017); this is a form of confirmation bias. Furthermore, when 
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educated people are more confident in their positions and beliefs related to their knowledge 
domains, they are more likely to adopt extreme positions (Robison & Mullinix, 2016). This 
happens regardless of their actual subject-matter knowledge. Studies in the US suggest that 
highly educated conservatives become more conservative, while highly educated liberals have 
increasingly become more liberal (Ballew et al., 2020; Matakos et al., 2017; Scala & Johnson, 
2017). This form of polarisation shaped by the participant’s level of education heightens their 
dogmatism around certain issues.  
Educated conservatives and liberals are more likely to adopt binary positions in 
deliberations (Hare & Poole, 2014). Studies that have looked into this phenomenon have found 
that the level of education is likely to shape views and positions on socio-political issues and 
dynamics during deliberations (Tomkins et al., 2018). This means that the level of education is 
likely to shape people’s attitudes and positions on moral, cultural and political issues related to 
immigration, abortion, and climate change. Pew Research studies have also confirmed a wide 
gap between the views and positions held by educated and uneducated Americans on various 
issues, including climate change and immigration (Jurkowitz  et al., 2020). Highly educated 
people are more predisposed to ideologically consistent views compared to the less educated 
on political issues (Ballew et al., 2020).  
Other studies have also found that the highly educated are more likely to consume 
counter-attitudinal content across various media platforms (Stroud et al., 2015).  Less educated 
people are supposedly likely to be gullible and flexible on the views and positions they hold 
on politics (Scala & Johnson, 2017). Just like age, very few studies linking education and 
polarisation exist outside the context of the US and western countries. Studies have also 
indicated the connection between sophisticated discussions, cognitive complexity, and 
interaction skills often instilled in formal educations systems (Herne et al., 2018). Cognitive 
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complexity, according to Herne et al., (2018), defines how the group receives, perceives, 
distinguishes, and integrates different dimensions of an issue under deliberation. 
2.4 Deliberative Norms and Group Polarisation 
The second concept linking deliberative governance and polarisation is a group’s deliberative 
norms (see Figure 1.1). With growing polarisation in attitudes, ideologies and perceptions in 
public discourse, scholars have looked into possible solutions to polarising debates in SNSs 
platforms (Freelon, 2015). Deliberative norms are informal deliberative guidelines of 
behaviour and agreed code of conduct that ensures orderliness in group discussions for better 
outcomes (Habermas, 2005). The basic forms of group deliberative norms include: careful 
consideration of information, appreciation of diverse opinions-though not necessarily agreeing 
with such opinions, the use of courteous language (Dalton, 2008; Stroud, 2015; Baumgartner, 
2018). Deliberative norms are intrinsically linked to idealised deliberative environments that 
can influence polarisation (Habermas, 2005). It is on the basis of pragmatic deliberative norms 
that Habermas argued for deliberative ideals in discussion within the public sphere (see the 
section below). Being idealistic,  the Habermasian deliberative norms have been used to gauge 
the quality of deliberations in various studies (Abdel-Monem et al., 2010; Elwyn et al., 2009; 
Himmelroos, 2017; Höskuldsdóttir, 2020; King, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2003; Ugarriza & 
Nussio, 2016; De Vries et al., 2012). 
Group deliberative norms can affect polarisation in various ways. It can determine  the 
possibilities of achieving convergent views and consensual values by influencing group 
opinion dynamics. Opinion dynamics describes the process, actors, and platforms that shape 
opinions formation through group interaction (Dong et al., 2018). Opinion dynamics 
determines if the group achieves specific opinions through a rational and inclusive process. It 
is difficult to achieve wide consensus in all issues under deliberations. Therefore, a more 
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flexible and reasonable approach based on shared logic has been used to achieve what is known 
as soft consensus (Dong et al., 2018; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2017). Soft consensus refers to a 
possibility of partial agreements among participants on specific issues where participants agree 
to disagree and respect each other’s logic, positions and reasoning (Dong et al., 2018; Herrera-
Viedma et al., 2017). This has been found to negatively influence polarisation (Brundidge et 
al., 2014; Dong et al., 2018). Achieving soft consensus may not necessarily prevent participants 
from becoming affectively polarised. It can calm potentially damaging contentions and conflict 
on polarising issues. Further, it does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of perceived 
polarisation (Dong et al., 2018; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2017). 
Deliberative norms determine group behaviour and whether their interaction meets the 
criteria of established deliberation principles of equality, civility, and egalitarian reciprocity 
(Halpern & Gibbs, 2013; Hoffman et al., 2013; De Zúñiga et al., 2018). Group norms shape 
how participants receive, interpret and respond to information and their subsequent positions 
(Sunstein, 2008b, 2008a). Due to the asynchronous nature of most SNSs platforms, they are 
likely to support a more reflexive, rationalised approach to argumentative conversations in line 
with deliberative norms. Scholars argue that enforcing deliberative norms in SNSs platforms 
is challenging because they are largely impersonal and de-individuate participants. This 
encourages incivil discourse, and group-based stereotyping (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013; Knoll et 
al., 2018; Kruse et al., 2018a). A further important consideration that is likely to affect the 
enforcement of deliberative norms is the identifiability versus anonymity dichotomy based on 
the platform’s affordance. Anonymity and identifiability are more likely to result in incivility 
and encourage non-compliance to deliberation norms (Seo et al., 2014). Both are likely to 
encourage disinhibition effects during deliberations, where the loosening of social restrictions 
and other group norms enhance intolerance and further polarisation. 
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Group deliberative norms regulate social status within the group (Connelly, 2006; 
Dalton, 2008; Holdo, 2019; Waterloo et al., 2018). However, deliberative norms are often 
subject to a variety of individual biases which interfere with the systematic and rational analysis 
of the information (Holdo, 2019). This translates to participants within the group perceiving 
their positions, opinions, and themselves as superior or victors. Ideally, groups should engage 
in discussions with open minds and should be willing and ready to influence and be influenced 
by the deliberations. Those who effectively persuade others should not appear as victors while 
those who are persuaded as losers. Rather, groups should be responsive to the dialogic 
exchange where arguments, as opposed to individuals, win. This is difficult to achieve where 
rhetoric appeals to passions rather than to reason (Reykowski, 2006). 
Other studies further suggest that using deliberation rules and enforcing deliberative 
norms such as equality of discussion, reciprocity, inclusion, reflection, reasoned justifications, 
respect, and diversity can alleviate opinion polarisation even in like-minded groups (Freelon, 
2015; Jennstål & Öberg, 2019; Stroud et al., 2015; Waterloo et al., 2018). The contrary opinion 
is that an individual’s predispositions shape opinion formation even when deliberative norms 
are in place (Freelon, 2015). Hence, if deliberative norms are to ameliorate the state of 
polarisation, three components tend to be critical: Firstly, discussions should involve the use 
of logical arguments as opposed to coercion and power; secondly, such reasoned discussions 
are directed at solving divisive issues in an inclusive context; thirdly, that those participating 
are tolerant and accommodative of divergent opinions, and perspectives shared by others 
(Barisione, 2012; Halpern, 2017; Lafont, 2015; Moscrop & Warren, 2016; Wiklund, 2012).  
Studies analysing the enforcement of specific deliberative norms in formal and informal 
contexts have found varied results (Dalton, 2008; Freelon, 2015; Stroud et al., 2015). Some 
note that it produces amicable discussion results, including building issue consensus and 
promoting learning (Holdo, 2019). When enforcement of group deliberative norms is done 
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effectively, it is likely to entrench a positive attitude in a polarised context (Erman, 2013), 
while increasing resistance and sensibility to manipulation through what Arceneaux & 
Johnson, (2007) referred to as ‘elite framing’. Further, group deliberative norms can reinforce 
desirable depolarising habits by recognising and revealing the place of shared values and 
diverse identities among participants (Xenos, 2014).  
Well enforced deliberative norms can encourage analytical and communication skills 
necessary for political reasoning in group contexts (Chambers, 2003). Analytical skills are 
critical in deconstructing, potentially polarising content in group deliberations (Lee et al., 
2013). It helps to understand and differentiate truth from error and facts from fallacy. In large 
group contexts, it has been found to enhance the feeling of collective efficacy, especially when 
norms like civility are jointly agreed and enforced (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). However, 
contextual characteristics such as the group’s motivation to deliberate on a particular subject, 
and the perceived potential to achieve a common ground influence the appreciation for 
deliberative norms. It is not uncommon for deliberative norms to be considered restrictive and 
inhibitory, especially when consensus on its enforcement is not achieved amicably. 
Scholars have argued for the need to break specific deliberative norms in order to raise 
critical issues while also defending important values towards depolarisation (Mccoy et al., 
2018). Violations of basic deliberative norms in some contexts are only justified to the extent 
that it is proportional to the level of systemic deficiency, meaning, it should not aggravate the 
prevailing polarised situation (Muste, 2014). Deliberative norms should engender activeness, 
inclusivity, and openness when personal judgements and experiences are overtly presented in 
the public spheres (Dahlberg, 2010). This, according to Dahlberg (2010), would encourage 
understanding and mutual respect between groups towards de-polarisation. Dahlberg overlooks 
a situation where deliberative norms are unclear, where no enforcement authority is available, 
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and the relative strength between protagonists is balanced. In such a case, diverse viewpoints 
and interests are likely to be transformed into polarised arguments or protracted conflicts.  
In this study, the Habermasian normative ideals inform the link between deliberative 
norms and polarisation. Habermas identified specific essential ideals for a holistic deliberation 
framework within the public sphere. Public spheres, according to Habermas and Cohen, should 
be characterised by a specific set of deliberative norms. Those characteristics include 
inclusivity and diversity of deliberation participants; openness where individuals are free to 
express their opinions without economic, institutional or political coercion; rationality, 
meaning that participants will deliberate while exercising utmost logic and reason; reciprocity, 
where participants are expected to appreciate others needs and interests just as their own. 
Various scholars have further added to the list of norms including: tolerance, mutual respect 
(Effing, Hillegersberg, & Huibers, 2011; Enjolras, Steen-johnsen, & Wollebæk, 2012; Keating 
& Melis, 2017); content heterogeneity (Brundidge, 2010); positive argumentative quality (Lee, 
2012), information reflexivity (Dennis & Chadwick, 2016; Knoll et al., 2018; Kushin et al., 
2015), and civility (Ji, 2017). These ideals are further explained in the section below. 
2.4.1 Tolerance and Polarisation 
Tolerance is a ‘virtue in our dealings with citizens who are different or are of a different origin’ 
(Habermas, 2003, p. 3).  Other researchers consider tolerance as the willingness to respect the 
liberties and rights of others whose views, opinions and practice differ from one’s own (Gibson 
& Bingham, 2018; Thomassen, 2006). Political tolerance is the willingness to allow disliked 
and discordant opinions, preferences, and views to be expressed publicly by others (Harell, 
2010; Mukherjee et al., 2013; Winter & Rathnayake, 2017). According to Thomassen, (2017, 
pg 440),  ‘there is no tolerance without intolerance’. This is tenable because in some cases, 
intolerance is what makes tolerance possible. Habermas considered the issue of tolerance in 
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deliberations as a paradox (Habermas, 2003). The paradox relates to arbitrariness and 
paternalism of tolerance in a deliberation context (Habermas, 2003). Arbitrariness, because the 
decision to exercise tolerance depends on the rationality of another party. Similarly, tolerance 
depends on the goodwill of the tolerating party (Habermas, 2003). Paternalism, because 
tolerance must circumscribe a range of accepted behaviour which the majority must accept and 
adopt (Habermas, 2003). Paternalism and arbitrariness help to draw a line between what can 
and cannot be tolerated in a deliberative context. Efforts to ground tolerance as a deliberative 
norm is dependent on the symmetrical relations between the tolerating and the tolerated parties 
in an online context (Habermas, 2003). The solution to this paradox, according to Habermas, 
is to rationalise tolerance as beneficial to both partisan parties (Habermas, 2003). However, 
partisan issues will always dim the prospects of tolerance especially if strongly attached to the 
discussant’s identity or cherished ideologies. 
Other studies have examined dogmatism because it affects the extent to which 
individual and groups are willing to tolerate and respond to heterogeneous views (Gibson & 
Bingham, 2018; Harell, 2010; Mukherjee et al., 2013; Ramírez & Verkuyten, 2011; Winter & 
Rathnayake, 2017). The rationale for tolerance as a deliberative norm depends more on the 
characteristics of the group relations than on the nature of the topic under deliberation (Johnson 
& Bichard, 2010). The influence of group characteristics means that the paradox of tolerance 
in group deliberation can be understood in two contexts; the decision to exercise tolerance is 
not an arbitrary but a rational decision. Studies show that rationality is an individual-level 
attribute that is heavily influenced by the topic of discussion (Gibson & Bingham, 2018). The 
contrary perspective is that the decision to be tolerant is significantly weakened by various 
group dynamics such as the relationship between the group members (Bode et al., 2014). The 
relationship between the tolerated and the tolerating is not hierarchical but is instead based on 
symmetrical dialogical relations between participants in group contexts (Thomassen, 2006). 
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This means that while deliberations in a group context can enhance tolerance, it will depend on 
the power relations dynamics among the group members.  
The exercise of respect and tolerance in a group contexts thrives in situations where 
more egalitarian relationships exist between group members (Adelman et al., 2019). In-group 
members who hold a strong religious, cultural, political, and ideological conviction are less 
likely to tolerate or approve of practices and beliefs of the out-group who subscribe to contrary 
views (Halvorsen, 2003; Ramírez & Verkuyten, 2011; Verkuyten et al., 2019). However, there 
are instances where people tolerate beliefs and positions that they would ordinarily disapprove 
of. For instance, individuals who understand and believe in democratic principles and norms 
are more likely to tolerate those with divergent views (Harell, 2010). Studies in the US context 
tend to associate conservativeness with discrimination and intolerance, while liberalism is 
linked with tolerance and open-mindedness (Gibson & Bingham, 2018). However, such a 
dichotomous understanding of tolerance based on ideological positions is not neccesarily 
applicable in other socio-political contexts. 
Research on SNSs and tolerance indicate that the diversity of the group can affect the 
exercise of tolerance in deliberations because such groups expand an individual’s ability to 
connect with heterogeneous groups of participants (Barberá, 2014; Ramírez & Verkuyten, 
2011; Winter & Rathnayake, 2017). Those who frequently interact in groups with different 
religious, ethnic, and socio-economic backgrounds in digital platforms are more likely to be 
politically tolerant (Hampton, Shin, & Lu, 2017; Kruse et al., 2018b; Mukherjee et al., 2013). 
Despite the diverse compositions of SNSs platforms, tolerance remains a major challenge, and 
some studies have found that SNSs are highly intolerant spaces (Barberá, 2014; Ramírez & 
Verkuyten, 2011; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010). Intolerant individuals and groups tend to 
interact less frequently with those of diverse perspectives and backgrounds, and this can drive 
selective exposure, confirmation bias and the adoption of extreme partisanship. Exposure to 
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heterogeneous views has been found to increase people’s cognitive skills which enhances their 
propensity for tolerance (Gibson & Bingham, 2018). Increased cognitive skills have been 
linked to decreased tendencies to adopt extreme positions in group deliberations (Ballew et al., 
2020; Lambert et al., 2015). However, tolerance is not just about possessing cognitive skills 
but also the ability to differentiate positions, interests, and perspectives in group deliberations 
(Mukherjee et al., 2013). These factors in a deliberative governance context influence how 
governance ideologies and controversies are framed. Tolerance in deliberations does not solely 
seek to change the in-groups’ evaluation of the out-group, but also to ensure healthy 
disagreements without deepening the partisan positions.  
2.4.2 Structural Diversity and Polarisation 
Research has shown that structurally diverse societies are more likely to be politically polarised 
(Hoerner & Hobolt, 2019; Scala & Johnson, 2017; Shoup, 2018; Testa, 2012; Turner & 
Smaldino, 2018). Often, failure to manage structural diversity in any society can result in 
citizen disgruntlement, partisanship and polarisation (Mccoy et al., 2018; Montalvo & Reynal-
querol, 2016; Stroud, 2010). Structurally diverse groups and societies are likely to result in 
heterogeneous SNSs networks (Enjolras et al., 2012). Diverse networks of people tend to have 
weak social ties that enhance access to divergent information (Shoup, 2018). In contrast, weak 
social ties are likely to experience less selective exposure, groupthink effects, and echo 
chambers (Bright, 2018; Garrett, 2009; Matuszewski & Szabó, 2019; Semaan et al., 2018a, 
2018b; Tornberg, 2018; Weeks et al., 2017). Deliberations in diverse contexts are critical for 
cross-cutting exposure of ideas across ideological lines (Testa, 2012). This minimises the 
possibilities of selective exposure in group deliberations, where participants opt to seek 
reinforcement within homogenous groups (Singer et al., 2019).  
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Deliberations in contexts of diversity provoke internal reflection, which may lead to the 
realisation of common ground among those holding diverse perspectives (Habermas, 2004); 
thus lessening the effects of motivated reasoning. However, groups traditionally marginalised 
in governance discourse including racial and ethnic minorities, women, and marginalised 
religious groups are less likely to participate in very diverse deliberative forums where they 
continue to experience minority status (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Flache & Macy, 2011; 
Mccarty et al., 2019; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Wojcieszak, 2011). When they participate, they 
are likely to exercise confirmatory bias on the issues they feel passionate about. Non-
participation of minorities and marginalised groups is fuelled by polarising factors such as 
social pressure, pre-conceived negative expectations, economic constraints, lack of trust in the 
process, and other institutional obstacles (Abdel-Monem et al., 2010; Abramowitz & Saunders, 
2008; Flache & Macy, 2011; Mccarty et al., 2019; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Wojcieszak, 
2011). With the emergence of SNSs platforms, some scholars hoped that these platforms would 
be the panacea for the challenges of  diversity and inclusivity faced in deliberative governance 
(Abdel-Monem et al., 2010; Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2012; Unzueta et al., 2012). Diversity in SNSs 
platforms is also expected to realise moderate, non-extreme views on politics and governance 
(Hampton & Lee, 2011). Although deliberation can have diverse participants, the nature of 
partisan polarisation in the group interaction can mar the outcomes of the deliberative process.  
Further, marginalised or underrepresented group members may not freely participate in 
deliberation when the group composition is imbalanced (Arriagada, et al., 2012). When 
marginalised or underrepresented groups are cowed into silence, the majority are likely to 
exercise groupthink (Shoup, 2018). Such groups are prone to form in-group factions when they 
feel underrepresented or outnumbered in a deliberation context. Research shows that people of 
colour tend to participate less in deliberations when the group is numerically dominated by 
Whites and vice versa (Abdel-Monem et al., 2010). Further, unconscious judgments and 
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partisan assumptions in diverse SNSs platforms can enhance social prejudices and alienate or 
antagonise participants (Hoerner & Hobolt, 2019). In diverse groups, the attitude and behaviour 
of partisan sides can be antagonised by partisan interpretation of the content, triggering 
divergent and more polarised reactions. Deliberations in a diverse context may reflect the 
polarity of expectation involving strong emotions which are sometimes aggravated by power 
hierarchies in the group (Barberá, 2014; Herne et al., 2019a; Singer et al., 2019).  
Studies also suggest that deliberation is sometimes biased against minorities, non-
white, and women because it is premised on conventional forms of engagement that 
disadvantage such groups (Flache & Macy, 2011a; Hamlett & Cobb, 2006; Lee et al., 2019; 
Mccarty et al., 2019; Smith, 2014). Deliberation, according to the Habermasian ideals, 
emphasises rationalised, analytic, and inferential styles of engagement (Habermas, 2003; 
Habermas, 2004). These ideals can disadvantage majority of people with lower socio-economic 
characteristics such as minority and marginalised groups. In such a context, it is not guaranteed 
that deliberation will achieve an inclusive policy discourse. As a governance process, 
deliberation requires an analytic and inferential approach to contested issues in order to 
ameliorate partisan polarisation (Ofunja et al., 2018). The analytic approach requires 
deliberators to identify issues of divergence then seek areas of commonality (Habermas, 2003). 
Heterogeneous SNSs groups are likely to experience difficulties compared to homogenous ones 
in achieving consensus or solution to polarising governance problems (Abdel-Monem et al., 
2010; Harell, 2010). Heterogeneous SNSs groups are occur due to explicit coercion, 
domination, and exclusion in deliberations (Dahlberg, 2005; Habermas, 2005; Jezierska, 2019). 
Diversity and polarisation in SNSs deliberations can be influenced by the methods of 
recruiting participants. This study considers two types of recruiting participants: self-selection 
and random selection. Self-selection derived from the concept of sampling in statistics is where 
people or groups with same ideologies add one another to SNSs deliberative groups (Nabatchi 
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& Amsler, 2014). Self-selected groups are likely to have homogeneous deliberators which are 
likely to undermine deliberation ideals such as inclusivity. Further, they are likely to form echo 
chambers that lead to group polarisation (Garrett, 2009; Szab & Matuszewski, 2019). Random 
selection, on the other hand, is where participants join the SNSs deliberative function through 
public click-to-join links. Whereas random selection can enhance the diversity of participants, 
it can also encourage exclusivity where few people dominate deliberations (see the section 
below). Studies show that random selection is the more appropriate way to promote cognitive 
diversity and diverse composition of deliberating platforms (Leydet, 2019). Cognitive diversity 
relates to a diverse way of perceiving, interpreting and solving political and governance issues 
(Beauvais & Baechtiger, 2016; Brinker et al., 2015). Cognitive diversity ensures participants 
are exposed to diverse opinions, views, and counterarguments. 
2.4.3 Inclusivity and Polarisation 
Deliberative governance derives its legitimacy mainly in the ability of deliberators to 
participate based on equal and inclusive terms (Habermas, 2003).  Whereas diversity deals with 
the structural composition of deliberative structures, inclusivity assesses the impact of such 
diversity in terms of the equality of participant’s voice (Abdullah, Karpowitz, & Raphael, 
2016b). Deliberative structures can be diverse and yet remain less inclusive in terms of views 
and perspectives, as is common in homogeneous groups and SNSs platforms. What constitutes 
inclusivity in a deliberative context varies based on different scholarly perspectives. Some 
consider inclusivity to consist of fairness, representativeness of voice, and treating discussants 
equally; all of which define the quality of deliberations (Abdullah et al., 2016b; Goode & 
Woodward, 2017). Participants are marginalised in deliberation if they have fewer chances of 
introducing discussion topics, being heard, making contributions, presenting their suggestions 
or criticising issues and proposals (Habermas, 2003). According to Habermasian ideals, 
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inclusivity should happen regardless of the existing power hierarchy, influence, status, and 
positions outside of the deliberative forum (Habermas, 2005). This proposition by Habermas 
downplays the critical factors that affect the quality of deliberations with regards to incivility.  
Deliberations are inclusive to the extent that they are open and accessible to those 
affected by a governance decision (Schneiderhan & Khan, 2008). However, including people 
in a process does not guarantee the equality of voice. Inclusion, in practice, is very complex 
and does not merely entail opening the doors of the deliberative forum to those affected by 
specific decisions. Guaranteeing the voices of those within the processes is at the core of an 
inclusive deliberative processes even in online contexts. Realising inclusivity is often affected 
by various factors that reflect the social, political, and cultural dynamics in society (Goode & 
Woodward, 2017). As earlier noted, minority voices in the society are likely to be excluded or 
under-represented in deliberative platforms. Gender dynamics affect inclusivity in deliberative 
governance, where women are likely to be disadvantaged because they tend to engage less 
compared to men (Holdo, 2019; Turnhout et al., 2010). Other dynamics that contribute to the 
lack of inclusivity in deliberative governance include a lack of opportunity to contribute due to 
digital illiteracy in the case of online platforms (Shah et al., 2005; Speer, 2012a).  
When a few voices dominate deliberations, the forum becomes an echo chamber where 
groupthink is likely to be realised. In such a context, the collective opinion of other group 
participants becomes the information reference point for other undecided participants. This 
potentially leads to a herding effect that some scholars have referred to as information cascades 
(Wang et al., 2018). Further, subject matter experts can dominate deliberations meaning that 
balancing the voices of ordinary citizens, those of experts, and other governing elites can be a 
challenge especially in SNSs platforms (Davidson & Elstub, 2014). People of higher socio-
economic status tend to participate in deliberation at higher rates even when random selection 
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is used to recruit participants (Cassells et al., 2018; Souza, 2001). They also dominate 
deliberations when mixed with those of a lower socio-economic status (Dahlgren, 2005).  
The method of recruiting participants to a deliberative platform is very critical in 
achieving inclusivity (Schenck-Hamlin, 2015). Random selection, compared to self-selection, 
is strategically open and linked to higher perceptions of inclusivity and legitimacy in 
deliberative governance. This is particularly important in contexts where structural diversity 
and inequality of voice or perceptions of exclusion instigate polarisation (Schneiderhan & 
Khan, 2008). Self-selection is likely to produce more homogeneous groups that reflect, rather 
than resolve, privileges of such social inequalities (Souza, 2001; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009; 
Zhang et al., 2019). Exclusivity instigated through self-selection can reinforce enduring 
hierarchies based on the participants education, income, race, and gender (Souza, 2001; 
Vecchione & Caprara, 2009; Zhang et al., 2019). This suggests that ensuring inclusivity in 
deliberative governance structures requires a review of the engagement formats, recruitment of 
participants, and deliberative structural design. Inclusivity in macro deliberation structures is 
largely influenced by asymmetries in power, positions, knowledge, and access to information 
among participants (Esau et al., 2020; Herne et al., 2019b; Wampler, 2012).  
Inclusivity in deliberations is challenging to achieve when diverse background 
inequalities are bracketed, set aside, or neutralised in deliberations (Siu, 2017). The threat of 
group polarisation is further exacerbated when either of the opposite sides perceives that their 
voices are excluded or underrepresented (Siu, 2017). Inequalities in group deliberation can be 
inevitable and constant, especially when created by the circumstances and conditions outside 
the deliberation context (Habermas, 2005). Therefore, the role of moderators is to ensure that 
diverse voices, views, and positions in deliberation are heard and taken into account. The 
diversity and inclusivity of voices can facilitate opinion evolution. Opinion evolution describes 
the process of forming new opinions and views among a group of interactive participants (Dong 
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et al., 2018, 2018; Zhao et al., 2018). Opinion evolution occurs when discussants take into 
account alternative views to shape and decide on their own opinions. This occurs through a 
repeated process of inclusive deliberations (Dong et al., 2018, 2018; Zhao et al., 2018).  
2.4.4 Civility/Incivility and Polarisation 
Research has indicated that online incivility is rampant across various SNSs platforms, making 
them very hostile environment for users (Antoci et al., 2016; Filatova et al., 2019; Papacharissi, 
2004; Stroud et al., 2015). The definition of incivility is one of the most debated concepts in 
communications and linguistic research. The majority of studies have conceptualised civility 
based on the guiding norms of etiquette and politeness in interactive environements 
(Papacharissi, 2004). Civility, defined as politeness ignores the democratic merit of robust and 
heated deliberations that often characterises the public sphere. Further, focusing on civility as 
an etiquette severely restricts open deliberations by making it tepid, reserved, and less 
spontaneous (Papacharissi, 2004). Another challenge is that civility is largely defined by the 
western standards of politeness which is sometimes not applicable in other contexts. Regardless 
of how civility is conceptualised, contention and incivility in digital platforms can erode critical 
values of deliberative governance (Druckman et al., 2019; Kim & Park, 2019; Lee et al., 2019). 
Whereas Habermas is deeply concerned with protecting citizens ability to solve 
governance problems through rational deliberations (Habermas, 2005), he believes that 
democracy is best realised when the public sphere is left open, conflictual, and anarchic 
(Habermas, 2003). According to Habermas, too much emphasis on civility in deliberation and 
the realisation of moderated opinions is unwarranted in the public sphere (Habermas, 1991). 
Focusing on civility at the expense of open deliberations risks limiting the capacity of the public 
sphere to establish and achieve legitimate aims of democracy (Habermas, 1991). According to 
him, defining the agenda in the public sphere require confrontational, and contested discussion 
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tactics that can be misconstrued as incivility (Habermas, 1991). However, the challenge with 
incivility especially in SNSs platforms is that it creates a potentially hostile environment for 
participants.   
Incivility significantly reduces the possibility of compromise and thereby enhances the 
chances of group polarisation and intergroup hostility. Incivility is common in various media 
platforms that lack gatekeeping structures (Price et al., 2002). However, studies show that SNSs 
discussion tends to be characterised by incivility, offensive, and hostile engagement more than 
mainstream media (Antoci et al., 2016; Kim & Kim, 2019; Lee et al., 2019; Chen et al., 
2019). Incivility in online discussions involves the use of demeaning words which 
demonstrates disrespect or insult targeted at opposing groups (Antoci et al., 2016; Maia & 
Rezende, 2016; Papacharissi, 2004; Stroud et al., 2015). Research on the effects of incivility 
on group interactions suggests that people will often respond to incivility with even stronger 
and negative emotions (Druckman et al., 2019; Kim & Park, 2019). Specifically, negative 
emotions are more severe when incivility is targeted at the group’s social identity such as their 
religion or ethnicity (Druckman et al., 2019).  The concept of social identity provides a useful 
explanation on the impact of incivility in digital platforms on group’s attitudes, perceptions, 
and behaviours (Kim & Kim, 2019; Lee et al., 2019).  
The social identity concept argues that incivility in group polarisation can accentuate 
perceptions of polarity and chasm between groups by enhancing the salience of group identity 
(Kim & Kim, 2019; Lee et al., 2019). Empirical findings further reveal that SNSs deliberations 
characterised by incivility contributes to the perceptions of partisanship and ‘us versus them’ 
dichotomy (Antoci et al., 2016; Druckman et al., 2019). Therefore, negative social identity cues 
coupled with partisanship can affect the quality of deliberations. Incivility in online 
deliberations can exaggerate the perceptual bias where the partisan mentality heightens out-
group hostility and in-group favouritism (Filatova et al., 2019). Increased salience of group 
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identity resulting from incivility affects the recipients’ perception of polarity among partisan 
groups (Sigelman & Kugler, 2003; Wright et al., 2017). Incivility can also enhance motivated 
reasoning, and confirmation bias where messages that conform to perceived in-group thinking 
are readily accepted and those of out-groups are continuously doubted, thus deepening negative 
attitudes between partisan groups (Antoci et al., 2016; Filatova et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2019).  
Civility, when expressing disagreement, can lessen the chances of binary thinking in 
deliberations (Filatova et al., 2019). It can also help people to consider the validity of claims, 
arguments and interests of others, thus reducing chances of confirmation bias. Incivility in 
SNSs emphasizing antagonism between two partisan groups may erode their expectation about 
achieving consensus through deliberation. Incivility has been partly linked to the practice of 
selective exposure in contexts of political discussions (Messing & Westwood, 2014). This 
happens because people tend to avoid comments that are riddled with incivility. In contrasts, 
exposure to civil but heterogeneous views has been found to ameliorate conflict by lessening 
the chances of negative labelling of opposing factions (Stroud et al., 2015). Incivility in SNSs 
platforms can drive people to exercise defensive motivation and thus reinforce their prior 
attitude. This makes sense in light of research suggesting a plausible link between incivility 
and perceptual polarisation, especially during political discussions (Kim & Kim, 2019; 
Robison et al., 2016). 
Research has established the link between incivility and the disinhibition effect where 
individuals feel disconnected from their real identities (Antoci et al., 2016). In the absence of 
social cues and other constraints inherent to face-to-face interaction, individuals tend to express 
their opinions and views harshly without worrying about the effects of their actions (Suler 
2004). In SNSs platforms, chat messages are often depersonalized meaning that they are likely 
to invite stronger or more uninhibited responses characterised by incivility. Further, 
deliberations in SNSs platforms entails significant anonymity, diminished self-awareness, and 
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reduced self-regulation (Maia & Rezende, 2016; Papacharissi, 2004). This is worsened because 
participants in SNSs platforms become less self-aware and feel submerged in the group context. 
This is what some scholars refer to as deindividuation, and has been found to create a conducive 
environment for disinhibition and incivility (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013; Nelimarkka, et al., 2018a, 
2018b). Unlike in face-to-face interactions contexts, SNS users are less likely to be concerned 
about offending others in their discussions. Furthermore, studies show that impulsive and 
assertive interactive behaviours that are less considerate of the recipients’ feelings are more 
common in SNSs platforms (Friedkin, 2017; Stroud et al., 2015).  
2.4.5 Moderation of Deliberations and Polarisation 
Habermas argues that underlying deliberative norms of mutual forbearance and moderation 
require protection to ensure politics does not descend into further polarisation and civil war 
(Habermas, 1996). However, he seems to contradict himself though when he worries that a 
public sphere guided by excessive regard for the norms of deliberation (i.e. moderation) and 
rational debate can lose its essential function (Habermas, 1996). He noted that protest, 
confrontation, and incivility are all critical components of deliberative politics in the public 
sphere and are difficult to moderate without affecting aspects of deliberations (Habermas, 
1996). Nonetheless, designers of deliberative governance agree on the role and place of 
moderation in both offline and online contexts (Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Lindell et al., 2017; 
McDevitt, 2003; Perrault & Zhang, 2019). Another perspective that is often ignored is that 
moderation of deliberations is shaped by the nature of the deliberative structure. Micro 
deliberative structures are easier to moderate compared to macro deliberative ones (Hendriks, 
2006). In fact, the mechanism of enforcing moderated discussions in most SNSs platforms is 
lacking or tedious to implement and realise. 
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Moderation can improve the quality of deliberation by managing group disagreements, 
keeping group discussions focused, and ensuring civility and tolerance in deliberations 
(Barberá, 2014; Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Zhang et al., 2013). Research shows that group 
polarisation reflects a dynamic psychological process, where the group’s opinions move to 
extreme polarity based on intolerance and incivil discourse (Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Lindell et 
al., 2017; Perrault & Zhang, 2019). Sunstein, (2008), noted that this could be reduced by 
achieving moderated opinions through well-structured and moderated deliberations in groups. 
However, few studies have examined whether there is an association between moderated 
deliberation and adoption of moderated opinions in SNSs contexts. Scholars advocate for some 
degree of moderation in SNSs deliberations to avoid flame wars and trolling in polarised 
debates (Barberá, 2014; Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Matakos et al., 2017). Moderation also 
increases the perceptions of equality among low-status socio-economic groups which 
positively impacts on their confidence to participate in deliberations (Matakos et al., 2017). 
Moderation in the context of diversity can help achieve exposure to discordant views and 
improvement of arguments without polarised antagonism in the SNSs groups. Importantly, the 
influence of moderators can turn everyday political talk into rigorous deliberative outcomes, 
which explains the link between moderated discussions and the quality of deliberations.  
The contrary perspective is that the use of moderation in SNSs deliberation negatively 
affects the perception of ‘free and open discussions’ (McDevitt, 2003). The perception of free, 
open and unmoderated discussions can be detrimental because it can encourage people to react 
with incivil and inappropriate comments, and this creates a false perception of active discussion 
(Matakos et al., 2017; Wojcieszak, 2011). Similarly, moderators can have a negative effect by 
using their privileged position to exert undue influence on the participants and on the outcome 
of deliberation. With existing power dynamics in the group context, it is possible that 
moderators will lean towards those already privileged in terms of participation. Studies show 
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that participants who joined and engaged in less moderated SNSs platforms held a positive 
perception of the legitimacy of policy outcomes after deliberations (Blatz & Mercier, 2018; 
Lindell et al., 2017). Further, those who joined less moderated deliberation platforms 
considered the claims by other participants as more valid compared to those who joined highly 
moderation platforms (Perrault & Zhang, 2019; Shen et al., 2018). Perceived biases in 
moderation can have a negative effect such as heightening the level of suspicion among 
participants towards the deliberation process. In polarised contexts, biased moderation can 
encourage self-censorship with the potential to exclude marginalised or underrepresented 
participants. This can affect inclusivity, increase the adoption of extreme positions, and lower 
the quality of deliberations (Perrault & Zhang, 2019). 
Having considered the positive and negative effects of moderation above, Habermas 
linked moderation to rationality in deliberations (Habermas, 1991). Rationality, according to 
Habermas, includes: fronting well-reasoned arguments, expressing well-justified positions, and 
the willingness to aid others understanding through explanation (Arriagada et al., 2012). 
Deliberation in the public sphere is designed to generate intrinsically cogent, cohesive, and 
solid arguments in an environment of civility and tolerance. Habermas (2003) emphasises the 
place of rationality and scrutiny of ideas to redeem and repudiate various claims to validity. He 
further argues that participants in deliberation must use a logical-semantic rule of argument 
(He, 2018). Habermas (2005) further noted the place of moderate expression and rational 
thinking as the key aim of deliberation. Habermas argument is valid because deliberations as a 
process should yield better understanding because it happens in a platform where the validity 
of problematic claims in politics and society are tested. However, this is based on the argument 
that the goal of deliberation is to reach a rationally motivated agreement among participants. 
Very few studies link moderated discussions with rationalised deliberations as advocated by 
Habermas (Habermas, 2005). Instead, they tend to show that moderators who make non-
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neutral, and semi-scripted interventions during offline deliberation contexts had two effects: 
they were successful at facilitating a more moderated group opinion, but were less successful 
in reinforcing the position supported by a majority in the group (Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Lindell 
et al., 2017; McDevitt, 2003; Shen et al., 2018). The possible benefits of moderators such as 
equality, civility, and tolerance can be offset by their disproportionate and overt influence, 
which can affect the quality of deliberations. 
2.4.6 Heterogeneous Viewpoints and Polarisation 
Another deliberative norm that can influence the quality of deliberations and polarisation is 
exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints. Such exposure, and its impact on polarisation, is the 
basis of selective exposure, filter bubbles, and echo chamber theories, (see the section below), 
(Bail et al., 2018; Bright, 2018; Dubois & Blank, 2018; Garrett, 2009; Szab & Matuszewski, 
2019). Arguably, regular exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints subsequently moderates and 
possibly alters a group’s position on critical governance matters. It is likely to stir up critical 
debate and quality deliberations under the right context and circumstances. However, exposure 
to heterogeneous viewpoints in certain contexts is more likely to discourage deliberations 
because of increased attitudinal ambivalence and abrasiveness (Nir, 2011).  
When participants are exposed to heterogeneous views and opinions in groups context, 
their awareness of diverse interests and opinions may lower the degree of perceived group 
homophily (Hampton, 2017). Diverse participants are likely to enhance the exposure to 
heterogeneous views and perspectives in SNSs deliberations (Mukherjee et al., (2013). 
Diversity essentially means more information, opinions and perspectives encountered in a 
group deliberation (Bright, 2018). Optimists argue that exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints 
encourages participants to examine issues more critically and to seek more alternatives through 
scrutiny (Wicks et al., 2014). However, this argument ignores the influence of pre-existing 
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attitudes and inflexible positions that individuals have despite exposure to diverse content. 
Nonetheless, different viewpoints are likely to aid comprehension and appreciation of the 
diversity of issues in deliberation (Lee, 2012).  
Depending on factors like personality, social environment, and the topic of 
deliberations, scholars have found that heterogeneous groups are motivated to reflect more 
extensively on their views in anticipation of engagement (Bimber & Copeland, 2013; Vissers 
& Stolle, 2014). The motivation for inclusivity yields a rationale for more tolerance and less 
polarisation (Hsu, et al., 2013). When participants consistently encounter homogeneous 
information supporting their own perspectives, their tolerance levels are lowered (Kim, Hsu, 
et al, (2013). This dip in the level of intolerance contributes to a more polarised society, (Lee 
et al., 2018). As earlier noted, intolerance is not the only consequence because awareness of 
glaring differences in opinions, positions and affiliations during deliberations can aggravate 
levels of anxiety and polarisation in political discourse (Mutz & Martin, 2001). It can create 
apprehension, avoidance, and detachments by conflict-averse individuals (Mukherjee et al., 
2013). Participants who fear to be ostracized can refrain from expressing heterogeneous content 
or shun group deliberations altogether (Jahng, 2018). Fear of self-expression means they retreat 
into a spiral of silence (Chen, 2018; Sohn, 2019).  
Despite initial optimism that digital platforms will enhance access and consumption of 
more heterogeneous content according to Ponder & Haridakis, (2015b), this may not be the 
case based on studies on selective exposure and echo chambers. This situation is a result of a 
phenomenon called social network homophily (Bail et al., 2018). Social network homophily 
means the nature of ties and network size influences the tone of deliberations through 
disproportionate exposure to homogeneous content (Halberstam & Knight, 2016; Koiranen et 
al., 2019; Medaglia & Zhu, 2017). Exposures to heterogeneous views can amplify pre-existing 
political and governance predilections, which affects the quality of deliberations (Lee et al., 
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2014). Groups are consequently driven towards extreme positions in the direction of their 
original positions (Pattie & Johnston, 2016).  
Homophily is also dangerous in the sense that minority groups are likely to be exposed 
to less information compared to majority groups. The effects of such a phenomenon are broad 
and could undermine the efficacy of governance institutions through a reduced contestation of 
ideas in deliberations (Halberstam & Knight, 2016). Biased information processing is a reality 
in some deliberation platforms where exposure of homogeneous information occurs (Mutz & 
Martin, 2001). Biased information processing distorts an individual’s conception of others and 
the world view in general. A link, therefore, exists between biased information processing, 
homogeneous content, and polarisation (Mccoy et al., 2018). Homogeneous content is also 
linked to the concept of confirmation bias (Prior, 2013) Different coping mechanisms exist 
where participants avoid disagreement and perceive polarisation to reduce psychological 
discomfort (Binder,et al., 2016; Nir, 2011).  
Participants in homogenous deliberation groups are likely to form extremely polarised 
attitudes (Erisen & Erisen, 2012; Jahng, 2018). This happens due to the influence of the most 
extreme members of the group. As Jahng (2018) notes, social sanctions and pressures to adapt 
to group’s norms and viewpoints is very high in homogeneous groups and leads to polarisation. 
In such groups, concordant content is highly persuasive because it is relatable and requires less 
cognitive efforts to understand. Palatability is also linked to pre-existing positions within 
participants memories when recalling and processing such content (Lee et al., 2014).  
Yet, some research studies suggest that SNSs also allow individuals to establish broad, 
low-density, and characteristically weak networks (Everett & Borgatti, 2014). Such networks 
allow incremental exposure to new controversial information. SNSs could transform the shape 
and nature of communities from a small close-knit to large social networks (Park, 2014; 
Tanczer, 2016). As earlier noted, the lack of face to face encounters and disinhibition effects 
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means that social restraints are deliberately ignored, and participants can make bolder and 
brazen remarks (Guerra et al., 2013; Hampton et al., 2017). SNSs may blur or eliminate 
constraints and costs associated with various structural deliberation barriers (Rojas, 2009).  
2.5 Critiquing Habermasian Deliberative Ideals/Norms 
Critically, the Habermasian normative ideals assume that citizens’ deliberations influence 
governance institutions through rational and critical conversations (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 
2016). Studies that have explored the Habermasian ideals consider deliberations as a unifying 
pillar in fragmented societies (Dahlberg, 2005; Dallmayr, 2009; Jezierska, 2019b; Ofunja et 
al., 2018; Susen, 2018). Through deliberations, citizens develop a shared understanding while 
being able to construct identities to mediate conflict which, in turn, builds stronger governance 
institutions (Lafont, 2015). Such studies further indicate that deliberations enhance informed 
decisions through the clarification of contested opinions and divisive perspectives on 
governance issues (Hutchens et al., 2019). Further, deliberations are likely to promote efficacy, 
knowledge, offline engagement and mobilisation, all of which are considered good for 
democracy (Barnes, 2002; Barnes et al., 2006; Myers, 2018). In the past few decades, research 
has focused on how the emergent digital platforms have influenced these positive contributions 
of deliberations with arguments for a transformed public sphere (Çela, 2015; Goldfarb, 2018; 
Iosifidis, 2011; Kruse et al., 2018a). 
One critical dimension in some empirical studies is whether such digital platforms have 
enhanced deliberations based on the Habermasian ideals of a democratic public sphere (Effing 
et al., 2011; De Graaf et al., 2010). These studies found that online deliberations are often 
characterised by rude or uncivil political discourse. McLaverty & Halpin, (2008), for example, 
regarded online deliberations as a clutter of incoherent voices that harms deliberative discourse 
in the public sphere. Deliberations in such platforms have been found to lack rational, inclusive, 
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and respectful exchange of arguments that are driven by the common good of those involved 
instead of personal gains (Rossini & Stromer-Galley, 2019). Moreover, the framing of 
important issues in SNSs deliberations was found to be problematic and incompatible with 
Habermasian ideals because they impede reflexive, accommodative and inclusive deliberations 
(Barisione, 2012). The quality of deliberations in digital platforms is affected by incomplete 
and underdeveloped argumentation (McDermott, 2018).  
The above shortcoming of Habermasian ideals is partly attributed to specific SNSs 
affordance and features (Iosifidis, 2011). Researchers have questioned the quality, framing and 
handling of deliberations in SNSs platforms (Çela, 2015; Harper, 2017; Iosifidis, 2011; Kruse 
et al., 2018a). These studies suggest that deliberations in SNSs based on the Habermasian ideals 
remain unrealised and are just what they are; ideals. For instance, deliberation on critical, 
contested, and emotive issues are rarely held to high standards of rationality (Shah et al., 2007). 
Rationalised deliberations on divisive issues such as immigration and climate change are 
hampered by an unwillingness to engage with those who hold ideologically opposed 
perspectives (Druckman & Nelson, 2003). According to Rothschild et al., (2019), discussions 
in SNSs platforms are sometimes marred by negative stereotypes which can exacerbate partisan 
polarisation. Negative stereotypes in deliberations can contribute to group polarisation, 
especially when it reflects cues in one’s political and social environment (Rothschild et al., 
2019; Tanczer, 2016).  
Even though the normative stance and Habermasian idealism pervade contemporary 
research about SNSs deliberations, some scholars disagree with these tenets (Erman, 2013; 
Gimmler, 2001; Jezierska, 2019b; Susen, 2018). They suggest that the Habermasian normative 
ideals reflect an unrealistic expectation in contemporary deliberative contexts (Belair-gagnon 
& Agur, 2014; Rasmussen, 2014). The difficulty being with the definition of what constitutes 
rational and respectful deliberation. The focus on normative ideals of deliberation ignores other 
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substantive issues and benefits of informal deliberations in the public sphere. For instance, the 
focus of diversity and heterogeneity of viewpoints based on the Habermasian deliberative 
ideals ignores a critical aspect of deliberations. The assumption that deliberation in 
heterogeneous platforms is inherently good compared to deliberation in homogeneous contexts 
is faulty. This is because deliberation within homogeneous groups have been found to generate 
better activism, mobilisation, and participation in offline activism (Dahlberg, 2010; Kruse et 
al., 2018b; Nyabuga, 2014). 
Empirical studies on SNSs deliberations have inordinately stretched the concept, and 
results of Habermasian normative ideals (Kruse et al., 2018b; Mercier & Landemore, 2019; 
Ofunja et al., 2018). For instance, there is no consensus on what constitutes the basic minimum 
conditions that are essential or necessary for effective deliberation to occur. This makes 
comparative research and meta-analyses studies on this areas exceptionally challenging (Flecha 
et al. (2018). The expectation that SNSs deliberations will reflect rational discourse is also 
entirely incompatible with three factors: the nature and history of polarising issues, structural 
diversities of most societies, and the SNSs affordances (Çela, 2015; Gimmler, 2001; Harper, 
2017; Iosifidis, 2011). The nature and history of polarising issues mean that such issues are 
likely to remain contested and polarising regardless of the platform of discussion. It also means 
that diverse societies are more likely to experience a divergence on issues that drive irrational 
discussions even in an environment where the Habermasian deliberative norms are enforced. 
Considering the above two arguments, SNSs platforms and its unique affordances are less 
likely to provide the necessary solutions to polarising issues because people shape the use of 
such digital platforms (Beauvais & Baechtiger, 2016; Medaglia & Zhu, 2017; Shmargad & 
Klar, 2019). 
The contrary view is that SNSs platforms should not be considered inadequate, or 
irrelevant simply because they fall short of normative standards of Habermasian ideals. The 
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most recent studies have called for the updating of Habermasian tenets to include other critical 
and contemporary aspects of SNSs deliberations (Filatova et al., 2019; Jezierska, 2019; Ofunja 
et al., 2018; Susen, 2018). Such studies have noted the place of networking, creativity and 
shared experiences as components of the public sphere that need to be emphasised in 
deliberation (Kruse et al., 2018b). SNSs affordances contribute to effective and expansive 
networking in a way that has transformed the public sphere. Some attributes excluded from the 
Habermasian ideals include the contribution of SNSs to building social capital and facilitating 
resource mobilisation for deliberative governance (Dunbar, et al., 2015; Vissers & Stolle, 
2014). Furthermore, the Habermasian ideals fails to take into account the fact that SNSs are 
dynamic platforms. They can be heterogeneous or homogeneous, informal or formal, 
asynchronous or synchronous (Bode et al., 2014; Cho & Keum, 2016; Drennan et al., 2017; 
Oppong et al., 2018). All these dynamics and affordances inherent in SNSs platforms can affect 
the enforcement of deliberative norms. 
The arguments in favour of holistic approaches, as opposed to narrow normative 
Habermasian idealism, has also challenged concerns related to deliberative norms (Gustafsson, 
2012). Desirable deliberative norms among participants in such platforms are not inherently 
occurring behaviours. These norms need to be taught, incentivised, and supported through civic 
education (Gladarev & Lonkila, 2012). Inculcating deliberative norms is important because the 
Habermasian normative ideals is incongruent with the socio-political and cultural practices of 
most democratic and contemporary societies. A holistic approach encouraging the adoption of 
deliberative norms based on the context of discussion, and the unique affordances of specific 
digital public sphere may be very beneficial in enhancing the quality of deliberations (Hardy 
& Scheufele, 2005; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). Such an approach should be more interpretive, 
open, and should have a contingent explanatory power to include dynamics unique to polarised 
contexts (Loader & Mercea, 2011a, 2011b; Espinoza et al., 2008). Such an approach should 
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also recognize the influence of social inequality, diversity, and cultural difference in a 
deliberative context. The Habermasian deliberative ideals tend to privilege particular 
rationalised deliberations that are characteristic of formal deliberative structures (Bernhagen & 
Schmitt, 2014; Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Wojcieszak, 2011). 
2.6 Selective Exposure, Echo Chambers, and Group Polarisation 
Considering the concept of heterogeneous viewpoints discussed above, there is a growing 
concern that ideologically motivated selectivity in exposure to content is underpinned by SNSs 
platforms (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Participants and groups are increasingly taking 
partisan positions to SNSs where they filter content based on their perceived ideological 
congruence (Stroud, 2018). Various theories have emerged to explain this pattern where SNSs 
consumption is based on divergent ideological orientations. This section therefore examines 
two key theories; selective exposure and echo chambers, in context of deliberations in the 
public sphere and polarisation. 
2.6.1 Selective Exposure and SNSs in Polarised Contexts 
The link between selective exposure and group polarisation is well established (Garrett et al., 
2013; Kim & Kim, 2017; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2010; Wicks, Wicks, & 
Morimoto, 2014). This association is based on the reception, control, and interpretation of 
concordant and discordant information (Bright, 2018; Halvorsen, 2003; Kim, 2015). Scholars 
have noted that participants in groups are more likely to consume concordant as opposed to 
discordant content due to a variety of possible media choices (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Hong & 
Kim, 2016; Lee et al., 2018; Sturgis et al., 2014). The choices of concordant content crystallise 
participants opinions towards their original perspectives and inclinations through what is 
referred to as reinforcement effects (Lee & Xenos, 2019). Consuming concordant information 
is also linked to the concept of cognitive dissonance where individuals avoid conflicting 
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information, beliefs, and views due to mental discomfort (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Rossini & 
Stromer-Galley, 2019; Stroud, 2010; Weeks et al., 2017).  
Cognitive dissonance suggests that people proactively select information sources 
consistent with their existing ideological predisposition to reduce mental discomfort and 
restore cognitive balance (Kim, 2015; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2010; Weeks et 
al., 2017; Wicks et al., 2014). This selection is significantly based on what participants feel or 
think is personally important to them. Selective exposure is often associated with narrow 
scopes of deliberation and discourse shaped by the group ideologies (Conroy et al., 2012). 
Various factors broaden or constrain the opportunity for exposure to divergent viewpoints in 
SNSs deliberation (Feezell et al., 2012). Selective exposure to homogeneous viewpoints is 
particularly common among groups who value their group identity (Vesnic-alujevic, 2012). 
Most polarised societies tend to be characterised by deeply fractionalised identity politics 
among heterogeneous groups (Esteban & Ray, 2007).  
However, SNSs facilitate the integration of homogeneous participants who can avoid 
cross-ideological interactions (Hoffman et al., 2013). SNSs platforms provide greater 
opportunity for individuals to cater for their choices and preferences (Hutchings et al., 2008). 
Homogeneous SNSs networks are likely to experience minimal exposure to ideological 
diversity and can become more polarised (Min, 2010). In SNSs platforms, selective exposure 
occurs because content is often presented sequentially as opposed to simultaneously. Some 
studies have alluded that selective exposure is also likely to reduce the quality of deliberations 
in SNSs platforms (Kim et al., 2015; Robertson et al., 2013). Such studies have linked 
heterogeneity of viewpoints to the quality of deliberations. The chances of practicing selective 
exposure is platform-dependent (Conroy et al., 2012; Hyun & Kim, 2015). Swickert et al., 
(2002) ranked various media platforms based on their tendency to promote selective exposure, 
and found that SNSs users enhance opportunities for selective exposure compared to 
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mainstream media. This happens for two reasons: SNSs enables exposure to a much wider 
variety of information sources and content which enlarge the pool of content to choose from. 
SNSs allows the users to exercise greater control of information through the use of various 
features and affordances (Binder et al., 2016; Eveland & Hively, 2009; Kim et al., 2015; Kim 
et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Merkel & Weiffen, 2012).  
Whereas participants tend to seek information consistent with their pre-existing 
ideological perspectives, they do not necessarily sacrifice their existing contacts or sources 
information of discordant (Binder et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2015; Kim, Hsu et al., 2013). Cross-
sharing of content between SNSs platforms and other digital technology platforms facilitate 
inadvertent exposure to diverse perspectives (Bimber & Copeland, 2013). Users of Facebook 
are more likely to share their content on WhatsApp groups and this enhances inadvertent 
exposure. The other assumption related to SNSs and selective exposure is that political 
orientation dictates the user’s SNSs connections. However, the use of SNSs leads to the 
gratification of diverse needs, including entertaining, socialising, information seeking, and self-
status seeking (Lee et al., 2014). The opportunity costs of entertainment gratification are higher 
than the exposure to discordant content. SNSs users will rarely shun their interaction with 
dissimilar others in SNSs platforms as an opportunity cost of entertainment. Further, SNSs 
users typically ignore opinions that contradict their beliefs but rarely block or unfriend sources 
of such content (Xenos et al., 2014).  
Selective exposure is not a common practice cross-cutting a broad socio-demographic 
spectrum (Brundidge, 2010; Lee etal., 2018). For instance, individuals with sophisticated 
political experience consume diverse content to either challenge or reinforce their existing 
knowledge and beliefs (Kahne et al., 2012; Miller & Krosnick, 2000). In contrasts, those who 
are most active in politics tend to display content selection which reflects their high level of 
polarisation (Binder et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2015; Kim, Hsu, et al., 2013). Although selective 
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exposure can discourage constructive deliberations, avoiding discordant content can produce 
other serious significant downsides that can affect the quality of deliberations (Kenski & 
Stroud, 2017; Ponder & Haridakis, 2015b, 2015a). Selective exposure is likely to limit the 
chances of issue-based consensus. This is because exposure to divergent opinions means 
participants are more likely to encounter and appreciate others’ legitimate rationales in relation 
to their own. Hence, they are also more likely to analyse and review their explanations (Kahne 
et al., 2012). Selective exposure, by contrast, is most likely to facilitate enclave deliberation 
leading to further fragmentation and polarisation.   
The link between selective exposure and the quality of deliberations is based on the 
argument that individuals are likely to achieve information selections based on their 
understanding and judgments about the quality of content. The argument is that individuals 
will generally prefer high-quality information over that which they consider as low quality. 
Therefore, individuals are likely to believe that concordant information is more credible and 
acceptable because of its higher quality (Garrett et al., 2013). Selective exposure is also linked 
to the quality of deliberations because strongly held views and positions are likely to motivate 
greater content selection and exposure than weaker ones. Selective exposure when coupled 
with selective avoidance can worsen the quality of deliberations (Stroud, 2018). This happens 
because individuals do not avoid contradictory positions and views with the same vigour and 
intensity with which they seek confirmatory views (Stroud, 2018).  
2.6.2 Echo-chambers and SNSs in Polarised Contexts 
Echo chambers occur when participants with the same perceptions, interests and views interact 
primarily within the spheres of their group (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Esteve & Valle, 2018; 
Garrett, 2009; Rao et al., 2016; Szab & Matuszewski, 2019; Tornberg, 2018; Vaccari et al., 
2016). Aided by SNSs algorithms, groups are increasingly choosing to interact in comfortable, 
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homogeneous spaces which are known as enclaves (Osatuyi, 2013). In enclave deliberations, 
participants choose to be exposed to content that is in-line with  their pre-existing views (Hong 
& Kim, 2016) while actively avoiding incongruent opinions (Weeks et al., 2017). Such 
behaviour firmly reinforces existing beliefs and viewpoints and can affect the quality of 
deliberations (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Sunstein, 2009). Echo chambers have been strongly 
linked to SNSs platforms because they can strengthen networking among fringe groups of 
people who share an ideology but are dispersed geographically  (Tornberg, 2018). 
SNSs can facilitate the formation of echo chambers through algorithmic filter bubbles 
which are technologically viable in most SNSs (Abdullah et al., 2016a; Bársony et al., 2019; 
Grönlund et al., 2017; Karpowitz et al., 2009; Maija, 2015). Algorithmic filtering personalises 
SNSs content using sophisticated search engines (Szab & Matuszewski, 2019). Algorithms 
provide SNSs users with content based on their previous online behaviour. The lack of cross-
cutting interactions is potentially dangerous in deliberative governance contexts. Nonetheless, 
the tendency to associate and engage with like-minded participants is a common cross-cultural 
phenomenon even in conventional offline groups (Colleoni et a., 2014; Esteve & Valle, 2018; 
Tornberg, 2018). Therefore, SNSs platforms enhance rather than instigate the convergence of 
those with homogeneous characteristics in echo chambers. 
The premise of the echo chamber concept, however, has been questioned by various 
scholars. One of its foundational tenets is the assumption that SNSs users play an extremely 
passive role in relation to information choice (Dubois & Blank, 2018). This passivity makes 
them vulnerable to the manipulative effects of algorithms. This oversimplifies the complex 
socio-psychological dynamics involved in information consumption in digital environments. 
SNSs can foster diversity and heterogeneity and at the same time, engender political uniformity 
and homogeneity (Rao et al., 2016). One cannot avoid contact with extremely incongruent 
content and still maintain objective perspectives or beliefs (Garrett, 2017). SNSs users are more 
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likely to read content shared by their friends even though incongruent with their political 
ideologies (Tornberg, 2018). This means that online social networks ultimately lead to the 
formation of weak ties which have been associated with exposure to heterogeneous content and 
goes against the idea of echo chambers (Barberá et al, 2015). Therefore, it can be argued that 
weak ties are inversely associated with echo chambers and vice versa. Despite the existence of 
ideological homogeneity in SNSs, the overall outcome of such platforms is the inadvertent 
exposure to heterogeneous content (Vaccari et al., 2016). 
Whereas people can exercise selective exposure to congruent content, this represents a 
small proportion of the aggregate online activities and general exposure (Colleoni et al., 2014). 
SNSs usage patterns and behaviours are complex and intricate and contextually determined 
(Koiranen et al., 2019). Moreover, measuring exposure to divergent ideas on one platform does 
not necessarily explain usage patterns on other platforms because of different affordances. 
Participants who regularly use political microblogs and blogs to access their content are the 
most likely to expose themselves to partisan echo chambers than those who use SNSs platforms 
(Szab & Matuszewski, 2019). Media diets and choices matter when determining echo chamber 
deliberations (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Matuszewski, 2019). Groups in echo-chambers are likely 
to consider their choices and perspectives as reasonable, adaptable, and mainstream (Pattie & 
Johnston, 2016). Consequently, they often find those holding alternative perspectives to be 
extreme zealots and wayward (Pattie & Johnston, 2016). Studies show that people do not mind 
accessing alternative perspectives as long as they are assured their congruent beliefs are well 
represented and supported (Evans, Fu, & Evans, 2018; Kahne et al., 2012). In the context of 
group deliberations, individuals deliberately access heterogeneous and discordant content to 
build on arguments against their opponents.  
The echo chamber effects are likely to lower the quality of deliberations when the 
homogeneity of the deliberation group significantly restricts the size of the argument pool 
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(Kahne et al., 2012). This is likely to enhance the circulation of the same views, thus leading 
to groupthink and polarisation. Individuals are more likely to share similar perspectives within 
the group to obtain the approval of other group members (Vicario et al., 2016). Some studies 
have also linked the echo chambers effect with factors that lower the quality of deliberations 
such as disinformation, misinformation, and stereotypes in SNSs platforms (Tornberg, 2018). 
When individuals exist in echo chambers, they are likely to experience network polarisation, 
where they are densely connected with each other within a group than they are with those 
outside their network (Dubois & Blank, 2018). Disinformation and misinformation are 
received with higher credibility among those in an echo chamber, especially when it is 
congruent with exiting beliefs and group ideology (Kahne et al., 2012). This has various 
implications for the Habermasian deliberative ideals such as tolerance and diversity for the out-
group. In polarised contexts, the homogeneity of information in echo chambers is likely to 
shape the formation of interpretive frames on contested issues or enhance collective identities 
that can negate consensus (Barbera, 2019). 
2.7 SNSs and Deliberative Governance in the Public Sphere 
The suitability of SNSs as a public sphere and its role in deliberative governance has been 
widely studied. SNSs enhances the co-creation and sharing of content (Li & Chan, 2017) which 
increase information reflection and elaboration in deliberation contexts (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 
2009). Co-creation and sharing of content also support the Habermasian ideals of rationality 
and evidence-based deliberations (Habermas, 2005). Rational arguments help participants 
make sense of complex governance information (Cho et al., 2009; Robertson et al., 2013; 
Wojcieszak et al., 2015). SNSs can encourage an enriched cross-network and interactive model 
(Zúñiga, (2013). They can facilitate a two-way symmetrical deliberation model between the 
governed and the governors in macro deliberative structures (Baogang, 2018; Ganuza & 
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Francés, 2012; Park et al., 2017a; Rosenbloom et al., 2017b). Fruitful deliberations in SNSs 
also depends on the level of trust and confidence between stakeholders, which has been found 
to be minimal in groups with weak ties (Kushin, et al., (2015).  
Deliberative governance requires information to be relevant, reliable, credible and 
sensitive to participants needs (Winter & Rathnayake, 2017). Instant dissemination of fake 
news and misinformation has drastically reduced the reliability and credibility of information 
in SNSs platforms (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Therefore, SNS information is treated with 
scepticism in macro deliberative structures. Regardless, fake news does not diminish the role 
of SNSs in enhancing connections with a large number of contacts (Tornberg, 2018). Further, 
SNSs can promote malicious misinformation and the spread of conspiracy theories in 
deliberative contexts (Barbera, 2019; Borges-tiago et al., 2018). The spread of fake news and 
conspiracy theories depends on the multiple channels afforded by SNSs platforms for a wider 
reach and larger effect (Lee et al., 2014). Despite the negative effects stated above, SNSs 
promote the construction and growth of group identities that can be important in establishing 
enclave spaces for deliberations (Arriagada et al., 2012). Enclave deliberations mean that 
disclosure of sensitive information can occur in an indirect, non-invasive manner in such SNSs 
platforms (Weir et al., 2011). Furthermore, deliberations in enclave spaces can happen without 
attracting the surveillance strategies of over-zealous state machinery. 
 Tanner et al, (2013) found the contribution of SNSs deliberations to be user-dependent. 
This is compounded by technologies’ ability to improve access to specific, timely and relevant 
information on a particular subject. The frequency and ease of accessing information via SNSs 
can significantly reduce the costs, inconvenience, and time associated with deliberations 
(Kenski & Stroud, 2017). However, this type of cost reduction argument is uni-dimensional 
and ignores the initial cost of buying smartphones and Internet connectivity  (Aktas et al., 
(2014); thus, underplaying the true costs of information access. The accessibility of digital 
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technologies challenges the Habermasian normative ideals of inclusivity, as SNSs platforms 
further empower those with pre-existing advantages of access (Head, 2007, Kahne & Bowyer, 
2018; Lim, 2009). SNSs deliberations can correct conflicting viewpoints (Robertson et al., 
(2013). Sometimes, the confluence of conflicting opinions leaves users more confused and in 
a dilemma (Ellison et al., 2007). The deliberation on governance issues demands a relatively 
deep level of cognitive involvement which some SNSs users may not readily possess. 
Encountering discordant views and opinions creates an information filtering mechanism where 
users ignore discordant information. Information filtering is a subjective process that is 
dependent on selective exposure and confirmation bias (Gustafsson, 2012; Park, 2015; 
Theocharis & Lowe, 2016). Information filtered through trusted others does not always have a 
positive influence in a deliberative context (Ljepava et al., 2013).  
SNSs are significantly instrumental in facilitating fluid and sustained participation in 
deliberative governance (Arriagada et al., 2012). They extend deliberations beyond actual 
physical forums and help to overcome geographical barriers that limit reach and accessibility 
(Kim et al., 2015). Whilst SNSs has significantly lowered engagement costs; this has not 
necessarily translated to higher participation in deliberations (García-cabot et al., 2016; 
Robertson et al., 2013; Stein et al., 2008). SNSs deliberations enable governance activists to 
coordinate deliberations more effectively (Newton, 2016). Deliberative governance is further 
enhanced by SNSs capacity to transmit both visual, image, and textual discussion (Winter & 
Rathnayake, 2017).  
2.8 Conclusion 
Deliberation governance is the contestation of governance discourses in the public sphere. The 
Kenyan constitution considers deliberative governance as a prescriptive solution to polarisation 
in Kenya. However, the outcomes of a deliberative governance process depend on the 
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platform’s structure and the quality of deliberations. The deliberative structure can be classified 
as either micro and macro. In micro deliberative structures, the discussion is more structured 
and happens in informal forums, involve small to medium groups, and aim to achieve 
consensus and decision making. In contrast, macro deliberative structures entail a broader scale 
and scope of deliberation that mostly happens in informal contexts, otherwise known as public 
spheres. Discussions are informal, involve many participants and aimed to shape public 
opinions. Whether in micro or macro deliberative structures, deliberations in both platforms 
can affect polarisation. For instance, scholars have established a positive correlation between 
the group size and consensus in deliberations (Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011). 
           The quality of deliberations is also defined by adherence to a group’s deliberative norms. 
Deliberative norms are informal guidelines of behaviour and the agreed code of conduct that 
ensures orderliness in group discussions for better outcomes. Deliberative norms are derived 
from the Habermasian deliberative ideals and include diversity, inclusivity, tolerance, civility, 
moderation, and heterogeneity of viewpoints (Habermas, 1996, 2003, 2005). Various scholars 
have established that deliberation in SNSs platforms falls short of the Habermasian deliberative 
ideals. Indeed, deliberations in SNSs platforms have often been characterised by incivility, 
intolerance, disinformation, and partisan discussions. For instance, incivility significantly 
reduces the possibility of compromise and thereby enhance the chances of group polarisation 
and intergroup hostility. Regular exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints subsequently 
moderates and possibly alters a group’s position on critical governance matters. Exposure to 
heterogeneous viewpoints and its impact on polarisation is the basis of selective exposure and 
echo chamber theories. 
However, some studies focusing on specific SNSs platforms argue that the 
Habermasian normative ideals reflect an unrealistic expectation in contemporary deliberative 
contexts. Their negative perspective is based on the expectations that citizens will be rational, 
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reciprocate, and respectful with heterogeneous others is problematic and unrealistic in already 
polarised contexts. Further, the expectation that deliberations in SNSs platforms will reflect 
moderated opinions and rational discourse is also entirely incompatible with three factors: the 
nature and history of polarising issues, structural diversities of most societies, and the SNSs 
affordances. Existing research on the Habermasian ideals fails to take into account the fact that 
SNSs are dynamic platforms. They can be heterogeneous or homogeneous, informal or formal, 
and asynchronous or synchronous. The above SNSs features are compounded by the context 
of deliberations and the nature of group formation especially in online platforms. Group 
formation and polarisation can be understood through divergent individual, group, and societal 
level perspectives. Therefore, group polarisation is a cognitive concept reflected by attitudinal 
polarisation, perceptual polarisation, and as affective polarisation. 
Group polarisation is a phenomenon where members of a deliberating group move 
toward a more extreme point in the direction of the members’ pre-deliberation positions. Based 
on existing research, the chapter established seven key indicators of polarisation: binary 
thinking, where group participants favour an ‘us versus them’ position in WhatsApp 
deliberations; motivated reasoning, where group participants only appreciate evidence that 
supports their position during deliberations; in-group favouritism and out-group 
discrimination, where the in-group’s participants favour those with similar viewpoints and 
positions and disagree with out-group regardless of the facts; confirmatory bias, disagreeing 
with other participants for oppositional reasons despite existing basic facts and evidence; 
partisanship, an inclination to staunchly support and favour a group’s viewpoint and opinion 
over alternatives; social comparison, group participants compare and take certain positions 
because they want to be perceived favourably by other group members; and groupthink, where 




Polarisation and Deliberative Governance in Kenya 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the history, evolution, and challenges of polarisation and deliberative 
governance in Kenya. A brief history and background of polarisation in Kenya indicate that 
colonial administrative tactics, such as divide and rule, exacerbated the level of ethnic 
polarisation that existed before. After the British left, post-colonial Kenya’s political elite 
continued to tackle the challenges of polarisation through initiatives that aimed to manage the 
structural diversity of the fragile nation. Structural diversity in Kenya includes: ethnic, 
religious, ideological, regional, and socio-demographic differences that are part of a complex 
socio-cultural composition of Kenyan peoples. This chapter focuses on the legislative and 
administrative initiatives that were used to tackle polarisation right from independence. 
However, the majority of these initiatives failed for various reasons including: low funding, 
bad politicking, and resource mismanagement. Ultimately, the issues that had caused decades 
of social discontent, political antagonism, and deep polarisation since independence flared up 
just after the 2007/8 general election. The result was post-election violence (more than 1000 
people died) that caused the nation to seek lasting solutions through a constitutional review 
process. The result was the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010 which prescribed 
devolution of power and deliberative governance via media platforms as key solutions to 
depolarisation. The chapter analyses this constitutional plan and how far it has made an impact 
on polarisation via deliberation and devolution especially at the county level. The specific focus 
of the chapter is on the 2010 constitutional clauses and the County Government legislative Acts 
of 2012 that highlight the role of the media, both mainstream and social media, to ameliorate 
the state of polarisation in Kenya. 
85 
 
3.1 Background and History of Polarisation in Kenya 
The history of polarisation in Kenya starts with an understanding of the ethno-political context 
of the post-colonial African state. The Berlin Conference of 18846 resulted in the creation of 
indiscriminate state boundaries that artificially unified diverse, non-cohesive, ethnic 
communities and cultures within singular state boundaries (Craven, 2015). This happened 
despite the complex socio-ethnic composition, political makeup (Gustafson, 1995), varied 
cultural beliefs and minimal potential for cohesion and co-existence (Mukhongo, 2015). The 
catastrophic result of this process meant that already highly polarised communities had to work 
in predefined political spaces, making it difficult to achieve the elusive concept of a united 
nation-state (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006; Kiarie, 2004). The Berlin Conference paved the way 
for European powers like Britain to divide, explore, conquer and manage territories without a 
good understanding of the socio-cultural, political and economic dynamics of the native 
communities.  
 Most studies that have explored the origin of polarisation and conflicts in Kenya have 
employed grievance-based models, which emphasise political, social, and economic 
deprivation or discrimination as the main sources (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009; Ogude, 2002; 
Snow & Taylor, 2015; Whitaker & Giersch, 2009). Often ignored are the differences in the 
style of colonial administration enforced by imperial nations and its effects on structural 
diversity and post-colonial conflicts. Colonial policies, like the ‘divide and rule’ policy7 as 
enforced by the British in Kenya, had already further influenced the conceptual understanding 
of heterogeneity and polarisation of ethno-political identities (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006). 
Effectively, Makinda (1996) notes that the divide and rule policy slowed down the 
establishment of a national liberation movement towards Kenya’s independence. Also, the 
                                                          
6 The Berlin Conference happened between the years 1884–1885. It is also called the scramble and partition of Africa 
because the major European powers divided and formalised the claims over African territory. 
7 Divide and rule is a policy of maintaining control over one's subjects or opponents by promoting dissent between them, and 
ensuring they do not unite in opposition. 
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colonial administrative structure was designed to minimise inter-ethnic collaborations and 
ensure reduced inter-ethnic interaction (Boone, 2012; Steeves, 2011). Kenya, therefore, 
approached independence with communities characterised by fractured political inclinations 
and fragmented social-ethnic identities (Snow & Taylor, 2015).  
During independence, socio-political polarisation resulted in the formation of two main 
political parties (KANU and KADU) with different ideological principles (Steeves, 2011). One 
of the key points of divergence between the two parties was around the devolution of powers 
and decentralisation of decision making (Boone, 2012). Specifically, the issue revolved around 
whether to abolish or retain the colonial centralist state structures to support national unity. 
KADU propagated the Majimbo8 system which emphasised de-centralisation and devolution 
(Anderson, 2005; Gerhart, 1994; Kanyinga, 2014). It further advocated the recognition of 
regional diversities to promote a feeling of inclusion in the young fledgling post-independent 
Kenya. KANU, on the other hand, argued for a unified, centralised nation-state (Anderson, 
2005; Gerhart, 1994; Kanyinga, 2014). After winning the first post-independence general 
elections, KANU’s practices and administrative structure enhanced existing regional cleavages 
(Anderson, 2005). Furthermore, KANU’s approach to resource governance and politically 
instigated policies exacerbated ethnic exclusion (Ajulu, 2010). Essentially, the political elite 
enriched their ethnic communities and oppressed political opponents (Mutahi & Kimari, 2017).  
The centralised system of government, aggravated by the personalisation and misuse of 
presidential powers, orchestrated state plunder and low resource governance (Anderson, 2005; 
Cottrel-ghai et al., 2013; Lynch, 2014; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). It also enhanced a culture of 
impunity where political elites sabotaged efforts towards transparency and accountability. Such 
actions further deepened socio-ethnic polarisation. Centralisation strengthened the 
misconception that presidential powers constituted the singular way communities could access 
                                                          
8 Majimbo is a swahili word that refers to the process of political decentralisation and devolution of power. 
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state resources and other state-afforded benefits (Lynch, 2014). Right from independence, 
Kenya’s political elite have consistently exploited exclusionary ethnic tactics. They have also 
occasionally deployed divisive political rhetoric leading to violent displacement of people to 
reshape electoral geography. This has occurred especially around elections campaign periods 
(1992, 1997, 2007/8) (Berg-Schlosser, 2017; Khadiagala, 2017; Long et al., 2013). Mueller 
(2008) notes that the ideological perception that some ethnic communities are consistently 
dominant in politics and benefit from resource distribution has threatened Kenya’s social fabric 
since independence.  
Meanwhile, marginalised communities in Kenya continue to confront acute poverty, 
and widespread inequalities since independence (Kanyinga, 2014). Perennially, most of such 
communities have experienced a resurgence of ethno-nationalism ahead of every election 
cycle, hoping their own political elites will ascend to power (Whitaker & Giersch, 2009). 
Kenya’s political elite are fragmented and have resorted to populism, propaganda, and 
manipulation of genuine economic grievances (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). They have also 
used enduring historical injustices and disaffection to fuel discontent and win the vote of the 
lower demographics within their ethnic communities (Kanyinga, 2014). A number of 
legislative and administrative initiatives have been implemented to try and remedy polarisation 
in Kenya since independence (see the section below). Following the failure of these remedial 
initiatives, a rationale for recognising, accommodating and appreciating socio-political 
differences and ethnic diversity was much needed. It was considered a panacea for dealing with 
underlying social grievances, ethnic polarisation, and political tensions driving conflict (Ghai, 
2008). The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) reported a widespread feeling 
of marginalisation and victimisation among various ethnic communities (Carrier & Kochore, 
2014), which was attributed to political affiliation and unjust deprivation of resources due to 
low governance structures (Muriu, 2014).  
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One of the principal objectives of the 2010 constitution was to recognise and appreciate 
Kenyan diversity by devolving and decentralising government services (Carrier & Kochore, 
2014; Cornell & D’Arcy, 2014; Ghai, 2008). The 2010 constitution sought to substantially 
remodel the structure of government and thereby reduce the concentration of power and 
resources in the executive presidency. The aim was to distribute the patronage power by the 
executive presidency and end the all-or-nothing contexts for national leadership that had 
contributed to violent elections in the past. Since the adoption of the constitution in 2010, two 
general elections have been held under the administrative structures, constitutional institutions 
and a devolved system.  
Despite the constitutional dispensation, polarised factions and uncompromising 
political blocs have emerged yet again. These factions have resulted from a political, resource, 
and ideological contestation (Nizam & Muriu, 2015). Like before, the political factions were 
structured as temporary political outfits having a form of unity but disguising their real 
intention to merely achieve electoral victory (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). In both elections (2013 
and 2017), however, there has been tensions but no violence. Following the irregularities and 
annulment of election results by the Supreme Court in 2017, wider disenchantment and divides 
were also witnessed (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). Considering its prescription as part of the 
solutions to polarisation in Kenya, it is interesting to note that various reports blamed SNSs for 
exacerbating and intensifying polarisation in a way that undermined electoral integrity (Mutahi 
& Kimari, 2017). 
3.2 Structural Diversity and Polarisation in Kenya 
As noted in the section above, polarisation has been a constant feature of Kenya’s governance 
and political architecture, whereby regional, ideological, ethnic, and other forms of identity 
strongly influence responses to social, economic, and political issues. Evidently, one of 
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Kenya’s challenges to achieving depolarisation can be explained through the failure to manage 
structural diversity over the past few decades. The level of polarisation in Kenyan society is 
influenced by the constantly changing dynamics of ethnic, religious, regional, and ideological 
diversity. This section examines how the interplay between the country’s structural diversity, 
identity politics, and low governance have impeded efforts towards national cohesion and 
integration.  
3.2.1. Structural Diversity of Kenyan Society 
Kenyan society consists of  loosely integrated multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious and 
multi-racial communities (Kiarie, 2004). The structural diversity of Kenyan society can be 
argued to consists of: ethnic, religious, socio-demographic, regional, and ideological forms of 
diversity. All these forms of diversity are critical in the contextual understanding of polarisation 
in Kenya. First, ethnicity describes all the aspects associated with a culturally constructed 
notion of group identity (Obala & Mattingly, 2014). It is the way in which the cultural and 
social aspects of a society intersect with one another through the interaction of distinct ethnic 
groups (Bedasso, 2015). Ethnic diversity in Kenya has very serious implications for 
governance and democracy. One consistent challenge is how to combine the majority rule and 
still accommodate minority rights in such a pluralistic society (Ogude, 2002). This challenge 
is compounded by the primordial understandings of ethnicity as a means of achieving 
difference, advantages or exclusivity, for social and political expediency is common in Kenya. 
The instrumentalisation of ethnic identity as the primary means of political mobilisation is an 
inescapable fact of Kenya’s socio-political dynamics (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). This has 
resulted in what is referred to as politicised ethnicity and it describes the deliberate 
politicisation and mobilisation of ethnic identities to achieve certain economic and political 
objectives (Ajulu, 2010; Klopp, 2002; Ogude, 2002). 
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The diverse ethnic groups in Kenya can be categorised into three main ethno-linguistic 
and cultural groupings, namely, Cushitic-speaking, Bantu-speaking, and Nilotic-speaking 
groups. They not only speak different dialects and languages but also occupy diverse 
geographical/ecological zones (CRECO, 2012; Kanyinga, 2014; Makoloo, 2005; Ombaka, 
2015). There are 42 ethnic communities based on the three main ethno-linguistic and cultural 
groupings. Out of 42 ethnicities in Kenya, only five are considered dominant based on their 
total share of the entire national population. Based on the 2019 population census, the major 
ethnic groups whose individual share of national population exceeds 10% are the Kikuyu 
(22%), Luhya (14%), Kalenjin (12%), Luo (13%), and Kamba (11%) (Kenya National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2019). Their combined share of the national population exceeds 64%. Therefore, 
the absence of a single numerically dominant group, and the relative equality in size of the five 
main ethnic tribes is the source of ethnic politicisation in Kenya (Nyaura, 2018).  
In view of five tribes with near equal numerical strength, ethnic diversity enforces 
strong ties within, rather than among, groups, where the dominance of one group is achieved 
over others (Sahle, 2012). However, some ethnic communities consist of several sub-groups 
(for example the Kalenjins have nine subgroups) which further complicates the elements of 
ethnic diversity (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). As earlier noted, ethnic 
dominance is achieved through the numerical strength of one ethnic community over the other. 
Politicised ethnicity, therefore, drives party coalitions and power sharing agreements (see the 
section below). The challenge with ethnicity in a polarised context like Kenya is the danger of 
collapsing negative issues regarding people’s identity and diversity using highly atrophied and 
simplistic notions without considering a whole range of contextually specific issues (Cottrel-
Ghai et al., 2012; Gerhart, 1994; Omulo & Williams, 2018). 
Understanding these dynamics, political elites in Kenya tend to mobilise and campaign 
for political support based on an ethnic identity (Kabiri, 2014). Ethnic identity defines how and 
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why the political elite seek, retain, or cede political power (Ajulu, 2010; Carrier & Kochore, 
2014). Ethnic voting is also linked to the ethnic composition of political parties ranging from 
party leaders to the grassroots members. Therefore, political ethnicisation and its consequences 
on polarisation in Kenya are the result of a very complex and interconnected host of factors 
including: colonial policies and practices, post-independence political practices, and historical 
experiences and grievances (Ajulu, 2010; Carrier & Kochore, 2014; Khadiagala, 2017; Klopp, 
2002; Omulo & Williams, 2018). Other factors include the centralisation of executive powers, 
lack of coherent party ideologies, and the lack of strong institutions including electoral bodies 
(Leighley & Vedlitz, 2017). Some of these factors can be categorised as institutional, historical, 
administrative, political, and social in nature and are further explored in the sections below.  
The second aspect of structural diversity that coincides with ethnic diversity relates to 
regional disparities (Ogude, 2002). Regional boundaries coincide with ethnic settlement 
patterns that determine resource allocation formulas as required by the constitution. Ethnically 
marginalised and lowly developed regions blame post-independence governments for neglect 
and being underfunded (Kanyinga, 2014). After independence, ethnicity was viewed in the 
context of regionalism. This is why devolution (also known as Majimbo) was among the first 
proposed initiatives to dissolve power from the two dominant communities at the time: The 
Kikuyu and Luo communities. The unequal distribution of state resources created infrastructure 
inequalities and generated resentment across marginalised ethnic areas (Kabiri, 2014). This 
intensified polarisation and conflicts because access to and control of political power was 
viewed to directly influence access to state resources (Nyaura, 2018). Since independence, 
some regions in Kenya continue to suffer due to unbalanced regional, economic and social 
development (Burgess et al., 2015). Despite various policy interventions, the government has 
failed to reverse the discriminatory and divisive effects of colonial policies that had privileged 
one region over another and widened the disparities and imbalances between regions. After 
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decades of experimenting with different socio-economic policies, regional disparities and 
imbalances represent one possible cause of polarisation and conflict. 
It is not a coincidence that the regions with the lowest proportion of the population 
living below the poverty line are Central Kenya and the Rift Valley provinces. The two leading 
provinces, in terms of affluence, are among the largest ethnic populations proportionate to the 
national population and have always been represented in political leadership since 
independence (Leighley & Vedlitz, 2017; Omulo & Williams, 2018). Another form of regional 
disparity is between urban and rural areas where those living in rural areas experience 
comparatively minimal resource allocation and higher rates of poverty. In the 2007/8 election, 
Kenya experienced post-election violence which was predicated on extremely weak institutions 
and ethnicised resource governance (Atanda & Iyi, 2011; Finkel et al., 2012). While the 2010 
constitution established radical changes in resource governance and granted more voice to 
marginalised communities through deliberations and participation in the devolved system, it 
also creates new avenues with a possibility of deeper marginalisation and disparities in the new 
county structures (see the section below). For example, the establishment of political and 
administrative units is still driven by population sizes. Hence, county allocation of revenues 
depends on population-based formulas and calculations (CRECO, 2014; Kanyinga, 2014; Lind, 
2018). Equity dictates that larger populations should access comparatively more resources. 
Popularly christened as ‘tyranny of numbers’, majoritarianism is problematically transferred to 
the architecture of resource governance (Cunningham, 2002; Harper, 2017; MCK, 2015). 
The combination of ethnic and regional disparities in Kenya can be explained from a 
number of perspectives: geography-based explanation which attributes regional disparities to 
the migratory patterns of various ethnic communities. It states that the differences in economics 
and the resulting resource endowment are because of the regions where the ethnic group settled 
(Robinson & Berkes, 2011). Region of settlement influenced resource availability, economic 
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activity, climatic conditions and capitalist penetration. The class-based explanation which 
argues that wealthy participants and communities have dominated politics and resource 
governance since independence (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). This dominance has skewed the 
distribution of resources in favour of areas whose populations dominate leadership positions at 
any given point. Another explanation relates to access to public services and social amenities 
such as education, infrastructure, and health care provided by the state. As earlier discussed, 
such resources and public services have been controlled by specific dominant communities 
since independence as well (Gerhart, 1994; Halakhe, 2013; Mbithi, Ndambuki, & Juma, 2018). 
This is interlinked to the struggle to control the state, government, and other constitutional 
institutions through discriminatory and exclusionary policies (Speich, 2009).  
The third form of structural diversity is ideological and reflects systems of belief, 
political programmes, and specific objectives adopted with the purpose of legitimising social 
and political action (Kanyinga, 2014). Unlike the highly categorised and defined ideological 
party systems in the US and the UK, Kenya’s political parties are more fragmented by ethnic 
affiliation than by political ideologies (Ogude, 2002). However, Kenyan parties are essentially 
personalised political outfits devoid of a coherent governance ideology, independent structures 
or internal democracy. While few parties are able to articulate their party positions on various 
issues, most engage in divisive and banal politics that basically further fragment and polarise 
the society to achieve popularity (Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2012). Incoherent party ideology is 
considered the reason why ethnic mobilisation remains the default approach during elections 
(Carrier & Kochore, 2014; Ohman & Lintari, 2015). Some scholars, however, argue that the 
fluidity of Kenya’s political alliances and the lack of coherent ideological positions prevents 
the emergence of a stable balance of forces, thus leading to polarisation (Ishiyama et al., 2016; 
Obala & Mattingly, 2014).  
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There are various political, and governance issues that have polarised Kenyans into 
ideological factions in the past decade. The constitutional review process in itself was 
polarising because of contentious issues like abortion, the administrative structures of 
government, Kadhi courts,9 resource governance, place of party coalitions, and review of 
county boundaries all of which reflected deep-seated ideological divergence (Carrier & 
Kochore, 2014; Cornell & D’Arcy, 2014; Hassan, 2015; Kanyinga, 2014; Ohman & Lintari, 
2015; Steeves, 2011). Periodic elections are equally polarised and heavily contested every five 
years with repetitively volatile consequences. In the past, dialogue has strategically resolved 
inter-community conflicts and achieved stability before and after elections. Therefore, 
commentators have suggested the solution to political, tribal, economic, and religious 
animosity, is  honest, open, and reflective national dialogue and deliberations between citizens, 
communities and the political leadership (Benesch, 2014; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Long et al., 
2013). Deliberations were thus considered a solution to curbing negative ethnicity, promoting 
accountability, empowering communities, and fostering patriotism.  
The last form of structural diversity in Kenya reflects its religious composition with 
83% of the population being Christian (Protestant 47.7%, Catholic 23.4%, and other Christian 
11.9%,), 11.2% Muslim, 1.7% African traditional religions, while the rest are unspecified 
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Kenya’s Muslim community, being in the 
minority, has long claimed socio-political and economic discrimination by Christian-
dominated governments since independence. Whereas a clear separation between 
church/religion and state exists, according to the constitution, religion drives polarisation when 
differing religious positions are directly tied to competing political interests (Kimani et al., 
2013; Kjær, 2014; Whitaker & Giersch, 2009). Moreover, religious identities in Kenya have 
become significant and effective platforms from which to achieve ideological mobilisation 
                                                          
9 Kadhi's courts are a form of court systems in Kenya that enforce specific limited rights of family, inheritance, and succession 
among the Muslims communities. 
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which permeates secular and political contestations and conflicts. Religious groups and 
organisations such as SUPKEM and NCCK10 can enter into the political arena either to 
advocate for collective religious values or to defend their unique, temporal interests, thus 
generating polarisation in the process (Kimani et al., 2013; Kjær, 2014). 
Despite the diverse religious identities in Kenya and the appearance of neutrality, it 
seems that the government grants more attention to the mainline Christian churches and 
specific brotherhoods of Islam to drive national discourse (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). 
Minority religious identities appear to be subordinated which is a recipe for polarisation and 
potentially violent sectarian confrontations. In theory, the constitution demands that bodies 
including political parties reflect a national character; it outlaws the formation of social 
associations, and political parties on the basis of language, religion, or race (Kimani et al., 
2013). Yet, despite efforts towards inclusivity, differing religious beliefs, ideologies, and 
influence have permeated every aspect of political thinking to the extent that it was viewed 
negatively in the truth, justice and reconciliation commission report recommendations of 2013.  
3.2.2. Impact of Structural Diversity and Polarisation in Kenya 
There are different ways in which Kenyan structural diversities, are linked to the various forms 
of polarisation mentioned in Chapter 2 (affective, attitudinal, ideological and group 
polarisation). First, structural diversity is likely to deepen the level of affective polarisation, 
which in turn, strengthens ethnic tendencies where the loyalty to in-group results in conflict 
and antagonism towards the out-groups. Affective polarisation in Kenya is characterised by 
accumulated rifts that reflect deeply unresolved social, political, and historical issues. These 
issues are often revived and constantly reused to arouse polarised feeling around issues that are 
pertinent during electioneering periods. Affective polarisation is, therefore, highly likely 
                                                          
10 NCCK, meaning the National Council of Churches of Kenya is a fellowship of Protestant churches and Christian 
organisations registered in Kenya. 
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during party coalition formations when the diverse nature of intergroup party dynamics plays 
out because party members are loyal to their in-group (Kanyinga, 2014). Ironically, party 
alliances and coalitions were initially thought to aggregate ethnic inclusivity, enhance broad 
representation, and achieve depolarisation (Khadiagala, 2017; Lynch, 2014). Affective 
polarisation in Kenyan parties arose from variegated movements and coalitions that reflected 
deep ethnic and regional divisions. This legacy has not disappeared in the era of competitive 
multi-party politics inaugurated in the early 1990s (Khadiagala, 2017). These coalitions have 
arrested the evolution of parties along more coherent, predictable and institutional lines. 
Instead of coalescing around common principles and ideals to boost their 
competitiveness, Kenyan parties are affectively polarised opportunistic machines for ethnic 
alliance and coalition building, a process that frequently engenders instability rather than 
predictability in political competition (Kramon & Posner, 2011; Mueller, 2008; Onyebadi, 
2012). Affective polarisation in Kenya is also more likely to be driven more by cultural identity 
dynamics than by ideological issues. During electioneering periods, the media often creates a 
perception of affective polarisation when it makes reference to a ‘two-horse-race’ to describe 
fiercely contested elections between parties (Kasara, 2013). While such descriptions heighten 
the stakes for participants, the fluidity of political coalitions in Kenya prevents the emergence 
of a stable and strong balance of forces on both sides of a polarising boundary. Considering 
that elections in Kenya are, to a large extent, driven by personalities, the ethnic and ideological 
differences between political elite affect the citizens’ affective orientations toward them. 
Secondly, the fierce competition for state resources means that democratic processes 
like voting in a structurally diverse context translate into zero-sum perceptions (Cornell & 
D’Arcy, 2014; Ghai, 2008; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). Perception of politics and governance as 
zero-sum contests increases the social distance and enhances group polarisation. This was 
evident during the 2007/2008 mediations leading to the power sharing agreement in 
97 
 
government (Obel Hansen, 2013). Achieving a negotiated deal during the negotiations was 
challenging because of hard-line positions between Party of National Unity (PNU) and Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM). Group polarisation driven by an ethnic perspective is 
perpetrated by a struggle to adopt a colonially imposed socio-political configuration of 
nationhood that instead yields factionalism (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). The contests 
between ethnic and religious groups in some counties decreases the willingness to cooperate, 
concede, and compromise with the political out-group (Schreiber, 2016). The place of 
deliberations with a possibility of consensus in such scenarios is often missing and can lead to 
actual conflict. Proponents of devolution in Kenya have argued that it will promote ethnic peace 
by removing the zero-sum nature of resource distribution and national electoral contests (Ajulu, 
2010; Kramon & Posner, 2011; Mueller, 2008). In contrast, devolution simply shifts the locus 
of resource governance, political competition, and ethnic conflict to local levels (Nyaura, 
2018). In Kenya, attitudinal and ideological polarisation due to structural diversity can frustrate 
technical exercises such as population censuses. Inclusion of various aspects of structural 
diversity such as people’s ethnicity and religion often ignite contested census results due to 
claims of biased enumeration (Amutabi, 2013).  
Thirdly, attitudinal polarising rhetoric centred on ‘us versus them’ leads to alignment 
of group interests around one critical social cleavage. This form of attitudinal and group 
polarisation suppresses and reduces the place and importance of other structural diversities and 
cross-cutting cleavages. For instance, Cottrel-Ghai et al., (2013), making reference to the 
2007/2008 post-election violence, argued that the ethnic diversity at the time emphasised 
attitudes related to cross-cutting differences. Such emphasis reinforced a multiplicity of 
differences whereby ethnic groups increasingly perceived politics through positions of the in-
group and out-group. In Kenya, ethnicity provides the simplest foundation for attitudinal 
divergence and the construction of in-group and out-group identities. Such attitudinal 
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polarisation means that conflicts based on structural diversity, especially relating to ethnicity, 
state resources, and political power, are often seen as unbridgeable scenarios, as exemplified 
in Bungoma, Wajir, and Mandera counties (Khadiagala, 2017). ‘It is our turn to eat’ is a 
common in-group slogan that reflects the attitudinal polarisation of ethnic groups who coalesce 
to achieve control over resources and political power (Hassan, 2015; Kanyinga, 2014; 
Lieberman., 2014). Attitudinal polarisation in Kenya is also evident in some of the stereotypes 
that exploit negative ethnic and religious characterisation of differences in society to enhance 
a perceptive split on key issues. These stereotypes were used to drive sensationalist rumours 
and narratives that perpetrated ethnic conflicts in counties like Nakuru, Eldoret, and Kericho 
during the 1992,1997, and 2007/8 campaigns (Omulo & Williams, 2018). 
In sum, all these forms of polarisation have diverse effects on the management of 
Kenya’s structural diversity. For instance, ideological and group polarisation in Kenya 
threatens the governability of ethnically diverse regions and the state of cohesion in these areas. 
According to Tiyambe (2010), politically motivated exclusion of marginalised ethnic 
communities from state-sanctioned development inevitably drives discontent, polarisation, and 
the potential for real conflict. Ethnicity translates into unhealthy inter-community competition 
in governance and politics (Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2013). Holmquist & Oendo (2001) support this 
observation. These circumstances are often compounded by structural and systemic processes 
and policies targeting entire communities for discrimination by the state (Ombaka, 2015). It is 
worsened through economic exclusion, political isolation and attendant social injustices 
(Omolo, 2015). Eventually, indigenous and minority groups become bitter and negatively 
impacted by the tide of persistent and systematic exclusionary politics (Sheely, 2015). The 
Ogiek community, for instance, is comparatively less developed and involved in governance 
due to systematic exclusion (Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2013). Some ethnic groups like the Oromo, 
Rendile, and Ogiek have always lacked a single representative at any level of governance due 
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to numerical disadvantages (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). Some scholars argue that Kenya is not 
polarised because of diverse ethnic groupings, rather it is divided because different ethnic 
communities relate differently to the state’s natural and productive resources (Miguel & 
Gugerty, 2005). 
3.3. Managing Structural Diversity and Polarisation in Kenya 
The state has adopted and implemented various legislative and administrative initiatives to 
manage structural diversity and achieve depolarisation in Kenya. These are categorised into 
two types: post-independence legislative and administrative initiatives, and the constitutional 
review process, 2010. Considering that structural diversity and polarisation have made Kenya’s 
budding democracy very fragile (Ghai et al., 2013), post-independence legislative and 
administrative initiatives have achieved diverse outcomes. The key characteristic that cuts 
across these remedial initiatives is their aim to achieve inclusivity and enhance citizen 
deliberations. The failure of various post-independence initiatives culminated in the 
constitutional review process in 2010. In some ways, the constitution drew on the experiences 
of previous initiatives and integrated them into a more solid legislative foundation that was less  
easy for the political elite to manipulate. However, it is unclear whether the structures and 
processes established through the constitution have succeeded in achieving depolarisation a 
decade later. 
3.3.1. Legislative and Administrative Initiatives 
Deliberative governance has undergone significant  evolution as a critical concept in public 
administration in post-independence Kenya. Legislative and administrative efforts towards 
inclusive deliberation were driven by the utility and applicability of deliberation as an 
alternative method for dispute resolution, conflict management, and depolarisation (Willis & 
Chome, 2014). The Kenyan government and various international-donor funded organisations 
100 
 
have progressively introduced various kinds of deliberative governance over the past three 
decades. This trend is partly a response to the increasing demands for transparency and 
accountability in resource management (Sahle, 2012), due to corruption and the progressively 
declining trust in government and governance institutions (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012). Other 
significant drivers of deliberation include heightened awareness and literacy rates, information 
flow, and interaction through social media in Kenya’s contemporary communities who demand 
meaningful involvement in policy decisions that affect them (Wampler & McNulty, 2011).  
Noting the contested nature of elections in Kenya, some rightly argue that periodic 
voting, (every five years), is grossly insufficient to guarantee the election of leaders who will 
implement policies that will drive national cohesion and lead to depolarisation (Long et al., 
2013). Doubts exist relating to the interests of elected political elites and the extent to which 
they represent the public interest. Apart from being hotly contested, periodic elections in Kenya 
rely on the aggregation of pre-determined preferences as opposed to deliberated and collective 
decisions (Lind & Howell, 2010). Similarly, Kenya’s political elite and key decision makers 
have become increasingly aware of the advantages of guided public debate in micro 
deliberative structures (World Bank, 2015). Some governance institutions are equally 
mandated to draw from various experiences and information from public knowledge as part of 
their mandate in polity formation. Furthermore, the push for public deliberation in policy is 
supported by incremental reform in public management agendas that emphasise the place of 
‘service users’’ involvement in the case of public goods (Hassan, 2015; Lind, 2018; Mbithi et 
al., 2018); the constitutional review process is a good example (see the section below).   
Table 1 details a chronology of the key legislative and administrative initiatives that have 





Table 3. 1: Timelines of Key Deliberative Initiatives in Kenya (1963-2019) 
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Service Delivery 
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governance at the 
constituency level 





2010 Micro & Macro County Heads Deliberative 
governance at the 
county level 
Select representatives 
and the public 
Source: Researcher, 2020 
The first attempt at deliberations in Kenya was the implementation of the Majimbo system of 
devolution in 1963 (Mukhongo, 2015). Majimbo is a Westminster-style system of public 
administration with multiple levels of government (Gustafson, 1995). Eight autonomous 
regions under Majimbo formed the basis for micro- and macro-deliberation structures in 
Kenya’s post-independence deliberative paradigm (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). Majimbo was 
able to reveal the critical areas of divergence in Kenya’s structural diversity being the first post-
independence initiative. It was critical in identifying three governance challenges to be tackled 
by the first post-independent government including: poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment. It 
was a short-lived initiative and did not achieve much in terms of managing structural diversities 
and achieving depolarisation. The challenges of Majimbo included high rates of illiteracy, 
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meaning citizens were unable to fully understand their rights and responsibilities to ensure 
substantive deliberations (Holmquist & Oendo, 2001). Further, access to information was 
restricted and safeguards entrenched by enacting the Official Secrets Act of 1968 (Lynch & 
Crawford, 2011). The factional political bickering that characterised KANU, KADU politics 
eventually led to its inoperability. The conditions established under Majimbo did not 
facilitate open, reasoned, and equal deliberations on governance issues (Mueller, 2014).  
  After the abolition of the Majimbo system in 1965, the government developed session 
paper number 10 of 1965 (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). Here the aspiration was planned 
economic, political, and social policies rooted in traditional African forms of solidarity and 
deliberations (Speich, 2009). The pillar of the sessions paper was public consultation and 
deliberation to generate common development priorities through micro- and macro-
deliberation structures (Lind & Howell, 2010). The session paper succeeded in achieving 
inclusivity, structured deliberations, and implementable decisions, according to Mueller (2014) 
and Sheely (2015). However, further progress under the framework of deliberative governance 
under the session paper failed because of a communist tag during the ideological confrontation 
of the Cold War (Mukhongo, 2015). Furthermore, immediately after 1965, Kenya became a de 
facto one-party state (Kelsall, 1996). Just like Majimbo, implementation was hampered by 
ethnic segregation, literacy issues, limited resources, and lack of clear developmental priorities 
(Speich, 2009). The one-party regime was distrustful and unaccommodating of criticism 
including any form of citizen dissent even within the framework of deliberations and 
participation (Hassan, 2015; Holmquist et al., 2001; Mukhongo, 2015). 
The third attempt at deliberation by the State was the District Focus for Rural 
Development, popularly known as DFRD. This was a relatively successful and comprehensive 
participation strategy which conclusively operationalised after 1983 (Nizam & Muriu, 2015). 
It established a combination of micro- and macro-deliberation structures through a five-tier 
103 
 
participatory structure consisting of the district, divisional, sub-locational and locational levels 
(Burgess et al., 2015). DFRD succeeded in increasing deliberations between government 
officers and the local communities compared to previous initiatives. Government officers were 
heavily involved in planning and advising on the implementation of community plans (Nizam 
& Muriu, 2015). However, citizens often felt minimally involved and merely embedded for 
political convenience rather than beneficially engaged in the process (Ogude, 2002). Proper 
structures for implementing and monitoring deliberation outputs were lacking or weak (Kimeli 
et al., 2014; Steeves, 2011).  DFRD was further affected by resource constraints and persistent 
inequalities between ethnic communities that made it markedly difficult to achieve deliberative 
ideals (Nizam & Muriu, 2015; Steeves, 2011). Elite in bureaucratic positions manipulated and 
excessively controlled the process, making it a ‘limp and ineffectual administrative ritual’, 
according to Forde et al. (2012, p. 526). Deliberative ideals such as equality, reciprocity, and 
inclusiveness were marred by incivility and issue polarisation (Willis & Chome, 2014).  
After 1983, several other participatory development strategies involving citizen 
deliberation emerged through policy enactments and pronouncements (Makinda, 1996). Based 
on their set-up, composition, implementation, and administration (Branch & Cheeseman, 
2006), the guarantee of the sustainability and survival of such strategies was minimal (World 
Bank, 2015). Multi-party democracy in the 1990s was a significant step towards the re-
introduction of progressive deliberative governance (Makinda, 1996). Financial donors 
pressured for citizen deliberations and involvement in their funded projects and, at the same 
time, press freedom improved significantly (Mbeke, 2008).   
More efforts towards deliberative governance occurred in 1996 following the 
establishment of the Physical Planning Act, 1996. This act was progressive in that it provided 
an opportunity for communally moderated deliberation in creating and implementing concrete 
plans for development in different localities (Mitullah et., 2014). The Physical Planning Act, 
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1996 as a deliberative strategy, however, lacked vital community awareness and sensitisation 
in terms of the roles and responsibilities of the participants. Thus communities in very remote 
settings were unaware of it and marginalised in the process (Gustafson, 1995). Communities 
reported that the process was time taxing, politically unfeasible, and logistically complicated 
(Atieno et al., 2014). The decision-making process was slow and challenging to achieve (Lynch 
& Crawford, 2011).  
A ministerial circular in 2001 introduced another deliberative governance model called 
the Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) (Ghai, 2008). The priority of 
LASDAP was to enhance public deliberation and involvement towards contributions to 
identify projects on education, infrastructure, and health in local authorities (Muriu, 2014). The 
structure of  LASDAP failed in its implementation because of political and financial challenges 
(Lynch & Crawford, 2011). Some scholars argue that the new regime in 2003 created a bigger 
platform for public deliberation in budgeting, policymaking and in other issues deemed 
contentious like resource mining and revenue allocation (Mapuva, 2015). Public deliberation 
also improved because civil society and the media also blossomed during this period (Lind & 
Howell, 2010).  
The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was another structured attempt at 
deliberative governance and participatory development. Members of parliament continue to 
manage CDF funds as a top-down rural development program (Ngacho & Das, 2014). Its legal 
provisions shape it into a model for decentralisation of development planning, deliberation, 
and inclusive implementation. Unlike other previous participatory processes, the CDF Act of 
2004 anchors CDF in the law through an act of parliament. The act targets projects aimed at 
improving infrastructural development, and reducing levels of poverty at the constituency 
level. Principally, such projects are solely identified by communities through deliberative 
governance within a participatory framework (Ngacho & Das, 2014). However, the CDF 
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continues to face numerous challenges including: corruption (Kasara, 2013), political capture,  
low community participation (Kabiri, 2014), inadequate monitoring of fund utilisation (Oduor, 
Wanjiru, & Kisamwa, 2015) and partisan distribution of funds in constituencies (Kabiri, 2014). 
3.3.2. Deliberative Governance and Constitutional Enshrinement 
As indicated in Table 1 above, the most recent legislative and administrative remedial initiative 
was the constitutional review process in 2010. Before the constitutional dispensation of 2010, 
Kenya’s governance policy continued to be centralised and ambivalent towards the minorities 
despite successive legislative and administrative attempts right from independence (Kanyinga, 
2014). Successive regimes and political elite also pursued what appeared to be an ‘ethnically 
blind’ approach to national development without dealing with the divisive issues (Bing, 2015). 
Over time, the failure to effectively manage structural diversity enhanced deep fissures and 
acrimony between Kenyan communities (Carrier & Kochore, 2014).  
The rigged elections in 2007/8 were a trigger rather than the main cause of violence 
that ensued. The post-election violence can be explained through three perspectives. First, it 
was an explosion of a society that had attempted to stay intact despite the glaring inequality, 
ethnic antagonism, rigged elections, polarised political processes, and historical injustices 
(Obel Hansen, 2013). Secondly, it was the effect of a series of failed legislative and 
administrative efforts to hold together a fractured society (Kimani et al., 2013). Lastly, it was 
also symptomatic of how Kenya was subjected to guided democracy bordering on 
authoritarianism, and the perpetuation of the interests by and for the majority (Finch et al., 
2015). Hence, solving these challenges is what informed the constitutional review process, 
after the 2007/2008 post-election violence (Mueller, 2014). 
Recognising decades of piecemeal governance reforms (Atieno et al., 2014), the 
Kenyan constitution was substantially reviewed in 2010 and received majority (67%) approval 
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in a referendum (Hassan, 2015). The constitution introduced a number of remedial measures 
to deal with polarisation and enhance national cohesion and integration. First, the constitution 
recognised that Kenyan society is structurally diverse and consists of distinctive groups, based 
on language, ethnicity, race or religious autonomy (Burgess et al., 2015). With this recognition, 
it sought to achieve consensus between the diverse groups through a deliberative and 
participatory process that brings all stakeholders into a governance process. This involved 
efforts to remedy the issue of proportional representation by creating layers of representative 
democracy at the national and county government (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). Secondly, the 
constitution redefined resource governance transferring some decision-making to the county 
assemblies away from the national assembly. This way, it created a form of elasticity in terms 
of policies and projects that were implemented at the county level (Ghai, 2015). It was hoped 
that this elasticity would dispel the rigidity of having centralised, top-down, and prescriptive 
distribution of state resources. The elimination of centralised resource distribution decisions 
was designed to avoid inherent structural and systematic biases that favoured one community 
over another (Nizam & Muriu, 2015). 
Thirdly, the constitution entrenched clauses that defined the role of public participation 
and deliberative governance in informing, engaging, consulting, collaborating and empowering 
the citizenry in different ways (Berg-Schlosser, 2017; Finch et al., 2015; 2016; Kimeli et al., 
2014). It made citizen deliberation and public participation mandatory in all governance 
processes including the appointment of public officials and constitutional office holders. It 
recognised the place of periodic elections, representative democracy and critical institutions 
such as the media and civil society in various stages of policy making (Mbithi et al., 2018). 
Fourthly, it sought to change the developmental crisis of historical imbalances that had 
encumbered the country’s economic and social growth in the past by enhancing accountability, 
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transparency, equity, service delivery, and inclusiveness (Berg-Schlosser, 2017; Finch et al., 
2015; 2016; Kimeli et al., 2014).  
Lastly, it established a two-tier government (national and county government) approach 
geared towards structural administrative and governance reforms (Kramon & Posner, 2011). 
The two-tier approach, which is the focus of this study, anchors the devolution of power and 
decentralisation of authority as a system of government in Kenya (Hassan, 2015). It mandates 
county governments to pass legislation that promote the interests, priorities, and rights of 
minorities and marginalised communities in development programs (Hassan, 2015). Despite 
these constitutional changes, some challenges, including the localisation of corruption, 
increased polarisation, exacerbation of inter-communal conflict, and the inefficient duplication 
of resources, have resurfaced yet again (Boone, 2012; Cheeseman et al., 2014; Hassan, 2015; 
Hope, 2014; Kanyinga, 2014; Omulo & Williams, 2018). The section below examines the 
content of specific legislations that are relevant to this study. 
 
3.4. The 2010 Constitutional Reform and Deliberation Governance 
To begin with, Article 1(1) and Article 1(2) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (Government 
of Kenya, 2010) bestows sovereignty on the Kenyan people. The people’s power is to be 
exercised in two ways: either directly through public participation or indirectly through 
democratic representations. The First Schedule (Article 6(1) of the Kenyan constitution) 
creates the national government and 47 county governments. Article 10(2) (a) of the 
constitution identifies the sharing of power and devolution as values and principles to guide 
Kenya’s democratic governance. Kenya’s devolution and decentralisation involve large-scale 
fiscal, political and administrative decentralisation (Burbidge, 2011; Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2012; 
Shrum et al., 2011). Furthermore, participation was established as a national value and a 
principle of public service in Articles 10(2a) and 232(1). Article 232(d) has guaranteed the 
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citizens’ involvement in deliberative governance and the policy-making process. Further, 
Article 196(1)(b) calls on the County Assemblies to facilitate deliberations and public 
participation (see the section below). 
Subsequent legislation, including the Public Finance Management Act (Government of 
Kenya, 2012b), the County Government Act (Government of Kenya, 2012a), and the Urban 
Areas and Cities Act (Government of Kenya, 2011), also incorporated public participation and 
deliberations in their core processes. These legislations decree participation and deliberations 
in all aspects of policy including determining budget priorities, drafting new legislation, and 
contributing to the audit of public-sector performance (Boone, 2012; Hassan, 2015; Kramon & 
Posner, 2011). In the newly devolved systems, deliberative governance and citizen 
participation are required in the review of local county expenditures and the submission of 
community petitions. County governments are tasked with ensuring that citizens receive 
relevant, timely, and comprehensive information for deliberation (Mbithi et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, county governments are required to establish structures and mechanisms 
to guide the process of public participation and deliberative governance. County administrators 
are required to provide an annual report on citizen participation to the County Assembly. 
Recognising the potential lack of political goodwill, Article 232(1), (d) states that citizen 
participation in policy deliberation and the decision-making process is paramount and 
compulsory. Part (f), as earlier stated, provides for the accurate and timely provision of 
information to the public to enhance proper deliberations. The definition of accurate and timely 
provision of information is subjective and manipulated to frustrate effective participation and 
deliberations. 
Similarly, Article 174(c), states that devolution seeks to give the power of self-
governance to the Kenyan people. Devolution enhances deliberative governance rights in the 
exercise of state powers and, more especially, in making governance-related decisions affecting 
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citizens. The above article of the constitution assumes citizens are empowered towards 
deliberative governance. This is why Article 174(d) recognises the rights of each individual in 
communities to govern their affairs and dictate their own development agenda. The Fourth 
Schedule, Part 2(14) established a constitutional framework to ensure full implementation of 
deliberative governance.  
The Fourth Schedule, Part 2(14) further states that the county governments, through 
their powers and functions, will plan, coordinate and ensure participatory and deliberative 
governance at all local levels. This law obligates counties to facilitate capacity building of 
communities enabling them to effectively exercise powers, functions, and rights under 
devolved governance mechanisms. Capacity building has been achieved through resource 
allocations and civic education in most counties (Nizam & Muriu, 2015). Section 207 of the 
Public Finance Management Act, 2012, requires county governments to put in place 
mechanisms, structures, and guidelines for deliberative governance in resource management 
(Mbithi et al., 2018). Consequently, the County Governments Act (2012), in Subsection 91, 
giving effect to Article 174(d), identifies modalities and platforms for mobilising citizen 
participation and deliberations in governance. These obligate county governments to facilitate 
structures for citizen mobilisation, deliberation, and participation using: 
media platforms, information communication technology-based platforms, town 
hall meetings, budget preparation and validation fora, notice boards that announce 
jobs, appointments, procurement, awards and other important announcements of 
public interest, development project sites, avenues for the participation of peoples.  
Further, Part IX, Article 94 of the County Government Act, 2012 states that:  
The County government shall use the media to achieve three objectives: first, ‘to 
create awareness and promote deliberations on devolution and enhance good 
governance’, Secondly, ‘to promote citizen’s participation and deliberations for 
purposes of peace, national cohesion and integration’; and lastly is to ‘undertake 
advocacy on core development issues such as agriculture, education, health, 
security, sustainable environment and economics, among others. 
 
Article 94 of the County Government Act, 2012, then spells out deliberative governance as a 
subset of public participation. Sections 100 and 101 seek to ensure the institutional framework 
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by county governments towards civic education to further awareness on deliberative 
governance. The Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011,11 states that citizens’ participation and 
deliberation in the governance of urban areas and cities is a critical necessity. Kenya’s Vision 
203012 seeks an open and participatory political process through increased deliberations in the 
country’s economic, social and political decision-making processes (Oduor et al., 2015). The 
media is required to facilitate this decision-making process. Furthermore, the political pillar of 
Kenya’s Vision 2030 provides for equal citizenship rights and equality of participation and 
deliberations in major policy decisions (Nyaura, 2018). This was instituted in a bid to create 
social equity for marginalised communities and ensure issues affecting them are channelled 
into public policy. 
The result of all the above legislation is what Cornell & D’Arcy (2014) call redefining 
the use of state power by different actors along multiple lines. It combines lateral, horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of power and authority, meaning that power and decision-making 
authority are decentralised to different levels and governance institutions (Finch et al., 2015). 
Such combinations form the foundation of participatory and deliberative structures and systems 
in governance (Kramon & Posner, 2011). It means that part of the administrative powers, 
financial resources and, policy-making roles are relegated to the devolved level of government 
and to citizens in particular (Nizam & Muriu, 2015), and that media and information 
technology platforms should be central to this. 
3.5. Deliberative Governance Under the 2010 Constitution 
A decade after implementing the 2010 constitution, various studies have documented the gains 
and challenges of deliberative governance in the county context (Atieno et al., 2014; Finkel, 
                                                          
11 Article 184 of the constitution states that urban areas and cities shall be governed independently. The Urban Areas and Cities 
Act, 2011, deals with the establishment and governance of urban areas. Section 22 and the second schedule of the Urban Areas 
Act, 2011, grants citizens the powers to have a say in the governance of their cities. 
12 Vision 2030 is the Kenya’s transformative development agenda that was inaugurated in 2008 and runs until 2030 as a 
blueprint for political, economic, and social progress. 
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2002; Lynch & Crawford, 2015; Marine, 2015; Sneddon & Fox, 2016). As required by Article 
94 of the County Government Act, 2012, most counties have established deliberation platforms 
as envisaged by the constitution (Kanyinga, 2014). Deliberation models in counties like 
Makueni have even been lauded by development partners like DFID and the World Bank 
(2016). Through various models examined by the World Bank, the county has been able to 
drive some development priorities at the grassroots level through deliberated consensus. Its 
citizens are consistently involved in the prioritisation, planning, budgeting, implementation, 
and audits of development projects (Cornell & D’Arcy, 2014; Mbithi et al., 2018). World Bank 
reports have further claimed  that deliberative governance has promoted continuous interaction 
between leaders and citizens, thus improving institutional accountability and increasing the 
responsiveness of governance institutions (World Bank, 2015).  Some studies suggest that 
deliberative governance has enriched the redistribution of power that was historically 
entrenched in central government (Kanyinga, 2014), and apparently created less alienation of 
citizens from governance processes (Carrier & Kochore, 2014).  
The implementation of Section 207 of the Public Finance Management Act, 2012, has 
entrenched the decentralisation of decision-making about resources to the local level. Revenue 
allocation formulas and ratios are shared and communicated across relevant deliberative 
forums as a legal requirement (World Bank, 2012). This has facilitated more understanding 
and contributed, to some extent, to the amicable sharing of national resources especially in 
areas with marginalised communities like Taita Taveta, Lamu, and Mandera counties 
(International Budget Partnership, 2014; Mbithi et al., 2018). The argument for local solutions 
for local problems has translated into greater participation in deliberations in counties like 
Machakos, Kisumu, and Mombasa, according to Mapuva (2015). Deliberative governance is 
now widely associated with the adoption of citizen-driven policies which are positively viewed 
compared to policies made through representative democracy (World Bank, 2015). This 
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positive perception has strengthened the responsiveness of county assemblies and the senate to 
deliberative governance outcomes that are specific to citizen needs (Mbithi et al., 2018). This 
has ensured that progressive and inclusive policies are developed in view of the needs of local 
communities especially mining communities in Turkana and Taita Taveta counties (Finch et 
al., 2015). 
However, there is a significant similarity in the challenges currently faced in the 
implementation of deliberative governance and the previously discussed remedial attempts 
since independence (see the section below). These challenges include minimal support from 
the political elites and inadequate civic education of citizens (Ahluwalia, 2013). Marine (2015) 
observes that the culture in government bureaucracy has not supported deliberative governance 
mechanisms as envisaged by the law. There is a need to transform this bureaucratic culture and 
ensure citizens are co-partners rather than clients in the county governance process (Ahluwalia, 
2013). Eliminating needless bureaucracy will ensure citizens are the provenance and 
beneficiaries of deliberative planning (Williams, 2008). Malpractices like tokenism and 
corruption that are embedded in bureaucracy and have thwarted the effectiveness of 
deliberative governance in counties like Turkana still exist (Agade, 2014). Bureaucracy also 
means that governance institutions continue to rely on conventional information exchange 
channels such as public hearings (Cheeseman et al., 2016). Such deliberation forums have 
failed to implement or adhere to deliberative norms and are often marked by incivility and 
inequality due to handpicked participants. These channels, according to Omanga (2019), are 
sometimes unidirectional and tokenistic and not oriented towards problem-solving. 
While deliberation seeks to remedy historical injustice through discussion and 
consensus, low institutional cultures and corrupt political elite are its foremost obstacles Omolo 
(2015). Therefore, the assumption that the constitution, in its design, would tackle historical 
challenges related to Kenya’s structural diversity is highly impractical and naïve (Nederveen, 
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2001). For instance, lack of consensus in deliberation forums has revealed the impracticality 
of meaningful progress especially when hotly contested issues are involved (Kirea, 2018). The 
overwhelming propensity to override citizens’ will and desires due to a lack of consensus exists 
(Hassan, 2015). Lack of consensus slows inclusive decision outcomes and exposes the process 
to political pressure and state capture by powerful interest groups who often subvert or thwart 
objective policy deliberations and decision-making (Cheeseman et al., 2014; Cornell & 
D’Arcy, 2014). 
Further, the constitution has succeeded in restructuring governance institutions but 
grossly failed to infuse relevant values and the necessary principles and norms of deliberations 
(Burgess et al., 2015). Emphasis on important values such as reciprocity, inclusivity, equality, 
and fairness and restructuring of governance institutions should happen contemporaneously 
(Kameri-Mbote & Kabira, 2016). There are many other technicalities that create major hurdles 
in the implementation of the deliberative governance process at county government level. 
Issues like inadequate resources and fledgling accountability systems are two examples noted 
by Uraia Trust (2012). Resources are needed to mobilise and put in place systems that will 
ensure feedback from deliberation is implemented. Constitutionalism depends on the strict 
adherence to and implementation of legislative clauses for better results (Gaventa & Barrett, 
2012). Evidence shows that well-structured deliberations have significantly managed some 
perennial challenges like exclusion, marginalisation, and inequality in counties like Lamu and 
Kilifi (Lind, 2018).  
 
3.6. Polarisation and Devolution in Kenyan Counties 
Devolution, according to the constitution, was also  meant to be the panacea for polarisation in 
Kenya. By decentralising power through the 47 counties, each with democratically elected 
representatives (senators, governors, and county representatives), devolution was expected to 
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lead to more inclusive and accountable county institutions. Devolution was also expected to 
prioritise and facilitate the management of structural diversities able to deliver better services 
for all, and consequently reduce the tensions and divisions that cause conflict. But has 
devolution established a mechanism for achieving peace and lessening polarisation? This is 
examined from two perspectives in the following sections. 
3.6.1. Impact of Devolution on Polarisation 
Devolution has translated into positive outcomes over the past decade in Kenya. Institutionally 
it has enlivened participation and strengthened democracy in Kenya (Ghai, 2008). It has further 
entrenched the separation of powers and established a set of powerful new actors in the form 
of governors. The new actors mean that the politics around devolution continues to heighten 
tension and polarisation in Kenyan counties (Muriu, 2014; Orr, 2019). As Nyaura (2018, p.18) 
argues for devolved ethnicity, where divisive ethnic politics of identity that existed in the 
national level are transferred to the devolved level, it is possible that Kenya is now experiencing 
a state of devolved polarisation. Devolution has further strengthened a sense of ethnic identity 
and heightened affiliation to ethnic homelands (Nizam & Muriu, 2015). It has created intra-
county ethnic minorities because counties were formed to accommodate various ethnic bands 
in the same geographical regions (Cornell & D’Arcy, 2014). As earlier noted, some minority 
ethnic groups, like the Ogiek and Rendile, experience exclusion within spheres of large ethnic 
dominance. Marginalisation of minorities, which happened before on a national level, now 
happens at the county level (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). This means that devolution has 
exacerbated and escalated existing tension among communities in the quest for power and 
resources at the county level (Mapuva, 2015). Further, the re-drawn geographic boundaries of 
most counties mean that majoritarianism that existed at the national level is now evident at the 
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county level. For instance, devolution has somehow re-ignited many pre-existing land conflicts 
and further created new ones (Finch et al 2015). 
Devolution has resulted, though, in more resources being sent to the county 
governments and the communities that were, for a long time, marginalised from national 
politics can access such resources.Yet, devolution has paradoxically worsened the contestation 
of scarce resources and enhanced imbalanced power relations in historically polarised areas 
(Flache & Macy, 2011b). Here, identity politics, rather than sound policies, continue to drive 
resource governance discussions in cosmopolitan counties like Nakuru and Bungoma (Berg-
Schlosser, 2017). Contestation of resources is also tied to county electoral positions, for 
example gubernatorial and senate, which are continually resolved through ‘negotiated 
democracy’ (Barret & Zani, 2014). Negotiated democracy is based on ethnically and politically 
negotiated power-sharing blocs between political elite representing specific community 
interests. Such a  system focuses on political elites and the positions they hold in view of their 
communities. This pacifies, but fails to solve, perennially divisive issues through an integrated, 
holistic deliberative approach involving citizens. Devolution appears to have deflected rather 
than resolved governance grievances in Kenya (Kasara, 2013; Obala & Mattingly, 2014).  
The resources allocated directly for stakeholders’ engagement under devolution are 
often meagre and grossly inadequate to support extensive deliberations. There are fewer 
deliberations forums to facilitate proper deliberation on contentious issues. Resources are 
channelled to development ‘priority’ areas and projects with what is considered to be ‘tangible’ 
outcomes for political expedience (Kabiri, 2014). Devolved governments are continuously 
limiting budgets allocated for deliberative forums especially on contested issues. 
Consequently, achieving depolarisation in counties remains something of a mirage (Boone, 
2015). Devolution further magnifies some underlying challenges including: resource patronage 
(Kabiri, 2014), and fierce competition over administrative positions (Rohwerder, 2015). The 
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high stakes ‘winner takes all’ politics previously seen at the national level now exists at the 
county level (Kasara, 2013). 
Finally, devolution has created a new set of bureaucratic positions in the form of elected 
representatives (Kanyinga, 2014). These positions have become hotly contested and led to the 
devolution of patronage-based politics and polarisation previously witnessed at the national 
level in the 2013 and 2017 general elections (Foulds, 2014). Kenya’s devolution reform agenda 
still remains vulnerable to manipulation by the governing elite (Willis & Chome, 2014). 
Contrary to the optimism that devolution will reduce spatial inequalities, studies suggest that it 
has inadvertently magnified horizontal inequalities between low and rich regions (Kanyinga, 
2014; Lavalle et al., 2011; Mbuyisa, 2014). The systematic entrenchment of regional and ethnic 
inequalities in devolved areas will most likely be the basis of mobilisation for national politics 
(Atieno et al., 2014). Despite the implementation of devolution, the manipulation of devolved 
regions by the central government through resource allocation is a reality (Muriu, 2014). This 
form of influence means politicians in the national arena can use divisive politics in the 
devolved contexts to advance their agenda. 
3.6.2 Impact of Polarisation on Devolution 
It can be argued that polarisation has equally influenced devolution. Polarisation has created a 
gridlock in devolved processes delaying, for example, the passing of  critical bills by county 
assemblies (Lind, 2018). Polarisation within the counties has slowed down decision-making 
for devolved functions which harms pragmatic response patterns for urgent issues like disaster 
response in the face of crisis. Tension and polarisation devoid of violence is a key driver of 
participatory interests (Jehn, 2001). Polarisation has broadened and deepened the level and 
nature of some contested issues in Kenya’s devolved systems (Cheeseman et al., 2016). It is 
unclear whether such deeply contested issues result in stronger or weaker resolutions especially 
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in macro-deliberation structures like county assemblies. Consequently, polarisation has been 
very useful in understanding and making choices related to contentious issues and differences. 
It has helped clarify the policy choices that participants have in a devolved context (Kibet & 
Ward, 2018). When counties are polarised around rifts reflecting critical, unresolved historical 
issues, then polarisation will be enduringly harmful.  
Polarisation has also caused the intense de-legitimisation of devolved processes and 
functions. It has challenged democratic systems and deliberative governance ideals in contexts 
where diversity and contested issues have not been managed very well (Carrier & Kochore, 
2014). Often when polarisation becomes a challenge rather than an inherent part of democracy, 
it becomes disruptive even in the context of negotiated democracy, as earlier described in some 
counties (Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Oduor et al., 2015). Unfortunately, polarisation has 
weakened accountability structures in county governance institutions (Kagwanja & Southall, 
2009). Studies in Nyeri and Kiambi counties suggests that polarised groups have developed an 
antagonistic attitude and support their side regardless of the facts (Muriu, 2014). Extreme 
polarisation instigates participants to respond to devolved contentious issues through their 
group identities rather than rationalised assessment (Obala & Mattingly, 2014; Pattie & 
Johnston, 2016). This has promoted ethnically instigated camp-mentality while promoting the 
extent of disinformation effect.  
Polarisation in some county deliberative forums has deepened because decision-
making, which hitherto was made at the national level, now rests with inexperienced 
participants due to devolution (Nyaura, 2018). Groups are forced to take sides, and the middle 
ground shrinks progressively. Attempts to seek compromise with opposing sides of the debate 
are considered adversely (Owen et al., 2011). The quality of deliberation in devolved 
governments is, to a large extent, shaped by prevalent tensions, contradictions, and attitudes 
around governance issues (Hassid & Brass, 2015). It is also shaped by the level of polarisation 
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and conflicts straddling political power relations, ideological, and economic apparatus at the 
county level (CJPC, 2014). Optimistic scholars note that strong partisanship in polarised 
contexts tends to have a stabilising effect in divided and devolved systems like Kenya 
(Kagwanja & Southall, 2009; Ogude, 2002; Snow & Taylor, 2015; Whitaker & Giersch, 2009). 
Polarisation has freshly exposed socio-political cleavages in devolved systems which needs 
confrontation (Barret & Zani, 2014). From county forums, polarisation has created easily 
identifiable positions, interests, and priorities that can be harnessed into quick gains during 
deliberations (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009; Mueller, 2014).  
3.7 Deliberation Governance and Polarisation in Kenya 
The majority of studies conducted on deliberation and polarisation in Kenya are based on 
offline public forums. Those studies suggest that deliberation in a context of diversity like 
Kenya would encourage people to consider alternative views towards depolarisation (Cottrel-
Ghai et al., 2013; Halakhe, 2013; Muendo, 2017; Sturgis et al., 2014). Pessimists, however, 
argue that there is a threshold beyond which polarisation is too deep to be resolved through 
deliberation (Caluwaerts & Deschouwer, 2014). Deeply rooted issues bordering on historical 
injustice are firmly etched in the fabric of Kenya’s societies (Cottrel-Ghai, Ghai, Oei, & 
Wanyoike, 2012). Such grievances have metamorphosed and become more convoluted over 
time and cannot be eradicated through exposure to diverse information as required during 
deliberations (Tiyambe, 2010). Considering the various failed attempts at instituting 
deliberation and participation in governance processes, it is possible that solutions for 
polarisation will take time to realise. 
Studies in Kenya also indicate that when people encounter political disagreement, their 
views and strongly held opinions are likely to thwart effective deliberative effort and its 
outcomes (Agade, 2014; Kimeli et al., 2014). In a context like Kenya, where ethnicity is at the 
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core of polarisation, exposure to heterogeneous views is likely to motivate people to uphold 
their existing biases and beliefs, regardless of the facts (Kimeli et al., 2014). These perspectives 
ignore the critical element of group effort and individuals’ investment in pertinent issues and 
power dynamics at the county level. The perspectives also ignore the actors and multiple 
dynamics that can complicate achieving tangible results in a deliberative platform. Specific 
deliberative methods previously used in Kenya, including structured and unstructured face-to-
face deliberation have been found to enhance disagreement that polarises participants (Kasara, 
2013; Munyua, 2016). Deliberations, in some contexts, have failed to moderate participants’ 
extreme opinions but rather exposed their firm biases instead (Willis & Chome (2014). Another 
fact is that Kenya’s ethnic groups have often ignored their differences and embraced one 
another during periods of political party coalitions (Munyua, 2016). Political elites have driven 
discussions in inter-party micro-deliberation structures leading to temporary co-existence and 
mobilisation of resources towards common interests during election periods. 
While the constitution and other legislation lay the foundation for a more structured and 
inclusive deliberative process at the county level, managing disagreement in deliberation is not 
adequately considered. Disagreement handling mechanisms are critical in exacerbating or 
moderating extreme viewpoints (Omolo, 2015). Handling disagreement ensures continuity of 
dialogue to avoid breakdown of deliberations. This is relevant in a socio-political environment 
where multiple actors and multifaceted contested issues complicate the deliberation process 
(Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2013). Therefore, the link between deliberations and polarisation in Kenya 
can be explained through a number of critical assumptions: first, participants are assumed to 
express competing and convincing arguments during deliberations. Arguments are expected to 
aid comprehension of problems and assist in identifying solutions. Studies that examined 
offline deliberative forums in Kenyan counties observed that convincing arguments rarely 
worked in an environment of deep polarisation characterised by hard-line positions (Kasara, 
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2013; Khadiagala, 2017; Lieberman et al., 2014). Lieberman et al. (2014) also noted that joint 
solutions in politics and governance are rarely achieved except in instances where participants 
had common interests. 
 Secondly, it is expected that participants in a deliberative forum will respect dissimilar 
views and that deliberation will be issue-centred. Studies show that polarised participants 
deliberating on polarising issues like land or resource allocation are less likely to be issue-
centred (Ajulu, 2010; Makinen & Kuira, 2008a). For instance, ancestral land is a highly 
emotive issue in Kenya (Boone, 2012). Kasara (2013), in his study, argued that tolerance and 
respect for diverse opinions were dependent on the political actors involved, the outcomes at 
stake, and existing pressure points. These two assumptions, however, ignore the place of 
divergent communication and interactive skills, which are determined by each participant’s 
literacy levels. Articulate and elaboration skills may not be commonly available across the 
spectrum of people in deliberative forums (Namasaka, 2012). The place of strongly held 
opinions, personalised issues, and their emotive value in a polarised context should not be 
ignored (Boone, 2012). 
Nonetheless, some proponents consider structured deliberation to be capable of 
mitigating ideological polarisation on governance issues. Some of the assumptions above are 
not entirely baseless. Unstructured deliberation in informal groups in Kenya shows that 
discussing politics with diverse friends, family, or workmates may promote tolerance, 
familiarity, and trust (Kamwaria et al 2015; Kasara, 2013). Further, exposure to diverse 
participants and viewpoints has been found to enhance ambivalence and belief complexity, 
according to Ahluwalia (2013). She further indicates that belief complexity is possible when 
participants achieve moderate evaluations and balanced judgments on contested issues. When 
this happens, participants can recognise that governance issues are complex and not necessarily 
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‘black and white’. They eventually appreciate that contrasting opinions have legitimate 
concerns and viewpoints as well.  
The initially held positions may be abandoned, and a shift toward the common views 
favourable to all may be adopted. Robinson & Berkes’ (2011) study further found that the 
pursuit of environmental solutions in urban areas in Kenya through deliberations translated into 
less acrimony when participants explored solutions independent of each group’s interests. It is 
also possible for deliberation to deepen the level and nature of polarisation and conflict, which 
it intends to resolve (Cornwall, 2008). For instance, deliberations in county hall forums have 
often resulted in historical and long-forgotten issues resurfacing (Wekesa & Tsuma, 2014). It 
often only  takes a few individuals to make lopsided arguments to sabotage deliberations.  
The above outcome can be explained in view of the individual or group understanding 
of a contentious and emotive issue. The impassioned understanding of a subject significantly 
alters the way information in deliberation is received, perceived, and interpreted (Owen et al., 
2011). Ilorah (2009) argues that it dictates how information is evaluated and the subsequent 
behavioural process. Studies on community policing deliberation forums in Kenya indicate that 
people who are committed and motivated to defend their views tend to extensively rationalise 
such views (Atieno et al., 2014; Kodila-Tedika, 2018). They also tend to shield their minds 
from new and different information. Achieving depolarisation through deliberation is not just 
about exposure to divergent information in a context like Kenya. If people fail to recognise 
differing viewpoints, they may discredit such information or fail to appreciate its relevance.  
3.8 Deliberative Norms and Group Polarisation 
Achieving depolarisation through deliberations is also dependent on the deliberative norms of 
the group (Kimani et al., 2013). Social behaviour research in Kenya has examined how highly 
egocentric personalities tend to perceive most views as oppositional, even when it is not the 
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case (Berg-Schlosser, 2017). This has also been observed in deliberative forums where politics 
is at the core (Kimani et al., 2013). Speer (2012b) suggested that politicians with big egos tend 
to drive deliberations to the extreme. When political ego drives the deliberative agenda, 
individuals tend to disregard measures of civility or counter-attitudinal information. Political 
and social pressure will drive the strength of opinion attached to some issues by groups. Studies 
on subsidy discussions among rural farmers in Kenya indicated that groups with strong and 
rigid opinions tend to reject counter attitudinal information regardless of the facts (Roberts, 
2004). Such groups are also motivated to avoid the scrutiny of arguments or exposure to 
information that discredits their prior knowledge.  
Deliberations that follow relevant norms and procedures will reduce the threats of the 
above-mentioned shortcomings (Lind & Howell, 2010). Deliberative forums with specific 
agenda, timelines, and expected outcomes utilised deliberative norms advantageously 
(Robinson & Berkes, 2011). Such advantages were possible despite the polarising nature of 
issues under discussion. This confidence in deliberative norms is anchored on the differences 
between systematic exposure to well-thought arguments (Ofunja et al., 2018), and combative 
interpersonal everyday talk. Systematic talk is expected to stimulate deep reflective thinking 
and depolarising interaction. It is also expected to increase group tolerance where information 
is depersonalised and projected as contexts of ideas rather than of persons. This does not work 
well in deeply polarised contexts where issues are processed emotively. 
Some scholars have consequently supported the idea that deliberation is likely to 
achieve group convergence (Long et al., 2013; Ofunja et al., 2018). They further argue that 
group convergence will occur if moderates move in the opposite direction of extreme members 
towards the middle ground. Research by Kimeli et al. (2014) show that opposing groups in 
public forums move toward the common centre due to exposure to persuasive arguments. A 
study by Lind & Howell (2010), on public election campaign forums in Kenya, pointed out the 
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role of stereotypes when deliberating on issues like terrorism. Disagreement in public 
deliberation is likely to degenerate and trigger the use of stereotypes to define, understand and 
describe issues or people. When this happens, the views of other participants, however 
legitimate, are dismissed and stifled.  
Extreme groups are likely to label those who disagree with them as an ‘out-group’ 
(Kimani et al., 2013). This increases with the level of polarisation experienced in a given 
context but often leads to dismissal of the ‘out-group’ as unworthy or undeserving as was the 
case in the power-sharing process in Bungoma county (Rinch, 2014). This exacerbates the level 
of polarisation. Public deliberation forums to discuss contentious issues like abortion in Kenya 
have shown that groups who consider themselves the majority tend to do less preparation for 
deliberations (Robinson & Berkes, 2011). They are also more likely to be inconsiderate, 
hardliners, and are more likely to concentrate on the merits of their own position. Research on 
community forums has also documented how majority group members may enter a deliberation 
with the intention and readiness to ignore opposing views, regardless of prevailing rationality 
(Berkes et al., 2011). 
Deliberation during the constitutional referendum found that knowledgeable 
participants who deliberated on emotive ancestral land issues changed their views the least 
(Robinson & Berkes, 2011). This obstinacy was also evident when deliberation was not 
consensual or forced. The same pattern of strong opposition was observed during deliberation 
on issues of county resource distribution even when the points were structured and presented 
with convincing logicality (Ndavula & Mberia, 2012). Deliberation among homogenous group 
members on issues like abortion sometimes leads to the amplification of cognitive errors. In 
such contexts, biased information and erroneous epistemic views are repeated and 
corroborated. When deliberative forums tackle issues that are long-standing or deeply rooted, 
it is highly unlikely that participants will present novel or fresh arguments. Even if novel, valid, 
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and cogent arguments are made, social validation aspects within a group are likely to diminish 
a positive depolarising outcome. Hence, social identities are likely to be turned into discursive 
weapons towards the automatic refutation of opposing views (Ofunja et al., 2018).  
3.9 Conclusion 
From this chapter, it is evident that the colonial administrative structures and policies have 
created a deeply polarised Kenyan state. Policies like ethnic isolation, divide and rule, and 
inequality in resource access enforced by the British in Kenya have further influenced the 
conceptual understanding of heterogeneity and polarisation of ethno-political identities. This 
state of polarisation was strategically retained by the post-independent political elites to further 
their advantage. Kenya’s political elite have consistently exploited exclusionary ethnic tactics. 
They have occasionally deployed divisive political rhetoric leading to violent displacement of 
people to reshape electoral geography. This has led to deep fissures and polarisation based 
largely on ethnic cleavages and historical injustices.  
These pressure points exploded during the 2007/8 post-election violence, risking the 
collapse of the democratic system. This provided the stimulus for a constitutional review 
process seeking long-term solutions to improve governance and reduce polarisation. The 
resulting new Kenyan constitution created a two-tier system which anchors the devolution of 
power and decentralisation of authority as key elements of democracy in Kenya. Such a system 
is supposed to achieve a government closer to the people. Hence, local county governments are 
mandated to ensure inclusive participation and deliberation of the people in all significant 
governance decisions. However, while devolution and decentralisation were considered to 
contribute to depolarisation, the former has strengthened ethnic identity and affiliation to 
individuals’ homelands. Contestations of resource distribution are now decentralised and 
localised. Devolution and decentralisation have arguably further magnified a number of 
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underlying challenges including: resource patronage; fierce competition over administrative 
positions; and political, ideological dissension. 
Central to these processes of deliberation and depolarisation is the use of all forms of 
media. The County Government Act of 2012, for instance, requires county governments to use 
all forms of media to mobilise towards participation and deliberation in governance. The 
counties are also required by law to use the media, including social media to promote citizens’ 
participation and deliberations for the purposes of peace, national cohesion and integration 
However, the stipulated role of SNSs in the new system of deliberative governance has received 






SNSs, WhatsApp and Deliberative Governance in Kenya 
4.0 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Kenyan Constitution and Part IX, article 94, 95 of the County 
Government Act, 2012 highlights the role of the media, mainstream and social media, in 
governance and polarisation. In particular, the rapid growth of SNS platforms is seen as 
offering particular potential for deliberation governance and depolarisation. The chapter begins 
by examining the SNS landscape in Kenya, focusing on its adoption, patterns of utilisation, and 
affordances. The key drivers of SNSs use in Kenya are the strong internet penetration and broad 
mobile phone uptake in the last decade. This wide adoption means SNSs have improved the 
feedback loop on governance and policy issues, enhanced users’ mental elaboration and 
cognitive skills, and transformed governance discourse through the formation of governance 
networks. Its negative and positive contributions on polarisation before and after the 2007/8 
post-election violence are clear. The focus of this study is on WhatsApp, which is currently the 
largest SNS platform with more than 12 million users in Kenya. WhatsApp has achieved wide 
adoption in Kenya due to its affordances. The core argument of this study is that WhatsApp 
has significantly transformed the concept of public sphere and influenced governance and 
polarisation. First, it is critical to understand whether WhatsApp qualifies as a public sphere 
based on the Habermasian ideals of: diversity, inclusivity, rationality, civility, and moderated 
involvement for deliberations. Further, it is important to establish whether it allows unfettered 
and unlimited access to information, and whether it lacks institutional or commercial influence. 
It is in the above context that this chapter examines scant scholarly literature to establish the  
link between WhatsApp use, deliberative governance and polarisation in Kenya. 
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4.1 SNS Landscape in Kenya 
The use and adoption of SNS in Kenya is significantly determined and reflected by the general 
socio-demographic characteristics of its population. According to the Kenya National Bureau 
of Statistics (2019) census report, Kenya’s total population as at 2019 was 47 million people 
(50.3 % and 49.7 % are males). The annual average change in Kenya’s population currently 
stands at +2.5% which reflects a positive deviation indicating an annual marginal increase in 
the population. The median age in Kenya is 20 years which means that majority of the 
population is made up of young people. The current rate of urbanisation stands at 27% which 
indicates that majority of Kenyan's still live in the rural homes. A significant percentage of 
Kenyans are educated because the literacy of adults aged 15 and above stands at 79%; the 
female literacy level being 79% while that of male is 84% (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 
2019).  
4.1.1 Penetration and Usage of SNSs in Kenya 
The combination of good Internet speed and a widespread mobile phone penetration have 
facilitated the significant uptake of SNSs in Kenya over the past two decades. According to the 
Africa Internet Users report (2019), 46,870,422 Kenyans against a total population of 
52,214,791 million had Internet access in Kenya by the end of 2018. This figure reflects a 
penetration rate of approximately 89.7% by December 2019 (see Table 4.1). Currently, there 
are more than 72 licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of which about half are operational. 
Kenya also has one of the highest Internet-speeds at 10.71Mbps across Africa and amongst the 
highest globally according to the Internet Users report (2019). Similarly, Kenya’s mobile 





Figure 4. 1: Internet Penetration Trend in Kenya from 2000-2019 
 
Data Source: Africa Internet Users report (2019) 
 
A variety of factors account for the rapid increase in mobile penetration: firstly, there has been 
a rapid reduction in handset costs, value and costs of callings cards (vouchers) from the lowest 
in 1999 being Ksh 250 to the lowest in 2012 being Ksh5 (Amutabi, 2013); secondly, the 
investment and improvement of communication technology infrastructure has propelled the 
growth in the number of service providers (Souter & Kerrets-Makau, 2012). More service 
providers means more competition, more customer options and a greater reach of 
telecommunications infrastructure (Aktas et al., 2014; Jeong et al., 2016); thirdly, market 
liberalisation reforms in the telecommunication industry in the past two decades have resulted 
in the greater affordability of internet mobile services in Kenya (Groshek, 2009). They have 
also resulted in tariff rebalancing for fixed operators (Ott & Rosser, 2007), and increased usage 
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In terms of the different types of SNS platforms, WhatsApp has become the most 
popular with an estimated 12 million users in 2019 (Africa Internet Users, 2019) which is 
higher than the combined users on Twitter (2.8.m), Facebook (7m) and Instagram (3m) (Africa 
Internet Users, 2019) (see Figure 4.1). The profile of SNS users is overwhelmingly urban, 
highly localised, educated, and fairly well-off on the socio-economic ladder (Bing, 2015; 
Kamau, 2017; Kirea, 2018; Makinen & Kuira, 2008b, 2008a; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017; Ndlela 
& Mulwo, 2017; Ogaji, Okoyeukwu, Wanjiru, Adhiambo, & Akoth, 2017; Adini et al., 2014). 
Studies also tend to confirm that most SNS users are young, male, educated, and able to afford 
digital connectivity gadgets like mobile phones, iPads and laptops. For example, in the case of 
Twitter, 60% of Twitter users in Kenya are younger (21–29 year-olds) compared to the global 
Twitter average age of 39 years (Phua, Venus, & Jay, 2017).  
The majority of Kenyans aged 21-35 years spend more than three hours on SNSs daily 
(Bing, 2015). Studies show that between 4.3 and 5.1 million users visit the Facebook platform 
monthly. Again, the majority of these users are concentrated in major cities and towns in Kenya 
(Benesch, 2014). SNS platforms in Kenya are used for various functions including: accessing 
news and politics (74%), entertainment (67%), networking (56%), contributing to a 
deliberation (56%), meeting friends (48%) and checking adverts (40%) (GeoPoll, 2017). In 
relation to the focus of this study, a culture of online deliberation has already emerged, where 
more than 76% of adult Kenyans (age 18-56) have participated in an online deliberation on any 
SNS platform (Alliance for Affordable Intenet, 2017; Kamwaria et al., 2015; Ndavula & 
Mberia, 2012; Simon et al., 2014).  
4.1.2 SNS and Deliberative Governance in Kenya 
As noted in Chapter 3, Part IX, article 94 of the County Government Act, 2012 the County 
government is mandated to use the media (mainstream and social media) to achieve three 
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objectives: firstly, ‘to create awareness and promote deliberations on devolution and enhance 
good governance’; Secondly, ‘to promote citizen’s participation and deliberations for purposes 
of peace, national cohesion and integration’; and lastly to ‘undertake advocacy on core 
development issues such as agriculture, education, health, security, sustainable environment 
and economics, among others. Part 95 states that the county governments will establish 
mechanisms to facilitate public deliberation and access information in the form of traditional 
and social media. A decade after implementing the constitution, the effects of SNSs on 
deliberative governance and polarisation in Kenya has received minimal scholarly focus. 
Nonetheless, existing related studies looking at SNS use in various socio-political contexts in 
Kenya have found different results. Deliberation on SNS platforms has been found to improve 
the feedback loop on governance and policy issues (Wyche, Schoenebeck, & Forte, 2013) and 
enhance mental elaboration and cognitive skills (Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). It has transformed 
governance discourse through the formation of governance networks, and improved 
mobilisation for participation in deliberation. These key points are further elaborated in the 
section below. 
The use of SNSs as a feedback platform on governance and policy issues has improved the 
delivery of government service in Kenya (Ndlela & Mulwo, 2017). Kenyans on Twitter (KOT), 
a collective group of Twitter, has achieved responsive action from governance institutions due 
to issue-based advocacy and complaint tweets. Such complaints/feedback have prompted 
positive responses from government and precipitated candid dialogue between stakeholders. 
This way, SNSs like Facebook and Twitter, have strategically contributed to a more interactive 
policy-making process (Ndlela & Mulwo, 2017). SNS feedback loops on policies have also 
reduced tedious bureaucratic engagement characteristics of governance institutions at the 
county level (Baruah, 2012). Most counties now accept digital and SNS feedback as key 
contributions to their policy and legislation making processes (Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). 
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Deliberations and subsequent feedback on SNSs were found to increase bridging capital among 
environment governance experts and other stakeholders in Kenya (Kagwanja & Southall, 
2009). SNSs have enhanced the possibility of contesting governance policies in a more 
interactive, unrestrictive way compared to the unidirectional mainstream media platforms 
(Wyche et al., 2013). 
Such unrestricted and interactive discussions crystallise key political and social issues 
into attitudes and have been found to improve cognitive skills (Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). The 
crystallisation of attitudes can either be positive or negative, according to Mutahi & Kimari 
(2017). They found that the formation of attitude among SNSs users enhanced their mental 
elaboration (the collective consideration of topics of concern) and the development their 
cognitive skills (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2013). Mental elaboration is what emboldens positive, 
collective, voter-led, anti-rigging monitoring actions as witnessed during the 2013 and 2017 
general elections in Kenya. Ishiyama et al. (2016), looking at voting patterns among young 
people in Kenya, noted that attitudes that favourably consider collective actions develop mainly 
from peer interactions and deliberations on SNSs. Peer deliberations, they found, encourage 
positive attitudes towards collective involvement and a sense of efficacy (Hassid & Brass, 
2015). However, peer deliberations can also influence deliberators to take extreme intolerant 
positions on specific governance issues. Further, the crystallisation of attitudes in a polarised 
context like Kenya can equally create negative salience and undesirable outcomes that have 
been known to fuel actual violence during election cycles (Lynch, 2014). Polarised 
deliberations outcomes that are collectively agreed can stifle inclusivity to achieve consensus 
in governance. This happens when the pursuit of consensus is valued more than the equality of 
voices for the minority groups. In such instances, deliberations harden ideological positions 
and erase the middle ground on key governance issues (Makinen & Kuira, 2008b).  
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The crystallisation of positive attitudes through SNSs deliberations can be argued to 
benefit urban dwellers due to the limitations of the digital divide (Kanyam et al., 2017). While 
the use of SNSs is very common in urban areas, challenges of digital illiteracy and access to 
digital technology remain unresolved in some remote areas/ counties in Kenya (Fuchs & Horak, 
2008). Therefore, whereas SNSs have generally increased the volume of governance discourse 
across the board (Kanyam et al., 2017), a critical section of the population remains digitally 
marginalised. Whereas more issues relating to transparency and accountability in both national 
and county governance are now brought to light than ever before, certain narratives by 
marginalised communities are still missing because the digitally illiterate are increasingly 
locked out of online deliberation in Kenya (Fuchs & Horak, 2008). Such individuals can 
read/write/communicate but they lack access and familiarity with digital tools. 
SNSs support the formation of online governance networks as an extension of offline 
ones. The use of SNSs for online governance networks expands and sustains the activities and 
connections between governance institutions, political actors, civic societies, and citizens 
beyond physical forums. A good example of governance networks with SNS presence is the 
national informal settlements coordination committee. The network exploits a web of 
relationships to advance specific governance agenda. The online network also encourages both 
formal and informal interactions on governance issues and is underpinned by either loose or 
close social ties between governance stakeholders (Hendriks, 2010). However, the norms of 
trustworthiness, inclusivity, diversity, and reciprocity which are pillars that often hold such 
governance networks together are sometimes challenging to develop in SNS contexts (Ramia 
et al., 2018). Because of its pluralistic composition, governance networks such as NISCC, with 
an online presence, are multi-sectoral, non-hierarchical platforms and can tackle emerging 
issues in their areas of jurisdiction. Governance networks advance and prioritise the 
convergence of thought on critical governance issues at the county level (Mkinen & Kuira, 
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2008). Unfortunately, these networks, even within online spheres, are sometimes plagued by 
unmoderated power differentials between various entities. Despite this, online governance 
networks have resulted in a number of positive aspects, including relational persistence in 
tackling governance issues (Baek, 2015) and pervasive awareness of diverse views leading to 
moderated opinions (Livingstone, 2014). 
Other influences of SNSs in deliberative governance include their use for rapid 
mobilisation for participation in county deliberation forums (Hampton & Lee, 2011). Most 
SNSs are characterised by local, regional and national networks which make them apt for 
mobilisation. Further, these platforms have reflected a sense of national unity in instances 
where Kenyans, despite their diversity, agree on some fundamental governance issues. These 
platforms are strategically tapped by human right groups with nationwide reach to mobilise, 
deliberate and coordinate programmes (Mwangi (2014). For instance, the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) uses its countrywide SNS platforms to receive, 
assess, monitor and respond to human rights issues in all counties in Kenya (Obel-Hansen, 
2013). Additionally, SNSs in Kenya have enriched lateral engagement without necessarily 
disrupting existing hierarchical systems (Snow & Taylor, 2015). In effect, they have reshaped 
and revamped traditional forms of governance activities, movements, and institutions and 
entrenched online protesting cultures. SNSs in Kenya can be said to have expanded the 
diversity and inclusivity in governance discourse compared in a way that sometimes influences 
the coverage priorities and agenda-setting role of the mainstream media (Kasara, 2013).  
SNSs have also heightened the general awareness, knowledge and contribution to 
governance discourse among Kenyans (Kamau, 2017; Marine, 2015; Mbithi et al., 2018). 
However, considering the information-sharing structure of SNS in Kenya, gaining knowledge 
depends mostly on substantive exposure elaboration (Kimeli et al., 2014; Omanga, 2019a). 
Exposure increases when participants involved in deliberation are well versed and informed 
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about the subject matter. It is also enhanced when users share content freely within and across 
SNS platforms. Information received via SNS platforms often forms the fodder for extended, 
considered interpersonal deliberations. However, the level of seriousness of information shared 
and attention accorded to such information on SNS are in doubt. News and information on 
topics like corruption, sex scandals, and political wrangles easily dominate SNS platforms in 
Kenya (Ogaji et al., 2017). Such topics, characterised by contention, glamour, humour, and 
sensual appeal, are more likely to ignite animated deliberations as opposed to governance 
issues (Wasserman & Maweu, 2014). This ostensibly creates aspersions on the ability of SNS 
to inform serious governance discourse effectively. Furthermore, the multiplicity of SNS 
audiences demands the acquisition of new skills, including the ability to handle context 
collapse characterised by diverse audiences (Gil-Lopez et al., 2018). The collision of formerly 
distinct audiences on SNS platforms means attributes like inclusivity, diversity, and tolerance 
are crucial skills for online deliberative governance (Winter & Rathnayake, 2017). 
 
4.1.3 SNSs and Polarisation in Kenya 
The role of SNSs in polarisation and the potential for violence was more evident following the 
2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya. Consequently, a power-sharing agreement was 
signed after the controversial presidential election results were announced (Shrum et al., 2011). 
Before this solution was achieved, the mainstream media had published the election results and 
the ensuing chaos and mayhem live on mainstream media. This was accompanied by ‘expert’ 
analysis and media commentaries that were deemed very biased, provocative, and 
inflammatory at that time (Simiyu, 2014). As a security measure, the government banned the 
live broadcast of all such election results and thus created an information blackout (Kasara, 
2013; Simiyu, 2014). Following the news blackout, Kenyans found other means of obtaining 
and relaying news. Fake news, misinformation, conspiracy theories, and inflammatory content 
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was widely exchanged across short message services (SMSs) further enhancing intolerance 
(Makinen & Kuira, 2008a). Consequently, the government then blocked the transmission of 
SMSs during the period of violence as well. Following this blockage, Kenyans turned to SNSs 
for updates. Many were actively involved in citizen journalism with constant reporting and 
updates on the ongoing situation in their communities, and on a national level, but largely 
influenced by speculation and personal opinions (Ishiyama et al., 2016). 
Yet SNS platforms offered citizens narratives consisting of polarised, inflammatory and 
exaggerated accounts of grassroots reactions during the crisis (Ishiyama et al., 2016; Makinen 
& Kuira, 2008a). While the mainstream media was partly resigned to government censorship 
due to fears of repression, SNS platforms like Twitter and Facebook offered swifter, 
unmoderated, very subjective, and more detailed accounts of the volatile post-election situation 
(Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012; Kanyinga, 2014; Makinen & Kuira, 2008a). According to Makinen 
& Kuira (2008), SNS platforms were not neutral but were culpable; they were a conduit, rather 
than the main cause of the post-election violence in Kenya (Shrum et al., 2011). 
Organising, coordination, financing, and mobilising for and against violence in 2007/8 
essentially relied on SNSs and other digital platforms (Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). Mobilisation 
for financial contributions towards the spread of specific polarised ideologies and messages 
were made via SNSs like Facebook and Twitter (Shrum et al., 2011). The same was true for 
groups and organisations that sought to promote peace and national coexistence during the 
period of tension (Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2012). What became abundantly clear was that security 
management in the age of digital technology could be very challenging in an environment of 
incivility and heterogeneity of views. Despite online tracking of digital technology in efforts 
to prevent violence, it was problematic for both state and non-state actors to detect online hate 
(Long et al., 2013). Messages exchanged on WhatsApp made it harder to penetrate encrypted 
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conversations. Laws and regulations on privacy also made it difficult for security personnel to 
intercept chats without authorisation (Ishiyama et al., 2016). 
Various scholars agree that the incitement to violence, intolerance, and ethnic hatred 
through SNSs in Kenya was largely facilitated by internet penetration, the rapid spread of 
mobile phones, and wide usage of SNSs (Finkel et al., 2012; Makinen & Kuira, 2008a; Shrum 
et al., 2011; Toka, 2008). However, polarisation and incitement did not start immediately after 
the contested election results (Simiyu, 2014). Before the elections, SNSs had already provided 
an opportunity for politicians to mobilise and campaign around incivil, inflammatory 
messages, thus reaching their constituency at little cost and with utmost convenience. Simiyu 
(2014) observed that the newly found power via SNSs emancipated mediated communication 
from a regulated and state-centred approach. It gave unmoderated power and agency to 
ordinary participants to openly voice their sentiments, some of which were laden with hatred 
and ideological polarisation (Ishiyama et al., 2016). This finding was further corroborated by 
Judge Kriegler’s commission report (Shrum et al., 2011). While the commission did not 
recommend the regulation of SNSs, it advised on the formation of an organisation to promote 
national cohesion and integration (Steeves, 2011). The National Cohesion and Integration Act 
(2008)13 was instituted to tackle online polarisation and the spread of online hate. Under 
sections 13, 62, and 63 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act (2008), hate speech on 
any platform is considered a criminal offence. The Act prohibits individuals from making 
hateful and inflammatory statements to spread hate and polarisation. It prohibits the use of 
images, words and programmes in a way that is considered abusive, incivil, intolerant, or 
insulting or polarising with the intention to threaten social cohesion. This law also prohibits 
                                                          
13 The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) of Kenya is a government agency intended to address the 
issue of inter-ethnic polarisation and conflicts. The Commission was set up through the National Cohesion and Integration 
Act (no. 12 of 2008) after the 2007- 2008 post-election crisis. 
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the use of abusive language to commit an offence, including stirring up ethnic hatred Kagwanja 
& Southall (2009). 
With this legislation and a constitutional institution to fight polarisation, the country 
experienced less polarisation and suppressed ethnic incitement on SNS platforms after the 
2007/8 crisis (Ishiyama et al., 2016). However, such platforms continue to provide alternative 
ways to spread incivil, polarising, and inflammatory political messages. Since its inception, the 
National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) has prosecuted few people on charges 
of sharing inflammatory content, incitement to violence, or spreading hate speech. This has 
been attributed to legislative loopholes and logistical challenges of monitoring, enforcing, and 
tackling hate crime, which according to Halakhe (2013) partly explains its inability to tame 
online hate speech and polarisation. 
However, before the general elections of 2013, SNSs were yet again polarised with 
statements of negative ethnicity, propaganda, intolerance, hate speech, and incitement 
(Mwangi, 2014). This time, polarisation was driven by the supporters of the two major 
antagonising political factions (Ombaka, 2015). SNSs were used to express the rift, which 
fortunately did not result in any actual violence as in 2007/8. The contested electoral outcomes 
and the ruling of the Supreme Court heightened the level of intolerance, polarisation, and 
tension even further (Cheeseman et al., 2014). Constant SNS updates with additional 
speculative content eventually heightened polarisation. Kameri-Mbote & Kabira (2016) and 
Kanyinga (2014) noted a pattern whereby voters are increasingly electing county and national 
legislators with more populist and polarised ideologies than their constituents. Consequently, 
discussions in parliament are more polarised and thus a spiral of polarised exchanges between 
political factions has been created. Conspiracy theories shared via SNSs can fuel partisan 
suspicion and can drive polarisation (Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). In every election campaign 
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period, the circulation of false narratives via SNSs risks igniting polarisation and tension in 
counties where ethnic allegiances form the core of politics and the governance process. 
Nonetheless, SNSs have also been strategic in finding solutions to some issues of 
polarisation and conflict management in Kenya. The integration of SNS affordances with other 
digital technologies have helped to identify conflict hot spots during election periods 
(Mukhongo, 2015; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017; Rohwerder, 2015). A good example is ‘Ushahidi’ 
meaning witness. ‘Ushahidi’ is a platform empowering citizen to map out, expose and discuss 
issues like corruption, hate speech, violent outbreaks, and human rights violations (Freedom 
House, 2012; Souter & Kerrets-Makau, 2012). Ushahidi combines geo-mapping technology 
with SNS features to promote rapid response measures during natural disasters and 
catastrophes. Since its inception in 2008, Ushahidi has spread to more than 150 countries 
(Souter & Kerrets-Makau, 2012). The use of Ushahidi shows how SNSs adopt the elements of 
Web 2.0 in identifying conflict hotspots and conflict management. Using Ushahidi, participants 
share their experiences, including first-hand accounts of vote bribery, electoral violence, and 
rigging practices (Kirea, 2018).  
Users can attach evidence using photos and videos of their revelations via SNSs. SNSs 
in Kenya have facilitated the development of critical and effective early warning systems that 
curb the spread of violence. Integration of SNSs in early warning systems allows for micro-
level intervention and responses to violent conflict (Karume, 2016). Stakeholders are then able 
to prevent developing conflict in its early stages. This bottom-up approach to conflict 
management, as argued by scholars, is more effective than state-centric interventions (Bratton, 
2012). However, the role of algorithms in the ranking, selecting, filtering, and recommending 
of specific content displayed on the users’ SNS feeds is a worrying trend for sensitive 
interventions like conflict. For instance, bots14 are highly ranked Twitter influencers in Kenya 
                                                          




at 27.6% (Bloggers Association of Kenya, 2017). This means bots are potentially more 
influential than the media, bloggers, and politicians. More bots can mean a more rampant 
spread of intolerant, polarising, misinformation and fake news. 
Another significant aspect of SNS adoption in the Kenyan context is crowdsourcing. 
Crowdsourcing using SNSs creates a problem-solving model through the integration of 
information, interventions, and practice in online communities (Simon et al., 2014). This 
strategy was mainly applied during the 2007/08 post-election violence in Kenya. Citizens were 
able to document and report conflict hotspots and violent incidents during the crisis (Benesch, 
2014). They shared videos and photos instantaneously with a twin effect: firstly, it further 
inflamed and aggravated the existing tension and conflict. It created a platform for 
understanding the scale, scope and horror of the conflict through rich media content exchange 
(Benesch, 2014; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). Key actors were consequently able to track, analyse, 
and document the existing structural tensions, flashpoints and social divides (Mutahi & Kimari, 
2017). The concept of digital humanitarians was conceived where aid, volunteers and donors 
were mobilised via SNSs to assist those affected (Ndavula & Mberia, 2012). SNSs in Kenya 
can be said to have promoted a sense of communal interaction revolving around user‐created 
content and shared meaning (Omanga, 2015). In this case, the user is elevated to the level of 
the content creator and consumer. This is a very powerful function where information content 
and narrative are controlled by citizens. SNSs in Kenya have consolidated the convergence of 
societies, thus transforming them, in some cases, into participative, informative and connected 
systems (Makinen & Kuira, 2008a, 2008b; Ndlela & Mulwo, 2017). 
4.2. Affordances and Usage of WhatsApp     
The focus of this study is WhatsApp as the largest SNS platform in Kenya. WhatsApp 
messenger started as a proprietary cross-platform, instant messaging service for smartphones 
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(Sarker, 2015), and is now available in new generation smartphones using Android, and 
Blackberry across the globe (Mefolere, 2016). The enhanced affordances of WhatsApp now 
allow users to send and receive video, images and audio messages using enhanced integrated 
location mapping features (Rastogi & Hendler, 2016). According to the founders/developers, 
it was to replace text messaging via the SMS platform (Rastogi & Hendler, 2016). It was 
expected to be uniquely different from other SNSs being a charge-free, advert-free and more 
flexible communications platform (Kurowski, 2016).  
WhatsApp messages tend to be more informal, social, and conversational in nature 
compared to SMS messages. A particularly remarkable feature of WhatsApp messaging is its 
networking function and ability to afford multiple integrations of individual users into public 
groups. It is common in Kenya to find open, inviting, and accessible public WhatsApp groups. 
The links to these WhatsApp groups are frequently publicised on well-known SNS platforms 
and popular websites. These groups are typically themed around specific agendas or particular 
topics like politics, community development, interest groups, ideological pursuits, sports and 
professions alignments. 
WhatsApp has a range of inherently distinct properties that are dissimilar to other SNSs 
and are conceptualised as affordances in its networking functionalities. The user’s phone 
number and the SIM cards are the primary and unique identifier in WhatsApp groups 
(Mefolere, 2016). Setting up a WhatsApp account requires an individual to have an active 
phone number and Internet connection. The user’s phone number acts as the app’s unique 
identification component. It can provide user-to-user connection, broadcast messages, and also 
group chats as earlier noted. WhatsApp interactions reflects an engagement using various 
formats including: plain text messages and multimedia files, i.e. audio, images, and video 
(Muendo, 2017). It also entails the use of geolocation information and contact cards. 
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Each WhatsApp user is identified with a specific profile. Like other SNS platforms, a 
profile consists of a set of information, including a user’s name, status line, and profile picture. 
The profile storage of each user’s profile happens centrally. This profile is visible to oneself 
and other users who can download it as long as they are added to the contacts. The central 
messaging systems of WhatsApp also manages other processes like user authentication, 
registration, and message relay. Unlike other SNSs, WhatsApp privacy settings and features 
afford the user comparatively more accessibility controls for their profile. Moderation of 
engagement with other users happens through blocking like in other SNSs. WhatsApp also 
enables the user to block a user from their contact lists. WhatsApp also stores all the sent or 
received content in a chat database. 
WhatsApp utilises a customised version of the open standard, extensible messaging and 
presence protocol (XMPP) (Mefolere, 2016). Principally, the user’s phone number is used to 
generate their profile and account, which then becomes the standard for establishing a 
username (Calleja-castillo & Gonzalez-calderon, 2018). Through a WhatsApp web interface, 
WhatsApp web capabilities are accessed through laptops and computers based on a scanned 
configuration application where users download an app player (Kurowski, 2016). Service users 
can download the WhatsApp web version which they can use as comfortably as their phone-
based versions. This means WhatsApp is heavily loading the critical access network and in 
particular, the uplink direction (Fiadino et al., 2016).  
WhatsApp has other attractive affordances similar to other SNS platforms. Its global 
dispersion and penetration networks allow users to pursue personalised networking and still 
remain in a global network. This leads to the formation of private, individualised and egocentric 
sociability portfolios (Ndlela & Mulwo (2017). Research on WhatsApp messaging across 
various fields reflect its use to connect and engage with social and professional peers virtually 
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like in medicine, psychology, imaging, media and education (Ellanti et al., 2017; Martinez et 
al., 2017; Mazzuoccolo et al., 2018; Garrison et al., 2016; Srilakshminarayana, 2016). 
An individual’s group of friends consists of participants already existing in their 
phone’s contact list. Addition of a new group member entails first adding them into one’s 
phonebook/ contacts. Unlike other SNS platforms, the formation of private WhatsApp groups 
is a more intentional, laborious, and selective process. Otherwise, WhatsApp automatically 
identifies phone contacts in a user’s phone. Visible contacts become eligible members of one’s 
group. Click-to-join WhatsApp links can now be formed and shared for anyone to join, since 
a recent development. Administrators can control a group of networked members because of 
their choice and control over their list of contacts (Fiadino et al., 2015). 
The establishment of public WhatsApp group links makes it easier to join such groups 
without saving phone numbers to a user’s phone as a precondition. Initially, mutual consent 
was not compulsory in order to add someone into one’s group. However, as earlier noted, 
recently updated affordances now prohibit establishing a group without the consent of target 
users (Okeowo, 2019). The disadvantage is that a user’s phone contacts and members are 
automatically visible to all group members. Similarly, any comments or contributions by any 
members are identifiable to that particular individual. The conversation amongst a group of 
participants on the same platform is called a ‘group chat’. Users in public groups can suggest 
other users’ contacts and addition via the snowball method. There can be several administrators 
in a WhatsApp group. Blocking a specific user prevents all future contact and consequently 
hides all future edits to profile information (Kurowski, 2016). Profile information is unique in 
WhatsApp in the sense that it is visible to all contacts by default, participants on the same 
platform is called a ‘group chat’. Users in public groups can suggest other users’ contacts and 
addition via the snowball method. There can be several administrators in a WhatsApp group. 
Blocking a specific user prevents all future contact and consequently hides all future edits to 
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profile information (Kurowski, 2016). Profile information is unique in WhatsApp in the sense 
that it is visible to all contacts by default but the user can limit the visibility of the profile by 
choosing options in the settings menu. The key advantage of WhatsApp as envisaged by the 
developers was its end-to-end encryption features to guarantee information security, sanctity 
of deliberations and protect user privacy (Rastogi & Hendler, 2016).  
4.2.1 WhatsApp’s Popularity in Kenya  
As earlier noted, WhatsApp is more popular than Facebook or Twitter in Kenya (GeoPoll, 
2017). Studies have linked the high WhatsApp usage in Kenya with its user-friendly interface 
and appealing interactivity affordances (Waterson, 2018). It uses a small internet bandwidth 
which makes it affordable and accessible to people in the lower socio-demographic categories. 
Its ability to share images and video and the fact that such content can easily cascade through 
groups makes it an apt SNS for governance deliberations. WhatsApp does not employ an 
algorithm that limits its organic reach (Gonçalves & Santos, 2014). It is devoid of negative 
content sieving that is characteristic of algorithms, machine learning, and data science on other 
SNS platforms like Facebook and Twitter (Gudipaty & Jhala, 2015). 
WhatsApp has tipped the smartphone into mainstream culture across the globe (Rastogi 
& Hendler, 2016). In contexts like Kenya, network service providers like Safaricom now sell 
smartphones with incentives that include free bandwidth to access services such as WhatsApp 
and other SNS platforms (Oteri, Kibet, & Ndungu, 2015). It has revolutionised the way of life 
while influencing deliberations and socialisation in both developed and developing countries 
but the user can limit the visibility of the profile by choosing options in the settings menu. The 
key advantage of WhatsApp as envisaged by the developers was its end-to-end encryption 
features to guarantee information security, sanctity of deliberations and protect user privacy 
(Rastogi & Hendler, 2016). WhatsApp allows closed, more asynchronous, and intimate 
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deliberations between group members. Its end-to-end encryption boosts user perception of 
privacy and security (Rashidi et al., 2016; Rastogi & Hendler, 2016). The specificity of groups 
members through systematic addition and selection, as in the case of private WhatsApp groups, 
further enhances the perception of privacy. Exclusivity in private WhatsApp groups means the 
possibility of reaching ideologically minded participants or creating echo chambers exists. 
Homogeneous WhatsApp users are often selected to fit or suit a specific purpose of 
communication (Bouhnik et al., 2014).  
While it serves the purpose of mass communications like any other SNS, WhatsApp 
can keep the initial source of the message anonymous (Sarker, 2015). With the viral transfer of 
information, it is challenging to trace the originator of messages. This presents a technical 
difficulty when curbing misinformation, hate speech, radicalisation, and polarisation via 
WhatsApp (see the section below). The dissemination through the app allows personalised 
messages because the exchange mostly happens between known users with one another’s 
contacts. WhatsApp has also facilitated what Morris (2017) calls the hybridisation of media. 
In a ‘twist of reversed digital engagement protocol’, mainstream media are now turning to 
WhatsApp for news collection and dissemination (Bright, 2016, p. 19).   
Among young people in Kenya, WhatsApp has achieved broad adoption because it is a 
stable, secure platform, cheaper than text messaging, user-friendly, and has a comparatively 
high hyper proximity with users (Kuroski, 2016; Rastogi & Hendler, 2016). As with many SNS 
platforms, WhatsApp strips images of any useful metadata (Sarker, 2015). This happens when 
images and videos start circulating within groups, and among users, and it is difficult to 
determine the origin of such content. As mentioned earlier, this is a great setback in the fight 
against radicalisation, criminal indoctrination, and terrorism. WhatsApp messaging has raised 
concerns relating to the spread of obscene videos and images.  
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Political aspirants continue to use WhatsApp to communicate with their voters (Rashdi, 
2018). This has included sharing political adverts in the form of videos, catchy phrases, and 
audio recordings with their constituency. On the other hand, voters have used it to discuss and 
share their political preferences (De Zúñiga et al., 2019). WhatsApp use is popular for 
entertainment purposes such as to share jokes or funny messages. WhatsApp messaging is 
primarily used to ‘dwell’ with significant others in the virtual space (Flores-salgado & 
Castineira-benitez, 2018). The effects of WhatsApp use on social relationships includes a sense 
of belonging and a secure bond of commitment (Sarker, 2015). WhatsApp adoption is intended 
for interaction with close ties in comparison to more public platforms such as Twitter, 
Facebook, and Instagram (Rosenfeld et al., 2018), which revolve more around interaction with 
weak ties. 
Studies looking at the digital discourse of WhatsApp group messages suggested the use 
of hybrid language as a distinctive pattern and feature of this platform in Kenya (Mefolere, 
2016; Montag et al., 2015; Omanga, 2019a). Scholars have inferred the critical functions of 
emoji, emoticons, and memes on WhatsApp as reinforcing the message and possible action 
(Butticè et al., 2018; Cetinkaya, 2017). These affordances are also important for conveying 
feelings and emotions that are contextually understood and appropriate but challenging to 
transmit in a written style (Handelman, 2018). In contexts like Kenya, the nature of WhatsApp 
groups follows a deterministic social perspective. Social dynamics between participants, the 
level and nature of interactions between them dictate how participants establish, use and 
interact within their WhatsApp groups (Fiadino et al., 2015).  
 4.3. WhatsApp as a Public Sphere in Kenya 
Having looked at WhatsApp affordances and its significant adoption in Kenya, its 
pervasiveness raises questions about its impact on socio-political dynamics related to 
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deliberative governance. These questions centre on whether WhatsApp has really transformed 
and revitalised the Habermasian concept of the public sphere. The public sphere, according to 
Habermas, should have three components (see Chapter Two, pp 69-75): it should have equal, 
inclusive, and protected involvement of participants and groups. Secondly, it should facilitate 
unfettered and unlimited access to information. Lastly, the platform should be devoid of 
institutional or commercial influence (Habermas, 2005; Habermas, 1989; McLaverty & 
Halpin, 2008; Ofunja et al., 2018; Susen, 2018). This section examines whether WhatsApp 
meets the Habermasian criteria of a public sphere and its aptness to enhance deliberative 
governance in Kenya. 
According to Habermas (1987, 1989, 1992), the public sphere is a unitary sphere which 
allows universal access (cited in Dahlberg, 2010). With over 12 million users in contexts like 
Kenya, the potential for WhatsApp to facilitate productive governance discourse is at least 
superficially compelling. WhatsApp provides wide access because people in geographically 
dispersed locations can join and form multiple interlinked networks. Hence, it can be argued 
that WhatsApp can facilitate more equal, inclusive, and protected interaction of participants 
and groups in deliberations. As a platform, WhatsApp dispels some critics of the public sphere 
that it privileges a particular style of deliberation, class of individuals, and level of rationality 
(Silva, Colussi, & Rocha, 2018). This is because those who view one another to be in the 
minority can form their own groups and networks via WhatsApp. However, such self-selected 
membership to WhatsApp can create homogeneous groups leading to echo chambers and 
selective exposure effects (see Chapter Two, pp.69-76). WhatsApp has widened and broadened 
the calibre of participants in the public sphere by including groups initially excluded from 
public discourse and deliberation such as minority groups and women (Rashdi, 2018). Yet, 
information on WhatsApp is not entirely unlimited, nor is there inclusivity and equality in its 
access (Dahir, 2017). Whether WhatsApp achieves equality, inclusivity, and unfettered access 
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are context dependent when looking at the Habermasian ideal. Due to the digital divide in 
Kenya, WhatsApp is significantly limited to particular socio-demographic groups. 
As a digital public sphere, WhatsApp has enhanced individuated networks and 
revamped online deliberative structures (Dayani & Ariff, 2014). WhatsApp encourages 
participants in groups to express their private dissenting views openly in what they consider to 
be safe ‘spaces’. Further, WhatsApp groups may project a perception of tightly closed 
discussion enclaves with limited and selected exposure engagement with the outside entities. 
However, for public WhatsApp groups with online click-to-join links, the potential of content 
reaching diverse audiences through numerous interconnected public and private networks is 
immense. Unlike before, when dissenting or anti-establishment views could only be channelled 
through mainstream media for wide reach and coverage, WhatsApp now acts as an alternative 
ideology propagation route for pressure groups and civil society actors in Kenya (Moura & 
Michelson, 2017). Through WhatsApp, governance interest groups can access both niche and 
mass audiences more quickly and effectively (Guler, 2017). 
In an era of heightened surveillance by the Kenyan government security apparatus, 
WhatsApp provides a more secure alternative space devoid of institutional and commercial 
influence in line with Habermasian ideals. Habermas noted the destructive factors that 
prevented the proper functioning of the public sphere (Kruse et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2015). For 
instance, he argued that commercial interests limit the role of mainstream media as effective 
public spheres (Habermas, 2005; Habermas, 1989). Habermas suggests that the public sphere 
should be revitalised through ‘speech communities’ (Kruse et al., 2018a). Such communities 
should be free from institutional influence and commercial interests that would prevent clarity, 
cloud objectivity, and prevent particular actions (Srinivasan et al., 2019a). Speech 
communities, for instance, prioritise deliberations as well as network building which are 
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translated into action (Karapanos et al., 2016). WhatsApp is a good example of such speech 
communities. 
However, the concept of WhatsApp as a public sphere faces various challenges in the 
Kenyan context. WhatsApp has promoted a fragmented deliberative structure within Kenya’s 
public sphere and political culture including: the fragmentation of space-time interactive 
dynamics as noted by Opperman & Vuuren (2018). Transient, asynchronous, and often 
incidental interactions via private and public WhatsApp groups eventually become pervasive 
in a user’s daily life (Silva et al., 2018). This means that while various issues of public concern 
are deliberated and forwarded within the confines of private groups and public spheres, it is 
impractical to pay attention to all shared content unless selective exposure is practiced. Such a 
practice is, though, problematic (see Chapter Two, p.71), whereas instant interactive dynamics 
in WhatsApp groups increases issue prominence and exposure; these increases risk issues 
associated with misinformation (Sevdalis et al., 2015).  
Transient, asynchronous, and often incidental interactions create difficulties for 
governance institutions to grasp pertinent issues (Santos & Faure, 2018). Fragmented 
deliberative structures also mean privileged governance information is circulated and accessed 
within a specific WhatsApp group only. This negates the idea of WhatsApp as a public sphere. 
Similar to other SNS platforms, WhatsApp is likely to amplify and reinforce certain negative 
tendencies that already exists in Kenya’s socio-cultural and political context such as intolerance 
and limited inclusivity (Durmaz et al., 2019; Flores-salgado & Castineira-benitez, 2018). In the 
context of pluralistic cultural interactions, WhatsApp users’ interest and demands are likely to 
become more intertwined and inconsistent (Durmaz et al., 2019). Deliberative governance via 
WhatsApp can become saturated with multiple voices (Maqsood et al., 2016). Multiple voices 




WhatsApp use and formation of WhatsApp groups in contexts like Kenya is shaped by 
specific social interaction patterns (GeoPoll, 2017; Mychelle et al., 2016; Omanga, 2019a). 
Such interaction patterns defines how people and groups connect, adopt, and interact in a 
unique way in their SNSs platform (Anglano, 2014). For instance, one common interaction 
pattern in Kenya is that individuals and groups who meet offline form WhatsApp groups where 
they continue their interactions and engagement online (Kibet & Ward, 2018). Therefore, it 
lengthens conversation and deliberations that would otherwise end with the physical separation 
of participants (Mychelle et al., 2016). Another interactive pattern involves the integration of 
evidenced-based deliberations. Using WhatsApp affordances, sharing of videos, audio, web-
links, and textual material to corroborate deliberative arguments is common (Omanga, 2019a). 
Evidence-based deliberation via WhatsApp has enhanced the credibility of arguments by 
ordinary and grassroots organisations especially on matters related to human rights and 
politicisation of ethnicity. In Kenya, WhatsApp allows people to retain the connection with 
their villages which then promotes information exchange between the urban and rural groups 
(Omanga, 2019a). WhatsApp groups in urban and rural areas have seen resource-rich urban 
groups support less endowed rural groups with tangible results through fundraising and 
mobilisation of other development resources (Omanga, 2019b). 
An existing culture in Kenya relates to how WhatsApp may have transformed the place 
of humour and its relevance within the public sphere. Humour in previous research has been 
considered as averse to deliberation, mobilisation, and efforts towards building social capital 
(Killen et al., 2018; Holton & Lewis, 2011; Lange, 2008; Lee, 2012). However, humour in 
WhatsApp can provide an aesthetic value to otherwise mundane deliberative discourses. 
WhatsApp provides a para‐social space where groups converge and this affords them a 
platform to share, to belong, and to connect (Kibet & Ward, 2018). Humour is very important 
in creating a sense of belonging and connection necessary for deliberation. Deliberation, 
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reinforced with humour, has been found to enhance the capacity for message reception and 
persuade attitudes (Boria, 2011; Livingstone, 2014). Humour in WhatsApp is shared in the 
form of videos, memes, jocular quotes, and emojis. Creation and forwarding of memes and 
humorous videos are part of a pervasive sub-culture in WhatsApp interaction in Kenya. 
Furthermore, humour on WhatsApp can help relax the discursive style and thus provide an 
alternative to the rigid elite-controlled broadcast platforms. However, while the sharing of 
humour in WhatsApp groups holds a promise for increased access to governance discourse, it 
is possible that parody and humour can, at the same time, foster apathy and cynicism according 
to (Davis et al., 2018). Cynicism, in the context of deliberations, is likely to lessen the 
seriousness and attention that should accompany deliberative governance. 
 
4.5 WhatsApp and Deliberative Governance in Kenyan Counties 
The challenges and shortcoming of deliberations in public forums across various counties has 
led to the adoption and use of WhatsApp to fill the gap. For instance, public forum venues had 
restricted access in terms of the number of people who participated in deliberations 
(International Budget Partnership, 2014). In addition, the documents that guided deliberations 
in public forums were packaged in technical language containing jargon (Omanga, 2019). They 
were bound in highly voluminous texts with dense prose making grassroots interrogation of 
the documents challenging and near impossible for some participants (Ndlela & Mulwo, 2017). 
In some instances, the actual role of public deliberation in the forums was grossly ignored or 
misunderstood (World Bank, 2015). County officials considered it as a bothersome legal 
routine while citizens saw it as a platform to self-express and speak to power on anything. 
Therefore, there was a general mismatch between the intent and actual outcome as regards 
public deliberation forums. Consequently, the spaces and public forums convened as per the 
constitutional requirement were not diverse, inclusive or representative as anticipated (Dahir, 
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2017). There was a pattern of mere tokenism where public deliberations sought to attain the 
minimum legal requirements in form but not in actuality (Finch et al., 2015). Citizens, 
exasperated by the superfluity and unreliability of public deliberations, sought alternative 
platforms for meaningful engagement. Such a context gave rise to SNS platforms like 
WhatsApp to fill the void. The influence of WhatsApp on county deliberative governance in 
Kenya, it can be argued, revolves around various factors (Connectivity; watchdog role; 
mobilisation and transformation of deliberation):  
Connectivity - Digital optimists argue that WhatsApp has transformed the structure of 
networking compared to other SNS platforms that have positively influenced county 
government political and governance discourse (Kanyinga, 2014; Maloiy et al.,2016). 
WhatsApp has supported the translation of county public forums into virtual networks of 
interaction and thus lengthened deliberations beyond offline contexts (Lynch & Crawford, 
2011). For instance, a WhatsApp group called ‘Sauti ya wachuuzi’15 (voice of young traders) 
began after its members met in a public forum in Nakuru county. It has more than 300 members 
and is touted as having contributed effectively to the election of the ‘peoples’ Governor in the 
2017 general elections. The WhatsApp group was the centre of platform debates and analysis 
that informed the decisions of many to choose the leaders they settled for at the county and 
national level elections. The group drew diverse small-scale traders from across the county and 
created a large network of similar minded participants via the WhatsApp group. This 
exemplifies the adoption of WhatsApp for networking, deliberation, and coordination of a 
strategy to achieve governance outcomes (Kiptalam & Rodrigues, 2010). 
Mobilisation-Some scholars have connected WhatsApp use with improved networking 
dynamics and political volunteerism in civil society organisations in Kenyan counties 
(Nyambura & Waema, 2011). WhatsApp is among the leading platforms used by non-
                                                          
15 Sauti ya wachuuzi is a WhatsApp group that has more than 500 members across Nakuru County. Their aim is to advocate 
for improved trading conditions and environment for small scale traders at the county level. 
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governmental organisations for informal engagement at the county level (Kanyinga, 2014; 
Maloiy et al., 2016). WhatsApp groups like ‘Sauti ya wachuuzi’ have shown a great potential 
to create substantial network capital consisting of both informal and informal engagement 
(Simon et al., 2014). It has promoted the merger of participatory capital and enlivened the 
groups’ commitment towards a culture of informal, purposeful but coordinated discussions 
(Srinivasan et al., 2019b). Evidence shows that groups like ‘Sauti ya wachuuzi’ have positively 
restructured and transformed the submission of petitions on political and governance processes 
at the county level (Karombo, 2019). ‘Sauti ya wachuuzi’ group members discuss and agree on 
specific issues, then select a group of representatives who then present their petitions during 
county assembly public participation forums. Similarly, petitions can be forwarded to relevant 
county leaders through WhatsApp platforms directly. Such networking and coordination has 
improved inclusivity to the extent that geographically diverse groups can instantly contribute 
and aggregate their discussions into petitions at the county assemblies (Swigger, 2013).  
Transformation-WhatsApp, has transformed a non-hierarchical and dialogical 
interaction thus making deliberations more inclusive and responsive at the county level (Ndlela 
& Mulwo, 2017). The implication of a non-hierarchical approach is the decentralisation of 
deliberations to a more local level within the counties (Kanyinga, 2014; Maloiy et al, 2016). 
Whereas county governance institutions mismanaged public forums and sometimes 
manipulated information flow through a top-down approach in governance (Brooks et al., 
2014), platforms like WhatsApp allowed a convergence of a top-down and bottom-up flow of 
information. This has resulted in a more responsive governance interaction framework which 
takes user-centred perspectives and views into account (Fiadino et al., 2016). WhatsApp in 
some counties has mainly facilitated a bottom-up approach where informal discussions on the 
platforms have led to the submission of formal budgetary proposals. This has translated into a 
much more pro-active and inclusive budget-making process than before (Osatuyi, 2013). ‘The 
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Nakuru Analyst’, using both formal and informal budget discussions forums, champions 
policies and issues they feel the county government has long ignored or needs to address.  
Part of the group’s aim was to create a convergence platform for county citizens and 
elected county authorities in one digital space for deliberation (Omanga, 2019b). Omanga 
(2019) describes the WhatsApp group as an alternative platform to public forums and a specific 
barometer of county governance and political affairs. Because of the limited number of 
participants who can join the WhatsApp group, the administrator encourages activeness in 
contribution, interaction, and engagement among its members, failure to do which risks 
removal from the group as a member. During the electioneering period of 2017, the 
administrators of ‘The Nakuru Analyst’ invited aspirants of various elective seats in the county 
to sell their manifesto and answer questions of interest to the WhatsApp group members. With 
increased interest in the concept, the ‘The Nakuru Analyst’ was replicated and formed at sub-
county levels (constituencies) through a network of other WhatsApp groups known by the same 
name: ‘Analysts’ (Omanga, 2019b), for example, Kuresoi Analysts, Naivasha Analysts, Molo 
Analysts, and Njoro Analysts, and so on. An interesting dynamic that was evident in the 
‘Analysts’ WhatsApp groups is the focus and attention on specific discussion norms (Omanga, 
2019b). Discussion norms enforced include: civility, tolerance, respect of others’ opinions, and 
forbidden sharing of content that is obscene, inflammatory, bordering on rumours or doesn’t 
add value to the deliberations (Omanga, 2019b). 
Watchdog role- WhatsApp groups in Kenyan counties have also strengthened citizens’ 
watchdog roles in governance by pushing for accountability and querying processes and 
activities at the county level. A good example of a public watchdog via WhatsApp happens in 
groups such as ‘The County Watch’ (Kericho County) and ‘The Accountability Demand 
Network’ (Nairobi County). These WhatsApp groups use videos, audio, pictures, and even 
written submissions to document and share perceived misappropriation, malpractices, and 
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resource misuse within the county. Various cases of corruption, low service delivery and 
slothful transaction in county governance institutions have been captured and forwarded to 
relevant authorities for redress through initiatives of the ‘The County Watch’. However, due to 
the sensitivity of these group’s activities, most of its member have been threatened and silenced 
because of their pursuits. Another challenge has been the lack of a legislative framework to 
strengthen the group’s demands for accountability due to lack of access to information laws. 
Instant messaging platforms like WhatsApp have thwarted and frustrated attempts by 
governments to suppress access to information (Ott & Rosser, 2007). WhatsApp has 
significantly circumvented government censorship of information and access due to its 
securitised end-to-end encryption (Silva et al., 2018). WhatsApp can strategically circumvent 
spatial, cognitive, and temporal constraints individuals face in establishing accountability 
networks within their counties (Boulianne, 2018). A study on the perception of privacy on SNS 
platforms ranked WhatsApp very high among young and educated respondents across East 
Africa (Mefolere, 2016), and accounts for the overwhelming membership by this segment of 
the population. 
Also related to its watchdog role is that WhatsApp has expanded the scope of citizen 
involvement in identifying remedies for practical, technical and structural shortcomings 
affecting accountability and transparency in governance (Uraia Trust, 2012). WhatsApp groups 
like ‘The County Watch’ have positively contributed to addressing the unstructured and 
unresponsive county governance institutions. WhatsApp groups on politics and governance are 
driven by gaps in voice and accountability between leaders and citizens (Ndlela & Mulwo, 
2017). Another vibrant and effective WhatsApp group examined in the study is called ‘In The 
Streets of Nakuru’, whose objectives are enhancing environmental conservation and county 
sanitation awareness. This WhatsApp group spearheaded the #ISupportBanPlastic, advocating 
the plastic ban of below 100 microns. With their petitioning, the county government banned 
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plastics and this resulted in nationwide modelled legislation and implementation. The ease and 
speed with which information related to transparency issues related to governance are widely 
shared, discussed and analysed via WhatsApp is both remarkable and dangerous (Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2018). By contributing to free speech and the free flow of information, WhatsApp 
can liberalise voice, power and communicative efficiency on governance issues according to 
Boulianne, (2018). For instance, members of county assembly are now able to instantly update 
and inform their constituency on various bills on the floor of the house via WhatsApp. In turn, 
interest groups and citizens are able to relay real-time feedback to their representatives to 
fortify their arguments in the county assemblies (Omanga, 2019). 
While no study has been done, digital pessimists have hinted on the narrowcasting 
features of WhatsApp and its potential to enhance political polarisation, ideological 
intolerance, and social fragmentation at the county level (Mueller, 2014). However, the 
pluralist structure of WhatsApp groups will possibly enhance exposure and exchange of diverse 
content. It is not clear whether the diversity of information sources has translated into the 
plurality of viewpoints in the Kenyan context. There is a possibility that homogeneous 
WhatsApp groups will consult specific subject matter experts and analysts on specific 
governance issues. This practice is likely to further narrow the homogeneity of their 
perspectives, views and information. However, the contrary perspective is that WhatsApp 
users, like on other SNS platforms, can have general exposure to content outside their spheres. 
Access to information sources through shared links from other SNS platforms can challenge 
the ideological preferences and issue positions of WhatsApp group members (Nickerson, 
2017). The frequency of interaction and deliberation that is characteristic of WhatsApp use 
means access to diverse content will happen more profoundly and continuously.   
Whereas WhatsApp has attained greater adoption in Kenya, it may have supported the 
reinforcement hypothesis by granting significant benefits to those already vibrant on other SNS 
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platforms (Buys et al., 2009; Makinen & Kuira, 2008b; Ndavula & Mberia, 2012). WhatsApp 
may have attracted participants who possess the requisite civic skills, income, inhabit strategic 
areas of residence (urban dwellers), and have access to socially supportive civic networks all 
of which are important determinants of participation in deliberations (Makinen & Kuira, 2008b; 
Ndavula & Mberia, 2012). Based on the arguments of a transformed public sphere, 
improvements in the platform of interactions, as in the case of WhatsApp, may not significantly 
improve the cognitive and interactive dynamics of deliberators (Boulianne, 2019). Studies on 
media effects have argued that simple knowledge-based stimulus-response models only 
account for a minute fraction of human behaviour (Iyengar et al., 2016). By increasing the 
range of information, scholars found that SNS platforms like WhatsApp do not necessarily 
translate into an informed populace (Berg-schlosser, 2017; Ndavula & Mberia, 2012). While 
examining the gaps between the availability of information via SNS platforms and low 
participation levels among Kenyan voters, Maloiy et al. (2016) found a negative correlation. 
Information has to be processed by users to create meaning. Practical knowledge rather than 
mere information translates citizens’ apathy into efficacy and participation in deliberations 
(Loader & Mercea, 2011a). Improved cognitive abilities among WhatsApp users is not solely 
dependent on the availability of information (Price et al., 2002); other factors account for such 
abilities as well. 
4.6 WhatsApp Groups and Polarisation in Kenya 
Having looked at the impact of WhatsApp on governance dynamics related to connectivity, 
watchdog roles, mobilisation, and transformation of deliberations, no study linking WhatsApp 
and polarisation currently exists in Kenya. This research, however, suggests that the connection 
between the two is likely to depend on the deliberative structure and deliberative norms in the 
platform (see Chapter Two, p.37). These two factors are likely to influence the quality and 
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plurality of reasoned arguments on governance and polarisation on WhatsApp. As a 
deliberative structure, WhatsApp messages are generally encrypted and their suitability for 
spreading fake news, inflammatory content, and misinformation is very high (Santos & Faure, 
2018). End-to-end encryption means that only the intended recipients can access their messages 
(Yus, 2017) and, therefore, provides a safe-haven away from government regulation and 
monitoring by security agencies (Ndlela & Mulwo, 2017; Srinivasan et al., 2019a). Encrypted 
messages make it challenging to fact-check, monitor, and control the spread of polarising 
content (Mychelle et al., 2016). It is critical to understand the socio-demographic usage of 
WhatsApp as a deliberative structure. Studies on SNS platforms in Kenya suggest that 
polarisation is more prevalent among older age groups who are least likely to join any such 
platforms (Kirea, 2018). Other studies have also found group polarisation to be more prevalent 
among rural as compared to urban groups (Ndavula & Mberia, 2012; Wyche et al., 2013).  
As relates to exposure to heterogenous viewpoints, WhatsApp is likely to embolden 
how participants express their diverse identities and ideological positions (Mutahi & Kimari, 
2017; Mychelle et al., 2016). As suggested in other SNS studies, WhatsApp groups are likely 
to consist of homogeneous participants, and they are likely to heighten awareness of in-group 
and out-group identities. This is likely to foster the increasing growth of negative perceptions 
towards those holding divergent opinions as has been proven on other SNS platforms in Kenya 
(Wyche et al., 2013). Furthermore, identity politics that is characteristic of Kenyan society is 
likely to exist in enclosed online environments such as WhatsApp groups (Karpisek et al., 
2015). It is, however, not clear whether diverse participants translate into diverse viewpoints. 
Research in other contexts shows that it is possible to have diverse participants with 
homogeneous viewpoints (Duggins, 2017). It is also unclear whether exercising moderation 
and enhancing tolerance in a diverse context will achieve less polarisation of divisive 
governance issues in deliberations. 
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To manage appropriate use of the platform and the enforcement of deliberative norms, 
WhatsApp has also recently introduced a number of measures to curb misinformation and 
polarisation (Marfianto & Riadi, 2018). The explicit labelling of multi-media content as 
forwards (Marfianto & Riadi, (2018). This was intended to limit the replicability and scalability 
of incivil, hateful, and inflammatory content. The content is strictly limited to five forwards at 
a specific time. The most frequently forwarded messages are also identified and labelled. 
Secondly, unlike previously, WhatsApp users have a choice about whether to be added to 
groups or not. Initially, this could be done without prior permission from the user as a default 
option. Lastly, WhatsApp group administrators have been granted more powers regarding 
which users can share and forward content (Kizel, 2019). Addition of users after they have left 
the group is also restricted. WhatsApp users now have greater control over whether an 
unknown user can see their content even though in the same group. In the past, several 
WhatsApp group administrators have been arrested for sharing hate messages via WhatsApp 
in Kenya (Dahir, 2017). The charge sheet stated that they threatened national security by 
spreading alarming propaganda via WhatsApp. However, no comprehensive legal framework 
exists to tackle issues of polarisation, especially in the online domain (Dahir, 2017).  
Nonetheless, positive examples of how WhatsApp has fostered de-polarisation exists 
in Kenya. For instance, the Uwiano Peace Platform takes advantage of WhatsApp affordances 
to obtain information on hate speech, tensions, incitement, threats and violence across the 
nation (Halakhe, 2013; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). Previously, information was sent to analysts 
who then mapped, verified, and forwarded the data to a multi-disciplinary rapid response 
system for quick intervention (Halakhe, 2013). Uwiano takes a different approach to tackling 
polarisation and violence compared to what has been adopted in other areas of the globe in the 
form of product design and more literacy campaigns. Furthermore, WhatsApp now uses 
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machine-based learning mechanisms to identify, analyse, and ban accounts that forward bulk 
messages (Rastogi & Hendler, 2016). 
4.7. Conclusion 
The Kenyan Constitution and the County Government Act, 2012 spells out the role of the media 
(mainstream and social media) in deliberations and polarisation. This legislative mandate is not 
entirely baseless because SNSs are widely used in Kenya. The combination of good Internet 
speed and a wide mobile phone penetration have facilitated the significant uptake of SNS 
platforms. Therefore, these platforms are an indispensable component of deliberative 
governance processes and depolarisation in Kenya. For instance, deliberation on SNS platforms 
had been found to improve the feedback loop on governance and policy issues and enhanced 
mental elaboration and cognitive skills. SNSs have also transformed governance discourse 
through the formation of governance networks, and improved mobilisation for participation in 
deliberation. However, deliberative governance on SNS platforms is limited by critical factors 
such as the digital divide that still exists between urban and rural dwellers in Kenya. Further, 
there is a tendency for SNS users to dismiss, satirise and degrade serious governance issues 
into mere dramatic occurrences. While SNS platforms have positive outcomes regarding 
deliberative governance, their history and effects on polarisation has been negative. For 
instance, the role of SNSs and their potential to fuel violence was more evident following the 
2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya. They provided a platform to drive citizen 
narratives consisting of polarised, inflammatory and exaggerated accounts of grassroots 
reactions during the crisis. With an understanding of this SNS history and background, it is of 
interest that the constitution would mandate the use of this platform to achieve depolarisation.  
With over 12 million users in Kenya, the potential for WhatsApp to facilitate productive 
governance discourse as a public sphere is compelling. Based on some of the normative 
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Habermasian tenets, the chapter has argued that WhatsApp does not entirely meet the key 
considerations for a public sphere. WhatsApp has facilitated unfettered and unlimited access 
to information to specific demographic segments who are not limited by digital the digital 
divide. As a public sphere, one common subculture in Kenya involves the use of WhatsApp to 
translate offline public spheres into online networks instantly. WhatsApp, like other SNS 
platforms amplifies and reinforces certain tendencies that already exist in a socio-cultural 
context. It makes multidimensional deliberation possible through the ability to join various 
groups and engage asynchronously. As a public sphere, the influence of WhatsApp on 
deliberative governance in Kenya revolves around various factors: connectivity, watchdog role, 
mobilisation, and transformation of deliberations. Despite these positive outcomes of 
deliberative governance, WhatsApp has narrowcasting features that are likely to enhance 
political and social fragmentation. Such a fragmented deliberative structure also means 
privileged governance information is circulated and accessed within specific WhatsApp groups 
only. Further, it may have supported the reinforcement hypothesis by granting significant 
benefits to those already vibrant on other SNS platforms.  
The link between WhatsApp and polarisation is likely to depend on two factors: its 
deliberative structure and deliberative norms. The challenges of WhatsApp and polarisation in 
Kenya relate to its suitability to spread fake news and misinformation. For instance, end-to-end 
encryption is likely to provide a safe-haven from government regulation and monitoring by 
security agencies. This implies that such sense of security is likely to embolden participants to 
make extreme claims and views during deliberations. WhatsApp, like other SNS platforms, has 
radically transformed how participants express their political identities and ideological 
positions in Kenya. This may have fostered the increasing growth of negative perceptions 
toward those holding divergent opinions. WhatsApp interlaces polarising information into a 




Research Design and Methodology 
5.0 Introduction 
The research approach adopted in this study consist of four elements: research paradigm, 
epistemological stance, research methodology, and the research design. Critical realism is the 
research paradigm used in this study. It strategically interrelates epistemology and ontology. 
As a paradigm, it is well suited to merge the strengths of both positivist and interpretivist 
perspectives. It also offers a more tenable position concerning the status of knowledge and 
specific claims about the existing reality. Critical realism often adopts triangulation and mixed 
research methods in its approach. Triangulation was adopted in this study for three reasons 
which are to achieve completeness, confirmation, and retroduction in the study of the research 
phenomenon. As regards to mixed methods, the study used both quantitative (online surveys), 
and qualitative research (online focus groups) designs, both of which were managed via 
WhatsApp platform. The choice of both methods in this study was informed by the research 
objectives, context, and nature of this research inquiry. The multi-disciplinary and multi-
contextual aspect of this study also influenced and informed this choice. The study respondents 
for both qualitative and quantitative methods were sampled from specific WhatsApp groups 
using both probability and non-probability sampling methods. This research, therefore, relies 
on primary data obtained directly through fieldwork using online surveys and focus group 
discussions. The chapter elaborates some of the statistical approaches used in the research, 
some of which have been previously used in similar studies. The chapter ends with a review of 




5.1 Research Paradigm 
According to Aliyu et al., (2015), a research paradigm consists of an all-encompassing system 
of interconnected thinking and practice which elaborately defines the nature of the research 
enquiry. Morgan, (2007) argued that a research paradigm is a shared belief system that dictates 
the nature of knowledge and evidence researchers seek and how they interpret its content. 
Morgan, (2007) further categorises the conception of a research paradigm concept into four 
elements: (1) the researcher’s worldviews; (2) as the kind of epistemological stance in research; 
(3) as shared beliefs and research approaches related to a particular area of study; (4) and as a 
model of research. This research study adopts the second and third categories being the most 
popular in social sciences  (Morgan, 2007). 
Paradigms can be depicted based on a continuum with positivism on one end and 
constructivism on the other end (Deforge & Shaw, 2012; Denzin, 2012). This leaves critical 
realism and pragmatism at the middle of the continuum according to (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2006). The idea of a continuum elaborates and simplifies the controversy and dichotomy 
between subjectivism and objectivism (Feilzer, 2009; Morgan, 2014). According to Sefotho, 
(2015), a continuum is significant in understanding the paradigmatic differences between 
ontological and epistemological components of a research. A researcher at the initial stages of 
the study adopts a specific paradigm regarding the nature of knowledge they wish to pursue 
(Black, 2006). This forms a researcher’s theoretical perspective and guides the nature of 
research questions and shapes the researcher’s choice of research methodology and method. 
Some scholars argue that ontology and epistemology are mutually dependent and 
therefore, difficult to distinguish conceptually (Aliyu et al., 2015; Black, 2006; Goldkuhl, 2012; 
Onwuegbuzie, 2012). Epistemology is considered as the construction of particular meaning 
while ontology is the construction of a meaningful reality (Cameron, 2011). Epistemology 
generally guides the researcher’s assumptions about knowledge (Chatterjee, 2013). It seeks to 
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establish a philosophical grounding for researchers to decide what kinds of knowledge are 
possible (Chatterjee, 2013). It further guides how researchers ensure that their pursuit of 
knowledge is legitimate and adequate. Therefore, an epistemological stance implies a specific 
ontological stance and vice versa (Plewis & Mason, 2005). According to Brannen, (2004), they 
are dissimilar, but interconnected. Both ontological and epistemological shapes the perceived 
and relative importance of the aspects of reality as considered in any research study (De Lisle, 
2011). Based on existing research paradigms, epistemological stands can be categorised into 
two possible worldviews: objectivistic and constructivist (Black, 2006; Valkenburg & Peter, 
2013).  
5.1.1 The Ontological and Epistemological Dimensions of Critical Realism  
As indicated in (Figure 1) below, critical realism is the research paradigm guiding this research 
study. Critical realism, developed by Bhaskar, (1975), is a comparatively new philosophical 
perspective. It shapes a wide range of research concepts, including epistemology, causation, 
ontology, persons, structure, and forms of explanation. Critical realism, according to Miller & 
Tsang (2010), strategically interrelates epistemology and ontology. It is an alternative paradigm 
both to the established paradigms of interpretivism and positivism. Due to its applicability in 
both natural and social sciences, it has received scholarly attention in a wide variety of research 
fields (Archer et al., 2013; Bhaskar, 1975, 2014; Decoteau, 2017; Eastwood et al., 2014; K. D. 
Miller & Tsang, 2010; Mingers & Standing, 2017; Sorrell, 2018; De Souza, 2013; Steffansen, 
2016; Steinmetz, 1998).  
Critical realism situates itself as an alternative to the positivists philosophical 
perspective that emphasize specific validity and reliability factors in research according to 
Souza, (2013) and the use of regression-based variables models according to Eastwood et al., 
(2014). Furthermore, critical realism is an alternative to the interpretivist perspective and 
emphasises the explanation of phenomena using a holistic perspective (Sorrell, 2018). There is 
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no unitary research framework, research methodology, universally accepted academic dogma 
or set of beliefs that unites critical realists. Yet as an increasingly prominent philosophy 
adopted by social scientists, it is founded on a priori or critical truths and phenomenon relating 
to the nature of the world researchers seek to understand (Bhaskar, 2014).  
Critical realism, according to Sorrell, (2018), offers a more tenable position concerning 
the status of knowledge and specific claims about the existing reality (epistemology). It aptly 
assists researchers to define and apply the nature of a particular reality (ontology). The progress 
by critical realists has been possible due to its adoption of all intransitive dimension of reality 
and phenomenon in its processes and design (Steffansen, 2016). As Bhaskar, (1975) noted, it 
provides a critical point of reference through which theories can be tested. However, critical 
realists acknowledge that it is impossible to fully comprehend and categorise some realities 
(Archer et al., 2013). The researcher’s perceptions when using critical realism are defined by 
their investigative interests, the nature of research questions, and the limits of the resources 
available for the process (Decoteau, 2017). 
Considering topics like polarisation and deliberative governance, it is possible that the 
knowledge of the context of research is largely mediated by other factors outside a researcher’s 
scope of consideration. Hence, it is only possible to obtain empirical feedback from specific 
aspects of the context of study that are available and accessible. This is why critical realists 
categorise ontological and epistemological into three modes or domains of reality (Bhaskar, 
(1975) and Archer et al., (2013). The first category is the empirical which defines the aspects 
of reality experienced either indirectly or directly. The second is the actual and defines those 
aspects of reality which actually occur but impossible to measure of categorise as research 
variables. The third relates to the real mechanisms and structures that influence the actual 
research phenomena and are often manifest during research processes.  
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A second critical realist ontological dimension argues that reality is stratified (Eastwood 
et al., 2014). However, according to some critical realists, the argument that reality is both 
hierarchically ordered and categorically defined in different levels is untenable. The lower level 
is thought to create foundational conditions for the higher level (Eastwood et al., 2014). Each 
stratum is distinct and separate but has the potential to interact with the layer below or above 
to produce new objects, social phenomenon, mechanisms, and events (Steffansen, 2016; 
Steinmetz, 1998). The ability of mechanisms in a social context to combine and recreate 
something new is referred to as emergence (Eastwood et al., 2014). Therefore, the task of 
critical realists is to unearth the underlying mechanisms that produce a particular phenomenon 
(Decoteau, 2017). Further, their role is to establish the interplay between such social 
phenomenon and their impact on the overall outcome.  
Critical realists argue that causal mechanisms cannot be inferred with certainty because 
they cannot be openly or directly observed. According to Mcevoy & Richards, (2006) and 
Miller & Tsang, (2010), causation can be inferred through a combination of theory construction 
and empirical investigation. Whereas this study’s interest relates to the correlational as opposed 
to causation mechanisms, its ultimate goal is to delve deeper than a mere correlation matrix 
and develop deeper explanation and broader levels of understanding of the research 
phenomena. Unlike positivism, this study does not aim to identify and establish generalisable 
laws relating to the subject of study. Neither does it seek to explore the shared beliefs or the 
lived experience of the research participants as is the case in interpretivism.  
From a critical realist perspective, positivists focus on observable events or phenomena 
while failing to consider the extent to which such observations are pre-influenced by 
intervening factors and theoretical frameworks (Archer et al., 2013). Positivists unrealistically 
deal with relationships between variables and component of a social systems in isolation 
(Mingers & Standing, 2017). They assume a closed system and ignore or minimise the impact 
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of the interactions between mechanisms, variables and phenomena within a particular context 
in which they occur (Decoteau, 2017). On the other hand, critical realists acknowledge the 
place and value of interpretivist approaches focusing on valuable discourse, social interactions, 
human perception and motivation (Bhaskar, 2014; Gaventa & Barrett, 2012). Interpretivists 
appreciate that human reasons and interactions can provide causal explanations (Easton, 2010).   
However, critical realists are critical of interpretivists when they fail to relate human 
discourses and underlying social structures (Deforge & Shaw, 2012; Mcevoy & Richards, 
2006). This creates a challenge where the actions of participants are constrained to the social 
networks in which social actors are embedded (Mcevoy & Richards, 2006). Importantly, 
critical realists acknowledge that the accounts of research participants may be incomplete, 
misguided or falsified to create good impressions (Miller & Tsang, 2010; Steinmetz, 1998). 
Critical realism is a suitable paradigm for this study because it acknowledges that the real 
world, such as governance institutions, operates as multi-dimensional, interactive open system.  
The effects on variables result from the interaction between social structures, systemic 
mechanism, and human agency (Bhaskar, 2014). Causal mechanisms have a greater potential 
to impact on the structures and social phenomenon under study (Shannon-Baker, 2016). 
Besides, the actualisation of the mechanism is dependent upon the variable conditions in which 
the mechanism operates (Archer et al., 2013). It is, therefore, more appropriate to think in terms 
of the tendencies that are produced by underlying causal mechanisms, than in terms of 







Figure 5. 1: Diagrammatic Elaboration of Research Approach and Design 
 
Source: Researcher, 2018 
 
Critical realism also relies on the concept of retroduction (Easton, 2010; Eastwood et al., 2014; 
Steffansen, 2016). This involves moving beyond observations and lived experience to postulate 
and seek explanations on the underlying mechanisms and structures that account for a research 
phenomenon. Retroduction involves asking why social events and specific phenomena 
happened in a particular way (Eastwood et al., 2014). Meaning, a critical realist consider the 
best explanations are those with the greatest explanatory power. According to Steinmetz 
(1998), explanations are potentially open to review and revision. It also follows that accepted 
theories and explanations can be rejected in favour of more convincing alternatives. This 
happens if the alternative can better explain a phenomenon in a much deeper and broader way 
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5.1.2 Triangulation and Mixed Methods Design 
Critical realists argue that the choice of methods should be dictated by the nature of the research 
problem (Bhaskar, 2014; Mcevoy & Richards, 2006; De Souza, 2013; Steffansen, 2016). Most 
critical realists also argue that an effective approach will most likely combine both qualitative 
and quantitative methods or techniques (Bhaskar, 2014; Eastwood et al., 2014; Mcevoy & 
Richards, 2006; Mingers & Standing, 2017; De Souza, 2013; Steffansen, 2016). Importantly, 
critical realists are keen to focus on how qualitative and quantitative methods are used. 
Quantitative methods help to develop reliable descriptions and provide accurate comparisons 
(Shannon-baker, 2016). In the exploratory phase of a research study, quantitative methods can 
help identify covert patterns, correlations, and associations (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2006). This 
shapes how a critical realist teases out unexpected and new causal explanations and 
mechanisms (Deforge & Shaw, 2012).  
Quantitative methods can be used to examine theories and their interactions with causal 
mechanisms within a specific context (Miller & Tsang, 2010). From a critical realist 
perspective, qualitative methods are open-ended and comparatively more flexible tools of 
inquiry (Bhaskar, 2014). Qualitative methods allow themes to emerge during an inquiry that 
could not have been anticipated in advance (Sorrell, 2018). Qualitative methods also illuminate 
complex relationships and concepts that are often missed in predetermined response categories 
or during standardised quantitative measures (Archer et al., 2013; De Souza, 2013). 
As noted in (Figure 5.1) above, this study adopted triangulation which incorporates 
more than one source of data or research method to examine a social phenomenon. A mixed 
methods approach incorporates distinct set of analytical practices and methodologies. Mixed 
methods are characterised by ‘paradigm pluralism’ and ‘eclecticism’ (Denzin, 2012, p. 82). 
According to Morgan, (2009), it is a rejection of rigid dichotomies and a celebration of research 
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contextual diversity according to (Denzin, 2012).  This is an iterative approach to research 
inquiry with a specific emphasis on the research question (Bryman, 2007). 
Critics of the mixed methods approach can be found among those who view and 
consider the incommensurability and incompatibility of mixed methods (Denzin, 2012). The 
complexity is based on the argument that quantitative or qualitative methods are established on 
different paradigmatic assumptions which cannot be combined (Goldkuhl, 2012). Practically, 
mixed methods designs are very expensive as a research strategy (Cameron, 2011). Other 
critics argue that mixed methods also achieve undesirable effects in what (Denzin, 2012, p. 83) 
terms as ‘methodological bilingualism’ which means that some researchers do not have 
adequate skills to merge the findings from mixed methods research. 
Mixed method designs are categorised based on the level of prioritisation of either 
quantitative or qualitative approaches (Feilzer, 2010) (see Figure 5.1). It also depends on the 
strategic ways in which combining data is possible, considering the priority and timing of data 
collection (Mertens & Hesse-Biber, 2012). Under critical realism, the combination and 
collection of data can occur sequentially or concurrently (Driscoll et al., 2007). All these are 
dictated by specific constraints and boundaries of the study context (Snelson, 2016). Based on 
arguments by Mcevoy & Richards, (2006), triangulation in this study is adopted as a 
component of critical realism for three reasons: (1) completeness; (2) confirmation; (3) and 
retroduction. 
Triangulation in this study seeks to achieve confirmation which enhances the reliability 
and validity of the research findings (Florczak, 2015). The combination of research approaches 
and methods assist the researchers to counteract the biases and shortcomings associated with 
adopting a single research method (Carroll et al., 2011). The assumption is that triangulation 
will achieve the corroboration of data to support more robust conclusions (Shannon-baker, 
2016). Combining both approaches and designs in mixed methods empowers the researcher to 
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improve the accuracy of their data (Feilzer, 2010). The use of triangulation in mixed methods 
produces a clearer picture in research (Morgan, 2014). This is what is referred to as 
completeness. Completeness also refers to the way in which the combination of research 
methods compensates specific strengths and weaknesses associated with one particular method 
(Cameron, 2011; Morgan, 2014; Shannon-baker, 2016).  
Triangulation makes sense for a critical realist and positivist than to an interpretivist 
(Ruwhiu & Cone, 2010). This is based on the argument that interpretivists, unlike  critical 
realist and positivist, are generally agnostic about the question of whether or not there exists a 
tangible reality (Brannen, 2004; Cameron, 2011; Mertens, 2011; Onwuegbuzie, 2012). 
Secondly, triangulation achieves completeness when it seeks to obtain a more complementary 
and deeper perspectives of social phenomenon using different data source (Denzin, 2012; 
Hussein, 2009; Mertens & Hesse-Biber, 2012). Triangulation often comes in handy as a way 
of developing the analysis (Coxon, 2005) and building upon initial findings using contrasting 
kinds of data or methods (Agee, 2017). Whereas a positivist seeks confirmation to reveal 
different aspects of a social phenomenon, an interpretivist seeks it to provide a much deeper 
range of perspectives (Bryman, 2007). For a critical realist, both of these goals are critical and 
compatible with the objectives of the paradigm. Lastly, triangulation provides a platform for 
achieving a retroductive inferences about the causal mechanisms in a specific context (Carter 
et al., 2014). 
5.2 Research Methodology 
In line with critical realism as earlier explained, the study used both quantitative (online 
surveys) and qualitative research (online focus groups) designs. At one level, qualitative and 
quantitative refer to distinctions about the nature of knowledge (Brannen, 2004): how one 
understands the world and the ultimate purpose of the research (MacDonald & Headlam, 1999). 
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On another level of discourse, the terms refer to research methods, that is, how data are 
collected and analysed (Brannen, 2005). It shapes the type of generalisations and 
representations derived from the data. It is important to underline that quantitative research 
design as used in this study does not aim to achieve representative results and conclusions; 
rather, it examines the nature and strength of association between variables. As a design, it 
seeks to analyse and understand the relationship between variables through statistical and 
mathematical analysis and methods (Brannen, 2005; Bryman et al., 2008).  
A qualitative research method is also used in this study to understand the context of the 
research phenomenon and explore the mechanisms through which it arises. Therefore, the 
quantitative methods in this study is not used to discover the causal relations between variables. 
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, is used to explain the relations between variables upon 
which the causality depends. Because critical realists accept that there are two ways of viewing 
the world: mental and physical, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to 
understand this reality (Plewis & Mason, 2005). Researchers should take account of this by 
seeking an understanding through both objective and subjective data (Gray, 2014).  
The choice of both methods in this study is also informed by the research questions, 
context, and nature of this research inquiry. The multi-disciplinary and multi-contextual aspect 
of this study also influenced and informed this choice. WhatsApp is a relatively understudied 
SNSs platform which reflects minimal research footprints. In qualitative research, different 
knowledge claims, enquiry strategies, and data collection methods and analysis are employed 
(Pickering, 2008). However, this study chose to use WhatsApp based focus group discussions 
as informed by the platform under study. Using a quantitative methodology, the research study 
measured variables on sampled subjects and expressed the relationship between variables. It 
used various effect statistical analysis procedures such as correlations, relative frequencies, or 
differences between means. Whereas the primary purpose of quantitative research is: to 
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describe, compare and attribute causality (Brannen, 2004; Feilzer, 2009), this study does not 
aim to attribute causality through this method.  
5.3 Sampling Process and Framework 
Based on quantitative and qualitative research designs, this research combined both probability 
and non-probability sampling techniques to achieve its target sample as indicated in (see Table 
5.1). Sampling was done in four counties (Kericho, Nairobi, Nakuru, and Bomet); two fragile 
and two non-fragile counties (see Table 5.1). Purposive sampling was used to identify and 
categorise the fragility of counties based on three factors: (1) prevalent conflict vulnerability 
related to structural diversity factors such as ethnic and religious conflicts (see Chapter Three, 
pp. 82-85); (2) the power dynamics within the county administrative structures and how it 
affects political contests during election periods; (3) historically experienced resource conflicts 
from the period after independence to date. Sampling polarised and conflict-prone counties 
were based on Kenyan government and various sectoral reports. Example of such reports 
includes: Conflict Analysis of Kenya by (Rohwerder, 2015), National Conflict Mapping 
Strategy Report by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (2016) and the Kenya 
Conflict Analysis Summary Report (2015).  
The sampling frame consists of the total number of members in both formal and 
informal WhatsApp applications (see Table 5.1). As earlier noted in chapters one and four, this 
study considers two types of WhatsApp groups; top-down groups in each county formed by 
the county government officials, their affiliates and representatives. Bottom-up groups are 






Table 5. 1:Tabular Presentation of Sampling Matrix 

















Nakuru 6   1289 487 119 24 18 
Kericho 7  1576 531 101 24 17 
Nairobi 9 2011 766 261 24 20 
Bomet 5  1266 428 103 24 16 
Total 27 6142 2212 584 96 71 
(Source: Researcher, 2018) 
The first process of sampling and recruiting respondents involved identifying specific, relevant, 
and open WhatsApp groups. Identifying relevant WhatsApp group was possible because of the 
name or group’s masthead. More than twelve of the sampled WhatsApp groups had their click-
to-join links advertised and published online. Some WhatsApp groups were identified through 
referrals made to the researcher. A total of 27 WhatsApp groups were sampled in the four 
counties (see Appendix B). As indicated in the title, some of the groups were easier to identify; 
others necessitated the researcher to contact the group administrators as in case of referrals. 
Figure 5. 2: Images of WhatsApp Group Click-to-Join Links used in Sampling 




Having identified the relevant groups, the researcher then requested to join the sampled 
WhatsApp groups. Some groups were full having reached the maximum allowed capacity of 
256 membership limit in WhatsApp groups. The researcher approached more WhatsApp 
groups to attain a practical and reliable sampling size. After joining the group, it was possible 
to see the group profile including; group administrators, the number of participants in each 
group, contacts of group participants and when the group was formed. The sampling frame, 
therefore, consists of the aggregate number of individual in all sampled WhatsApp groups (see 
Table 5.1). 
Using the Cochran’ sampling formula (see Appendix D), the target respondents were 
derived from the sampling frame per county. The Cochran’s expected sample was 2212 (see 
Table 5.1). The researcher approached all the forum administrators explaining the intent and 
purpose of the survey. A customised introduction write-up of the purpose, scope, and the 
estimated time to fill the survey was posted on the WhatsApp chat wall. The researcher faced 
various challenges at this point including: a general suspicion among potential participants on 
the intent, timing, and scope of the study. Non-responses from WhatsApp group participants 
and, finally, a lack of support from WhatsApp group administrators. Persistence and 
application of different engagement approach allowed eventual success in some instances. The 
refunding of data bundles and small tokens of minute airtime and SMSs offers were used as 
forms of incentives to encourage more responses. The researcher developed a WhatsApp 
friendly survey with a consent form attached at the beginning. The consent form required 
potential participants to state whether they: had read and understood the scope of the survey; 
were willing to participate on a voluntary basis and willing to be added to a separate research 
group; were willing to be contacted for further research.  
Subsequent selection of individual survey respondents was through probability 
sampling using systematic random sampling. With access to each WhatsApp group participants 
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list, the selection of n'th phone number/contact from the list was picked. The survey link was 
then copied to individual respondents WhatsApp number. The challenge at this stage was then 
related to suspicion of the survey link as malware. This was managed through a prior 
explanation to individual’s respondent before pasting the survey link to their WhatsApp wall. 
Respondents were subsequently able to fill the survey and confirm completion through a 
message to the researcher. A small token as reimbursement for airtime and data bundles used 
was awarded to respondents. The total complete responses achieved across the four counties 
was 584 out of a targeted 2212. This represents a response rate of 26.4% which falls within the 
‘normal’ rates of most online surveys (Pan, et al., 2013; Basa-Martinez et al., 2018; Nulty, 
2008). 
 As with other online surveys, five factors may have influenced this response rate:(1) 
The sampling methods where participants were already willing to participate; (2) the methods, 
message and time of contact was also an important factor. Various respondents used WhatsApp 
after work mostly in the evenings; (3) the invitation process and designs where respondents 
were added to a separate WhatsApp group made communication easier and improved response 
rate; (4) The use of pre-notification, follow-ups, and reminders also shaped the response rate. 
(5) Lastly, the use of incentives in terms of bundles and airtime improved the response rate. It 
is critical to underline that the respondents in this research study are active participants in online 
and web-based applications. The mode and mannerism of engagement in activism, interest 
groups, and citizen journalism was high. Whereas the sampling process for online surveys was 
based on probability, the results achieved through this process are not representative. In effect, 
it is a study of those who are already engaged and participating in deliberations in their 
WhatsApp groups. It is also likely that the 26% who responded are those who experienced an 




Table 5. 2: Tabular representation of County Response, Mean, and Standard Deviation 
County  County Freq, Per Mean SD 
Bomet County, (126) 21.62% 2.95 1.187 
Kericho County, (111) 19.06% 2.94 1.246 
Nairobi County (171) 29.40% 3.12 0.932 
Nakuru County (176) 30.24% 2.77 1.213 
 
5.4 Research and Data Collection Tools 
5.4.1 Online Survey 
As indicated in (Table 5.1) above an online survey was used for quantitative research questions. 
Using the free Google Form platform enabled the researcher to obtain data from WhatsApp 
group participants. Google Form is a google hosted platform created as Web forms with an 
independent database. The database serves as a store for the submitted responses 
(Onwuegbuzie, 2012). The platform has inbuilt analytical capability of submitted data and 
provides quick analytics and results. Online surveys platforms like Google Form are very 
valuable tools for assessing and understanding opinions and trends of a large number of 
respondents (Torrance, 2012). The online survey method enabled the use of quantitative 
analytical techniques which facilitated inferences regarding existing associations between 
WhatsApp group profiles and polarisation. Secondly, it permitted the researcher to study more 
variables at one time. This is particularly important considering the multiplicity of variables 
characterising this study. One shortcoming of online survey method noted during fieldwork 
was the incomplete submission of survey responses (Pan et al., 2013) Approximately 23% of 
online survey responses were incomplete and couldn’t be used in the quantitative analysis. It 
was also unreliable in getting proper answers for questions considering that no question needed 
descriptive responses (Nulty, 2008). Essentially, respondents prefer multiple-choice responses. 
This shortcoming was circumvented through the application of qualitative research design 
which was used to understand any unexplained phenomenon (Black, 2006).  
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Although it relies on recollection and cognitive comprehension, it is an appropriate 
method for understanding self-explanatory phenomenon (Bista, 2017; Pan et al., 2013). It 
allows a cross-sectional study of large populations in situations where experimental research 
is costly or cannot yield valid results (Gray, 2014). The online survey questionnaire was 
distributed through WhatsApp platform. This meant designing a WhatsApp friendly 
questionnaire that was easily accessible through a respondent’s phone. Likert scale and ranking 
scale questions allowed respondents to simply check boxes of appropriate responses. The 
questionnaires constituted a combination of carefully worded multiple-choice questions and 
close-ended questions constructed for easy comprehension. 
Various advantages were evident with the use of this data collection technique 
including: (1) time saving and efficiency; (2) costs effectiveness by lowering the overhead 
costs and (3) high response rates. Responses were accessed instantly though databases (Bista, 
2017; Heidemann et al., 2012; Onwuegbuzie, 2012; Pan et al., 2013). Online survey 
questionnaires allow rapid deployment and return times which critically advantaged handling 
quick surveys (Bista, 2017). Additionally, online surveys are convenient platforms for 
respondents because they can complete them in comfortable schedules (Pan et al., 2013). 
Flexibility in online surveys allowed intricate skip patterns where logic can be employed 
seamlessly (Nulty, 2008).  
5.4.2 WhatsApp Focus Group Discussions  
WhatsApp-based focus group discussion (WFGDs) discussions were used to understand and 
clarify patterns and results arising from the quantitative study. The researcher created and 
managed discussions in the WhatsApp discussion groups. This was done after the end of the 
online survey. Two WFGDs were selected for each county and each group consisted of between 
8-12 respondents. A total of eight focus groups were created with 71 respondents overall. The 
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respondents were derived from lists of those who had participated in online survey. Participants 
for WFGDs were recruited through convenience and purposive sampling procedure (willing 
participants). The sampling method applied adopted a pragmatic approach which ensured 
effective recruitment. The respondents were then banded into eight WhatsApp groups formed 
for the purposes of the survey. 
Figure 5. 3: Sample of WhatsApp Group Based Focus Group Discussion 
 
(Source: Author, 2020) 
 
 
The researcher moderated and ensured structured discussions and engagement among 
participants via the WhatsApp web version. This ensured a consistent, cohesive, and exhaustive 
discursive approach across all WhatsApp groups. Research questions were floated one at a time 
while allowing time for asynchronous response in relations to each research questions. Cross-
reference chatting and asynchronous response patterns allowed participants to respond to 
question at their convenient time. However, each item/question was allowed ample discussion 
time before the introduction of another. Through constant comparison and monitoring of 
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discussions and feedback, group response saturation was assessed. Discussions were often 
concluded through restatement and summary of topical highlights. At this point, respondents 
were encouraged to affirm or contradict the highlights in a way that elicited the participation 
of most respondents. Using the WhatsApp chat exporting features, participant’s responses were 
exported to an email and downloaded for analysis. Participant’s typed responses were 
considered as verbatim responses. This meant no further transcription was needed. The findings 
are presented in the discussion section of this study. 
The purpose of WFGDs was to explore the social dynamics of the WhatsApp group, 
with the help of a moderator/facilitator, to stimulate participants to reveal essential information 
about people’s opinions, beliefs, perceptions and attitudes. This is specifically applicable when 
doing research related to vulnerable population groups and geopolitical areas. Its security 
protocol creates perceptual confidence required to discuss sensitive subjects bordering on 
individual’s feelings, needs, and perceptions of various topics including health, security and 
politics in restricted/ authoritarian environments. WFGDs happen in two ways: synchronously 
or asynchronously. Synchronous sessions in WhatsApp group refer to sessions that are real-
time. Participants take part in typing and contributing to the discussion at the same time as 
everyone else. This is possible with the researcher’s arrangement. Asynchronous sessions 
typically happen when participants read others' comments and contribute or make comments 
at later times. This does not necessarily happen when anyone else is participating. WhatsApp 
focus group discussions can be used to collect rich narrative data through online focus groups 
gather opinions, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, behaviours and motivations about a topic.  
WhatsApp can collect rich qualitative and narrative data through online focus groups. 
This is specifically applicable when doing research related to vulnerable population groups and 
geopolitical areas (Freitas et al., 1998). Its security protocol creates perceptual confidence 
required to discuss sensitive subjects bordering on individuals fears, needs, and perceptions of 
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various topics including health, security and politics in restricted environments (Hussain, 
Mahesar, Shah, & Memon, 2017; Sánchez-moyaa & Cruz-moya, 2015; Sarode et al., 2017; 
UNDP, 2018). Such methods have been used by international organisations like UNDP. Other 
advantages of WFGDs is that they are more structured compared to the conventional face to 
face focus group discussions. Just like conventional focus group discussions, this can be 
attributed to the complexity in bringing structure and orderliness in any group (Brannen, 2004). 
Despite this shortcoming, WFGDs provided rich data mined through downloads of the typed 
interaction within the diverse respondents of the research group. Through WFGDs, issues that 
were emergent from the survey questionnaire were discussed. WFGDs allowed the researcher 
to achieve multiple perspectives on the phenomenon of research. This is because open-ended 
questions that were carefully sequenced, clearly formulated, and easily understood were 
presented for discussion (Freitas et al., 1998; MacDonald & Headlam, 1999).  
Additional advantages of using WFGDs included that word-for-word transcripts are 
available almost immediately, allowing the capture of complete sentences and thoughts. 
Furthermore, the virtual meeting via WhatsApp groups eliminates the need for physical 
meeting hence lowering research costs. The relative anonymity of WhatsApp translated into a 
more candid discussion of sensitive issues. Its potential to reach a broad geographic scope 
meant that participants could be recruited from diverse geographical locations as well as from 
different social and demographic groups. It provided for a convenient way of participating in 
the comfort of participant’s homes. The challenges of using WFGDs is that they can reflect 
less robust discussions compared to the verbal ones. Furthermore, it is impossible for the 
researcher to observe critical non-verbal body language and expressions which are sometimes 
very relevant in analysis and inferences of research findings (Freitas et al., 1998). Non-verbal 
communication plays a significant role in conveying meaning and emotion, and its failure can 
affect the interpretation of messages (Carter et al., 2014). One critical challenge experienced 
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was the relatively slow pace of responses from specific participants limits topics that can be 
covered. There were also fewer spontaneous comments unlike in conventional focus groups 
(Biedermann, 2018; Rabiee, 2004). Potentially, more guarded comments that happened in 
some WhatsApp groups resulted in less robust discussions.  
5.5 Measuring Specific WhatsApp Group Variables in the Study 
The aim of this research study was to understand the influence of WhatsApp groups on 
polarisation and deliberative governance in Kenyan counties. To achieve this, the study sought 
to first, establish the deliberative structure and norms of WhatsApp group’s participating in 
deliberative governance, understand the influence of WhatsApp groups deliberative structure 
and norms on polarisation, establish the effectiveness of top-down approach in deliberative 
governance, and to influence of WhatsApp group deliberative governance on polarisation. The 
study variables were categorised into two: deliberative structure and deliberative norms. 
5.5.1 Measurement of Deliberative Structure 
Socio-demographics/Control Variables: Socio-demographics also acted as control 
variables and included; age, gender, and level of education. All three variables were 
appropriately measured through nominal, and categorical scale measurements 
appropriate for quantitative research method adopted from other similar studies (Baek, 
2015; Ganasegeran et al., 2017; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). Careful categorisation and was 
done for each of the variables where age (18-24; 25-34;35-44;45-54; 55-64), gender 
dichotomy consisted (Male and Female), and Level of education (Diploma; Doctorate; 
Masters; Secondary, Tertiary, Certificate, Undergraduate). Further, respondents were 
also required to indicate their county of residence with the options limited to those under 
the scope of this study (Kericho, Bomet, Nakuru, and Nairobi). 
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 Type of WhatsApp group (Formality): Classification of WhatsApp groups was in two 
categories based on their manner of formations; formal and informal WhatsApp groups. 
A brief definition and description were attached to each of the two choices to aid 
respondent’s clarity and understanding in responding. Formal WhatsApp groups are 
those formed Respondents ticked the appropriate box that best described their 
WhatsApp group formation (M = 2.03, SD = 1.62). 
Recruitment method: This refers to the methods used to get members joining the 
WhatsApp group. Two methods were categorised as follows: self-selection, where 
respondents added by a friend, colleague, or acquaintance. Random selection is where 
respondents joined the group via public click-to-join WhatsApp group links. A 
description of each category was given to aid respondents in understanding the choices. 
Group Ties: Measurement of this variable was guided by studies done by (Conroy et 
al., 2012; Dennis & Chadwick, 2016; Enjolras et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2016; 
Gustafsson, 2012; De Zúñiga et al., 2017). Most studies conceptualise the relationship 
among participants as social or network ties. A brief definition and classification of 
each type of tie was attached to all choices to aid respondent’s clarity and 
understanding. The classification of ties was adopted from studies done by (Gilbert & 
Karahalios, 2009). This was classified as follows; No Ties (members do not know each 
other personally and do not engage outside the WhatsApp group), Strong Ties 
(members know each other personally and engage outside the WhatsApp group as well) 
and Weak Ties (group members know each other from WhatsApp group but not 
personally), Cordial Ties (members met in the WhatsApp group and have met in 
person), All the four types of ties were averaged to create a composite measure for each 
category (M = 2.69, SD = 1.09).  
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Group Size: Group size, according to this study, refers to the number of participants in 
the WhatsApp group. Other studies conceptualise group size to mean the number of 
people in a group with whom an individual discusses politics (Eveland & Hively, 2009; 
Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Killworth et al., 2001). WhatsApp groups analysed in this study 
consisted of group membership ranging from 50 to 256 (256 being the maximum 
membership). Categorisation was as follows: Btw 50-100, Btw 101-150, Btw 151-200, 
Btw 200-256. The number of members in a WhatsApp group is indicated as part of the 
applications interface features and respondents were required to check the nominal 
values from their WhatsApp groups. The average values of participants were then 
calculated for each type of WhatsApp group (M = 1.35, SD = 1.73). 
 
5.5.2 Measurement of Deliberative Norms 
Heterogeneity of viewpoints: This variable sought to establish whether respondents 
were exposed to diverse perspectives, opinions, arguments and positions with 
measurements previously adopted by Scheufele et al. (2004, 2006), Kim & Chen, 
(2015), Lee et al., (2014), Brundidge, (2010) and Kim et al., (2013). Heterogeneity was 
measured in three aspects; (1) deliberation with diverse others (composition) (gender, 
religion, ethnicity, and region of origin), (2) frequency of exposure to diverse 
viewpoints (exposure), (3) and interaction with different information sources on 
governance (information sources). A Likert 5-point scale was used where all the items 
were combined into a singular factor and averaged into an index of heterogeneity of 
viewpoints where (Cronbach’s α= 0.732, M =8.11, SD 3.08). 
Diversity of participants: Measuring participants diversity considered other studies 
done by (Aulich, 2009; Laurence & Bentley, 2016; Sturgis et al., 2014). This study 
considers diversity to encompass the various forms of socio-political heterogeneity in 
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a particular range of dimensions. It is also similar to what Unzueta et al., (2012) referred 
as the distribution of differences and demographic dimensions in society and includes 
racial and ethnic variations. Diversity consists of multiple aspects of observed and 
perceived social difference and include; race, age, ethnicity, gender, etc. Various 
studies on social media have used similar conceptualisation of diversity (Binder et al., 
2016; Hampton & Lee, 2011; Kibet & Ward, 2018; Messing & Westwood, 2014; 
Molyneux et al., 2014). Respondents were asked to indicate if people with the following 
diversity aspects were part of their WhatsApp groups; religious (religious affiliations 
such as Muslims, Christians and others), ethnic (ethnic identities), ideological 
(difference in political party affiliations) regional (sub-counties of origin). Yes, 
responses were coded as ‘1’ and No responses were coded as ‘0’. An aggregate value 
of all types of diversity was calculated, first for each WhatsApp group then the overall 
diversity value for both WhatsApp types (M = 3.41, SD = 1.88). 
Moderation: Moderated discussions in the context of WhatsApp groups occur when 
administrators establish the rules of discussion and engagement. Respondents were 
required to indicate the level of moderation that exists in their WhatsApp group. A 5-
point scale ranging from ‘Well moderated’ to ‘Not moderated’ was used in this variable. 
(M = 2.71, SD = 1.48). 
Tolerance: Tolerance according to this study was considered as allowing the 
discussion, occurrence, existence, or practice of something which one does not 
necessarily agree with or like without making any interference. This is similar to what 
is adopted by (Kim et al., 2013; Pickering, 2008). As adopted from Bangwayo-Skeete 
& Zikhali, (2013), tolerance was defined and measured by the ability of group members 
to respect the contributions of others during WhatsApp group discussions. Respondents 
were asked to indicate the perceived level of tolerance in their WhatsApp groups using 
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a 5-points differential scale, ranging from highly tolerant to highly intolerant. This item 
was consequently folded into a 3-point scale, ranging from strong to weak level of 
intolerance (M = 1.82, SD = 1.71). 
Incivility: Incivility in measuring this study was based on the extent to which people 
show disrespect for others using demeaning or impolite language for those who express 
opposing viewpoints. This definition and operationalisation of the term was derived 
from various scholars (Antoci et al., 2016; Druckman et al., 2019; Kim & Park, 2019; 
Kim & Kim, 2019; Lee et al., 2019; Masullo Chen et al., 2019). However, for the 
purpose of clarity, the definition of incivility was broadened to include any rude, 
demeaning, offensive, and impolite use of language targeted at individuals and groups 
during the deliberations in the focus group discussions. A five-point differential Likert 
scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree enabled respondents to 
categorise their perceived level of incivility in their WhatsApp group deliberations (M 
= 2.10, SD = 1.95). 
Inclusivity: Whereas diversity looked at the structural composition of the WhatsApp 
group in view of the various segments of the Kenyan society, inclusivity examined 
whether their voices are included, accommodated and heard in WhatsApp deliberations. 
Inclusivity considers the equality, fairness, and representativeness of contributions by 
the WhatsApp group deliberators (Karpowitz et al., 2016c; Erman, 2016; Karpowitz & 
Raphael, 2016; Schneiderhan & Khan, 2008; Thomassen, 2006). The question on 
inclusivity followed the one on diversity where respondents were asked the extent to 
which they thought the contributions of various groups are included in deliberations. 
Four Likert scale categories ranging from ‘Not inclusive at all’ to ‘Definitely inclusive’ 
were given as options in the survey question. 
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Polarisation: Based on the previous research studies (Beam et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 
2015; Hong & Kim, 2016; Iyengar et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Stroud, 2010), this 
study adopted time tested approaches of measuring the link between SNSs and 
polarisation. The survey questions on polarisation were designed to reflect the 
following six polarisation indicators: binary thinking, motivated reasoning, in-group 
and out-group identities, confirmatory bias, partisanship, and social comparison. 
Samples questions included: whether people in WhatsApp discussion take ethnic 
positions regardless of the facts presented (Motivated reasoning) or whether people take 
opposite positions to their opponents during discussions (partisanship). An aggregate 
polarisation index was established from both all the seven characteristics of polarisation 
(Cronbach’s α=0.67, (M = 3.10, SD = 2.24).   
 
5.6 Data Analysis Procedures 
5.6.1 Quantitative Data Analysis 
Due to the cross-sectional structure of the study and its empirical specification, data analysis 
was done using a combination of various statistical methods. These non-parametric statistical 
methods include: (1) Pearson's Chi-square correlations, (2) Kruskal-Wallis H test, (3) Phi Co-
efficient, and (5) Cramer’s V effects size analysis. Both descriptive and inferential statistics 
were used. Some of the statistical methods mentioned established basic descriptive statistical 
patterns while others established the strength and direction of associations between variables. 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test (one-way ANOVA on ranks) as a rank-based non-parametric 
analysis test was used to determine if there are any statistically significant differences between 
two or more groups of an independent variable (continuous variable) and dependent (ordinal 
variable) (Ostertagová et al., 2014). In this study, it was specifically used to establish the 
association between the dichotomised WhatsApp group variables and polarisation. The use of 
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the Kruskal-Wallis H test was to establish, for instance, the difference between the level of 
polarisation (whether low, medium, and high) for those who had low and high levels of 
education. The Kruskal-Wallis H test, however, is an omnibus test statistic and does not 
specifically tell which group of independent variables are statistically and significantly 
different from the others (Ostertagová et al., 2014). The Kruskal-Wallis H test also determines 
whether the medians of two or more variables are different (Bergsma, 2013). It specifies that 
at least two variables are different. This is why a post hoc test analysis was needed. The tests 
are apt for this study because no assumption of normality in data distribution was made. 
The study also used the Pearson Chi-square analysis to evaluate Tests of Independence 
when using a bivariate table as is the case in this study. Cross tabulation or a bivariate table 
presents the distributions of two categorical variables simultaneously (Driscoll et al., 2007). 
The Pearson Chi-square is a non-parametric meaning it is distribution-free and is designed to 
analyse group differences when the independent variable is categorical and the dependent 
variable is measured at a nominal level (Hussein, 2009; Mertens, 2011). Like the Kruskal-
Wallis H test adopted in this study, the Pearson Chi-square is a robust method of analysis and 
does not require equality of variances among the study variables groups categories or 
homoscedasticity in the test data (Driscoll et al., 2007). It has been adopted in this study 
because it permits evaluation of various dichotomous WhatsApp group independent variables, 
and of level, categories of polarisation (low, moderate, and high). Unlike many other non-
parametric and some parametric statistics, the calculations needed to compute the Pearson Chi-
square provides significant data information about how each of the groups performed in the 
study. This richness of detail from the Pearson Chi-square allows the researcher to understand 
the significant results and achieve more detailed information that can be usefully interpreted 
(Shi et al., 2018). Whereas the Chi-square is a test of significance statistic in itself, it should be 
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followed with an effect size or strength statistic. The Cramer’s V is a very common strength 
test that accompanies the Pearson Chi-square test.  
Cramer’s V was used to compare the strength of association between the two WhatsApp 
group profiles based on the three test variables. Cramer’s V analysis gave a reliable estimate 
in comparison of nominal data for various WhatsApp group profile with more than two 
categories. Cramer’s V is based has the advantages of robustness with respect to the nature of 
the distribution of the data (Prematunga, 2012). In understanding Cramer’s V results, a 
significance level that is very close to zero indicates that the variables are unlikely to have any 
association (Bergsma, 2013). The challenge with Cramer’s V is the difficulty that arises with 
the interpretation of large data sets. Another challenge is its tendency to generate relatively low 
associational/correlation measures. This challenge was overcome by weighting the data 
variables and this gave more reliable Cramer’s V values (see Table 6.4). The study also used 
the phi coefficient to establish the degree of association between binary WhatsApp group 
variables and polarisation. It is calculated along with Cramer’s V analysis and reflects a cross-
tabulated table data where the variables are dichotomous. As for the Phi coefficient, a large 
value close to +1 indicates a strong association between the dichotomous variables whole a 
value close to 0 indicates a weak association between the two variables. 
 
5.6.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
The goal of WFGDs quantitative analysis was to create descriptive, multi-dimensional 
categories that provide a preliminary framework for understanding quantitative findings. 
WFGDs was used to answer two research questions: the influence of WhatsApp deliberative 
structures and norms on polarisation, and the influence of WhatsApp group deliberative 
governance on polarisation. In the process of qualitative data analysis, the researcher focuses 
on the whole set of data obtained from all WFGDs groups. This was followed by an attempt to 
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break it down and gainfully reconstructing it again in a much more meaningful way as 
suggested by Chowdhury, (2015). The application of categorisation of WFGDs themes and 
topics enabled the researcher to achieve comparisons and contrasts between patterns as noted 
by (Bryman, 2007). This categorisation also reflected the complex threads and specific patterns 
of the data thus achieving deep understanding and making sense of findings in a more 
systematic way. After the WFGDs sessions, the researcher began by categorising and 
organising data in forms of critical themes, patterns, and meanings as emergent from the data. 
This is referred to as open coding by some digital media scholars (Z. Chen, Su, & Chen, 2019; 
Epstein & Leshed, 2016; Henn & Foard, 2014; Nelimarkka et al., 2018b). The researcher 
identified and tentatively named the conceptual categories into which the phenomena observed 
would be grouped guided by the WhatsApp group variables. 
Based on the learnings from the pilot phase of the interview questions, this study adopts 
specific categorisation of themes to answer the second research question. The themes relate to 
the influence of WhatsApp deliberative structures and norms on polarisation was based on the 
following seven indicators of polarisation: binary thinking, where group participants favour 
binary thinking and if an ‘us versus them’ positions in WhatsApp deliberations; motivated 
reasoning, where group participants only appreciate evidence that supports their position 
during deliberations; in-group and out-group identities, where the group’s participants favour 
those with similar viewpoints and positions and disagree with out-group regardless of the facts; 
confirmatory bias, disagreeing with other participants for oppositional reasons despite existing 
basic facts and evidence; partisanship, an inclination to staunchly support and favour a group’s 
viewpoint and opinion over alternatives; social comparison, where the in-group’s participants 
favour those with similar viewpoints and positions and disagree with out-group regardless of 
the facts; and groupthink, where the desire for group harmony  and conformity shapes the 
group’s position during deliberations. 
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The analysis of WFGDs aimed to achieve the characteristics detailed by Rabiee, (2004) 
of being verifiable, systematic, sequential, and continuous. The analysis, therefore, began with 
familiarisation with the data after downloading it from the WhatsApp interfaces. The next stage 
involved identifying thematic patterns within the responses and linking them to key indicators 
of polarisation. During this stage, descriptive statements were established and analysis carried 
out in view of the study’s research questions. The third stage involved indexing which was 
about sifting through the focus group data and highlighting and sorting out relevant quotations. 
The fourth stage of the analysis involved charting, where quotes were lifted and rearranged to 
make sense in the context of the research questions. The last stage involved the interpretation 
and connecting the responses to the context of study in relations to the quantitative study 
findings. 
 
5.7 Ethical Considerations 
In line with the ethical guidelines required for digital media research, all identifiable data was 
anonymised and safely kept as long as was needed. Consent was sought as required to access 
WhatsApp groups which covered the use and reporting of this study’s findings. All the numbers 
and contacts used for setting up WhatsApp focus group discussions and any other data from 
such discussions was kept on a securely located, and encrypted hard disk only accessible by 
the main researcher. Part of the ethical safeguards depends on the end-to-end encryption of 
WhatsApp groups which is the focus of this study. In addition to such safeguards, all data was 
handled according to the guidelines set out by the AoIR guidelines (2012), SRA (2003), and 
the General Data Protection Regulation, 2018 (GDPR). For online surveys and focus group 
discussions, informed consent from individual respondents were sought before they filled the 
online survey. The guidelines made it clear that participants could quit at any time in line with 
additional ethical considerations of online surveys. Further, the research ethics for this thesis 
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was overseen and approved by the University of Salford’s research, innovation and academic 
engagement approval panel. 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a detailed account of the research philosophy, research design, 
research methodology and research methods used to answer this study’s research questions. 
The research questions are: what are the deliberative structure and norms of WhatsApp group’s 
participating in deliberative governance, what is the influence of WhatsApp groups deliberative 
structure and norms on polarisation, what is the effectiveness of the top-down approach in 
deliberative governance, and lastly, what is the influence of WhatsApp group deliberative 
governance on polarisation.  
The chapter begins by defining and elaborating critical realism as a deconstructive 
paradigm that combines two epistemological stances and hence uses mixed research methods. 
One of the reasons why critical realism has been chosen in this study is that it accepts both 
singular and multiple world realities and is uniquely strategic in solving practical problems in 
the real world as explained by Feilzer, (2009). This means this research is undertaken under 
the premises of alternative to the established paradigms of interpretivism and positivism– in 
this case, online surveys and focus group discussions approach. Critical realists argue that the 
choice of methods should be dictated by the nature of the research problem. Most critical 
realists also argue that an effective approach will most likely combine both qualitative and 
quantitative methods or techniques. This study, therefore, adopted triangulation which 
incorporates more than one source of data or research method to examine a social phenomenon. 
Mixed methods and triangulation mean that both qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
were used. The multi-disciplinary and multi-contextual aspect of this study influenced and 
informed this choice. Based on quantitative and qualitative research designs, this research 
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combined both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. Out of the targeted 2212 
respondents as per the sample size, a response rate of 26.4% was realised.  
Regarding the quantitative research design, an online survey using the free Google 
Form platform enabled the researcher to obtain data from WhatsApp group participants. This 
meant designing a WhatsApp friendly questionnaire that was easily accessible through a 
respondent’s phone. Likert scale and ranking scale questions allowed respondents to check 
boxes of appropriate responses. WhatsApp-based focus group discussion (WFGDs) 
discussions were used to understand and clarify patterns and results arising from the 
quantitative study. The researcher created and managed discussions in the WhatsApp 
discussion groups. This was done after the end of the online survey. The variables were 
categorised into deliberative structures and deliberative norms according to the study 
objectives. WhatsApp group deliberative structure variables include: socio-demographic 
characteristics, group size, and group ties. The deliberative norms variables include: tolerance, 
moderations, civility/incivility, inclusivity, diversity, and heterogeneity of viewpoints. 
Quantitative analysis in this study used nonparametric statistical methods as follows: Pearson’s 
Chi-square correlations and Kruskal-Wallis H test was used to establish the association 
between WhatsApp deliberative structures and norms and polarisation. The effect size analysis 
was used to find out the directions and strength of the associations used Phi Co-efficient and 
Cramer’s V effects size analysis. The qualitative analysis used open coding to establish themes 
and sub-themes that matched the seven indicators of polarisation which are: binary thinking, 





WhatsApp Deliberative Structures, Norms, and Polarisation 
6.0 Introduction 
Based on the research method and design laid out in chapter five, this chapter seeks to answer 
two research questions. The first was to establish the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp 
groups on governance in Kenyan counties. The study uses a quantitative method involving an 
online survey to examine the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp group participants in 
terms of their age, gender and level of education. Understanding the socio-demographic profile 
seeks to find out who uses WhatsApp platforms and if there is any difference with other SNSs 
platforms. The second research question sought to understand if and how the WhatsApp group 
deliberative structures and norms influence group polarisation (see Figure 6.1). The research 
question was answered in two ways. The first uses quantitative methods to establish if any 
association exists between WhatsApp group deliberative structures and norms and group 
polarisation. The second uses qualitative methods through WhatsApp-based focus group 
discussion where deliberative structures and norms are discussed in relations to their effect on 
group polarisation. The respondent’s feedback is classified into themes and compared to seven 
indicators of group polarisation. The seven indicators are binary thinking, motivated reasoning, 
in-group and out-group identities, confirmatory bias, partisanship, social comparison, and 
groupthink. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the implication of the findings on 
theories of selective exposure and echo chambers. It discusses some of the practical 






6.1 Profile of WhatsApp Groups; Deliberative Structures and Norms 
The first research question sought to establish the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp 
groups in Kenya. From the results in table 6.1 below, the profile of WhatsApp groups mainly 
consists of males (64.8%, M = 2.94, SD = 1.44), aged between 18-44 (91.3%, M = 2.92, SD = 
1.44) and educated with an undergraduate and diploma certificates (67.7%, M = 4.34, SD = 
1.95). These socio-demographic reflects the profile of other SNSs deliberation platforms (see 
the section below).  
Table 6. 1: Descriptive Statistics of socio-demographic Variables 
Variable Categorisation Frequency/Percentage Mean SD 
Age 18-24 yrs (125) 21.40% 2.88 1.138 
25-34 yrs (280) 47.95% 3.00 1.158 
35-44 yrs (106) 18.15% 2.85 1.156 
45-54 yrs (49) 8.39% 3.09 1.026 
55-64 yrs (24) 4.11% 3.02 1.040 
Gender Male (378) 64.8% 2.85 1.013 
Female (206) 35.2% 2.99 1.208 
Education High school (27) 4.58%, 3.01 1.334 
Tertiary level (43) 7.28%, 2.25 1.500 
Diploma (108) 18.51%, 2.98 0.941 
Undergraduate (287) 49.2%. 3.11 0.994 
Masters (113)19.33%, 3.21 1.053 
Doctorate (6) 1.02%, 2.86 1.157 
 
 
6.2 WhatsApp Group Deliberative Structure, Norms, and Polarisation 
The second research question sought to understand whether and how the WhatsApp group’s 
deliberative structure and norms influence group polarisation. Answering this research 
question was realised in two ways. The first method was to establish if an association exists 
between various WhatsApp group profile variables and polarisation using the Kruskal-Wallis 
H test. For the statistically significant associations, further analysis was done using effect size 
statistical methods to determine the strength and direction of association using the Pearson Chi-
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Square, Phi coefficient analysis and Cramer’s V analysis. The second method involved 
WhatsApp based focus group discussions, where the findings were categorised into themes and 
compared to seven indicators of polarisation.  
 
Table 6. 2:Descriptive Statistics of WhatsApp group deliberative structure and norms 
Variable Categorisation Frequency/Percentage Mean SD 
WhatsApp Group  Formal (236) 40.41% 3.65 0.603 
Informal (348) 59.59% 3.40 0.763 
Group Ties Cordial Ties (107) 18.32% 3.00 1.000 
No Ties (152) 26.03% 2.85 0.540 
Strong Ties 
 
(227) 38.87% 2.64 1.102 
Weak Ties 
 
(98) 16.78% 2.75 1.070 
Recruitment Self-selection (204) 43.33% 2.08 1.311 
Random-selection (273) 56.67% 2.36 0.959 
Diversity Gender Yes (568) 97.29% 1.03 0.178 
Religion Yes (523) 89.55% 1.03 0.182 
Ethnicity Yes (571) 97.78% 1.03 0.173 
Ideological Yes (511) 87.55 1.03 0.158 
Regional Yes (432) 73.97% 1.44 0.497 
Group Size Btw 50-100 (12) 2.055% 3.86 0.348 
Btw 101-150 (39) 6.67% 3.55 0.635 
Btw 151-200 (176) 30.13% 3.10 0.927 



















 (290) 49.66%  







 (393) 67.35% 









 (112) 19.34% 








6.2.1 Association between WhatsApp Profiles and Group Polarisation  
A Kruskal-Wallis H test was conducted to determine if the level of polarisation was different 
for the various age categories in WhatsApp groups. For the purpose analysis, age was 
categorised as younger (Btw 18-34 yrs.) and older (Btw 35-64 yrs.) while the levels of 
polarisation are categorized as low, medium and high (see Table 6.1). The test indicated no 
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statistically significant difference in polarisation for both the younger and older age categories 
across various levels of polarisation (see Table 6.2). The results show that the association 
between the younger age category is (χ2(4) = 9.705, p = 0.097) for high polarisation, (χ2(4) = 
2.461, p = 0.569), for moderate polarisation, and (χ2(4) = 3.809, p = 0.937) for low polarisation. 
None of the categories is statistically significant as was the case with the older age groups as 
well. The results in table 6.3 suggest that the association between older age category is (χ2(4) 
= 3.419, p = 0.201) for high polarisation, (χ2(4) = 2.098, p = 0.112), for moderate polarisation, 
and (χ2(4) = 2.110, p = 0.231) for low polarisation. These results suggest that the respondents 
age is less likely to influence the level of group polarisation in WhatsApp groups.  
Similarly, no statistically significant difference in polarisation was found between the 
gender dichotomies (males and females) where chi-square values were (χ2(4) = 1.271, p = 
0.260) high polarisation, (χ2(4) = 2.336, p = 0.126) moderate polarisation, (χ2(4) = 1.311, p = 
0.252) low polarisation for the male respondents. The Chi-square values were (χ2(4) = 0.922, 
p = 0.160) high polarisation, (χ2(4) = 2.012, p = 0.213) moderate polarisation, (χ2(4) = 1.099, 
p = 0.188) for female respondents. These results also suggest that a person’s gender is less 
likely to influence the level of group polarisation in WhatsApp groups. 
Education was also categorised into two for the purposes of analysis: lower education 
(High school, Tertiary college, and Diploma holders) and higher education (Undergraduate, 
Masters, and Doctorate) (see Table 6.2). The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed a statistically 
significant difference in polarisation for the lower and higher levels of education (see Table 
6.3). For lower education, the chi-square values were (χ2(5) = 21.829, p = 0.001) for high 
polarisation, (χ2(5) = 19.365, p = 0.002) for moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 34.623, p = 
0.005) for low polarisation. For higher education, the chi-square values were (χ2(5) = 19.342, 
p = 0.003) for high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 16.981, p = 0.011) for moderate polarisation, and 
(χ2(5) = 21.671, p = 0.005) for low polarisation (see Table 6.3). The mean rank of polarisation 
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for those with lower education is (277.94) while for those with higher education is (256.48). 
The above mean ranks suggest that participants with a higher level of education are less likely 
to be polarised in deliberative governance in their WhatsApp groups (see the section below).  
Table 6. 3:WhatsApp Group Variables and the Level of Polarisation 
WhatsApp Variables Dichotomy Low Moderate High 
Age Younger 3.809 2.461 9.705 
Older 2.110 2.098 3.419 
Gender Male 1.311 2.336 1.271 
Female 1.099 2.012 0.922 
Education Lower 34.623* 19.365* 21.829* 
Higher 21.671* 16.981* 19.342* 
Group Ties Weak 1.400 0.620 0.525 
Strong 1.019 0.911 1.321 
Group Size Small 10.912* 11.222* 13.126* 
Large 10.001* 8.763* 9.001* 
Moderation  Moderated 8.950* 6.450* 4.854 
Unmoderated 6.321* 8.361* 8.091* 
Civility  Civil 3.001 3.451 3.091 
Incivil  3.980* 2.931* 4.201* 
Tolerance  Tolerance 2.019 1.223 2.067 
Intolerance 3.116 2.871 2.109 
Inclusivity Inclusive 3.102 3.198 2.998 
Exclusive 2.197 2.100 2.015 
Diversity Diverse 11.334* 15.654* 9.493* 
Heterogeneity of viewpoints Heterogeneous 14.910* 16.450* 16.329* 
Notes: Cell entries are interpreted based on significance level where * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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For the purposes of this analysis, the nature of ties was categorised as strong (Cordial and 
Strong ties) and weak (Weak and No ties) (see Table 6.2). The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed 
no statistically significant difference in polarisation for both weak and strong categories of 
group ties in WhatsApp groups (see Table 6.3). The Chi-square values indicate that the 
association for weak group ties was (χ2(3) = 0.525, p = 0.913) for high polarisation, (χ2(3) = 
0.620, p = 0.932) for moderate polarisation, and (χ2(3) = 1.400, p = 0.706) for low polarisation. 
For strong group ties, it was (χ2(3) = 1.321, p = 0.172) for high polarisation, (χ2(3) = 0.911, p 
= 0.132) for moderate polarisation, and (χ2(3) = 1.019, p = 0.301) for low polarisation. These 
results indicate that the nature of ties, whether weak or strong, are less likely to influence the 
level of polarisation in WhatsApp groups.  
The Kruskal-Wallis H test found a statistically significant difference in polarisation 
between small and large group sizes (see Table 6.3). Small groups were categorised as 
consisting of between 50-150 participants, while large groups consist of 151-256 participants 
in WhatsApp groups. The chi-square values for small groups was (χ2(5) = 13.126, p = 0.004) 
high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 11.222, p = 0.011) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 10.912, p = 
0.005) low polarisation. The chi-square values for large groups was (χ2(5) = 9.001, p = 0.022) 
high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 8.763, p = 0.011) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 10.001, p = 
0.007) low polarisation. The mean ranks for the difference in group sizes were (329.06) for 
small groups and (375.02) for the large groups. Overall, these results tend to suggest that large 
WhatsApp groups are likely to have comparatively higher levels of group polarisation.  
The findings also suggest a statistically significant difference between polarisation and 
the moderation of deliberations in WhatsApp group (see Table 6.3). Moderation of WhatsApp 
groups was categorised into two; moderated (Well and average moderation) and unmoderated 
deliberations (Lowly and not moderated) deliberations. The chi-square value for moderated 
deliberations was (χ2(5) = 4.854, p = 0.003) high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 6.450, p = 0.042) 
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moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 8.950, p = 0.03) for low polarisation. The values for 
unmoderated deliberations was (χ2(5) = 8.091, p = 0.012) high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 8.361, p 
= 0.005) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 6.321, p = 0.013) for low polarisation. The mean 
ranks for polarisation in moderated WhatsApp groups were (263.30), and for unmoderated 
WhatsApp groups was (299.90). This implies that moderated deliberations in WhatsApp 
groups tend to have less polarisation comparative to unmoderated WhatsApp groups.  
For purposes of analysis, civility in deliberations was categorised into civil and incivil  
deliberations (see Table 6.2). There was a statistically significant difference between 
polarisation and incivility but not for civil deliberations. The chi-square values for incivil  
deliberations was (χ2(5) = 4.201 p = 0.021) high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 2.931, p = 0.012) 
moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 3.980, p = 0.001) low polarisation. The chi-square values 
for civil deliberations was (χ2(5) = 3.091 p = 0.221) high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 3.451, p = 
0.313) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 3.001, p = 0.441) low polarisation. The mean ranks 
for the difference in polarisation was (234.81) for civil and (261.02) for incivil . This suggests 
that incivil deliberations were more likely to influence group polarisation or vice versa.  
There was no statistically significant difference between polarisation and inclusivity 
because the chi-square values for inclusive deliberations was (χ2(5) = 2.998 p = 0.134) high 
polarisation, (χ2(5) = 3.198, p = 0.322) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 3.012, p = 0.231) 
low polarisation. The chi-square values for exclusive deliberations was (χ2(5) = 2.015 p = 
0.221) high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 2.100, p = 0.313) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 2.197, 
p = 0.441) low polarisation. Similarly, there was no statistically significant difference between 
polarisation and tolerance in deliberations and supports the Kruskal-Wallis H test (see Table 
6.3). The chi-square values for tolerance was (χ2(5) = 2.067 p = 0.072) high polarisation, (χ2(5) 
= 1.223, p = 0.111) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 2.019, p = 0.201) low polarisation. The 
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chi-square values for intolerance was (χ2(5) = 2.109 p = 0.06) high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 2.871, 
p = 0.129) moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 3.116, p = 0.09) low polarisation. 
The remaining two variables (diversity of participants and heterogeneity of viewpoints) 
could not be realistically dichotomised to analyse their association with polarisation (see Table 
6.2). The findings here indicate a statistically significant difference between the diversity of 
participants and the various levels of polarisation. The Kruskal-Wallis H test shows that the 
chi-square value was (χ2(5) = 9.493, p = 0.002) for high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 15.654, p = 
0.001) for moderate polarisation, and (χ2(5) = 11.334, p = 0.248) for low polarisation (see 
Table 6.3). The findings from the Kruskal-Wallis H test further indicate a statistically 
significant difference between polarisation and the heterogeneity of viewpoints in WhatsApp 
group deliberations (see Table 6.3). The chi-square values for heterogeneity of viewpoints was 
(χ2(5) = 16.329 p = 0.021) high polarisation, (χ2(5) = 16.450, p = 0.007) moderate polarisation, 
and (χ2(5) = 14.910, p = 0.001) low polarisation.  
6.2.2 Effect Size Measures of WhatsApp Variables and Polarisation 
As noted above, the Kruskal-Wallis H tests analysed the statistically significant differences 
between some dichotomised WhatsApp group variables and the three levels of polarisation (see 
Table 6.3). However, findings on statistical significance can be different, if the variables are 
considered holistically (without dichotomisation). Therefore, a post-test analysis using Phi 
Coefficient and Cramer’s V determined the strengths of association for all WhatsApp groups 
variables (see Table 6.4). The closer the value of Cramer’s V is to 1, the stronger the association 
between the variables. The Pearson Chi-square results and the Cramer’s V values indicates no 
association between a person’s age, gender, inclusivity, and their level of polarisation (see 
Table 6.4). These results confirm the findings of the Kruskal-Wallis H test indicating that there 
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is no significant association between a person’s age or gender and their level of polarisation 
(see Table 6.3).   
Table 6. 4: Effect size analysis between WhatsApp variables and Polarisation 
WhatsApp Variables Pearson Chi Square Phi Coefficient φ Cramer’s V (ϕ² c) 
Age 5.912 0.268 0.518 
Gender 1.381 0.624 0.439 
Education 9.018* 0.491* 0.677* 
Group Ties 2.201* 0.038* 0.599* 
Group Size 2.672* 0.126* 0.651* 
Moderation  3.721* 0.112* 0.642* 
Inclusivity  1.191 0.314 0.336 
Tolerance  2.652* 0.088* 0.628* 
Heterogeneity of viewpoints 3.982* 0.221* 0.732* 
Diversity  3.119* 0.082* 0.619* 
Civility  2.192* 0.501* 0.571* 
Notes: Cell entries are interpreted based on significance level where * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
The results in Table 6.4 above confirm those of the Kruskal-Wallis H test, (see Table 6.3), 
indicating that the level of education, group size, and moderation are likely to significantly 
influence the level of polarisation in WhatsApp deliberations.  Similar to the Kruskal-Wallis H 
test, the Cramer's V values indicates a strong positive association between the diversity of 
group participants, heterogeneity of viewpoints, and level of polarisation (see Table 6.4). 
Unlike the Kruskal-Wallis H test (see Table 6.3), the Cramer's V indicates both moderate and 
strong positive associations between the group ties, tolerance, civility, and the level of 
polarisation (see Table 6.4). The differences in the results in tables 6.3 and 6.4 reflects how the 
variables were analysed in relations to the level of polarisation. For the Kruskal-Wallis H test, 
the variables were dictotomised, sorted hierarchically, and weighted, while for the effect size 
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analysis tests such as the Cramer's V, the variables were considered holistically. The 
heterogeneity of viewpoints had the highest Cramer's V value (0.732) suggesting a very strong 
influence on the level of group polarisation in WhatsApp group (see Table 6.4). The level of 
education, the group size, moderation, tolerance and diversity all had Cramer's V values of 
more than 0.6 which also suggest strong influence of these variables on the level of polarisation 
in whatsapp groups. The nature of group ties and the civility had moderate (more than 0.5) but 
statistically significant values in relations to the level of polarisation.  
6.3 WhatsApp Focus Group Discussions findings 
The focus group discussion sought to establish if and how the WhatsApp group variables 
examined above influence polarisation in deliberative governance. As shown in (Table 6.5), 
the thematic analysis of the focus group discussions compared the arising themes with the 
following seven key indicators of polarisation: binary thinking, where group participants 
favour binary thinking and if an ‘us versus them’ positions in WhatsApp deliberations; 
motivated reasoning, where group participants only appreciate evidence that supports their 
position during deliberations; in-group and out-group identities, where the in-group’s 
participants favour those with similar viewpoints and positions and disagree with out-group 
regardless of the facts; confirmatory bias, disagreeing with other participants for oppositional 
reasons despite existing basic facts and evidence; partisanship, an inclination to staunchly 
support and favour a group’s viewpoint and opinion over alternatives; social comparison, 
group participants take certain positions because want to be perceived favourably by other 
group members; and groupthink, where the desire for group harmony  and conformity shapes 






Table 6. 5:WhatsApp Group Variables, Emerging Themes and Polarisation Indicators 
WhatsApp Variable Emerging Themes from FGD’s Polarisation Indicators N (71) 
Gender Influence of gender-defined patriarchal norms and dynamics 
Digital divide impacts on gender dynamics in deliberations 
Conflict avoidance and ambivalence prevalent among women 






Age Peer pressure defines the collective stand of young participants  
Socialisation on ethnic polarisation is from old to young participants 
Digital divide suggest younger are perceived to be polarised 






Education More education has encouraged bold expression of polarising ideas 
Educated participants become polarised influencers in the group 
More educated participants are likely to consume diverse content 






Group Ties WhatsApp group formation shapes group ties and polarisation 
Close ties groups can easily form ideological cliques/consensus 
Group homogeneity and enclaves are likely with close ties 
Weak ties facilitate easier exposure to diverse content 
Close ties are likely to adopt same patterns of thinking 






Moderation Group administrators are seen as partisan and unable to moderate 
Informal norms of moderation do not work in WhatsApp groups 
Moderation was difficult due to non-compliance in the group 






Diverse information challenges prior positions and opinions 
Heterogeneous content does not mean quality information 
Participants still can exercise content avoidance in the groups 
Exposure to cross-cutting content does not mean change of views 
Binary thinking 





Tolerance Tolerance is determined by personality type and social learning 
Issue framing determines occurrence of tolerance in discussions 
Keyboard warriors promotes intolerance through partisanship 
Anonymity in public WhatsApp groups aggravates intolerance 





Civility Incivil  comments are viewed as an attack on the group 
Incivility increases negative labelling and reduce dialogue 
Incivil  comments arouse negative emotions, and lurking 
Incivility exaggerates perceived bias leading to antagonism 





Group Size Homogeneity of small groups promote enclave deliberation 
Large groups suggest exposure to cross-cutting viewpoints 
Partisan selection of group members suggests partisan ideologies 
Large group groups suggest inadvertent exposure of content 
Motivated Reasoning 




Diversity Information filtering is impossible hence incidental exposure 
Extreme positions realised due to the group’s dominant view 
Expulsion from WhatsApp group results in enclave deliberations 
Spiral of silence for those who with minority opinion 
Partisanship 
Motivated Reasoning 
In-group and Out-group  
Social comparison 
55 
Inclusivity Power dynamics disadvantages contributions by minority groups 
Absence of two-sided deliberation leads to extremes positions 
Assuming individual views to represent the entire group’s views 
Lack of inclusivity is a product of imbalanced power dynamics 






6.3.1 Socio-demographic Characteristics and Group Polarisation 
Gender Dichotomy and Group Polarisation 
Respondents argued that males tend to be more polarised because they are comparatively more 
involved in politics and governance issues than women. Reference was made to the ‘patriarchal 
nature of the Kenyan politics’ whereby men had more interest, more exposure, and more say 
in politics and governance. Men, according to respondents, are more likely to join WhatsApp 
groups and seek avenues to further express their ideas on issues which they feel committed and 
passionate about. Such ideas, it was noted, was what made them more polarised. Respondents, 
however, also argued that women, having recently experienced more empowerment, have 
increased their involvement in online deliberations including on platforms like WhatsApp. 
Consequently, they are also more likely to take hard-line positions on the issues they are also 
passionate about. One respondent noted: 
Both genders can be polarised in the same measure. Politics has largely been viewed as 
men’s domain for years which can make one infer that women are less polarised. 
However, polarisation has been noticed in women given they have now become more 
vocal on governance matters even in WhatsApp (WFGD 3, R 7). 
Another respondent observed that: 
…anybody can be polarised and the differences between men or women does not matter. 
Men have things [issues] they are keen on pushing as their agenda and the same case is 
for women. (WFGD 2, R 8). 
Respondents noted that men are likely to deliberate on governance issues more frequently 
compared to women. This is because of how men are ‘socialised’, according to one respondent. 
Men invest more time and effort in county issues, meaning they would develop deeper personal 
convictions about particular ideologies with a higher possibility of being polarised. The effect 
of the digital divide was noted to negatively affect women compared to men and their access 
to platforms like WhatsApp, especially in rural areas, was also mentioned by respondents. The 
digital divide, it was claimed, meant fewer women on WhatsApp and less chance of them being 
exposed to polarised views and opinions during deliberations. One respondent suggested that 
polarisation in WhatsApp groups was influenced more by the topic of deliberation than by 
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gender dynamics. The contrasting perspective was that participants are polarised on 
governance issues that they have an interest in and this was largely influenced by participant’s 
gender. Respondents noted: 
Men in WhatsApp are more polarised than women because they are more techno-savvy. 
In most cases, men tend to get involved in politics and governance matters; in this case 
polarisation ends up affecting most men than it would with women (WFGD 2, R 4). 
 
Another respondent suggested: 
 
It is not gender that makes people polarised, it is the issues that men and women feel is 
important to them and they cannot compromise…. a good example is the gender rule 
which we have debated since 2010 (WFGD 2, R 4). 
Other explanations for gender and polarisation, as given by respondents, relate to their 
personality differences or ‘difference in behaviour’ as one respondent put it. Respondents felt 
that women were comparatively more opinionated and were dogmatic in some ideologies 
compared to men. Men, according to respondents, are more assertive and sometimes dismissive 
of others’ arguments in deliberations. One respondent noted that women were more likely to 
avoid ‘conflict’ and be ambivalent compared to men during deliberations. Men, it was noted, 
consistently expressed more conservative opinions than women on governance with a high 
possibility of being polarised. One respondent noted that both genders sometimes participated 
in deliberations with their minds already made up on certain contested governance issues 
because of ‘their background’. The discussions also revealed that while county leadership 
positions were mostly occupied by men, WhatsApp deliberations did not elicit any form of 
binary affiliations based on any specific leaders and personalities. One respondent noted: 
Women do not like conflict and where there is fights….and when discussions in our 
WhatsApp groups become heated, you can see that it is the men who always disagree and 
fight with each other (WFGD 5, R 1). 
 
Another respondent stated that: 
 
Gender is crucial according to me…it is all about what you value or don’t in governance 
that will polarise people (WFGD 2, R 4). 
Because women considered themselves ‘the underdogs’ during deliberation on certain 
governance issues, they were more likely to ‘group together to fight back’ and support each 
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other during WhatsApp deliberations. Men, it was suggested, lacked such patterns of defensive 
engagement during deliberations. However, men were more likely to become defensive just for 
the sake of it when they were challenged with what the respondents called ‘facts and figures’. 
One respondent felt that men were more likely to react negatively when their dominance and 
‘privileges’ were challenged during deliberations. Respondents argued: 
We women are the underdogs in many issues in our county. We often support one another 
in discussions when the men want to dominate everything. We have to join efforts and 
defend our issues (WFGD 5, R 1). 
 
Men like to defend themselves…when their privileges are questioned or even 
threatened…they gang up (WFGD 3, R 6). 
Despite the varied opinions on gender and polarisation, a significant majority of respondents 
held that gender is one of the least contributing factors to polarisation in their WhatsApp group. 
The respondents noted that gender was less likely to define their ideological positions 
compared to, say, ethnicity and religion. The findings also revealed an overall difference in the 
level of polarisation between both genders where men were more likely to be polarised 
compared to the women. 
 
Age Factor and its Effects on Group Polarisation 
Respondents agreed that the majority of WhatsApp groups consist of younger participants. The 
older age groups have been left behind by what one respondent called ‘a digital transformation’. 
The perception that polarisation is higher among younger participants on platforms like 
WhatsApp is a general result of this transformation. One respondent noted that the ideologies 
that fragmented younger and older participants in WhatsApp groups reflected the polarisation 
around what the age groups felt was pertinent to them. Some respondents argued that 
polarisation was a form of ‘socialisation’ and that it entrenches itself in a way that is self-
perpetuating in society. They noted that while young participants use WhatsApp platforms 
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more, and appear to be more polarised, they have been socialised to be polarised around 
governance, ethnicity, and politics by older age groups. Respondents noted that:  
Younger people are open to different opinions because it enables learning and growth 
and maybe out of respect for the older ones in our WhatsApp groups, by virtue of having 
more experience they can use it to change opinions. That is why they are less partisan 
(WFGD 6, R 4). 
Older people have a more difficult time tolerating different opinions, one they may feel 
they know more or have experienced more (WFGD 2, R 1). 
Another respondent added that: 
Young people learn polarisation from older people…especially on issues touching on the 
ethnicity…. we learn it from our parents (WFGD 1, R 5). 
Respondents argued that because young participants were more prone to peer pressure, they 
were more likely to stick to the group’s position, especially on issues they felt disadvantaged. 
Younger participants, it was noted, added their friends to WhatsApp groups in a way that 
resulted in similar-minded ‘cliques’. Such cliques supported one another in WhatsApp group 
deliberations. The link between age and polarisation was argued to depend on which age group 
had the resources to deliberate and engage in WhatsApp groups. However, no clear consensus 
was evident on whether younger or older participants had more access to resources like digital 
handsets, data bundles, and time for deliberations. It was, however, evident from the responses 
that the majority of young participants spend more time on WhatsApp and other social media. 
Respondents also argued that younger participants are more liberal than older participants who 
tend to be more conservative and polarised in their opinions. The respondent further noted that 
because the majority of people in urban areas in Kenya are younger age groups, they more 
tolerant and accommodating of other’s views. Respondents used words such as ‘open-minded’, 
‘diverse’ and ‘accommodating’ to describe how liberal young participants are when interacting 
on WhatsApp platforms. They also saw others as ‘closed-minded’, ‘dogmatic’, and 
‘unreasonable’.  One respondent stated: 
I agree, younger people are very open minded; they are willing to accept new ideas and 
opinions who unlike the old are stuck in old ways. That is why you have old men who 
are still voting for KANU [One of Kenya’s post-independence party] more than 20 years 




The discussion then looked at whether older participants should be considered more 
ideologically consistent rather than being polarised and extreme compared to young age groups 
during deliberations. This emerged after one respondent noted how older age groups ‘tend to 
stick’ to ideologies and ‘ways of doing thing’. The older age groups were also noted to be more 
ethnically polarised compared to the younger groups. One respondent noted that: 
Older people are more polarised as they tend to stick to known ideologies that may have 
worked in the past and may be unwilling to explore new ideas even when provided with 
new information. Can’t teach an old dog new tricks! (WFGD 2, R 4). 
 
Another one also stated that: 
 
People of my father’s age like sticking to old ways and I think this explains why they 
rarely change the parties they support…the same thing if they join WhatsApp group. I 
also think older people are very ethnically polarised…our generation is getting better in 
accepting ethnic differences (WFGD 1, R 4). 
Another perspective was that polarisation was not age-dependent but rather issue-dependent. 
Therefore, polarisation in WhatsApp groups depended on whether issues deliberated affected 
younger or older age groups. Respondents noted that apathy and decreased participation in 
governance among young participants mean that they were less likely to engage and be 
polarised. Just like gender, some respondents thought age played a minimal role in defining the 
issues that polarised WhatsApp groups. They noted that whether young or old, factors like 
ethnicity were more likely to polarise compared to age. One respondent noted: 
Younger people are not more polarised than older people as most are not even interested 
in politics to start with. How can younger people be polarised if they have stayed away 
from county politics and governance (WFGD 3, R 3). 
 
Another suggested that: 
 
The youth are united by very many things including unemployment, being excluded from 
county leadership. It is politics that poisons us (young respondent) and we become 
polarised (WFGD 3, R 7). 
Respondents also noted that younger participants spent more time on WhatsApp groups than 
older participants. More time on WhatsApp, it was noted, meant constant exposure to different 
views and opinions on governance issues. Respondents further noted that younger age groups 
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were likely to be members of various other political and non-political WhatsApp groups. This, 
according to respondents, also meant wider exposure to different perspectives on issues. 
 
Level of Education and Group Polarisation in WhatsApp 
There was a general consensus among respondents that an increased level of education in 
Kenya’s population is concurrent with the rising levels of perceived polarisation. However, the 
explanations given for this trend varied. Some argued that education had created more 
knowledgeable and confident participants who have consequently expressed their views and 
opinions more openly than before on platforms like WhatsApp. Others felt that polarisation 
among the educated and uneducated have been constant over the years. To them, WhatsApp 
and other online platforms have magnified the perception that polarisation is more widespread 
than before. One respondent indicated that: 
Educated people, because they may be able to articulate themselves better may not be so 
tolerant of different opinions. It may also stem from the feeling that they are well read on 
an issue and do not need to be instructed by the ignorant [clarified to mean the less 
educated] (WFGD 6, R 3). 
 
Others argued that participants who are less educated tend to be more dogmatic and ‘stubborn’ 
with their opinions and information. They are less willing to engage in deliberations that would 
otherwise change their positions on specific governance issues. Respondents noted that the 
education system engenders polarisation by heightening the focus and sensitivity around issues 
that divide society. Asked for an example, one respondent (male) suggested hat education has 
taught women to be more empowered and fight for their rights and this has resulted in 
polarisation between men and women. It was further suggested that education has supported 
more ‘evidenced’ discussion which is more convincing. Hence, the perception that those who 
are more educated were more likely to be influencers in their WhatsApp groups.  
One respondent noted: 
The less educated tend to have less information and by extension believe that the 
information they have is absolute and true. They are not willing to participate on 




Another respondent noted a contrary perspective stated that: 
 
Some people are stubborn because they feel they are well educated...I may be wrong but 
I have seen people in our group who are at each other’s throats because they know a thing 
or two more than the rest of us…that is what education does (WFGD 1, R 6). 
However, one respondent noted that influencers were more likely to be involved in framing 
issues in a polarised way during WhatsApp deliberations. Apparently, influencers in WhatsApp 
groups, just like in offline contexts, were purveyors of information from county authorities. 
They created a perception of being closely connected to power than the rest of the group 
members. They have what respondents referred to as ‘in-house’ information relating to county 
governance which they used to enhance their credibility. The argument on whether influencers 
are part of political elite was not conclusive; nonetheless, they were thought to be equally 
polarised. As one participant noted: 
Our WhatsApp group has people who are close to county government power. They bring 
us information from county and act like opinions leaders. They are very authoritative and 
influence discussions in our WhatsApp group (WFGD 5, R 5). 
 
Another argued that: 
 
Interacting with political leaders who are also polarised does not make any 
difference…there is no neutrality on what they say and this is where I feel we need to 
speak out (WFGD 2, R 3). 
Compared to the less educated who were less politically interested and inclined, educated 
participants were argued to be media junkies. Their behaviour of consuming diverse content 
gave the impression that they were more likely to be exposed to diverse information sources 
and content. One respondent argued: 
Less educated people like to stick to belief systems that they are comfortable with. Also, 
less educated people tend to display bias where they embrace information that supports 
their beliefs and reject information that contradicts them (WFGD 2, R 5). 
 
Another respondent also noted: 
We who are educated like to read a lot and are  exposed to variety of information…it 
might not help to change views we hold though. (WFGD 4, R 4). 
Respondents had varied opinions on whether educated participants in their WhatsApp groups 
were likely to express civility and rationality in deliberations. Some argued that those who are 
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educated were more inclined to be moderate in their expressions and mindful of their language 
compared to the less educated. Other respondents, however, gave examples of how the most 
passionate, irrational and polarised positions had been advanced by those considered well 
educated.  
Educated people believe they are knowledgeable and therefore they will stick more to 
their positions/ opinions in political discussions (WFGD 4, R 4).   
 
Respondents suggested that because WhatsApp is mainly based on a written format and 
structure of engagement, those who are educated are more likely to be articulate and therefore 
appear more ‘opinionated’ compared to the less educated. Being opinionated, as argued by one 
respondent, was construed to mean being polarised. Yet the majority of respondents indicated 
that the level of education was not the leading factor that caused polarisation in WhatsApp 
deliberations. One respondent argued: 
The reason people discussing governance issues don’t agree very often is because of 
those who argue do that in an uninformed way. To fix polarisation and the divide in many 
counties will happen if people are educated. If people are educated, it is easier to agree 
on the facts and move forward (WFGD 1, R 5). 
6.3.2 Group Ties, Group Size and Polarisation 
The categorisation between participants ties in the WhatsApp groups was classified in the 
WFGD’s as follows; Weak ties where members do not know each other personally and do not 
engage outside the WhatsApp group or where group members know each other from WhatsApp 
group but not personally. Strong ties where group members know each other personally and 
engage outside the WhatsApp group or where group members met in their WhatsApp group 
and have met in person. The majority of respondents agreed that the group ties influenced 
polarisation in WhatsApp groups. Respondents suggested that the manner in which WhatsApp 
groups are formed was determined by their pre-existing relationships. Most respondents agreed 
that the WhatsApp groups formed by those with prior relationships were more friendly and 
shared ‘somethings’ [meaning views and opinions] in common. Some WhatsApp groups were 
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noted to be very diverse and participants in them were likely to be strangers to one another. 
Respondents noted that friends, as opposed to strangers, were more agreeable during 
discussions but this did not mean they could be more polarised. Also apparent was that those 
with closer ties in their WhatsApp groups knew most of their group members by name. Two 
respondents noted: 
I know all the people in my WhatsApp group. We picked and chose people we added to 
the group because we wanted only those who share same ideas with us. Our WhatsApp 
group is not for arguing things, it is for action (WFGD 2, R 7). 
 
We were able to form our WhatsApp group because we are close friends in the first place. 
So, we happen to share many views in common on politics and governance. We also 
participate in many things together (WFGD 5, R 5). 
There was general consensus that random selection as a recruitment method united participants 
with similar interests and goals in WhatsApp groups. However, such participants have different 
ideologies because the relationship between them is weak. Respondents also claimed that 
exposure to diverse information in contexts like public WhatsApp groups was, as one 
respondent put it, ‘impossible to avoid’. Another respondent argued that WhatsApp groups 
with weak ties encouraged participants to express their opinions more freely and without any 
inhibitions; they felt ‘nothing personal’ in relation to their audience. Respondents further noted 
that participants with close/strong ties are likely to seek group positions and seek issue 
consensus during WhatsApp deliberations. WhatsApp groups with strong ties, according to 
respondents, involved exposure to likeminded opinions while avoiding different perspectives. 
Those with close ties in their WhatsApp groups felt that they were likely to influence one 
another on specific views that defined the group’s identity. 
According to one respondent:  
No, actually people tend to be more polarised with strangers because they may have 
nothing to lose from the connection as compared to close ties. So, it may be easier to 
tolerate a differing opinion from a close tie because there’s value in the relationship 




Some contrary opinions were that WhatsApp groups with weak ties eventually resulted in the 
formation of what respondents termed ‘inner circles’ within the WhatsApp groups. Those 
within the inner circles are likely to support one another in deliberations regardless of their 
affiliations. Further, close ties were possible because of what one respondent termed as ‘gang 
mentality’. Asked what this meant, the respondent noted that those with close ties were likely 
to rally around each other on emotionally driven points in deliberations. Also apparent from 
the respondents was that participants in weak ties engage in infrequent deliberations and have 
less opportunities for polarisation, whereas close ties interact quite freely and have a chance to 
deliberate deeply and exhaustively on issues. Discussion among ‘strangers’ in WhatsApp 
groups was considered to be done with a carefully weighed view of one’s reputation. This was, 
however, disputed by those who noted that the opposite was actually the case. One respondent 
observed that: 
People in my WhatsApp group know each other very well; we were not friends before 
we joined our WhatsApp group but we work in civil society and we share and discuss 
things a lot more now than we did before (WFGD 7, R 2). 
It was, however, noted that because weak ties in WhatsApp groups make it easier to introduce 
new ideas and information, they enhance more cross-cutting deliberations. Respondents further 
suggested that WhatsApp features allowed what one respondent called ‘mutation’. Asked what 
this meant, the respondent stated that mutation is where those with similar views self-identified 
within a heterogeneous WhatsApp group and created a different but homogeneous WhatsApp 
group. The result was WhatsApp groups made up of participants with similar ideologies and 
points of view. According to respondents, this was possible in WhatsApp groups with weak 
ties. Some respondents felt that the participant’s personality factors were a greater determinant 






Group Size and Group Polarisation 
Respondents generally argued that larger groups were more likely to be polarised because of a 
high number of viewpoints. Others suggested that it was much easier to achieve consensus or 
common ground in deliberations among smaller groups compared to larger ones. As one 
respondent noted: ‘participants are more agreeable in smaller groups’ compared to large ones. 
In large WhatsApp groups, respondents noted, it was easier for polarising opinions to be 
ignored or lost in the increased traffic of conversations. Large groups were noted to increase 
distrust between participants, and this was linked to higher chances of issue polarisation during 
deliberations. Smaller WhatsApp groups were also seen as more close-knit, with strong ties 
between participants compared to larger ones. Therefore, respondents felt that small groups 
tend to have more open and non-polarising discussions in more enclave deliberation 
environments. One respondent contended: 
Different views, defended intensely within the group will generate more heat and draw 
battle lines easier than the smaller group. It is easier to find areas of common ground in 
smaller groups than in bigger groups (WFGD 2, R 5). 
Another of a contrary opinion indicated that: 
I think people who are close have very frank discussion with one another. They know 
each other and know what sets people off in discussion (WFGD 1, R 6). 
The respondents argued that participants in small WhatsApp groups can easily form in-groups 
where particular information circulates. Larger groups increased the diversity of participants 
and this also meant more opinions, more cross-cutting views, and information sources, 
according to respondents. Respondents noted that participants in larger groups were likely to 
use angry and disrespectful tones in their discussions because of the impersonal relationships 
between participants. This led some to avoid participating in deliberations because they 
perceived the negative tones to mean heightened polarisation. One respondent noted that the 
addition of members to smaller WhatsApp groups was more likely to be based on a partisan 
selection process. Only participants who were perceived as ‘favourable’ or compliant with the 
group norms or characteristics were added to such small groups. A respondent declared:  
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A large group is more polarised as there are varying opinions presented over an issue...it 
is more like a market of ideas, too many ideas, too much noise and little understanding 
between people (WFGD 7, R 5).  
 
Another respondent of a contrary perspective noted: 
We don’t need to look far for examples; just look at small groups where being added to 
the group is through favourability to group admin or members (WFGD 3, R 3). 
Asked about the influence of binary and partisan positions, respondents argued that binary 
thinking was determined by the issues being discussed and less by the size of the group. The 
majority of respondents shared the opinion that particular attitudes and stereotypes that drive 
ethnic polarisation had nothing to do with the group’s size. As one respondent put it: 
Small networks tend to be more polarised as divergent opinions are fewer. Large 
networks tend to be more polarised as it holds many people with different political views; 
this might end up promoting polarisation (WFGD 3, R 7). 
 
It was, however, noted that while some WhatsApp groups consist of large networks, very few 
participants actually participate in deliberations. Most practised lurking behaviour during 
discussions. The discussions then looked at whether lurking reflected a form of polarisation. 
Respondents noted that those who practised lurking behaviour are more polarised and did not 
want to reveal their positions. The other perspective was that lurking meant that the polarised 
nature of deliberations in WhatsApp groups pushed some to silence because they considered 
themselves to hold extreme but minority viewpoints. The respondent indicated their different 
views and diversity of participants in their group was one of the most polarising factors. They 
also felt that the group ties and the group size were some of the most polarising factors in their 
WhatsApp group. 
6.3.3 Moderation, Civility and Group Polarisation 
 
It was clear from the discussions that polarisation on WhatsApp is extremely challenging to 
moderate. Respondents noted that deliberations on contested issues in their WhatsApp groups 
shatter the informal norms of moderation and civility. Apparent from the discussions was that 
polarisation and intolerance were influenced by some features of WhatsApp including the lack 
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of appropriate moderation mechanisms for the group discussions. It was clear that some group 
administrators heightened polarity in deliberations rather than moderate engagement. 
Moderating opinions of participants who were believed to be speaking ‘facts’ were considered 
to be negative for group discussion and viewed as ‘gagging’ according to one respondent.  
One group administrator noted: 
As WhatsApp group administrator, I don’t feel I can moderate the discussions in my 
group because WhatsApp features are not very enabling (WFGD 1, R 1). 
Another WhatsApp group administrator with an alternative view noted that: 
Our work as admins [short for administrators] is not to limit people from having their 
dicussions… we are not to police people in the group…but many time we have had to 
remove people who abuse others (WFGD 5, R 1). 
It was apparent that moderation in some WhatsApp groups was done by ‘everyone’. Asked 
what this meant, respondents noted that the responsibility for pointing out abusive or 
demeaning utterances lay with the group participants as a whole. There was general 
ambivalence about the role of WhatsApp administrators during deliberations and how their 
contribution influences group polarisation. It was further noted that when participants believe 
their opponents are extreme with their views, they are more likely to be seen as biased, 
irrational, and selfish. The other side, it was noted, was likely to prefer to escalate the polarised 
deliberation and actions over civility or cooperation. Some respondents considered WhatsApp 
group administrators ‘helpful’ in maintaining civility during deliberations. However, others 
noted that they are not, as one respondent put it, ‘immune to polarisation’.  
As one respondent indicated: 
Moderation allows people to air different opinions on an issue without being victimised 
over a shared opinion but moderation can also skew the WhatsApp discussion to one side 
when the moderator is biased (WFGD 6, R 2). 
 
Another respondent argued: 
I doubt moderation is possible in our WhatsApp groups…everybody feels entitled to say 
what they think regardless of language they use and this is where it is helpful (referring 
to moderation) (WFGD 6, R 5). 
217 
 
Moderated deliberations, it was noted, depend on the compliance of participants which 
respondents noted was very low in most WhatsApp groups. Others noted that polarisation, like 
a ‘cancer’, had infected the entire society and spread to the online platforms sparing none, 
including the administrators.  As one participant underlined : 
Polarisation in Kenya is everywhere; it is like a cancer that has spread even to social 
media like WhatsApp. We need to do a radical surgery because no amount of talking and 
discussing will eradicate it (WFGD 2, R 2). 
 
The same respondent noted that unless a ‘radical surgical’ is done to remove polarisation in 
Kenyan society, the moderation of polarised deliberations on platforms like WhatsApp meant 
nothing. The place for deliberations on polarisation led to a discussion the findings of which 
are presented in the next chapter. Some respondents noted that polarised attitudes, unlike 
visible behaviour, was challenging to moderate effectively. It was evident that respondents 
could collectively moderate their views and opinions during WhatsApp deliberations, ensuring 
they were less inflammatory and polarised. One respondent noted that their WhatsApp group 
used the term ‘call to order’ for participants who were making unrelated remarks or using 
incivil language. One respondent commented: 
We all take responsibility to call one another to order. I feel this has helped in our 
discussions (WFGD 6, R 2). 
  
Some respondents further noted that because their WhatsApp groups are moderated, they feel 
more confident to express their opinions knowing they will not be ‘attacked’. Whether the 
ability to express one’s thoughts freely was good or bad for polarisation was not apparent from 
the discussions. One respondent gave an example of a WhatsApp group they exited because 
they ‘could not continue in an environment of chaos, where negative comments were flying 
about’. One respondent noted that: 
Inhibiting people who are intolerant of other views can only work within a short time 
frame. Dissidents may actually gain sympathisers who may be quickly be less tolerant. 
Rather than moderating discussions, I would propose educating/presenting facts rather 
than inhibiting those with hard-line stances (WFGD 4, R 1). 
 




People expressing their minds freely should not be taken to mean that they are 
polarisation. I have seen people calling others out for speaking out [mean speaking up] 
their minds (WFGD 2, R 2). 
Moderation may introduce fairness into discussion but in some WhatsApp groups, biased 
moderators expelled participants who expressed divergent opinions, according to respondents. 
It was further evident from the discussions that moderation of WhatsApp deliberations drives 
participants to form their own WhatsApp groups. Respondents argued over whether the group 
administrators should moderate the content or the expression of such content. This generated 
further discussion on whether it was the content or the manner of expressions that was 
polarising. As a respondent argued: 
People are more willing to have conversations when there is a moderator because they 
feel their views will be fairly weighed. People are also more willing to hold moderate 
positions and not the content when moderators do their job (WFGD 1, R 2). 
 
There was a discussion on how moderating can quickly degenerate into censorship because of 
what some respondents called ‘amateur’ and ‘over-zealous’ WhatsApp group administrators. 
It was also not clear from the discussion if discussion disagreement in WhatsApp group 
deliberation influences how open participants are to persuasion. Respondents noted that while 
it was possible to moderate WhatsApp group discussions in some instances, it did not mean 
participants expressed less polarised opinions. According to them, it meant that they did it in a 
more responsible and considerate way. The majority agreed that unmoderated discussion in 
their group is one of the most polarising factors. 
 
Civility/Incivility and Polarisation 
For clarity and depth of discussion, the definition of incivility was broadened to include any 
rude, demeaning, offensive, and impolite use of language targeted at participants and groups 
during the deliberations. Respondents noted that incivility was usually between participants 
who sometimes disagreed on governance issues, rather than between specific groups. However, 
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incivility was likely to be viewed as an ‘attack’ on the individual and the group affiliated to 
that person. Further, incivility was seen to target people rather than ideas or views they 
presented during deliberations. Incivility, it was further noted, resulted in defensive reactions 
to what was perceived as an attack on an in-group by the outgroup. Respondents noted how 
this was likely to enrage and worsen incivility in deliberation due to retaliatory behaviour. 
Respondents claimed: 
Sometimes abusive comments made on a person is taken to mean an attack on the group. 
People take things personally even in groups (WFGD 2, R 2).  
 
People can be angry at the system but they don’t know how to discuss without aiming 
blows at each other in the group (WFGD 4, R 2). 
Further, incivility was seen to increase negative labelling of the targets or opponents be they, 
individuals or groups. Some of the labels noted by respondents to describe incivil participants 
in their WhatsApp group included: ‘biased’, ‘emotional’, ’unreasonable’, and ‘anti-discussion’, 
‘blind to reason’ or ‘anti-progress’. Eventually, the resulting attitude was that the opposing 
group views the other as not worth engaging with. The contrary view was that incivility in 
WhatsApp groups had come to be viewed as the ‘order of the day’, to express its commonality, 
and this was a source of distrust in deliberations. As one respondent noted: 
We are used people attacking each other and it’s the order of the day in our WhatsApp 
groups…although some topics are very heated than others (WFGD 3, R 7). 
 
Further, respondents highlighted that incivil comments were more likely to be shared and 
forwarded in WhatsApp group discussions, and this encouraged certain participants who were 
seeking attention to use them. Incivil comments on sensitive issues, group identity or targeting 
ethnic tribes or political parties during deliberations were noted to elicit the strongest reactions 
from the WhatsApp group. Asked whether incivil comments are prevalent in WhatsApp groups 
with homogeneous participants, respondents noted that it was less likely to be the case. For 
instance, one respondent noted that: 
I do not think people who know each other can use rude or abusive language at each 




Another respondent added: 
Someone made comments about Kikuyus ‘being who they are’ (stereotyped as thieves 
and corrupt) and this was a big thing because people ended up abusing one another; some 
left the group (WFGD 3, R 7). 
It was further evident from the respondent’s views that exposure to incivil  comments in 
deliberations was likely to spiral into more ‘bile’ and negative emotions. Asked to expound on 
this, respondents claimed that incivility was likely to drive negative emotions and evoke 
stronger attitudes. Respondents felt that the stronger the negative attitudes in a group, the more 
the participants expressed stereotypes against their opponents (out-group members). One 
respondent stated: 
Going personal with rude comments has made people leave the group or demanded their 
opponents to leave…it depends on the group (WFGD 5, R 5). 
 
Respondents further noted how incivility led to counter-attitudinal reactions such as 
‘closedmindedness’ or ‘shutting down’ and heightened levels of defensiveness during 
deliberations. Incivility was thus linked to the use and spread of polarising fake news. One 
respondent noted that incivility and fake news ‘go together’. Another noted that incivility and 
certain negative stereotypes are common in governance discourse. One respondent noted: 
Some people cannot attack one another directly, so they use fake news…but the effect is 
still the same (referring to breaking down deliberations) (WFGD 2, R 7). 
 
In WhatsApp groups, incivility touching on participant’s positions or perceived privileges was 
likely to heighten extreme polarisation especially when incivil language justified dominance, 
demeaned an ethnic community, or targeted a political leader supported by segments of the 
group. It was noted that partisan affiliation to certain political elite in WhatsApp group 
deliberations encouraged incivility, especially when discussions centred around county 
government leaders and personnel. Asked to clarify this, respondents contended that the 
incivility was often heightened by supporters of warring county government politicians.  
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It is worse in our WhatsApp because there are those who feel they can tell everyone off 
because they work for county. County politics makes name calling even worse when it’s 
about people who ate money (referring to corruption) (WFGD 5, R 5). 
With WhatsApp group discussions, respondents stated that it is possible to skip incivil 
comments and scroll through negative chats. The discussions also looked at whether there was 
constant reminder through moderation when discussions turn incivil. Respondents observed 
that this was possible to the extent that participants were compliant. Incivility was also noted 
to influence participants to practice lurking behaviour. Some respondents noted that they would 
rather ‘boycott’, be quiet or do what one respondent called ‘shutting down’ [meaning leaving 
WhatsApp for while] rather than engage in incivil discussions. They also noted that they were 
likely to consider deliberations as non-serious when they saw the use of incivil comments.  
I would rather shut down and not be involved…it is not in my nature to engage in such 
(meaning incivil  debates) (WFGD 1, R 5). 
 
It was, however, clear that incivility was more likely to exaggerate perceived bias that led to 
the antagonism characterised by ‘us versus them’. Discussions that involved name calling were 
noted to mess up discussions and make further deliberations impossible. One respondent 
further noted that incivility was not just about specific swear words and that it could be about 
invoking certain stereotypes to ridicule or antagonise perceived respondents during WhatsApp 
group deliberations. Respondents felt that inclusivity was not one of the most polarising factors 
in WhatsApp group. 
6.3.4 Heterogeneous Viewpoints and Diversity of Participants 
 
Respondents felt that exposure to divergent viewpoints did not influence polarisation in any 
way because those who participated in WhatsApp deliberations held prior positions on 
governance issues before joining WhatsApp. Exposure to different perspectives would not, 
according to them, necessarily change their positions. This, they noted, was especially the case 
for strongly held opinions and deeply entrenched views. Some respondents argued that 
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changing opinions depended on an individual’s understanding of those issues rather than 
exposure to diverse views. The counter-argument was that being exposed to different 
information was what informed opinion change. Respondents linked exposure to 
heterogeneous viewpoints with the group’s increased appreciation for others’ diverse opinions 
and views. Respondents also felt that when they engaged with those with different opinions, 
they were having ‘good’ quality discussions. One respondent stated: 
Different opinions enable other people in the WhatsApp group to consider that someone 
else’s opinion does actually make sense and they are entitled to it if it does not (WFGD 
1, R 1). 
The willingness to evaluate one’s opinions, according to the respondents, was dependent on 
the quality of new information rather than exposure to diverse opinions. Diverse information 
founded on rumours and misinformation, as was noted to be common in WhatsApp groups, 
was less likely to change participants’ opinions. It was also evident from the discussions 
that participants on WhatsApp can sometimes actively avoid content that counters their prior 
positions. This, according to respondents, happened in the following ways: ignoring specific 
contributors and exiting and forming other WhatsApp groups. As one respondent suggested: 
Different points of view can be beneficial to help people realise that their line of thought/ 
cherished beliefs may not be universally acknowledged by other WhatsApp group 
members. This can definitely reduce polarisation (WFGD 2, R 5). 
 
The majority of the respondents were agreeable to encountering diverse viewpoints through 
different information sources; however, some doubted whether new information would change 
their views on specific governance issues. WhatsApp features tend to enhance information 
cascades where shared content quickly diffuses and grows exponentially through forwarding. 
Most respondents admitted having encountered diverse information on governance in their 
WhatsApp groups that challenged their points of view. It was not, however, clear if information 
cascades on WhatsApp involved like-minded groups or those with cross-cutting identities who 
are only loosely connected to each other. One respondent commented: 
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When different content is shared in WhatsApp, it will be a great eye opener to them and 
help them learn to appreciate other people's political opinions. The greatest danger is the 
people stay in their cocoon of information and think no one else’s matters (WFGD 2, R 
7). 
 
It was further evident from the discussions that WhatsApp groups members experienced an 
inconceivably large amount of diverse content on governance. This created an information 
overload which forced users to choose and attend to information selectively. However, the 
selection of content to read was not necessarily based on the congruence of opinion. Rather, 
according to participants, it was based on factors including: humour value, mood, availability 
of time, nature of content (video or audio), type of WhatsApp and users’ interests. Respondents 
implied that content that was considered outrageous, alarming or even counterintuitive was 
more likely to be circulated and viewed if it was believed to be true. It was not just about 
exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints on governance but also the packaging of such content 
that determined exposure in WhatsApp groups. One respondent indicated: 
I use my WhatsApp once a day mostly in the evening after work. When I open it, I find 
thousands of messages and I cannot go through all of them coz I am mostly tired. So, I 
sieve through what I like (WFGD 3, R 4). 
 
The majority of respondents agreed that their WhatsApp groups consist of diverse participants; 
the level of ideological homogeneity between them was minimal on a range of issues. 
Respondents noted that they shared similar opinions on issues that brought them together. 
However, the respondents argued that their opinions differed on various other governance 
issues and topics. One respondent gave an instance where while environmental governance 
issues led to the formation of some WhatsApp groups, it did not mean they agreed on revenue 
allocation issues at the county level. The diversity means that the groups availed of a lot of 
opportunities for participants to select their information sources during deliberations and filter 
out unfamiliar or challenging messages. One respondent stated: 
Actually, WhatsApp removes the impact of a face-to-face discussion that allows one to 
wait for the other to share their opinion and the expression of non-verbal communication. 
This usually enables the person to know when to stop and if the participants are enjoying 




The respondents suggested that participants become polarised in concert with like-minded 
others due to the mutual affirmation of a shared identity. This behaviour intensifies their shared 
attitudes, including a negative view of outsiders or those of the out-group. Respondents further 
noted that the trouble lies with participants regarding their political and ethnic communities’ 
affiliations as group identities in deliberations. It was further noted that WhatsApp 
deliberations happen in a way that reflects the warring political parties and ethnic affiliations. 
It was also noted that the diversity of participants can also render the WhatsApp group 
unmanageable. One of the respondents gave an example where the WhatsApp group he once 
belonged to was dissolved because of what he termed ‘unmanageable differences’ which made 
co-existence in the group impossible. Another observed: 
People tend to form cliques on WhatsApp platforms just as in real life; therefore, they 
gravitate towards friends and people with same ideologies. Secondly, politics has an 
emotional component to it which cannot be quickly dismissed even in WhatsApp (WFGD 
5, R 5). 
 
Respondents gave instances where those with divergent opinions or persistent about ‘pestering’ 
the group were removed from the group. The respondents agreed they had developed more 
extreme positions and opinions compared to what they thought before they were exposed to 
particular topics in WhatsApp deliberations. It was also revealed that those with a minority 
position on specific governance topics became silenced or have a disproportionately minimal 
say or weight in WhatsApp deliberations. As one respondent indicated: 
My experience – based on my WhatsApp group– is that with the anonymity most diverse 
people are emboldened and become more polarised. WhatsApp speed of communication 
oftentimes leads to polarisation due to the ‘joys' some people find in bashing/trolling 
those of differing opinions (WFGD 7, R 8). 
 
Exposure to diverse information creates an environment where various opinions are tolerated 
to the extent that is good for polarisation. Diversity, according to the respondents, encourages 
participants to appreciate a variety of views and opinions. A sense that the group was facing a 
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common fate or that the members were likely to have the same fate was noted to magnify intra-
group similarity and this tends to increase polarisation. 
6.3.5 Tolerance, Inclusivity and Group Polarisation 
 
Respondents felt that participants using WhatsApp groups are more likely to be flexible and 
tolerant towards other political and religious beliefs and practices. The majority of respondents 
perceived themselves as tolerant in their WhatsApp group deliberations. The majority also 
agreed that tolerance enables participants in heterogeneous WhatsApp groups to find 
confidence in self-expression despite their existing differences in positions. There was a 
discussion about the difference between lurking and exercising tolerance in deliberation. One 
respondent observed that those who were extremely polarised and passionate would not keep 
silent when an opinion challenging their beliefs and positions was expressed in the group. The 
potential of tolerance to lead to constructive disagreements was noted by respondents. 
However, this was considered to be dependent on the issue being discussed. It was also evident 
that some respondents misconstrued disagreements to mean polarisation during WhatsApp 
groups. Some respondents noted: 
Actually, tolerance may present itself as silence over the polarising discussion such that 
members of a social media group cease to talk over an issue rather than belabour over it 
because they may never agree (WFGD 6, R 2). 
Intolerance in the society is the same as what is in WhatsApp groups (WFGD 1, R 2). 
When people are emotional and make their points without logic in discussions, 
polarisation occurs. I can be right to say that opposition to our ideas helps them become 
stronger and more tolerant because we become stronger and more tolerating when we 
defend our ideas and positions. (WFGD 2, R 2). 
 
Respondents reported varied levels of tolerance in their WhatsApp groups and the discussion 
looked at some of the possible explanations for such variance. Diverse personality, different 
levels of education, social learning, and being part of highly diversified networks were among 
the explanations respondents gave. For instance, education was argued to open participant’s 
minds allowing the debunking of polarising stereotypes that often-caused intolerance. Those 
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in public WhatsApp groups (heterogeneous networks) felt that they were also more tolerant 
compared to those in closed (homogeneous networks) WhatsApp groups. Some WhatsApp 
groups consist of politicians and the discussion was whether their presence increased 
intolerance and polarisation in deliberations. One respondent observed that:  
If the participants are exposed to different thought patterns or if facts are presented, it 
makes people start questioning opinions that have been cherished for long. Tolerance in 
discussion would reduce polarisation as people would be willing to listen to other views 
and be more accepting (WFGD 3, R 5). 
 
Another respondent also indicated: 
 
Tolerance can be taught and that is something most people in WhatsApp groups are not 
willing to learn (WFGD 4, R 6). 
Respondents noted that WhatsApp groups have made what he called ‘social intolerance’ more 
visible and more acceptable [legitimate]. One respondent indicated that intolerance towards the 
minorities in their group has contributed to the pervasive negative public opinion against such 
groups. Some respondents noted that politicians in WhatsApp groups have amplified the 
perceptions and effect of divisive issues and made tolerance harder to achieve. Others argued 
how the presence of politicians had minimal effects on polarisation, especially given that their 
contribution was a small percentage in their deliberations. It was apparent that politicians 
influence the level of tolerance in WhatsApp groups. Intolerance was also blamed on issue 
framing in WhatsApp groups. Respondents indicated that the manner in which governance 
issues are broached and framed in their WhatsApp is sometimes antagonistic and leads to 
intolerance.  
Tolerance in WhatsApp can help reduce polarisation as it gives others a chance to express 
their different political views…but when people move to defending their views or they 
feel attacked, tolerance is forgotten (WFGD 4, R 1). 
 
It was also apparent that WhatsApp, unlike other social media platforms, allows the use of 
phone numbers, and this negates the element of anonymity and improves tolerance in 
deliberations. In contrast, some respondents argued that tolerance was not made better by 
removing anonymity. The discussion on whether it was easier to be tolerant of strangers (weak 
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ties) than friends (strong ties) achieved no clear consensus. Moderation was noted to enhance 
more tolerance, but the asynchronous nature of WhatsApp deliberations made it near 
impossible for group administrators to pay attention to all the polarising aspects of a discussion. 
No definitive position was arrived at with regard to whether tolerance exists in small networks 
compared to large ones. One respondent stated: 
The existence of eco-chambers feeds polarisation on social media, making it difficult to 
be tolerant. Tolerance is the antithesis of polarisation (WFGD 7, R 2). 
 
Further, respondents noted that those who are young are comparatively more tolerant in 
WhatsApp groups compared to the older age groups. Younger participants, it was argued, were 
more likely to take ‘liberal’ positions on many issues compared to the older age groups, and 
this is what defined polarisation. It was also noted that participants in WhatsApp groups 
became more intolerant when the issues being discussed touched on their individual or group 
identity. Issues touching on ethnic identity and ancestral issues of land were noted to heighten 
the level of polarisation in WhatsApp groups. Respondents noted: 
I think that tolerance also depends on what level of education somebody has got…more 
educated can mean more understanding [also clarified to mean more tolerance] (WFGD 




we are very intolerant when we defend things [clarified to mean governance issues] that 
tie [clarified to mean bind] us together based on what we believe is about us as a 
people…...this is the case in WhatsApp discussions as well (WFGD 1, R 7). 
 
The majority of respondents felt that intolerance is one of the most polarising factors in their 
WhatsApp group. Intolerance was noted to worsenen when the hostility between the 
intergroups increased due to a feeling of being threatened and dislike by the outgroup. 
Inclusivity and Polarisation 
Respondents suggested that the challenges of achieving inclusivity arose because specific 
participants and groups dominated deliberation in WhatsApp groups. Respondents gave 
instances where power dynamics, for instance, between those who had expert knowledge and 
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those who did not translated into imbalanced input during deliberations. An instance was also 
given where participants exhibited different participatory tendencies where the persistent and 
assertive dominated WhatsApp group deliberations. Asked how this affected group 
polarisation, respondents felt that it made deliberations one-sided and this was likely to result 
in extreme positions. One respondent felt that because they lacked adequate knowledge on 
finance issues, they still wanted to participate in WhatsApp group deliberations on budget-
making but did not have the ‘knowhow’ [meaning expert knowledge].  
One respondent observed that: 
Some people are also more likely to be assertive, while other are softer [laid-back] and 
accommodating... this is what makes a (WFGD 7, R 2). 
Another respondent stated: 
When we discuss budgeting, I am not expert in accounting or finance; what do you think 
happens to my input...I don’t have the knowhow (WFGD 7, R 2). 
Some respondents, however, further argued that inclusivity was not a ‘big deal’ because at least 
those who spoke out were able to capture their opinions in some way. According to them, there 
was no need for ‘all’ [meaning everybody] to contribute to discussions because it would be 
‘chaotic’. One respondent felt that surviving the deliberative environment required one to be 
one of the ‘fittest’, meaning those who were able to make contributions rather than feel 
excluded or ‘disadvantaged’. This, however, elicited comments by others who felt that large 
WhatsApp groups ‘crowded out’ those with minority opinions despite having contributions to 
make. For instance, one respondent argued: 
Sometimes it feels like a struggle to be heard…to survive discussion you need to be 
fittest…I don’t feel ignored when my comments are not responded to (WFGD 3, R 2). 
 
Another respondent also observed that: 
 
…there is no need for all to contribute to discussion when your views have been presented 
already (WFGD 6, R 7). 
It was also noted that in WhatsApp group deliberation, participants’ opinions and views are 
sometimes considered as a particular/single groups opinion. One respondent noted that while 
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most participants joined WhatsApp groups in their individual capacities, their voices were often 
‘muted’ because they belonged to a particular group and certain participants spoke for those 
groups. Asked how this influenced polarisation, respondents noted the inclusivity of diverse 
voices reduced the friction that triggered polarisation. One respondent noted: 
Some people think they speak for civil society. I come from Haki Africa (a civil society) 
and no one should talk for me apart from just me unless it is the organisation’s position 
(WFGD 2, R 1). 
 
Further, respondents declared that texting and other aspects of WhatsApp deliberations related 
to sharing information, forwards and sharing screenshots of supporting evidence disadvantaged 
particular participants, including the less literate. It was stated that this limited their input 
during deliberations and limited their voices from being heard during discussions. The stream 
of discussions through chatting happens very fast, in large groups, and it was noted that more 
than twenty comments can be received at any given moment in WhatsApp groups. This means 
that some messages would receive more attention than others and participants would 
selectively choose what they consumed (selective exposure). It was noted that some 
deliberators were more ‘naturally’ capable of influencing the deliberations with their comments 
and contributions. This was further attributed to their positions in county government or 
hierarchies in society. One respondent observed that: 
It depends on how fast in typing and organising your thinking. WhatsApp discussion and 
chatting happens so fast…by the time you make your comments, a new topic has been 
introduced (WFGD 7, R 2). 
 
Inclusivity, as noted by some respondents, was considered a challenge founded on a person’s 
capabilities and endowments. It was also noted that equality of voices was affected by the 
nature of topics that were deliberated on. Respondents noted that some expert topics such as 
county legislation and finance that used legal jargon only privileged participants with specific 
endowments. Another instance noted by respondents was related to topics that did not touch 
on specific segments of the group. Factors such as level of education, gender, and knowledge 
were also raised in terms of their effects on equality of voice. The respondents indicated that 
230 
 
because most minority and marginalised groups were less likely to be educated, they were more 
likely to be disadvantaged in terms of contributing to discussions on such issues. One 
respondent argued that: 
So some of it is really about the process and thinking, the words we use, the people we 
connect with which are real and they have huge personal impact. The differences we have 
should be considered. People are so used to listening to the same voices that they miss 
that diversity which includes hearing a different way of thinking from those with different 
education, knowledge and experience (WFGD 6, R 4). 
 
Respondents further felt that the increasing demands for calls towards accountability and 
transparency were improved when majority of voices are included. It was generally agreed by 
the majority of respondents that excluding diverse voices in WhatsApp group deliberations 
especially when seeking to present county petitions can lead to skewed policies. One 
respondent observed that the lack of inclusivity in platforms like WhatsApp groups was 
emblematic of the exclusion that so,e groups experienced in deliberating critical issues in 
county governments. 
We have seen what social media like WhatsApp can do but we have ignored the fact that 
not everybody uses it. Some people do not use it because of circumstances outside their 
control and therefore their voices are nor heard or represented. What should be done 
about such people? (WFGD 5, R 8). 
 
Some respondents stated that the inequalities experienced in WhatsApp group deliberation are 
inevitable especially because they are created by the circumstances such as access to 
communication devices, internet, and many other conditions outside the deliberation context. 
6.4 Discussion of Findings 
The discussion sections seeks to tie together all the quantitative and qualititaive findings and 
put them into context compared to existing research. The section highlights the wider relevance 
of the study especially with regards to deliberative structures, deliberative norms and group 
polarisation. The results from both methodological approaches are interpreted, compared, and 
explained in relations to the research questions. The results and findings are also discussed in 
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view of two theories, selective exposure and echo chambers with a summary of the implications 
at the end of the section. 
6.4.1 Profile of WhatsApp Groups; Deliberative Structures and Norms 
The first research question sought to establish the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp 
groups in Kenya. The findings suggest that WhatsApp groups consist mainly of young and 
educated participants. They are dominantly males (64.8%), aged between 18 and 44 years with 
relatively high academic qualifications with mostly diploma & undergraduate qualifications 
(see Table 6.1). The socio-demographic characteristics of WhatsApp groups mirror the 
demographic profiles of active users across other SNS platforms like Facebook and Twitter in 
Kenya (Banjac et al., 2016; Bing, 2015; Moreno et al., 2013; Ndavula & Mberia, 2012; Ndlela 
& Mulwo, 2017). The predominantly male, young, and educated socio-demographic 
composition of WhatsApp groups also reflects the demographic profiles of other digital 
deliberative platforms across the globe (Fischer, 2012; Friedman, 2006; Gustafson & Hertting, 
2016; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2017; Bommel et al., 2010; Turnhout et al., 2010; Wampler & 
McNulty, 2011). This study’s findings suggest that participants with high socio-demographic 
status tend to seek novel, pragmatic SNS platforms to realise extensive participation in 
deliberations. This also confirms studies linking resource capabilities to participation 
differences in deliberative governance in Kenya (Finch et al., 2015). However, the situation 
where younger participants participate more in WhatsApp group deliberations seems to defy 
the life-cycle effect (Dalton, 2008). The life-cycle effects state that young adults are 
disadvantaged in terms of resources because of their station in life. WhatsApp, like other SNSs, 
has facilitated more networking and participation in deliberations among young participants.   
The findings concur with other studies on the reinforcement effects of media use. 
Reinforcement effects suggest that using an additional SNS platform is a result of pre-existing 
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deliberative behaviours on other online or offline platforms (Nam, 2012; Marien et al., 2013). 
WhatsApp’s unique affordances, such as its securitised encryption, has significantly 
transformed specific aspects of the public sphere. Such instant messaging and social 
networking affordances and features which are unique to WhatsApp also attract the formation 
of diverse groups with different deliberative governance goals. However, like other SNS 
platforms, WhatsApp has reinforced existing socio-demographic inequalities in the access and 
use of digital platforms for deliberative governance. WhatsApp has aggravated the fact that 
lower socio-economic groups are more likely to be marginalised by emergent technology 
which consequently bolsters the status quo. The same voices and views that have been heard 
on other SNS platforms are merely replicated on WhatsApp, and this contrasts arguments for 
a transformed public sphere. Active SNS users consider WhatsApp to provide additional social 
networking infrastructure to widen their scope of interaction and deliberation.   
Another explanation for this study’s findings on WhatsApp profiles relates to a bias 
affecting the probability sampling method in SNS related surveys. This bias can partly explain 
the above socio-demographic profiles in WhatsApp groups. It is the tendency to sample from 
and over represent a segment of respondents who are robustly engaged (Asna et al., 2011). A 
study on participation in SNSs means establishing a sampling frame from the very platforms’ 
researchers seeks to study. Sampled participants are, therefore, likely to be active and have the 
requisite socio-economic endowments for deliberations. Active participants in deliberative 
governance in WhatsApp groups are also likely to respond to online survey questionnaires. 
This sampling dynamic is also noted by Hsieh & Li (2014). This sampling bias is partly 
explained by the social desirability bias (Akbulut, 2017). Social desirability bias means the 
susceptibility of respondents to project themselves as possessing positive attributes like 
knowledge, civility, and rationality in questionnaires. Whereas they may actually not possess 
such desirable attributes, their responses introduce a subjective measurement error. Some 
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researchers argue that such forms of bias can be eliminated by weighting the findings across 
entire populations using statistical analytics (Heidemann et al., 2012). However, weighting 
does not fully eliminate the inherent biases emanating from such results. 
6.5 WhatsApp Deliberative Structures, Norms, and Group Polarisation 
The second research question sought to understand how WhatsApp group deliberative structure 
and norms influence group polarisation. As earlier noted, answering this research question 
involved establishing if any association exists between various WhatsApp group deliberative 
structures and norms and polarisation using the Kruskal-Wallis H test (see Table 6.3). The 
strength and direction of association was further analysed using the Pearson Chi Square, Phi 
coefficient analysis and Cramer’s V analysis (see Table 6.4). The second research method 
involved WhatsApp-based focus group discussions which further explored the relationship 
between WhatsApp variables and polarisation based on seven indicators of polarisation (see 
Table 6.5). 
6.5.1 Socio-demographic Characteristics and Group Polarisation 
How Gendered Dynamics Shapes Group Polarisation  
The study found no statistically significant difference between either male or female gender 
and polarisation (see Table 6.3 & 6.4). In contrast, the qualitative analysis revealed a number 
of possible links between the two variables (see Table 6.5). The findings reflect the influence 
of socio-political structures that define partisan and gendered dynamics in deliberative 
governance (see Table 6.5). The patriarchal system in Kenya that influences gender dynamics 
was noted to influence the gendered norms of interaction and deliberations in WhatsApp 
groups. Both men and women were observed to take specific inflexible positions on 
governance issues in a way that reflects binary thinking. This study’s findings concur with 
other studies on the effects of binary thinking on polarisation (Atlee, 2019; Wood & Petriglieri, 
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2005). Binary thinking based on gendered dynamics can translate into binary positions in 
deliberations, meaning heightened polarisation.  
Binary thinking means that governance issues deliberated are considered in view of the 
prevalent gender dichotomy which enhances more polarity (see Table 6.5). Groupthink among 
men is possible due to the comparatively lower level of participation by women in WhatsApp 
deliberations. Groupthink dynamics are enhanced by women’s minority status, vulnerability to 
negatively gendered comments, and unwillingness to compete in deliberation spaces (see Table 
6.5). This tendency for males to monopolise deliberation platforms explains their dominant 
perspectives and decisions which mirrors groupthink effects also found in other studies 
(Karpowitz et al., 2009; Lindell et al., 2017). This study’s findings concur with others 
indicating that women are more likely to form their own enclave deliberation spaces and 
WhatsApp groups (Clark et al., 2015). However, enclave deliberations enhance the polarising 
effects of echo chambers (Abdullah et al., 2016a; Baldassarri et al., 2016).    
Whereas men are considered more polarised than women in WhatsApp groups, one of 
the explanations is that men have more access to, interest in, and exposure to county politics 
and governance issues (see Table 6.5). They are more likely to form, join, and engage in 
WhatsApp group deliberations as opposed to shunning polarising and contested discussions. 
Studies have confirmed the effects of participation differences and gender inequalities due to 
the digital divide (Antonio & Tuffley, 2014; Brundidge et al., 2014; Galbreath et al., 2012; 
Min, 2010). The inadequate representation of women’s voices due to digital divides is likely 
to result in the amplification of male-centric ideologies through groupthink. Apart from the 
domination of WhatsApp deliberation spaces by men, the findings further revealed that 
differences in personalities for genders were likely to influence polarisation. As was noted, 
women’s conflict-avoidance in often male-dominated deliberative contexts are likely to reduce 
susceptibility to polarisation through the adoption of non-partisan ideologies (see Table 6.5). 
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The differences in personalities between genders are evidenced by studies suggesting that 
women are more persuadable compared to men (Herne et al., 2019a), and respond more to 
deliberations and debates (Clark et al., 2015). For polarisation, this means they are less likely 
to be partisan or exercise motivated reasoning. Similar to other studies in Kenya, partisanship 
defined by gender is often transcended by ethnic affiliations and allegiance to political parties 
during deliberation on particular issues (Cottrel-Ghai et al., 2012). 
Further, the findings indicate that men are often perceived as more competent and 
expert on politics and governance, awarding them a higher status on deliberative governance. 
This means men are less likely to have their ideas, opinions, and views challenged in a 
deliberation context. Women, on the other hand, are seen to take certain positions during 
deliberations due to the influence of social comparison (see Table 6.5). Social comparison 
means that women are expected to take certain positions in support of their fellow women on 
certain issues, as a social norm, in WhatsApp deliberations. The expectations in terms of social 
comparison are considered to happen regardless of prevailing logic and facts presented during 
deliberations. What seems to be logical or factual is often lost in the deliberative environment 
where the dynamics of gender identity are tied to specific partisan governance issues. Such 
issues are always bound to heighten group polarisation, especially when connected to deeply-
rooted or historical issues  such as gender inequality in society. Whereas studies have shown 
that anonymous identities by use of pseudonyms have negated the power dynamics of gendered 
interaction norms in online spaces (Djupe & Mcclurg, 2010), this was not evident from this 
study’s findings on WhatsApp group deliberations. Overall, this research revealed that gender 






The Bearing of Age Differentiation on Group Polarisation 
The findings indicated no statistically significant difference between younger and older 
participants and polarisation (see Table 6.3 & 6.4). In contrast, the focus group discussions 
revealed various linkages the two variables emerged (see Table 6.5). Younger participants are 
likely to support their peers during WhatsApp deliberations which exemplify a form of social 
comparison. Social comparison is probably because young participants are keen on specific 
governance issues affecting them and are likely to take the same stance on them. The perception 
that younger participants are more polarised was because they use digital platforms more. 
Further, this contrasts with findings from other studies showing that older participants are more 
polarised (Boxell et al., 2017).  
The negative effects of the digital divide affect the older age groups more and explains 
the perceptions that they are less polarised on online platforms like WhatsApp (see Table 6.5). 
There is a misconception about the ideological consistency that is common among the older 
age groups and polarisation. Whereas ideological consistency on certain issues is a form of 
absolutism, it may not necessarily reflect partisan extremity of opinions or polarisation. It is 
possible that these ideologies are passed from the older to the younger generations. 
Socialisation was seen to influence a form of partisan polarisation where the younger age 
groups assumed the ideological and attitudinal positions of the older generations in WhatsApp 
deliberations (see Table 6.5). This particularly applies to instances where an issue being 
deliberated touches on ethnic identity, which substantially transcends other forms of group 
identities such as age difference.  
Studies in the US found that older Americans who rarely use SNS platforms expressed 
more polarised opinions than younger Americans who do (Boxell et al., 2017). The explanation 
for such polarisation among the older generation in the US is the consumption of cable TV and 
talk radio. Such age-defined consumption of cable TV and talk radio is not necessarily reflected 
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in the Kenyan context. WhatsApp groups may have a different impact on polarisation across 
different age groups, making some age groups more impacted compared to others. Differing 
prioritisation of county governance issues for different age groups seems to define partisan 
polarisation differently in WhatsApp group deliberations. The younger and older age groups 
are drawn into binary camps depending on the issues they support in WhatsApp groups 
deliberations (see Table 6.5). Polarisation defined by age group can also be explained in terms 
of the perception of the status quo. Having more experience of the repercussions of social and 
governance processes, the older age groups tend to prefer the status quo. In contrast, the 
younger age groups are considered ‘lacking in experience’ and are often willing to seek change 
through drastic governance processes.  
Studies suggest that social, political and governance changes sometimes trigger 
polarisation as defined by age preferences (Abelson et al., 2003). The study also found that 
younger participants are more liberal than older participants who tend to be more conservative 
and polarised in their opinions. This can be connected with the fact that the majority of people 
in urban areas in Kenya are younger age groups (Nizam & Muriu, 2015), which suggest that 
they are more tolerant and accommodating of other’s views. Words such as ‘open-minded’, 
‘diverse’ and ‘accommodating’ were used to describe the liberal and non-partisan approach to 
governance issues among young participants.  
 
Group Polarisation and the Level of Education  
The quantitative analysis found a statistically significant difference between participants with 
a lower and higher level of education and polarisation (see Table 6.3). The effects size analysis 
suggests that participants with a higher level of education are less likely to be polarised (see 
Table 6.4). In contrast, focus group discussion, however, revealed that those who are educated 
are more likely to be dogmatic in their beliefs especially when deliberating with those they 
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consider less educated in WhatsApp deliberation (see Table 6.5). They are likely to assume the 
role of influencers with their views being highly considered in WhatsApp deliberations. 
Education has emboldened the expression of partisan and polarised ideas in deliberation. Other 
studies found the role of elite polarisation as a primary cause of mass polarisation in various 
contexts including on digital platforms (Yamamoto & Kushin, 2014).  
Research has also indicated the role of social influence and the tendency to adopt the 
opinions of influential participants with regard to being polarised in social networks (Ghadirian 
et al., 2018). Influencers are likely to hold polarised or partisan positions on certain issues. 
Their opinions cascade and are likely to be shared by a considerable number of participants in 
the WhatsApp group leading to more extreme group attitudes. The manner in which influencers 
frame county governance issues shapes whether such issues draw disagreement, collaboration 
or in-group identities. Influencers, including county officers, who are members of WhatsApp 
groups are likely to instigate polarisation within the groups in terms of what, how, when and 
with whom they share content. With the lead of influencers, it is highly likely that issues will 
be framed in line with the group identity. This is elaborately explained through the concept of 
social comparison showing how identifying with a particular group is likely to encourage 
alignments even in non-homogeneous groups (Tanczer, 2016). 
The findings suggest that participants with a high level of education are assumed to 
make more sophisticated deliberators. The role of sophistication in deliberations is highlighted 
in other studies and is partly attributed to their consumption of diverse information (Stroud et 
al., 2015).  They are often considered to possess better reasoning skills and a higher knowledge 
level which involves their ability to consider reasoned arguments and realise less motivated 
reasoning. Studies have, indeed, shown that high levels of education and knowledge about an 
issue foster the moderation of opinions (Herne et al., 2019a). This can be explained in two 
ways. First, educated and knowledgeable participants on WhatsApp platforms may possess 
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desirable democratic values and deliberation norms. These values mean they can exercise high 
levels of tolerance and respect for others’ opinions in a way that moderates polarising opinion. 
Secondly, educated participants are likely to possess a higher level of cognitive complexity and 
interaction skills often instilled in the formal educations systems (Herne et al., 2018). Cognitive 
complexity defines how the group receives, perceives, distinguishes, and integrates different 
dimensions of an issue under deliberation. Nonetheless, less educated participants can learn 
cognitive complexity skills through experience and can equally learn to accommodate 
divergent, conflicting opinions and values.  
Both highly educated and the less educated can recognise and appreciate that divergent 
opinions are legitimate during deliberations and can be held simultaneously. This is likely to 
lessen the chances of confirmation biases leading to polarisation. The contrary perspective from 
this study’s findings is that the less educated participants are equally likely to hold onto their 
values, positions, and attitudes in a polarised way (see Table 6.5). Participants with low 
education, especially those who form the minority and marginalised groups, are likely to lack 
access occupations where essential deliberations skills such as reasoning and public speaking 
are developed. The more educated are better at finding support and arguments that are 
congruent with their own perspectives; meaning they have a higher propensity for confirmatory 
bias. In comparison, the less educated are more likely to be less confident about their partisan 
positions and opinions, meaning they can be more amenable to new popular, extreme, and 
sometimes polarising opinions in the group. The findings confirm other studies showing that 
educated participants can easily assimilate new information during deliberations and 
subsequently change their minds on partisan issues (Jurkowitz et al., 2020). Nonetheless, 
particular governance issues are likely to defy the influence of education and can drive 
participants towards polarised perspectives.  
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6.5.2 How Diversity of Participants and Viewpoints Influence Group Polarisation 
The study found a statistically significant difference between polarisation and heterogeneity of 
viewpoints, and between polarisation and diversity of participants in WhatsApp group (see 
Table 6.3). The effects size analysis further revealed that WhatsApp groups with diverse 
participants and heterogeneous viewpoints were more likely to be polarised (see Table 6.4). 
The focus groups discussion findings revealed more clearly the relationship between the three 
variables (see Table 6.5). This research confirmed that WhatsApp group deliberations expose 
the group to diverse information which is likely to challenge prior positions and opinions (see 
Table 6.5). Similar to other studies, this happens through inadvertent or incidental exposure to 
heterogeneous viewpoints as advocated by various scholars (Lee, 2016; Lee et al., 2014; 
Tucker et al., 2018; Weeks et al., 2017). However, heterogeneous does not necessarily mean 
quality information in terms of shaping non-polarised deliberations in WhatsApp groups. The 
findings concur with existing literature suggesting that incidental exposure to diverse content 
undermines the practice of selective exposure in SNSs platforms (Conroy et al., 2012;Hyun & 
Kim, 2015).  However, this study’s findings indicate that participants can still exercise content 
selection in their groups (see Table 6.5). This is possible when participants scroll or sieve 
through WhatsApp content and chats based on information sources they consider discordant. 
Contrary to other studies, selective exposure in WhatsApp groups is not singularly motivated 
by the avoidance of discordant information in heterogeneous contexts (Bright, 2018; 
Halvorsen, 2003; Kim, 2015). This study found that selective exposure is motivated by other 
factors such as the content’s humour, the mood of participants, time constraints, and the nature 
of the content (video or audio). Regardless of the motivation behind the practice of selective 
exposure in WhatsApp groups, it affects the participants’ exposure to diverse content. 
It was also evident from the findings that exposure to heterogeneous content in 
WhatsApp groups did not necessarily actuate change of views or positions. This was noted 
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especially for polarising issues that triggered dogmatic positions before or despite 
deliberations. This study suggests that groupthink and confirmation bias can affect dogmatism 
on certain issues in WhatsApp group deliberations. WhatsApp groups can support enclave 
deliberations where those with homogeneous viewpoints converge. This is likely to be 
influenced by the method of recruitment, whether through self-selection or random selection. 
Other research confirms this study’s results suggesting that deliberation in homogeneous 
contexts like WhatsApp groups can breed groupthink dynamics, since the pool of argument is 
significantly limited by the network size and minimal viewpoints (Abdullah et al., 2016a; 
Lindell et al., 2017, 2017; Maija, 2015; Strandberg, Himmelroos, & Grönlund, 2019). Often, 
enclave deliberation dynamics means that the group is likely to make narrow decisions and 
take extreme positions based on incomplete, one-sided, and biased information. The 
contrasting perspective is that groupthink mechanisms in diverse click-to-join WhatsApp group 
contexts are limited, thus stifling potential attitudinal and ideological polarisation.  
This study’s findings suggest the practice of social comparison in WhatsApp group 
deliberation as defined by the homogeneity of views within the group (see Table 6.5). 
Respondents noted that those who expressed divergent opinions were sometimes expelled from 
their WhatsApp group. Expulsion means that participants who wanted to remain in the group 
endeavoured to conform to the group’s opinion and perspective. This tendency to achieve 
group conformity and win social acceptance from other WhatsApp group members to avoid 
expulsion reflects the dynamics of social comparison associated with polarisation. Participants 
in such a context are also likely to adjust their opinions and viewpoints to match the dominant 
participants in the group. This is connected to the point that the majority of WhatsApp groups 
are formed by participants who share similar values and objectives (see Table 6.5). Emphasis 
on group identity is likely to translate into group pressure for ideological conformity during 
deliberations as also noted in other studies (Bimber & Copeland, 2013; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). 
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One plausible expectation with ideological conformity in homogeneous WhatsApp groups is 
the tendency to shift opinions towards the extremes, thus further enhancing group polarisation.  
Alternatively, heterogeneous WhatsApp groups having exposure to diverse opinions 
might, after experiencing group pressure, develop moderated opinions (see Table 6.5). In a 
heterogeneous context, exposure to diverse arguments presented by various conflicting 
subgroups during deliberation can lead to depolarisation. This can happen when the position 
initially held and espoused by one group is abandoned in favour of that favoured by the others. 
Such shifts in opinion and perspective are likely to occur when the topic of deliberation is less 
emotive or deeply rooted in the group’s identity. Due to the tendency of participants to self-
identify in WhatsApp groups, the use of stereotypes, in-group favouritism, and out-group 
marginalisation are likely to enhance polarisation and the hardening of positions.  The topic 
under deliberation can also activate in-group barriers within heterogeneous WhatsApp groups. 
Deliberation on issues such as women’s affirmative action in governance policies that trigger 
gendered binary thinking can stimulate the creation of in-groups, even in diverse WhatsApp 
groups. Similar to findings in other studies (Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2018; Wicks 
et al., 2014), the existence of heterogeneous in-groups within larger WhatsApp groups can 
heighten emotional or task-related polarisation and negate the deliberative outcomes. These 
polarising dynamics can be further exacerbated by the structural differences of WhatsApp 
group deliberators. Importantly, this study’s findings revealed that heterogeneity of viewpoints 
and diversity of participants was one of the most polarising factors in WhatsApp group 
deliberations. 
6.5.3 Group Polarisation in Inclusive and Moderated Contexts 
The study found a statistically significant difference in moderation, unmoderated deliberations, 
and polarisation (see Tables 6.4 & 6.5). The findings indicate that moderated deliberations in 
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WhatsApp groups influence the level of polarisation in a positive way. This implies that 
moderated WhatsApp groups reflected lower levels of polarisation. The qualitative findings 
revealed that unmoderated deliberations are likely to heighten polarisation. This study also 
found that the challenge with WhatsApp groups is the lack of appropriate moderation 
mechanisms and low compliance to deliberative norms (see Table 6.5). The enforcement of 
what respondents called gagging as opposed to proper moderation in WhatsApp deliberations 
goes against the Habermasian ideals of deliberation as earlier noted (see Chapter Two, pp. 
47,49). It was further noted some group administrators are biased and therefore, unable to 
moderate deliberations with fairness. This contradicts the concept of moderators acting as 
deliberative intermediaries (Barberá, 2014; Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Zhang et al., 2013), guiding 
the process in a more nuanced way without sacrificing openness and complexity as advocated 
by McDevitt (2003). Biased moderation is likely to trigger or worsen the perception of 
partisanship and polarisation.  
It is further evident from this study that moderation can be perceived as a collective 
group responsibility or self-policing mechanism, especially when dealing with incivil or 
intolerant comments in a WhatsApp group. Such collective moderation was noted to discourage 
incivility in deliberations. Moderation as a group responsibility can help achieve better 
compliance in other forms of deliberative norms such as civility and tolerance. In contrast, 
moderation as a group responsibility requires the objectivity of the group which is often lacking 
in partisan contexts. Partisan contexts can encourage biased moderation, where the focus is on 
discouraging the expression of discordant opinions. This study’s findings also suggest that 
moderated deliberations in WhatsApp groups can encourage participants to present their 
concerns and opinions more freely and thoughtfully (see Table 6.5). Uninhibited deliberations 
can help to debunk partisan narratives and encourage inclusivity. 
244 
 
The contrary reality is that improper enforcement of informal norms of moderation can 
skew deliberation of certain topics to one side and thus create polarised perspectives (Matakos 
et al., 2017). Further, moderation of attitudes resulting from or leading to motivated reasoning 
is difficult to achieve if founded on complex pre-existing beliefs. This concurs with studies 
suggesting that participants are more open to considering diverse and oppositional arguments 
when deliberations are moderated and civil (Barberá, 2014; Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Matakos 
et al., 2017). It also concurs with other findings showing that moderated deliberations in online 
platforms are more credible and persuasive than incivil  ones (Zúñiga et al., 2018).  
The focus group findings suggest that the success of moderation largely depends on the 
group’s perception of the moderators and their reasons for moderating (see Table 6.5). These 
findings support previous  research suggesting that when moderation is facilitated by interest 
groups or privileged persons (i.e. county officials), moderation is seen as censorship 
(Rademacher & Wang, 2014). The minority or non-privileged groups are likely to view the 
moderation through a binary perception; meaning ‘they’ are moderating ‘us’. Ambiguity in the 
norms of deliberations can allow moderators to make unfair decisions in WhatsApp groups. 
Unfair moderation practices in themselves can generate polarised positions, especially when 
they are intended to stifle specific viewpoints. In sum, the study revealed that unmoderated 
deliberation is one of the most polarising factor in WhatsApp group deliberations. 
The quantitative analysis did not reveal any statistically significant difference between 
inclusivity and polarisation (see Tables 6.4 & 6.5). In contrast, the qualitative findings indicate 
a few pointers between the two variables (see Table 6.5). Deliberation in large heterogeneous 
WhatsApp groups expands diversity but does not necessarily translate into inclusivity in 
deliberations. Lurking behaviour is an instance where, despite diverse participants in a 
WhatsApp group, the voices of a pro-active few dominate issue-deliberations (see Table 6.5). 
The result of lurking behaviour and the continued domination of a few participants in 
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deliberations means that exposure to diverse views are significantly narrowed and can lead to 
groupthink. This suggests that the power dynamics at play in WhatsApp group deliberations 
are likely to disadvantage contributions by minority groups (see Table 6.5). This finding 
supports similar studies on deliberations in other SNSs platforms and the impact of minority 
status in political discussions  groups keep silent when they feel their voices are ignored or they 
feel frustrated (Sohn, 2019).  
Inclusivity can be enhanced through well-moderated deliberations; the dynamics of 
achieving this are difficult to sustain even in small WhatsApp groups. Non-inclusive 
deliberations suggest the absence of a multi-sided, non-partisan deliberation which can lead to 
the adoption of extreme positions. However, this research further revealed that inclusivity or 
the lack thereof was sometimes because minority voices fail to take up opportunities to express 
their ideologies during deliberations (see Table 6.5). Inclusivity was considered to be for the 
‘fittest’, who were able to navigate technology and WhatsApp group power dynamics to make 
their voices heard. The consideration of WhatsApp deliberation as a contest where survival is 
necessary is likely to reflect varied differential power dynamics. The perception of skewed 
power dynamics during deliberations suggests that participants can reject evidence-based 
deliberations (confirmation bias) expressed by those considered as the dominant groups. 
Other factors that account for non-inclusivity in WhatsApp deliberations are a lack of 
expert knowledge and the asynchronous nature of discussion (see Table 6.5). The latter means 
that multiple chats at any given point will necessitate selective exposure to particular 
deliberation content. Some views may be missed or ignored. In instances where inclusivity of 
voice is lacking, the dominant views are often considered to represent the entire group’s views. 
This can then aggravate the level of polarisation when participants feel frustrated that they 
cannot express their views even in a supposed deliberative context. Thus it underlines the 
argument that the inclusion of diverse voices in deliberative governance is far more complex 
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than merely the diversity of deliberators themslves (Perrault & Zhang, 2019). Deliberation 
platforms are structurally diverse and inclusive to the extent that they are open to various 
participants affected by a decision (Davidson & Elstub, 2014). WhatsApp platforms are marked 
by socio-economic inequalities that are bound to limit the extent of inclusivity as also noted in 
other SNSs studies (Souza, 2001; Vecchione & Caprara, 2009; Zhang et al., 2019).  
Inclusivity requires guaranteeing voice within the deliberative processes, which is 
shaped by the recruitment process. The method of recruitment, whether via self-selection or 
random selection, can reproduce and reinforce enduring hierarchies based on education, 
income, race, and gender. This is likely to happen even in diverse WhatsApp groups and can 
affect the extent of inclusivity in deliberations. For instance, when a WhatsApp group consists 
of participants with varying levels of expert knowledge, those who are more knowledgeable 
are likely to dominate subject matter deliberations. As earlier noted, for instance, men are likely 
to dominate deliberations compared to women. This study’s findings found that the lack of 
inclusivity was one of the most polarising factors in WhatsApp group deliberations. 
6.5.4 Group Ties, Group Size and Group Polarisation 
The study found a statistically significant difference between group size and polarisation (see 
Table 6.3). As noted in Table 6.4, larger WhatsApp groups were found to experience more 
polarisation. In contrast, the focus group discussions found that participants are more likely to 
be homogeneous and agreeable in smaller WhatsApp groups (see Table 6.5). Smaller and 
homogeneous WhatsApp groups are likely to form echo chambers where the amplification of 
consonant perspectives occurs. Smaller, homogeneous groups are also prone to experiencing 
groupthink dynamics where particular homogeneous ideas and viewpoints are circulated and 
this can eventually influence the formation of extreme decisions. The argument that larger 
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WhatsApp group networks result in more heterogeneous voices and therefore less chance of 
being polarised is difficult to prove in view of ideological homogeneity even in large groups. 
Nonetheless, large groups are also likely to have more information sources, more views, 
and more positions on governance issues that may result from group diversity (see Table 6.5). 
Studies have shown that heterogeneity of content and information sources is likely to reduce 
opportunities for partisan polarisation (Chan, 2016). This study’s findings indicated that 
practising motivated reasoning and confirmatory bias was likely in both WhatsApp groups but 
more so for small homogeneous groups (see Table 6.5). Large WhatsApp groups are likely to 
have weak ties because of the method of recruitment. Public click-to-join links allow diverse 
participants to join the group with their varied views, opinions and positions on governance. 
This suggests an enhanced and inadvertent exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints and opinions 
and the possibility of less polarisation in larger WhatsApp groups.  
It is possible that a proportionately large number of polarised, dogmatic participants 
with inflexible positions on different issues will be found in larger WhatsApp groups. This 
corresponds with studies showing that participants with a higher level of dogmatism and 
propensity for opinion leadership tend to target large groups (Choi et al., 2018). Larger and 
diversified group networks tend to have greater exposure impact for discordant content makes 
it easier to achieve selective exposure. Smaller WhatsApp groups are also likely to experience 
partisan selection of group members. This also suggests the existence of partisan ideologies 
during deliberations. Smaller sized WhatsApp groups are also likely to consider themselves as 
enclaves or in-groups where concordant ideologies are shared. Such distinctive characteristics 
of smaller WhatsApp groups make them more influential, particularly if they are very 
consistent in their positions and points of views. This study’s findings found that group size 
was one of the most polarising factors in WhatsApp group deliberations. 
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The findings indicated no statistically significant difference in polarisation for both 
weak and strong group ties in WhatsApp groups (see Table 6.3). However, the effects size 
analysis indicated showed a strong association between group ties and polarisation (see Table 
6.4).  The focus group discussions revealed the connections between the nature of group ties 
and polarisation in WhatsApp groups (see Table 6.5). WhatsApp groups with close ties are 
more likely to form ideological cliques where homogeneous information is shared within the 
group (see Table 6.5). Further, close ties are likely to support some key tenets of the social 
identity whereby one’s self-identity is understood in relation to the social identity of others 
within a group. Research has  previously linked social identity to the formation of in-group and 
out-group identities (Iyengar et al., 2012). WhatsApp groups provide incentives where the 
group identity and ideologies are likely to be valued and protected in the same way as individual 
identity. Because of the close relationship among group members, participants are prone to 
develop strong emotional attachments due to the closeness and intimacy between them (Park, 
2014). Social comparison was suggested to be less prevalent among weak tie groups. It was 
further evident that participants in weak tie groups are more likely to adopt moderate opinions 
due to incidental exposure to diverse information in deliberations. 
 Group-differentiation and groupthink mechanisms are likely to occur in close ties as 
opposed to weak ties (Karpowitz et al., 2009). Groupthink mechanisms are less likely in weak 
ties because they facilitate easier introduction of diverse content (Haythornthwaite (2011). This 
research in the Kenyan  context confirm research from elsewhere showing that weak ties tend 
to consist of participants with heterogeneous views and this exposure is likely to reduce 
ideological extremism (Haythornthwaite, 2011; Hill & Dunbar, 2003; Rademacher & Wang, 
2014). Inadvertent exposure to heterogeneous information in weak ties can also mean there is 
a lower likelihood of partisan motivated reasoning. Weak ties can easily translate into weak 
attachment and consequently result in partisan identity. This can happen when groups 
249 
 
uncritically accept information in line with their partisan views thus refusing conflicting 
information. This can lead to extreme views and polarisation. Partisanship in WhatsApp groups 
with close ties suggests that members can readily accept certain ideas advanced by their group 
members. WhatsApp groups with close ties, unlike weak ties, are likely to emphasise 
intergroup distinctiveness (see Table 6.5). This especially the case when self-selection is the 
method of recruiting group members. Intergroup distinctiveness, according to concurring 
studies, encourages group members to uncritically adopt ideologies advanced by partisan 
sources; reflecting a form of confirmation bias (Beam et al., 2016; Eveland & Hively, 2009). 
Overall, the research here found that group ties were one of the most polarising aspects in 
WhatsApp group deliberations. 
6.4.5 Tolerance and Civility in WhatsApp Group Deliberations 
It was also evident that moderated deliberations can build tolerance and understanding for those 
with diverse viewpoints (see Table 6.5). Engaging in a comfortable deliberation process is 
more likely to reduce tension and diffuse polarised positions than adversarial deliberation. The 
study found no statistically significant difference between different levels of tolerance and 
polarisation (see Table 6.3). However, the effect size measures found a significant association 
between tolerance and polarisation when all levels of tolerance are considered in aggregate (see 
Table 6.4). Evident from the focus group discussions, though, is that self-censoring is 
sometimes misconstrued as tolerance in WhatsApp deliberations (see Table 6.5). Self-
censoring, misconstrued as tolerance, can encourage a spiral of silence effect in deliberations. 
Those with extreme viewpoints can refrain from expressing opinions deemed as intolerance.  
It was not clear from the findings if the diversity of WhatsApp groups facilitates 
intolerance; considering existing literature that diversity of participants facilitates the exchange 
of diverse views that potentially enhance intolerance (Barberá, 2014; Ramírez & Verkuyten, 
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2011; Winter & Rathnayake, 2017). As confirmed by other studies examining various SNSs 
platforms (Johnson & Bichard, 2010), the anonymity in WhatsApp groups with weak ties can 
aggravate intolerance. Intolerance in deliberations can lead to extreme positions and more 
polarised disagreement. Furthermore, intolerance can deepen the impression that the 
differences between ideological positions in the WhatsApp group are unbridgeable. This 
validates the argument that ideological diversity challenges established predispositions and 
beliefs that feed intolerance in group contexts.  
Other factors noted to affect the level of tolerance in WhatsApp groups include: diverse 
personality, different levels of education, and social learning (see Table 6.5). The influence of  
the participant’s personality on tolerance as a social learning construct is evident in various 
studies (Bangwayo-Skeete & Zikhali, 2013; Finkel, 2000; Ramírez & Verkuyten, 2011). This 
study’s findings also suggest that younger participants are more educated, liberal and 
accommodating of divergent views and opinions (see Table 6.5). Socio-demographic 
characteristics influence power dynamics that affect the level of tolerance in both online and 
offline deliberations (Bangwayo-Skeete & Zikhali, 2013; Harell, 2010; Mukherjee et al., 2013). 
The group’s power dynamics determines whether the majority with a dominant view can 
tolerate the minority views during deliberations.  
This study’s findings further revealed that issue framing determines the occurrence of 
tolerance in discussions (see Table 6.5). Some issues, such as politics and governance, are 
sometimes framed as contests. Contests enhance the chances of deliberations degenerating into 
intolerant disagreements and extreme positions. Moreover, issue framing and the role of 
political actors within the WhatsApp groups seem to define the levels of tolerance in 
deliberative governance. When an issue is framed in a divisive way, it is likely to instigate 
motivated reasoning and intolerance (Harell, 2010). In close-knit, homogeneous WhatsApp 
groups, participants are likely to hold different standards of tolerance for those in their in-group 
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and contrasting standards for those in their out-group. Further, deliberations on issues touching 
on the in-group’s social identity are more likely to heighten intolerance (see Table 6.5). In spite 
of the contrasting views and findings, this  study’s indicates that intolerance is one of the most 
polarising factors in WhatsApp group deliberations. 
Our research found that incivil deliberations are more likely to influence group 
polarisation (see Table 6.3). The effects size analysis between polarisation and civility found a 
moderate association between the two variables (see Table 6.4). The qualitative analysis 
indicated that incivil comments are viewed as an attack on the in-group even though directed 
at an individual (see Table 6.5). This suggests that incivility is likely to trigger in-group defence 
mechanisms against the out-group in deliberations. Just like tolerance, previous studies have 
argued that participants are likely to hold different standards of incivility in their in-group and 
contrasting standards for those in their out-group (Druckman et al., 2019; Kim & Park, 2019). 
It was also evident from the focus group discussions that incivility towards the in-group 
are likely to be responded to in a way that accelerates into more incivility. Incivility is also 
likely to increase negative labelling and reduce modest interaction needed to achieve good 
quality deliberations. Incivility in deliberations can be perceived differently indicating a strong 
cognitive bias that shapes how participants understand and respond to it. Cognitive bias is likely 
to exist when incivility by one’s side of the group is overlooked or tolerated during 
deliberations. For instance, participants can choose to ignore any contribution accompanied by 
incivility and be seen as practising confirmatory bias. Incivility can drive participants to 
exercise lurking behaviour and this affects inclusivity in deliberations (see Table 6.5).  
This study’s findings found that incivility increases negative labelling using 
participant’s identity with the likelihood that it will reduce group deliberations (see Table 6.5). 
Negative emotions are a product of negative labelling, both of which lead to partisan 
polarisation. Incivility in WhatsApp groups can increase participant’s perception of polarity 
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thus lowering the expectation of deliberative governance (see Table 6.5). Incivility can 
exaggerate perceived bias leading to antagonism that hinders the resolution of polarising issues 
in governance. The link between incivility and perception of bias was also evident in other 
studies (Sigelman & Kugler, 2003; Wright & Graham, 2017). Similar to other research, the 
qualitative analysis established a link between binary thinking and incivility in WhatsApp 
group deliberations (see Table 6.5) (Antoci et al., 2016; Druckman et al., 2019). Motivated 
reasoning seems to occur when participants in WhatsApp groups avoid contributions 
accompanied by incivil comments. This research here corroborates other work that has 
established a link between incivil discourse and participant’s perceptual polarisation (Kim & 
Kim, 2019; Robison et al., 2016).  
6.6 Implications for Theory and Research 
The WhatsApp group deliberative structures and norms suggest specific influences on two 
critical theories related to polarisation. These theories are selective exposure and echo 
chambers 
6.6.1 Selective Exposure and Group Polarisation 
This study’s findings challenge some key arguments of selective exposure and polarisation. As 
earlier defined, selective exposure reflects a cognitive behaviour where SNSs users prefer to 
encounter consonant information supporting their existing beliefs (Kim, 2015). Exposure to 
diverse views fosters cognitive dissonance through encountering various viewpoints (Garrett 
et al., 2013; Kim & Kim, 2017; Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2010; Wicks, Wicks, & 
Morimoto, 2014). This study on WhatsApp group deliberations partly invalidates the 
association between selective exposure and group polarisation. Achieving selective exposure 
requires a situation of network/group homophily as indicated in existing literature (Kim, 2015; 
Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2010; Weeks et al., 2017; Wicks et al., 2014). The profile 
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of WhatsApp groups examined in this study suggests largely non-homophilic deliberative 
environments currently exist. Controlling for homogeneity to achieve homophily (which is one 
of the foundational constructs of selective exposure) is a challenge in WhatsApp groups. 
Diversity of participants is a default consequence for the random selection and formation of 
WhatsApp groups. Besides, WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection cannot guarantee 
exposure to homogeneous content only. This indicates that WhatsApp group users readily 
experience inadvertent exposure to a variety of content due to the  diversity of participants and 
the heterogeneity of viewpoints. Selective exposure in heterogeneous WhatsApp groups is 
challenging because participants can take advantage of the broader availability of content to 
increase their exposure to homogeneous views. In contrast to other studies, this does not mean 
that they will systematically avoid opinions that challenges their exisiting views (Conroy et al., 
2012;Hyun & Kim, 2015). 
Interactive WhatsApp affordances including: forwarding, posting, commenting, and 
sharing of content during deliberation enhance incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal ideas. 
These WhatsApp affordances imply cross-medium, cross-network, and cross-platform 
information sharing. This increases the likelihood of incidental exposure in WhatsApp groups 
which is a result of the weak-ties and the inevitable encountering of diverse information as 
confirmed in existing literature (Karnowski et al., 2017; Kim, Chen, et al., 2013; Tewksbury et 
al., 2001; Weeks et al., 2017). Further, WhatsApp group deliberations happen asynchronously, 
which severely inhibits the practice of selective exposure. The study contrasts with existing 
literature suggesting that repeated incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal information can 
eventually result in selective exposure. Such studies suggest that selective exposure and 
incidental exposure influence each other in a vicious circle (Karnowski et al., 2017; Stroud, 
2018). Selective exposure in WhatsApp happens when participants seek to reaffirm and 
reinforce their projected identity through consumption of consonant ideological information. 
254 
 
This means that WhatsApp group participants can scroll through chat content and identify 
information or content that they will view or read.  
Therefore, inadvertent exposure in WhatsApp groups happens when participants 
exercise imperfect selective exposure strategies. Selective exposure in WhatsApp groups is 
driven by participant’s desire to access humour content such as videos and memes rather than 
content consonance. Time constraints also mean that participants will use the limited time 
available to consume what is possible. This is not entirely based on content consonance. The 
findings support research suggesting that moods can influence the selection of content in 
WhatsApp groups, and that those negative moods influenced by mental fatigue enhance 
selective exposure. This study also suggests that selective exposure occurs because participants 
select content based on their judgments about their content preferences. Therefore, selective 
exposure has an effect on the quality of deliberations because awareness of both sides of an 
issue is critical for an all-rounded discussion, especially on contested issues. Selective exposure 
affects the quality of deliberations because it can significantly reduce exposure to 
heterogeneous discussions and lessen the chances of participants learning, considering, and 
understanding different perspectives of an issue. This is also the case of enclave deliberations 
where participants are not exposed to diverse opinions and are less likely to be aware of others’ 
legitimate perspectives and rationales; even their own rationales in some instances. 
6.6.2 Echo Chambers and Group Polarisation 
Echo chamber effects describe a situation where participants join or form SNS platforms where 
they encounter content they already concur with. Selective exposure and echo chamber theories 
are based on similar conceptual tenets. Given this study’s findings and the above arguments 
relating to selective exposure, random formations of WhatsApp group significantly negate the 
ideological echo chambers. Self-selection, as opposed to random selection, is likely to result in 
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enclave WhatsApp groups as echo chambers. The tendency of small, close-knit, and 
homogeneous WhatsApp groups to result in enclaves is evident from this study. In-group 
favouritism has been linked to echo-chamber effects in various studies (Jamieson & Cappella, 
2008; Sunstein, 2009). Expulsion of participants with discordant views or who express 
discordant views eventually creates enclaves and echo chambers. Inhibited exchange of ideas 
might mean information inside the echo chamber is vetted, redacted and sieved for ideological 
consistency. 
 WhatsApp groups provide an easier method for like-minded individuals to locate each 
other. Similar to other studies, it has increased the participant’s propensity to cluster based on 
common interests and traits (Barbera, 2019). It was also evident from this study that the 
mechanisms of social influence and persuasive arguments in WhatsApp groups partly exists. 
The findings also coincide with other research on how enclave reinforcement seeking is linked 
happens when participants with discordant views are expunged from the group (Strandberg et 
al., 2019). Crosscutting interactions are based on an intertwining link between diverse 
participants and heterogeneous views (Hong & Kim, 2016). Crosscutting interactions in 
WhatsApp groups can slow the process of ideological polarisation by limiting the effects of 
enclave deliberations. Based on the idea of enclave WhatsApp groups, echo chambers can be 
understood as playing a key role in the formation of collective group identities which 
consequently defines interpretive frames on governance information.  
6.7 Implications for Practice 
The study findings have a number of implications for practice related to the use of SNSs 
platforms for deliberative governance and their impact on polarisation. First, the predominantly 
young, male and educated composition of WhatsApp groups suggests that the platform lacks a 
socio-demographic inclusivity that is needed to ensure a holistic deliberative framework in 
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solving group polarisation. This challenges the optimistic views that SNSs platforms are likely 
to transform the public sphere by drawing-in various groups affected by county governance 
decisions (Filatova et al., 2019; Kruse et al., 2018a). Whereas WhatsApp groups are 
structurally diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity, and ideology, the platforms has failed to 
mobilise a different socio-demographic composition for deliberative governance. Rather, 
through the reinforcement effect, the voice of a few dominant and privileged participants seems 
to be amplified. In a polarised context like Kenya, where the views of the marginalised and 
minority groups need to be heard, a holistic solution for polarising governance issues may not 
be realised. When participants in WhatsApp groups are exposed to echoes of their own views, 
the consequence may well be heightened polarisation.   
Secondly, if the exit or expulsion of participants with discordant views is pervasive in 
WhatsApp groups, the tendency to extremism will be greatly aggravated. The WhatsApp group 
will end up being smaller, close-knit, with homogeneous participants who are more willing to 
take extreme measures, including violence in some instances. In certain instances, political 
extremism can be a product of group polarisation. This is because such enclave deliberations 
will produce more extreme and polarised views that can be targeted towards the out-group. 
When the strongest loyalists are the only participants who stay, deliberation will produce 
increasingly extreme views and movements. For better outcomes, deliberating groups should 
be appropriately heterogeneous and should contain a plurality of articulate participants with 
reasonable views. Social enclaves in digital platforms are breeding grounds for group 
polarisation, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse.  
Thirdly, fair moderation devoid of illegitimate censorship is a very fundamental aspect 
for creating safe and engaging deliberative platforms. This is especially the case for polarised 
contexts where discussion on controversial topics happens. Otherwise, those with minority 
status in the group will often drift into a spiral of silence. Alternatively, their contribution will 
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have disproportionately little weight or influence in contexts of the entire discussion. The result 
can be that important content is held back and not shared within the group. The implication is 
that low governance decision can result from groupthink. Participants views can become more 
extreme when their opinions are corroborated. They gain more confidence after learning that 
others share their views as well. The confirmation from others can strengthen confidence in 
extreme expression. This can have a negative impact on whether tolerance is practised. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The chapter sought to answer two research questions, including understanding the socio-
demographic profile of WhatsApp groups. The findings indicate that WhatsApp groups 
participants are predominantly male, aged between 18 and 44 years with relatively high 
academic qualifications (diploma or undergraduate). These findings mirror the demographic 
profiles of participants in other SNS platforms in Kenya. This similarity can be explained by a 
reinforcement effect theory which states that the use of additional SNS platforms is a result of 
pre-existing deliberative behaviours on other platforms. The study also sought to understand 
whether WhatsApp group deliberative structure and norms influence polarisation. The study 
found no statistically significant difference between specific WhatsApp group deliberative 
structure variables and polarisation. This suggests that whether participants are young or older, 
male or female, close ties or weak ties, in small or large groups does not influence the level of 
polarisation.  
The study also found no statistically significant difference between deliberative norms 
and polarisation. This implies that whether participants are tolerant or intolerant, and whether 
deliberations are inclusive or exclusive does not affect the level of polarisation in WhatsApp 
groups. In contrast, WhatsApp groups with diverse participants where heterogeneous 
viewpoints are shared were more likely to be polarised. Incivil  and unmoderated deliberations 
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are more likely to experience high levels of polarisation. The effects size analysis further 
suggests a significant association between polarisation and the level of education, group ties, 
group size, moderation, tolerance, heterogeneity of viewpoints, diversity of participants, and 
civility. The significant association for the majority of the above variables is because they were 
analysed as aggregate as opposed to dichotomies. 
These above statistically significant associations were further confirmed or refuted by 
the respondent’s feedback from the focus group discussions. The study found that groupthink 
among men is possible due to the comparatively lower level of participation by women in 
WhatsApp deliberations. As relates to age, younger, as opposed to older participants, are likely 
to support their peers during WhatsApp deliberations which exemplify social comparison as 
an indicator of group polarisation. Concerning education, the study found that the more 
educated participants are media junkies who are better at finding arguments that are congruent 
with their own perspectives; meaning they have a higher propensity for confirmatory bias. On 
the diversity of participants and exposure to heterogeneous content, the study found that 
WhatsApp groups can support enclave deliberations where those with homogeneous 
viewpoints converge and form echo chambers. While the quantitative study linked 
unmoderated deliberations to high levels of polarisation, the qualitative findings indicated that 
biased moderation is likely to trigger or worsen the perception of partisanship and polarisation. 
With regard to inclusivity, the study found that the lack of inclusivity implies domination by a 
few participants in deliberations. Such dominance suggested that exposure to diverse views are 
significantly narrowed and can lead to groupthink.  
Regarding the group size, the study found that smaller and homogeneous WhatsApp 
groups are likely to form echo chambers where the amplification of consonant perspectives 
occurs. Larger and diversified group networks tend to have greater exposure impact for 
discordant content makes it easier to achieve selective exposure. In relation to group ties, the 
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study found that WhatsApp groups with close ties are more likely to form ideological cliques 
where homogeneous information is shared within the group. In contrast, groupthink 
mechanisms are less likely in weak ties because such ties facilitate the easier introduction of 
diverse content. On the issues of tolerance, the findings indicate that deliberations on issues 
touching on the in-group’s social identity are more likely to heighten intolerance. Just like 
tolerance, participants are likely to hold different standards of incivility in their in-group and 
contrasting standards for those in their out-group. It was also evident from the focus group 
discussions that incivility towards the in-group are likely to be responded to in a way that 




The Quality of Deliberation in WhatsApp Groups and Polarisation 
7.0 Introduction 
Two research questions are answered in this chapter. The first is to understand whether there 
is a variance in the quality of deliberation based on WhatsApp group formation. The quality of 
deliberations is based on the Habermasian deliberative ideals and include diversity, inclusivity, 
tolerance, civility, moderation, and heterogeneity of viewpoints (Habermas, 1996, 2003, 2005) 
(see Figure 1.1). The WhatsApp groups were classified into two based on formation and 
recruitment method. Formation was further classified into two where top-down WhatsApp 
groups are formed by the county government itself, its officials, their affiliates and 
representatives, and bottom-up are those formed by citizens on their own initiative and volition 
to discuss governance issues. Recruitment method was also classified into two: Self-selection 
is where the WhatsApp group is formed through addition by a friend, colleague, or participants 
who knew each other. Alternatively, random selection is where participants joined the group 
through click-to-join links. The second research question sought to establish whether and how 
the quality of deliberation in WhatsApp groups has influenced group polarisation. The focus 
group discussions on the quality of deliberations are guided by the Habermasian deliberative 
ideals. The discussions are guided by the seven indicators of group polarisation and how these 
indicators are shaped by the quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups. The chapter 
concludes by looking at some of the practical implications for deliberative governance and 





7.1 WhatsApp Groups Formation and Quality of Deliberations 
The third research question sought to establish if there a variance in the quality of deliberation 
based on the formation of WhatsApp groups. WhatsApp groups are classified into two based 
on formation and recruitment. WhatsApp formation, according to this study consist of top-
down where the groups are formed by the county government itself, its officials, their affiliates 
and representatives. The contrast is bottom-up which are those formed by citizens on their own 
initiative and volition to discuss governance issues. The method of recruitment, according to 
this study, consists of self-selection and random selection. Self-selection is where the 
WhatsApp group is formed through addition by a friend, colleague, or participants who knew 
each other. Random selection is where participants joined through click-to-join links. The 
analysis of the quality of deliberations uses Pearson Chi-Square tests followed by an effect size 
analysis using a Cramer’s V tests. 
 
7.1.1 Formation: Bottom-up and Top-down WhatsApp groups 
 
Inclusivity had a positive statistically significant Cramer’s V value for both top-down (0.389) 
and bottom-up (0.311) WhatsApp groups (see Table 7.1). Top-down WhatsApp groups had a 
comparatively stronger Cramer’s V value with regards to inclusivity. These findings suggest 
that participants in top-down WhatsApp groups indicated comparatively higher inclusivity than 
those in bottom-up groups (see Table 7.1). The Cramer’s V analysis for tolerance indicates a 
positive statistically significant value for both top-down (0.223) and bottom-up (0.244) 
WhatsApp groups (see Table 7.1). Respondents in bottom-up WhatsApp groups indicated a 
slight but comparatively higher tolerance (see Table 7.1). Moderation in WhatsApp groups had 
a positive, statistically significant Cramer’s V value for both top-down (0.322) and bottom-up 
(0.293) WhatsApp groups (see Table 7.1). The Cramer’s V value is slightly higher for top-




Table 7. 1: Formation: Bottom-Up and Top-Down Deliberations in WhatsApp groups 
  Top Down Approach  Bottom Up Approach 
  Cramer’s V (ϕ² c) Cramer’s V (ϕ² c) 
Inclusivity  0.389** 0.311* 
Tolerance  0.223* 0.244** 
Moderation  0.322* 0.293* 
Diversity  0.251* 0.312* 
Heterogeneity of viewpoints 0.524* 0.576* 
Polarisation 0.301* 0.345* 
Civility  0.277 0.338 
      Notes: Cell entries are statistically significant. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Diversity indicates a positive, moderate, statistically significant Cramer’s V value for both top-
down (0.251) and top-down (0.312) WhatsApp groups (see Table 7.1). These findings suggest 
that there is a difference in diversity for both top-down and bottom-up WhatsApp groups. 
However, this value is significantly higher for bottom-up approaches and suggest they are 
comparatively more diverse. Heterogeneity of viewpoints indicates a strong positive, 
statistically significant Cramer’s V value for both top-down (0.524) and bottom-up (0.576) 
WhatsApp groups (see Table 7.1). These findings suggest that bottom-up WhatsApp groups 
have comparatively more diverse viewpoints. Civility indicates a low, positive statistically 
significant Cramer’s V value for both top-down (0.277) and bottom-up (0.338) WhatsApp 
groups (see Table 7.1). This value suggests that civility is comparatively higher in bottom-up 
WhatsApp groups. Polarisation indicates a low, positive statistically significant Cramer’s V 
value for both top-down (0.301) and top-down (0.345) WhatsApp groups (see Table 7.1). 




7.1.2 Recruitment: Self-selection and Random Selection 
Inclusivity has a weak, positive, statistically significant Cramer’s V value in WhatsApp groups 
formed through self-selection (0.201) and random selection (0.271) (see Table 7.2). WhatsApp 
groups formed through random selection had a comparatively stronger Cramer’s V value 
suggesting a comparatively more inclusivity.  
Table 7. 2:Formation: Self-selection and Random Selection in WhatsApp groups 
  Self-Selection Random Selection 
  Cramer’s V (ϕ² c) Cramer’s V (ϕ² c) 
Inclusivity  0.201* 0.271 
Tolerance  0.431* 0.392 
Moderation  0.333* 0.298* 
Diversity  0.556* 0.618* 
Heterogeneity of viewpoints 0.490 0.499* 
Polarisation 0.596* 0.614 
Civility  0.231* 0.219* 
      Notes: Cell entries are statistically significant. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Tolerance has a moderate, positive statistically significant Cramer’s V value for WhatsApp 
groups formed through self-selection (0.431) and random selection (0.392). WhatsApp groups 
formed through self-selection had a comparatively stronger Cramer’s V value implying a 
higher tolerance (see Table 7.2). Moderation has a weak, positive statistically insignificant 
Cramer’s V value for WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection (0.333) and random 
selection (0.298) (see Table 7.2). The Cramer’s V value for diversity for WhatsApp groups 
formed through self-selection (0.556) was moderate, positive, and statistically significant (see 
Table 7.2). Comparatively, WhatsApp groups formed via random selection had a higher 
Cramer’s V value for diversity (0.618) (see Table 7.2). For heterogeneity of viewpoints, the 
Cramer’s V value for random selection (0.499) and self-selection (0.490) are nearly similar and 
suggests no significant difference between them (see Table 7.2). A minimal difference was 
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also evident in polarisation between WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection (0.596) 
and random selection (0.614). Both Cramer’s V values are high, positive statistically significant 
associations (see Table 7.2). Civility has a weak, positive statistically insignificant Cramer’s 
V value in WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection (0.231) and random selection 
(0.219) (see Table 7.2).  
7.2 Section Two: Quality of Deliberation and Polarisation in WhatsApp Groups 
The fourth research question sought to establish whether and how the quality of deliberation in 
WhatsApp groups has influenced polarisation on county governance issues. The majority of 
respondents, as shown in the findings in Table 7.3 generally indicated that the quality of 
deliberations in their WhatsApp groups has aggravated polarisation on county governance 
issues. The results suggest that the quality of deliberations has heightened the perception of 
polarisation on deeply-rooted, historical, and contested governance issues (see Table 7.3). 
Further, it has facilitated the formation of enclaves and echo chambers which have amplified 
the polarity on county issues. Deliberation in WhatsApp groups has also enhanced the framing 
of issues as binary contests and deepened the perception of polarity. This also means that 
deliberation in WhatsApp groups has also intensified partisan information cascades where 
participants follow the cues of those who share their perspectives without regarding the 
opposing arguments (see Table 7.3). Lastly, deliberation in WhatsApp groups has worsened 
politicising of polarisation of the county governance. However, a few respondents thought that 
the quality of deliberations in their WhatsApp groups has attained specific goals such as 
consensus, moderate opinions, ideological convergence, and virtual interactions between 





Table 7. 3: Themes on the influence of deliberative governance in WhatsApp groups 
 
Perspective Main Themes from WFGDs Sub-themes N (71) % 
Quality  Low quality of deliberations in 
WhatsApp groups 
 
Inconclusive discussions, lack of clarity in discussions, 
too much politics, no support for arguments, 
personalised attacks, and domination by few voices. 
Mischief of trolls in deliberations 
Propagation of polarising conspiracy theories 
Referring to partisan drawing stereotypes 
Fake news, misinformation, and sensational content 




Deliberations has facilitated consensus and tolerance 
Moderation of opinions has been realised 





Heightened polarisation on deeply-
rooted governance issues  
 
Deep-rooted have always been polarising, no expected 
solutions 
Amplifies the salience of divisive issues 
Encouraged dogmatisms in deliberations 




Promoted convergence of people to discuss contested 
issues 
Presence of experts to elaborate on contentious issues 





Facilitated ideological factions, 
enclaves, and alignments. 
 
Strengthened group/ethnic affiliations, echo chambers 
Enhanced regionalist, ethnicised deliberations 
Heightened group perception of partisan identity 
Encouraged use of coded language to refer to out-group 




Empowered marginalised groups to speak out 
Emboldened use of local languages hence inclusivity 
Easier to enforce deliberative norms in enclave groups 




Intensified polarising information 
cascades 
Manipulation of the group’s opinions by influencers 
Increased evaluation on discordant information 
Ready acceptance of concordant information 
Lowered the credibility of evidence and facts provided 




Enhanced ideological convergence, social comparison 





Worsened politicisation of polarisation 
 
Amplified negative views about opposing factions 
Paid agents share polarising shock-value content 
Exaggerated the state of partisan polarisation 




Enabled a virtual meeting of citizens and leaders 





7.2.1 The Quality of Deliberation Has Worsened Polarisation 
The majority of respondents felt that the quality of deliberations on county governance issues 
is low and has aggravated polarisation in their WhatsApp groups. When asked to clarify what 
they considered to be low deliberations in their WhatsApp groups, respondents noted: 
‘inconclusive discussions’, ‘lack of clarity in discussions’, and ‘too much politics’ and 
‘disrespectfulness’, ‘endless disagreements’, ‘lack of focus on one topic’, ‘irrational 
arguments’, ‘sharing of unrelated content’, and ‘lack of evidenced’ discussions, ‘sharing of 
personal content during discussions’, and ‘advertising stuff during serious discussions’. It was 
argued that this happened because: participants did not ‘take discussions seriously, there was 
‘no support for arguments’, participants were ‘focused on attacking each other’, there was 
‘domination by a few voices’ and participants ‘shared fake news’. Some respondents felt that 
there was inadequate information to inform quality deliberations. Some blamed the county 
governments for failure to comprehensively allow access to information on legislation. Others 
also noted that the information from the county government was ‘public relations information’ 
[clarified to mean that it is subjective]. Some respondents suggested:  
Based on some of the topics I have seen being discussed on my WhatsApp group... there 
are conversations I've seen people being very rational and all...the issue is when you are 
discussing politics then people share memes that are not relevant (WFGD 2, R 1). 
People end up insulting each other over the difference in opinion. This is especially so 
with those people affiliated with the main tribes and political parties (WFGD 4, R 2). 
It is very hard to follow discussions in our WhatsApp group because people keep 
introducing new topics and posting new things before we even finish the previous one 
(WFGD 6, R 8). 
Asked how the quality of deliberation in their WhatsApp groups enhances polarisation, 
respondents noted that non-serious discussions meant less time and effort spent on tackling 
partisan and divisive governance issues. Respondents also felt that low quality deliberations in 
their WhatsApp group sometimes caused discussions to end in a more divided way. As one 
respondent stated: ‘the ending of discussion is worse than the start’. Also apparent was that 
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WhatsApp group deliberations are also dominated by participants who sometimes ignore 
comments that do not support their view. One respondent observed that when they contribute, 
‘…I am not replied to or no one takes my comments’. The few participants who dominated 
discussions took an approach which respondents called ‘controversial’. Such WhatsApp group 
discussions, according to respondents, created disinterest and encouraged lurking behaviour in 
WhatsApp group deliberations. One respondent explained that: 
As opposed to a face to face discussion, individuals can troll other people’s opinions and 
even drag their names in the mud without fear. We have also not been very successful in 
using our social media pages to educate, sensitise and inform others about politics 
(WFGD 5, R 2). 
 
However, some respondents had an alternative perspective. They suggested that deliberative 
governance on WhatsApp had facilitated consensus among those with divergent ideologies. 
WhatsApp groups, it was also suggested, have made deliberation and exposure to discordant 
views easier to achieve. Further, respondents pointed out how WhatsApp deliberations had 
facilitated more opportunities to expound on why participants hold particular beliefs about 
county governance issues. It has also helped groups to realise common ground on partisan 
governance issues where differences initially seemed unbridgeable. Some of the respondents, 
therefore, felt that WhatsApp groups have, to some extent, helped to clarify certain issues 
which cause partisan divides. This, it was observed, increased the sensitivity and consideration 
with which participants approached county governance issues.  
Discussion with my WhatsApp friends means I can say things without offending them 
but also that when we disagree we don’t need to be nasty to one another. I think this is 
what will reduce ethnic polarisation (WFGD 5, R 5). 
One respondent disagreed, stating: 
Partly because our education system never taught us how to accommodate divergent 
views.  It was the teacher's way or no other way… we have people in the group who have 
been trained [clarified to mean socialised] to believe there can only be one bulldozed 
[clarified to mean forced] solutions to political (WFGD 7, R 3). 
 
While some respondents argued that consensus was not easy to achieve on polarising topics, 
they felt that WhatsApp group deliberations allowed participants to ‘hear each other out’. 
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WhatsApp deliberations, according to some respondents, have made informal, free-ranging 
discussions between partisan parties much easier to achieve. WhatsApp discussions have 
significantly eliminated identification with ‘symbols’ that drive participants into partisan 
political camps. When asked to expound on the issue of symbols, one respondent talked about 
how joining WhatsApp groups using a pseudonym made it almost impossible to identify the 
participant’s name and their tribe. However, some other respondents contradicted this, claiming 
that issues as opposed to people are the drivers of partisan polarisation. One respondent 
observed that, while people are biased, WhatsApp groups have enhanced what she termed their 
‘natural instinct’ to learn from one another. The respondent observed that: 
People have a natural instinct to discuss serious topics in a peaceful manner just that some 
other crazy things come in the way and I think WhatsApp has made it possible for people 
to meet and talk about things in a way that they learn from one another…this is where 
the instinct comes in... (WFGD 6, R 1). 
 
There were some suggestions that WhatsApp deliberations had moderated extreme opinions 
on partisan county governance topics. A small number of respondents claimed that 
deliberations in WhatsApp groups had bridged the gap between those holding partisan views. 
They felt that the middle ground had been growing following what they called ‘appropriate 
discussions’ [clarified to mean deliberations]. It was further apparent from the discussions that 
moderating opinions was somehow a challenge because it is dependent on a participant’s 
willingness to accept and be swayed by rational arguments. While there was no agreement 
about whether rational deliberation in WhatsApp groups is possible, respondents felt that 
deliberation had swayed participants away from holding partisan bias and their alignment to 
pre-existing beliefs. Some respondents further argued that because they are inadvertently 
exposed to more diverse views from different ethnicities, they have become more moderate in 
their views. It was also evident that some participants adopt moderate opinions regardless of 
the issues being discussed. The participants could not agree about whether the number of 
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participants holding middle-ground positions had increased or decreased following 
deliberations in their WhatsApp groups. One respondent felt: 
Some people are becoming more quiet and withdraw when they see conflicts and 
polarisation. This can be confused with middle ground (WFGD 1, R 4). 
 
 
Other Factors Affecting the Quality of Deliberations and Group Polarisation 
Apart from the issues highlighted above, respondents suggested other factors that have 
aggravated the quality of deliberations and polarisation in WhatsApp groups. The first is what 
respondents referred to as ‘trolls’ and ‘moles’. Prompted to explain this, some respondents 
indicated that certain participants are hired to ‘advocate’, ‘push for’, or ‘frustrate’ particular 
ideological positions during WhatsApp group discussions. One respondent spoke about an 
instance of ‘moles’ in their WhatsApp group, people who were working for the county 
government. According to some respondents, trolls or moles were especially prevalent in 
public click-to-join WhatsApp groups. Trolls and moles provoke discussions in a disruptive 
way so that nothing meaningful related to ‘questioning’ or ‘scrutinising’ county governance 
can be discussed. One respondent observed that: 
With trolls in WhatsApp, I don’t think we can really have healthy discussions…some are 
planted to disrupt discussions (WFGD 4, R 4). 
Respondents gave instances where such participants dismissed another participant’s 
arguments, focused on minor issues, and used uncivil language targeted at specific participants 
in the group. Such trolls, it was further revealed, used divisive tactics such as refusing to 
acknowledge evidence presented during deliberations and being overly ‘argumentative’ and 
sometimes ‘intolerant’ when challenged. Respondents could not agree on whether such 
participants were ‘planted’ [clarified to mean paid or hired] to disrupt critical deliberations or 
whether it was just a personality issue. One respondent stated: 
When they [referring to trolls] begin to argue for certain points, you can always tell who 
they will support or what evidence they will give (WFGD 6, R 3).  
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Secondly, some respondents also stated that deliberations in WhatsApp groups had 
compounded the sharing of conspiracy theories around county governance issues. Conspiracy 
theories create what one respondent termed ‘more confusion’ which sometimes draws 
participants into even more polarised positions. One respondent felt that conspiracy theories 
offer an understanding of complex county governance issues in a ‘dangerous’, over-simplified 
way during deliberations. One respondent suggested that conspiracy theories ‘fill the gaps when 
people discussing…cannot find answers to questions’. The anonymous forwarding of 
conspiracy theories in WhatsApp groups, according to some respondents, makes it difficult to 
establish the origin and validity of county governance information. Conspiracy theories allow 
polarising content to ‘spread like wildfire’ because they are fixated on simplified stories and 
narratives, according to respondents. Forwarding conspiracy theories, as discussed by one 
respondent, is most commonly used to legitimise or justify a group’s partisan position. One 
respondent observed: 
…that why we have such theories for when we don’t really understand what is happening 
at the county level…we need more information (WFGD 6, R 4). 
 
Another respondent stated: 
…and sharing such theories happens when one side wants to counter what the other side 
has alleged…. mostly with made up information (WFGD 2, R 3). 
 
Some respondents believed that conspiracy theories were often used to push particular ideas or 
positions. This was seen to blur constructive deliberations in WhatsApp groups even more. 
Asked to expound on the influence of conspiracy theories on polarisation, one respondent 
argued that participants who believe in such theories ‘draw [in] their fellow believers’ to 
WhatsApp groups. Participants form factions around the conspiracy theories they believe in or 
those propagated by their ‘sides’ [clarified to mean in-group]. Common conspiracy theories, 
according to respondents, often related to the misappropriation of county funds, bias in resource 
distribution based on factors such as tribe, wrangles between county governing agencies, and 
often how the country’s executive arm influences county politics despite the separation of 
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powers. Conspiracy theories, it was further noted, ‘cheapen’ the quality of arguments in 
WhatsApp deliberations especially when backed up with certain limited facts. One respondent 
revealed that conspiracy theories which are perceived to come from friends, influencers, and 
other trusted sources within their WhatsApp group deliberations enhanced the credibility and 
sharing of specific polarising narratives on county issues. 
… seen in our group how some people rally behind some theories that nearly makes sense 
but they are not true if you scrutinise them well (WFGD 7, R 3). 
 
…it happens when people don’t have clear information about somethings happening at 
the county level (WFGD 3, R 5). 
 
 
The third factor is related to ‘fake news’: misinformation and disinformation. The majority of 
respondents agreed that partisan views and positions in their WhatsApp groups are aggravated 
by fake news. This happens because participants produce and share photo-shopped content and 
edited videos that fuel further polarisation. One respondent gave an example of unverified but 
circulated documents in their WhatsApp group asserting that certain regions had obtained a 
higher financial allocation despite the lower population size in such regions. If there is no 
opportunity to counteract fake news and sensational narratives in WhatsApp groups, 
misinformation and sensational content around governance issues worsen polarisation. It was 
also apparent that fake news and sensational information cross-shared from the internet and 
other social media means that everything is treated with suspicion. Discussing this issue, one 
respondent further indicated that fake news has lowered the admissibility of county governance 
information shared in their WhatsApp groups. Some respondents felt that the attention given 
to fake news is driven by the desire to win arguments, which the majority of respondents agreed 
was achieved with or without admissible information and content.  
Instead, WhatsApp groups give room for arguments, with everyone trying to defend their 
opinion and just sharing information without verifying (WFGD 7, R 6).  
Fake news in WhatsApp groups was also considered to increase the spiral of responses, 
comments, and forwarding of controversial topics on governance. Some respondents argued 
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that they had observed patterns where participants participated keenly in challenging fake news 
inconsistent with their pre-existing ideology. However, less critical deliberations and scrutiny 
were given to fake news supporting an individual’s political ideology. One respondent argued 
that fake news on governance was thriving in WhatsApp group deliberations because 
participants are ‘lazy’. According to that respondent, participants do not care to search for facts 
and truths beyond what they already know or believe. It was also evident that fake news relied 
on governance issues which made respondents feel most vulnerable, which they were most 
interested in, or even those that aroused a perception of ‘being targeted’. One respondent 
observed that: 
There is always something about fake news in out groups especially [when] it is mixed 
with truth and it can get confusing at time…it [referring to fake news] can be used target 
people for political gain as well (WFGD 4, R 3). 
 7.2.2 Heightened Perception of Polarisation on Governance Issues 
Respondents felt that deep-rooted political and governance issues that characterise Kenyan 
society are the basis of polarisation. Such issues, as opposed to WhatsApp group platforms, are 
the key drivers of polarised deliberations according to some respondents. According to the 
majority of respondents, resolving such issues was a challenge even in well moderated 
deliberations. Respondents felt that participants join their WhatsApp groups with pre-existing 
positions or when they already hold partisan views. Nonetheless, respondents felt that 
WhatsApp group deliberations had heightened actual and perceived polarisation around 
deeply-rooted issues such as ancestral land. Some respondents claimed that WhatsApp groups 
have facilitated the convergence of participants who take ‘hard-line’ positions or even realise 
more ‘stubborn’ positions on deep-rooted county governance issues. Respondents suggested 
that discussing such issues led to inconclusive discussions which sometimes degenerated into 
incivility. This view was echoed by another respondent who suggested that they avoid talking 
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about deep-rooted and divisive issues in their WhatsApp group because participants always 
‘fall out’. One respondent commented: 
…my group discussion [WhatsApp] has made certain things we discuss to be very 
emotional [clarified to mean sensational]. Things that have always divided us will never 
be solved through discussion only in my opinion. Discussion can help a little but not 
solve anything fully (WFGD 3, R 2). 
 
Other historical and deeply-contested governance issues that were seen as polarising included: 
skewed allocation of development projects; historical land appropriation inequalities; ethnic 
compositions of county employment; and power sharing in county politics. Moreover, 
participants were prone to disagree on gender issues such as support for more positions for 
women at the county level. One respondent noted: 
There is no way we can ever agree on land even if we discussed, we need more action 
than discussions…we are done discussing. We know the right way (WFGD 1, R 8). 
 
Another respondent observed that: 
The disagreements that we have on the ground [clarified to mean offline contexts] have 
been transferred to WhatsApp groups. The chats [deliberations] divide people into digital 
communities based on tribal conflicts. That is why WhatsApp groups can’t do away with 
polarisation (WFGD 6, R 1). 
 
Related to the deliberation of deep-rooted and historical issues, the participants also suggested 
that WhatsApp deliberations amplify the perceived differences between participants on some 
deeply rooted and historical issues. Respondents felt that they were not ‘polarised all the time’. 
They also felt that the governance issues that divide participants at the county level are ‘well 
known’, and respondents felt that constant sharing, discussion, and arguments in WhatsApp 
deliberations enhance the salience of such issues. This suggests that extreme views expressed 
through WhatsApp groups are not necessarily persistent over time. One respondent indicated 
that ‘discussing makes it stick in our minds’ (referring to the salience of divisive issues 
discussed in WhatsApp groups). One respondent felt that the constant discussion in their 
WhatsApp had worsened polarisation by encouraging participants to argue for or defend their 
positions based on their group’s identity. Hence, one respondent stated: 
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WhatsApp has exaggerated everything...we are not as divided as media reporting shows 
but also WhatsApp makes it look very bad (WFGD 4, R 4). 
However, the amplified perception of polarising differences prompted participants to interpret 
issues under deliberation in a more polarised way. Further, salience was also considered to 
heighten polarisation when a governance issue was current and enjoying a wave of mainstream 
media attention. Respondents referred to the issue of county budget reviews and the submission 
of proposals. These are undertaken annually and arouse polarised discussion periodically in 
WhatsApp groups. It was also noted that partisan political elite who often weighed in on 
governance issues through WhatsApp groups somehow contributed to the salience of 
polarising debates. Weighing in on issues in WhatsApp discussions gave a sense of importance 
to the discussion on these divisive governance issues, and this elicited more polarised responses 
and discussions. One respondent stated: 
When [name of particular politician] makes comments in our WhatsApp group, negative 
comments from people against him follow…. then he is defended (those of his side come 
to his aid) (WFGD 1, R 1). 
 
Respondents gave instances of how periodic elections of county leaders perpetuate cycles of 
polarised discussions in WhatsApp groups. County governments’ handling of crises and 
budgeting are governance issues which occasionally caused polarisation, according to 
respondents. The majority of respondents agreed with the view that not all issues create partisan 
divides; however, this issue is made more difficult because some respondents misconstrue 
disagreements in deliberations as polarisation. One respondent observed that: 
We can disagree most of the time in our WhatsApp…we agree more than we disagree, I 
hope you understand…like we are not badly off except when a hot topic [clarified to 
mean polarising issue] comes up (WFGD 4, R 7). 
 
Respondents with differing perspectives argued that deliberations in WhatsApp groups have 
facilitated a holistic approach to divisive governance issues. According to these respondents, 
such deliberations are capable of supporting more holistic discourse and solutions to deeply-
rooted, partisan county governance issues. Some respondents felt that WhatsApp groups had 
converged key governance professionals, development experts, and civil society activists onto 
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one platform where they can deliberate on common governance challenges. It was also implied 
that ‘mwananchi’ (citizens) who are part of WhatsApp groups benefit from the interactions 
with professionals within their group. One respondent indicated that: 
For those who talk about not having accurate opinions and advice, I think WhatsApp has 
provided an open space for all professionals from all works of life to meet and 
discuss…local mwananchi can in the process benefit from the interaction (WFGD 1, R 
5). 
 
Some respondents claimed that polarising stereotypes and myths held by participants in the 
WhatsApp groups are potentially debunked through exposure to varied expert opinions and 
perspectives. Other respondents observed, in contrast, that it was not a lack of expert 
knowledge that was driving partisan polarisation in their groups. Some respondents were 
unable to agree on whether polarisation is a result of what they described as ‘ignorance of facts’ 
or what another respondent called ‘selective use of facts’ in deliberations. One respondent 
indicated that: 
We are not polarised because we lack knowledge...ignorance is the issue. The challenge 
is that some people are not willing to listen to each other and talk with others in a sober 
discussion (WFGD 1, R 4). 
 
No clear position was achieved from either perspective on this issue. However, the influence 
of experts in deliberative governance was assumed to depend on the issue under discussion in 
the WhatsApp group. One respondent observed that ‘people in the group are sometimes very 
polarised to even listen to experts’.  
7.2.3 Facilitating the Formation of Enclaves and Echo Chambers 
Polarisation, according to respondents, has increased because participants in WhatsApp groups 
feel more confident and expressive about their feelings and views in a way that they would not 
in a face-to-face situation. Respondents felt that participants who share the same ideology or 
share similar interests in political and governance matters converge in WhatsApp groups. 
Deliberation in some WhatsApp groups, it was observed, formed enclave spaces where extreme 
views were validated by those with close relations [clarified to mean ties]. Respondents felt 
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that some WhatsApp groups draw together participants with similar opinions and increase their 
confidence in expressing extreme opinions. This was, however, challenged by one respondent 
who commented that while their WhatsApp group consists of close participants, they still 
experienced divergent opinions and views including interactive disagreement on governance 
matters.  
Discussing with different people in WhatsApp creates a false understanding that we don’t 
agree with makes it appear that those we disagree with are usually very different and that 
we have a lot less in common politically than we can expected (WFGD 6, R 7). 
 
Commenting on enclave WhatsApp groups, one of the respondents observed that like-minded 
participants convince each other ‘how right they are’ or how valid their positions are. This was 
noted to be common in relation to governance-related grievances that led to radical and extreme 
demands made by WhatsApp group members. It was also apparent that this tends to validate 
the perception of in-group identity among those who hold similar ideological positions. One 
respondent claimed: 
In fact, WhatsApp deliberations have brought to the fore a deeper and common 
understanding among Kenyans, who are now discovering that their perceived political 
problems are all the same and emanate from the political class (WFGD 4, R 5). 
Another respondent also stated that: 
Some people fear confrontation and become very bold and confident to say things 
because they are in WhatsApp and also because they know so and so will back them if 
they bring up a certain point (WFGD 2, R 6). 
 
WhatsApp groups have also facilitated the formation of enclaves of participants from particular 
regions only. Such WhatsApp group enclaves adopt specific words, phrases and jargon that are 
unique to the group during deliberations. There was no consensus about whether enclave 
WhatsApp groups increase the expression of extreme views on certain topics during 
deliberations. 
For example, the common mwananchi [citizen] doesn't independently critic[ise] a 
candidate based on what they can do, what they have achieved and their manifesto. We 
critic[ise] based on tribe and if that person is our person (WFGD 2, R 4). 
It was further stated that some WhatsApp groups held deliberations using vernacular or local 
languages. The discussions also revealed how such groups enhance the formation of 
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homogeneous enclaves of people who speak a similar dialect, language and share near similar 
views on various governance issues. The fact that WhatsApp allows the recording of audio and 
video messages in vernacular language was considered to worsen the propagation of ‘coded’ 
polarising messages. One respondent explained the connection between coded messages and 
the perception of otherness, or difference among those with different positions or views within 
or outside the WhatsApp group. Respondents revealed an emergent trend in some WhatsApp 
groups where friends added one another to a heterogeneous WhatsApp group eventually 
stifling out those who did not ‘belong’. This technique of crowding-out those with divergent 
views encouraged the formation of homogeneous enclaves and was confirmed by some 
respondents. Some respondents admitted that they sometimes ‘flow’ [clarified to mean 
conform] with the group’s decision or position even though they may not necessarily agree 
with it. Such linguistically homogeneous WhatsApp groups, according to respondents, are 
further enhanced by the expulsion of those with alternative opinions and views by group 
administrators. As one respondent noted:  
This increases the volume of information we receive from those with similar views, 
opinions and whose policies, statements views etc. we find acceptable or we support as 
opposed to the other views (WFGD 5, R 1). 
Respondents with an alternative perspective observed that deliberation in such enclave 
WhatsApp groups has amplified the voices of the marginalised in society. According to some 
respondents, WhatsApp is where the marginalised can develop, compare, and share their 
unique perspectives and arguments comfortably. Prompted to explain further, these 
respondents felt that enclave deliberation in WhatsApp groups could be positive if it affords 
marginalised groups a platform for expressing their grievances. They also felt that deliberation 
among like-minded participants could be advantageous because it happens in an environment 
which one respondent referred to as ‘less tense’. Deliberations in such WhatsApp groups, it 
was argued, reduce the power dynamics common in diverse groups that sometimes 
disadvantage specific participants. Respondents observed that in such groups, marginalised and 
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minority groups have a much better opportunity to express their needs and opinions. It was 
noted that this can happen without participants feeling that they are in the minority as 
sometimes happens in partisan discussions. Respondents also stated that enclave WhatsApp 
groups are likely to have a ‘common purpose’ and ‘less friction’ in their deliberations. They 
are much easier to ‘control’ and make it much easier to enforce deliberation norms and manage 
partisan factions. One respondent explained: 
When people share common interests in WhatsApp, there is less quarrelling and more 
action (WFGD 1, R 4). 
Another suggested that: 
There is bound to be less disagreement in the group...quick gains when people discuss. 
We can always disagree but we can control…the discussion (WFGD 1, R 4). 
 
7.2.4 Enhancing the Framing of Issues as Binary Contests  
Another aspect that impacts WhatsApp group deliberations and polarisation on county 
governance issues is framing, or what some respondents described as ‘how issues are 
discussed’ or ‘what we focus on’. It was suggested that county governance issues were 
sometimes framed as ‘contests’ or dilemmas, which encouraged participants to take sides 
without exploring middle-ground positions or looking at other alternatives. It was argued that 
discussions inciting participants against perceived injustices by the county government made 
it difficult to deliberate meaningfully. Similarly, cross-platform sharing of county governance 
content emphasising partisan positions on county issues were thought to instigate polarised 
debates in WhatsApp groups as well. Some respondents argued that county governance issues 
deliberated in WhatsApp groups originate from mainstream media and are sometimes packaged 
in terms of conflict. One respondent, explaining the link with mainstream media coverage of 
county issues, argued that participants sometimes ‘copy-pasted’ controversial content only, 
which heightened polarised deliberations. One respondent asserted that: 
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‘people share information from nation [The Daily Nation Newspaper] and others from 
standard [The Standard Newspaper] and depending on the angle of the newspaper. When 
this is copy-pasted to WhatsApp groups, people take sides (WFGD 5, R 5). 
One respondent felt that participants in WhatsApp groups seemed to focus largely on the 
negative aspects of county governance that created divisions and conflicts. Prompted to explain 
this, the respondent argued that governance issues that generated greater participation in 
deliberations were those that were framed as conflicts or those that created the perception of 
‘camps’ [clarified to mean binary positions]. The binary positions expressed in such topics, 
according to respondents, were enhanced by what each side considered ‘supporting evidence’. 
Asked to expand on the objectivity of ‘supporting evidence’, respondents argued that it referred 
to information confirming a participant’s views and positions on county governance. One 
respondent observed: 
…the discussion is sometimes about which side has the supporting evidence for their 
argument…and it is just not correct evidence because no one shows evidence that is 
against what they are arguing (WFGD 7, R 3). 
 
Respondents suggested that partisanship motivated participants to produce their often clashing 
versions of ‘supporting evidence’ which facilitated misinformation and ‘fake news’. It was 
further evident that WhatsApp groups easily facilitate the sharing and forwarding of skewed 
and unreliable evidence in discussions. Another issue related to the use of supporting evidence 
was that county governance data often shared in WhatsApp groups are generally considered 
suspicious and are not trusted. One respondent argued that the county government information 
sources cannot be trusted and that they were also a source of polarising deliberations. On the 
issue of the county budget, one respondent noted: 
...that is why the budgeting process is often framed us ...those who support it against 
those who oppose (WFGD 2, R 4). 
 
Another respondent suggested that:  
Our habits of not looking at the evidence in WhatsApp discussion makes us jump into 
conclusions. We don’t have the discipline to look though information and identify facts 
and lies (WFGD 8, R 8). 
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Related to the framing of issues in a binary manner, the respondents observed how this has 
enhanced ethnic affiliation thus making it synonymous with polarisation. Ethnicity affects what 
side participants take during WhatsApp group deliberation in defence of governance issues. It 
was apparent that ethnicity affects how participants rationalise, simplify, and understand 
county governance issues during deliberations. It was also evident that WhatsApp has 
encouraged the formation of groups based on ethnicity or what one respondent called ‘tribal 
cocoons’. One respondent claimed: 
WhatsApp groups are just tribal cocoons where people praise their tribal leaders. It is just 
an online version of what happens in kamukunjis [referring to informal street 
discussions] (WFGD 2, R 4). 
 
An example was given of inter-ethnic contest between Kalenjin and Kikuyu for county 
leadership positions and resources which sometimes play out during deliberations in WhatsApp 
groups in Nakuru county. It was further apparent from the discussions that certain ethnicities, 
who had experienced discrimination historically, used WhatsApp more for advocacy than for 
deliberations. An example is the ‘Ogiek Rights Group’, a WhatsApp group formed to discuss 
the human rights issues of the Ogiek community. Respondents from the group argued that they 
staunchly defend those they perceive to represent their interests. They consider WhatsApp to 
be a platform for expressing their grievances or fighting perceived injustices. Instances of 
participants in WhatsApp groups defending their tribal leaders, regardless of facts implicating 
them in corruption, were common. Respondents also believed that WhatsApp groups 
encouraged the use of ethnically defined and negative stereotypes to identify and refer to other 
communities during discussions. One respondent commented that: 
When the deputy governor was implicated in a water project scandal and when it came 
up in our WhatsApp group, most people from his area [clarified to mean region of origin] 
defended him saying he is being targeted because he comes from minority community 
(WFGD 6, R 6). 
 
Respondents felt that WhatsApp groups have heightened awareness of participants’ identities 
and positions on specific governance issues and thus heightened polarisation. One respondent 
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claimed that ‘WhatsApp has revealed who we truly are as a society’. Respondents indicated 
that WhatsApp groups have revealed underlying partisan attitudes related to participants’ 
identities over time. As one respondent stated:  
I think the tone and how we conduct our political debate in WhatsApp groups has shown 
that Kenya has become more negative and divided over the last several years. We cannot 
change this very easily...not even by having more discussions (WFGD 5, R 8). 
 
Some respondents further pointed out that because participants feel strongly about their 
political or ethnic identities, WhatsApp group affiliations have been transformed into a way of 
expressing a participant’s identity. Asked to clarify this, some respondents believed that 
WhatsApp groups became a reference for individuals’ actions and reactions during 
deliberations and interactions with others. This view was echoed by another respondent who 
argued that in such groups, discussions were mainly ‘one-way’ [clarified to mean imbalanced].  
A contrasting perspective from some respondents was that WhatsApp groups have 
enhanced discussion on collaborative governance action. Despite the glaring differences that 
have been magnified by WhatsApp group deliberations, respondents felt a keener interest in 
pursuing common governance solutions through collective action. Some respondents felt that 
owing to WhatsApp deliberations, opposing sides have identified and addressed bad county 
governance practices by coordinating demonstrations, community mobilisation, and joint 
petitions on governance challenges. Respondents gave examples of WhatsApp groups such as 
‘Sauti ya wachuuzi’, ‘The Nakuru Analyst’, and the ‘Kericho Renaissance Network’ as some 
of the WhatsApp groups where deliberations have translated into governance reforms at the 
county level. Looking at the above examples, respondents stated that WhatsApp groups 
reinforce individual thinking, actions, and interactions rather than being a forum for targeting 
others. This view was echoed by another respondent who also observed that deliberations have, 
in many ways, improved the group’s ‘willingness to participate’ [clarified to mean group 
efficacy] in county forums. One respondent observed that: 
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We used to struggle in the past to just get people coming together to talk especially during 
Moi’s era [referring to Kenya’s second president]. Today this are very easy because our 
discussion in the groups are followed by mobilising for demonstrations...we reach many 
people who participate with us… I think it bears fruit when you follow with action 
(WFGD 7, R 7). 
For some respondents, WhatsApp groups are the reason for increased solidarity, especially 
when participants expressed their views in moderated and safe spaces. Other respondents also 
felt that the unifying imagery generated when WhatsApp deliberations translate into action had 
significantly eroded certain partisan views about diverse others. Respondents further noted the 
extent to which enforcing deliberation rules in their WhatsApp group is easier when a sense of 
collaboration and common purpose exists in the group. One respondent explained that: 
When we all agree to something in the group, people are very keen to obey. I think it is 
because we have group goals and we must be disciplined when discussing them (WFGD 
1, R 4). 
7.2.5 Intensifying Partisan Information Cascades on Governance Issues 
WhatsApp group deliberations have intensified what one respondent called ‘herd behaviour’ 
[clarified to mean information cascades]. Information cascades, according to respondents, 
happen because participants are sensitive to large-scale distortions that are enhanced by 
WhatsApp affordances and features. Some respondents blamed the wide ‘circulation’ and 
‘forwarding’ of seemingly credible content in WhatsApp groups. Another respondent implied 
that information cascades happen because participants have a minimal understanding of 
governance issues. Information cascades were further apparent when one respondent alluded 
to the notion that people ‘toe the line’ when making group decisions. Prompted to explain the 
place of information cascades in WhatsApp groups, respondents felt it was impossible to 
challenge certain ideas, especially when they were in the minority. This phenomenon is also 
common in specific WhatsApp groups used to gauge or establish public opinion and interest in 
certain county governance policy issues.  
...discussion is in such a way that you feel it is you against many... so if you cannot beat 
them just join them…. It is easier to toe the line when you know the things you disagree 




The decisions by the majority were considered the group’s position in certain instances where 
the group needed to made decisions or take action. Commenting on the issue of inclusivity, one 
of the respondents said that discussion in their group was dominated by those who had the 
‘muscle’ [clarified to mean resources] to implement the group’s decisions. It was also apparent 
that some participants left specific WhatsApp groups because they had divergent opinions from 
the rest of the group. This is what some respondents referred to as ‘lefting’ [clarified to mean 
withdrawing one’s membership of a WhatsApp group]. ‘Lefting’ was noted by most 
respondents to be voluntary or forced through what some respondents described as a form of 
purging. The result of ‘lefting’, according to the respondents, is that those participants who 
remained in the WhatsApp group expressed homogeneous ideas and views that are potentially 
polarising. One respondent observed: 
…their discussions will be majorly to get other[s to] agree with them even when they 
don’t make any sense socially, economically or otherwise. People who don’t agree are 
usually lefting the group. This kind is difficult to reason with. Our elections are 
characterised by such polarisation (WFGD 2, R 2). 
However, respondents with an alternative perspective felt that WhatsApp groups do support an 
interactional context and the threads needed for effective deliberations. Some respondents felt 
that WhatsApp groups, as deliberation platforms, provide better discussion threads that support 
rationalised deliberations. This allows participants to identify those who ‘make sense’ and use 
logic in arguments, thereby determining the attention participants gave to specific participants. 
Respondents argued that WhatsApp groups are relatively non-restrictive and allow for more 
elaborate discussions that can create clarity in discussions. One respondent suggested: 
.. and this is where WhatsApp gets it right that you can make your points and clarify 
everything in a way that makes more sense to everybody. You can even write essays in 
Word [clarified to mean Microsoft Office Word software] and paste them in WhatsApp 
(WFGD 5, R 1). 
 
The participants demonstrated from their responses that knowing each other in their WhatsApp 
groups helped them to manage group expectations. This was thought to affect polarisation in 
certain ways; it did not surprise other participants when specific participants made certain 
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comments and took certain positions during discussions. Asked to clarify further on this, 
respondents thought that knowing each other’s positions and views on county governance 
issues helped them to ‘avoid’ or manage unhealthy disagreements that often led to polarised 
discussions. One respondent commented, ‘we know how to handle the discussion with some 
people’. Constant discussions in WhatsApp means participants have developed a certain 
familiarity with one another in a way that lessens intolerance and the use of uncivil language. 
One respondent noted: 
Just because we know and understand one another, we can have discussion very well...we 
still disagree but we manage it very well. We don’t take it personally because we know 
each other’s character (WFGD 5, R 1). 
Commenting on their group’s interactional thread in deliberations, respondents felt that 
WhatsApp group deliberations promoted a non-hierarchical interaction. The majority of 
participants agreed that WhatsApp groups had facilitated county citizens to imagine, invent 
and engage in non-hierarchical interaction on county governance matters. Respondents argued 
that actual grievances can now be channelled to relevant authorities for solutions by ‘anybody’ 
through open channels and platforms such as WhatsApp groups. One respondent alluded to the 
notion of not feeling ‘powerless’ anymore because ordinary citizens can access county 
leadership for redress on contested matters. Prompted to clarify this, one respondent argued 
that citizens had less need to target one another through partisan attacks as they could 
‘...address those who have the answers and solutions’.  
Being in the group has made it easier for many of us to access some of our leaders we 
would otherwise see on media. While we felt powerless before, we can now feel 
empowered… We can have discussions through WhatsApp (WFGD 4, R 8). 
 
On grievance handling, one respondent assumed that WhatsApp deliberation has many 
mediators and adjudicators who intervene when partisan issues are discussed. WhatsApp 
groups are not always affected by partisan or polarised deliberations because a ‘large’ number 
of participants adopt a neutral position on county governance topics. One respondent pointed 
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out that WhatsApp groups have empowered viral discussions and marketing for innovative 
ideas that have created solutions to some of the most polarising issues at the county level. 
...that is why I think some brilliant ideas on county governance have come from 
WhatsApp. It has a source of solution when people talk between one another (WFGD 1, 
R 4). 
Focus group participants also argued that WhatsApp group deliberations had enhanced the 
prominence of specific influencers on county governance issues. Influencers are widely replied 
to, mentioned, or questioned during deliberations. This gave influencers the power to steer the 
deliberations, sometimes in a partisan and more polarised way. When asked to elaborate, 
respondents gave an example of discussions that sometimes happen in WhatsApp groups 
involving county governments and civil society leaders. Often, both groups held opposing 
ideologies and this created partisan clusters and alignments out of sync with the rest of the 
group members. For example, respondents suggested that discussing the county development 
record on human rights issues and access to social amenities often resulted in a contest between 
the county officials versus the activists (civil society). The rest of the group members aligned 
according to their ideological inclinations and views. In one case, the respondents thought that 
conforming to particular ideas and positions during deliberation was because participants 
wanted to maintain a favourable ‘picture’ [clarified to mean perception] of themselves among 
group members. One respondent noted:  
People find it easier to take sides rather than stand with their own opinion. I know of 
people who normally just wait to see the position that certain county leaders take and 
they support (WFGD 1, R 7). 
 
7.2.6 Worsened Politicisation of Polarisation around County Governance  
Polarisation in WhatsApp groups, according to respondents, has been aggravated because 
specific politicians and extreme groups exploit it for their benefit. Some respondents implied 
that polarisation is strategically used by the political elite to drive ethnically partisan agendas 
that benefit them. County politicians form WhatsApp groups to vilify their opponents’ policies 
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and intensify favourable impressions related to their manifestos. One respondent stated that 
women were more targeted for such actions compared to men. They further argued that: 
political leaders who are female are more likely to be abused and receive targeted hostility 
on WhatsApp, regardless of what they say or don’t say…it is also that women are more 
likely to face negative reactions than their male politicians and it is not fair (WFGD 4, R 
4). 
 
One respondent observed that knowing the rapidity with which propaganda spreads within 
WhatsApp groups, opposing political elites use it to amplify dissatisfaction with county 
government. This happens when non-genuine grievances are raised during deliberations that 
feed into partisan narratives. It was further noted that counties have public communication 
teams who infiltrate public WhatsApp groups to steer favourable discussions or defend 
unpopular county government policies. One respondent described how: 
When the governor fell out with his deputy governor, each one sponsored many messages 
in WhatsApp to smear the other with allegations that were often false. No good discussion 
can happen in such a situation (WFGD 8, R 8). 
Another respondent observed that: 
Polarisation benefits politicians who use it to appeal to their bases… due to lack of clear 
manifesto. It is easier to say we need to be in power because their tribe has been there 
longer…it is our turn to eat (WFGD 8, R 1). 
Respondents felt that deliberating on certain governance issues such as county appointments 
focused on ethnic alignments rather than ideas and policies. Deliberation, it was suggested by 
some respondents, often degenerated into personality-based contests rather than issue-based 
discussion. It was also apparent that when WhatsApp groups aimed to collect the opinions and 
views of citizens, the responses are sometimes biased toward extreme opinions by a handful of 
dominant participants. County government then relies on such opinions and feedback from a 
few participants by be given more weight and consideration. This was further attributed to the 
ability of WhatsApp groups to personalise ‘attacks’, feedback, and comments as one potential 
interactive mechanism for causing polarisation. One respondent suggested that WhatsApp 
allows participants to respond to specific chats even in group discussions and this can intensify 
personalised attacks. One respondent indicated that: 
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In WhatsApp groups, attacks are common when you can reply to someone and tag them 
and also send them direct messages. People can often get very personal just like in other 
social media. There is not difference for those on Facebook, Twitter or WhatsApp 
(WFGD 6, R 3). 
Despite claims of polarised politicisation in WhatsApp groups, some respondents argued that 
the groups have enabled virtual meetings of citizens and leaders. Respondents further felt that 
WhatsApp groups had created an opportunity for citizens to question their leaders and 
interrogate proposed governance policies. At the same time, leaders are able to respond to 
governance ‘queries’ in WhatsApp groups. Whilst a minority mentioned that WhatsApp groups 
have supported the effective functionality of representative democracy, the majority felt that it 
had actually changed their expectations of leadership. WhatsApp groups had afforded citizens 
an opportunity to challenge one another’s proposals in a less polarised environment where 
leaders can contribute to the discussions. The majority agreed that because polarisation was 
sometimes caused by a misunderstanding between citizens and their leaders, WhatsApp offers 
an opportunity for clarification of misinformation and biases.  
One respondent observed that: 
We are taking more time to query our leaders compared to the past…from the perspective 
of the civil society, I think WhatsApp has given as a best place [clarified to mean 
platforms] to meet the leaders who can’t stand us (WFGD 3, R 8).  
 
Some respondents argued that the use of WhatsApp groups to consider certain actions, events, 
and policies at the county level was considered to drive partisanship among participants. In 
contrast, some respondents observed that WhatsApp group deliberations had improved the 
interrogation related to accountability and transparency at the county government level. One 
respondent claimed: 
As the civil society, we have held our leaders to account in all forums including 
throughout WhatsApp…the widespread awareness has improved the response from 
leaders as well... I think it is easier to circulate news on corruption scandals in WhatsApp 
than in other social media…this is our target (WFGD 6, R 2). 
 
Also apparent was that WhatsApp deliberations had facilitated more consistent engagement 
and the formation of positive attitudes between citizens and their leaders. Respondents felt that 
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this had improved cooperation and the handling of polarising governance issues. Prompted for 
further clarification, respondents felt that discussions in their WhatsApp groups followed by 
action have generally encouraged more openness and participation in discussions. It was also 
suggested that WhatsApp group discussions channelled to appropriate leaders had resulted in 
a more responsive county legislative process. This had somehow translated into fewer 
grievances in often polarising county governance issues. One respondent emphasised that: 
Every time we discuss and come up with real action plans and present it to our MCA, we 
have seen some response... it is not always the best feedback but it makes people feel 
listened to. The problem is that some are very personal [referring to what is presented to 
their leaders] and not relevant to the whole society (WFGD 2, R 2). 
Another respondent noted: 
WhatsApp has improved how frequently we discuss, we don’t have to meet face to face 
but we are still able to follow up on one another about county issues... (WFGD 7, R 7). 
 
7.3 WhatsApp Group Formation and the Quality of Deliberations 
The third research question sought to establish if there is a variance in the quality of deliberation 
based on WhatsApp group formation. WhatsApp groups were classified into two categories: 
those based on formation and recruitment.  
 7.3.1 Formation: Bottom-up and Top-down WhatsApp Groups 
This study found a variance in the quality of deliberations between top-down and bottom-up 
WhatsApp groups. Top-down WhatsApp groups have a higher Cramer’s V value for the quality 
of deliberation variables relating to inclusivity and moderation (see Table 7.1) Bottom-up 
WhatsApp groups, on the other hand, have a higher Cramer’s V value for quality deliberation 
variables relating to tolerance, diversity, civility and heterogeneity of viewpoints (see Table 
7.1). The variance in the quality of deliberation between top-down and bottom-up WhatsApp 
groups is not hugely significant based on the Cramer’s V analysis. Nonetheless, the observed 
variance can be explained by the objective of formations, nature of ties, group size, and group 
composition. Top-down WhatsApp groups are formed in compliance with the legal framework 
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requiring the use of digital media to enhance engagement in deliberative governance. On the 
other hand, bottom-up WhatsApp groups are citizen-driven, counteractive, and structured to 
provide alternative deliberation spaces. Further, bottom-up WhatsApp groups are often 
initiatives to plug the gaps in official engagement and deliberation channels. WhatsApp groups 
are likely to consist of participants with varying interests, motivations, objectives, and group 
norms. Therefore, the variance in the quality of deliberation as defined by the group norms can 
be explained by three factors: group influencers, the group’s interactive dynamics, and the 
group’s social sanction. 
Social sanctions shape the standard of behaviour defined by specific group norms that 
are deemed socially acceptable (Heckathorn, 2018). For instance, mutual respect as a social 
sanction among group members can make it easier to realise tolerance and civility in group 
deliberations. Social sanctions, even in online platforms, are also essential for a group to 
regulate itself and maintain order in deliberations. Just like in offline contexts, social sanctions 
in online platforms encourage group behaviours that are considered to be appropriate and deter 
those that are not. Deliberative norms, as defined by the group’s sanctions, shape behavioural 
standards and expectations that make it possible to have better interactions and discussions. 
WhatsApp groups are likely to experience external social sanctions where the consequences 
for deviance are imposed by others. This, as earlier established, includes drastic actions such 
as expulsion from the WhatsApp group. Studies have found that social sanctions are weaker in 
diverse groups and communities (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). Based on this logic, social 
sanctions that support deliberative norms are likely to be prevalent in small groups with close 
ties, even in online contexts. 
The role of group influencers can partly explain the variance in the quality of 
deliberations based on norms such as tolerance, moderation and civility in WhatsApp groups. 
Influencers in WhatsApp groups can have a significant sway in shaping compliance with the 
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group’s deliberative norms. In the context of WhatsApp groups, the group administrators are 
likely to be the group’s influencers. The place of group influencers is stronger if they are 
perceived to have a broad range of experience, greater expertise, or deeper knowledge of a 
topic. The role of WhatsApp group administrators in establishing the groups grants them 
significant influence on the affairs and the group norms. Studies have also shown that enforcing 
the group’s deliberative norms can define the roles of some group members (Connelly et al., 
2006; Holdo, 2019; Thomassen, 2006). However, the question of whether the mechanisms of 
influencers in WhatsApp groups differ from those in conventional contexts is valid. Other 
studies have noted that desirable influencers are likely to possess favourable predispositions, 
domain-specific competence, and good social connections (Winter & Neubaum, 2016). Their 
influential positions within the group’s structure are at the centre of networks linked by 
patterned flows of information. This is what makes them key influencers in terms of the group’s 
deliberative norms. In top-down WhatsApp groups, the group’s influencers are likely to be 
county officials who can either command the respect or otherwise of the group members; this 
affects their influence on group norms.  
The group’s interactive dynamics partly account for the variance in the quality of 
deliberations in WhatsApp groups. When the group members wish for a framework enabling a 
more sustainable discussion, they are likely to pursue collective enforcement of deliberative 
norms; hence, there is a higher rate of compliance. Deliberative norms in WhatsApp groups 
are likely to be adopted if they can facilitate the group’s objectives and survival. This is viable 
because WhatsApp groups, like conventional groups, can dissolve when faced with severe or 
unmanageable differences. The variance in the quality of deliberative norms may be related to 
the keenness to punish norm infraction such as expulsion. Cramer’s V analysis shows that 
bottom-up WhatsApp groups are slightly more polarised than top-down WhatsApp groups (see 
Table 7.1). The compliance with group norms can depend on group cohesion and ties, which 
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somehow reflect the level of group polarisation. Group cohesion in public WhatsApp groups 
can be challenging due to its weak ties. Weak ties, as opposed to close ties, are likely to lead 
to less adherence to the group’s norms unless effectively moderated. There are situations where 
the violation of specific deliberative norms should be considered valid. Violating deliberative 
norms in WhatsApp groups can be legitimised if it serves a noble deliberative function. Specific 
instances include when and if participants cannot contribute effectively to governance 
discourse with a biased enforcement of deliberative norms. In instances where moderation of 
WhatsApp group deliberations is biased and a threat to inclusivity, non-compliance should be 
deemed acceptable. It is also possible that defining and establishing a governance agenda 
within the public sphere might necessitate confrontational and contested discussion tactics 
marked by incivility, an argument that was also noted by Habermas (1991).   
7.3.2 Recruitment: Self-selection and Random Selection  
WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection were found to be comparatively more tolerant, 
moderated, and civil that those formed through random selection (see Table 7.2). The groups 
formed through random selection, on the other hand, were more inclusive, had more 
heterogeneous viewpoints, were more diverse, and more polarised (see Table 7.2). The method 
of recruitment defines the group’s composition and other dynamics of interaction that are likely 
to influence the adoption of deliberative norms. Random selection processes have been linked 
to perceptions of group legitimacy (Leydet, 2019), and these, in turn, are connected to 
adherence to deliberative norms in online platforms such as WhatsApp groups. When the 
participants appreciate the legitimate existence of the group, they are willing to comply with 
the group’s deliberative norms.  
Both recruitment methods determine the homogeneity or heterogeneity of participants 
and this, in turn, shapes the deliberative and polarising dynamics such as the ability to achieve 
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tolerance. Self-selected members of a WhatsApp group are likely to be ideologically 
homogeneous. This means that they are likely to have close ties which help with compliance 
with the groups agreed deliberative norms. However, self-selection is also likely to result in 
homogeneous WhatsApp groups that are likely to reinforce polarisation by creating in-groups 
vs out-groups (see Table 7.3). It is further likely to enhance the formation of echo-chambers, 
which means a platform is not descriptively representative, which partly explains the 
comparatively low inclusivity noted in the findings (see Table 7.3). However, the composition 
of WhatsApp groups does not entirely define the quality of deliberation because the 
participants’ argumentative strategies are equally important. The amplification of errors in 
homogeneous WhatsApp groups can be moderated in enclave deliberation if the participants 
adopt well-rounded argumentative strategies. This helps to compensate for the biases in the 
deliberation pool where some, for instance, act as devil’s advocates by introducing discordant 
perspectives. 
As earlier discussed, the lack of diversity, heterogeneity of viewpoints and inclusivity 
can negatively impact the epistemic goals of deliberation. This happens because homogeneity 
in self-selected WhatsApp groups substantially reduces exposure to diverse views and inhibits 
changes in opinion. It is also likely to enhance polarising groupthink dynamics where particular 
information is amplified, leading to poor or more polarised decisions. Formation of WhatsApp 
groups through self-selection can challenge the exposure to cross-cutting information which is 
important in promoting intergroup trust and reducing partisanship. This explains why such 
groups have comparatively fewer heterogeneous viewpoints and structurally diverse 
participants (see Table 7.2). Meanwhile, this study finds that WhatsApp groups formed through 
self-selection are significantly more tolerant than those formed through random selection. 
Other studies have found that exposure to heterogeneous views enhances tolerance in 
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deliberations (Kushin et al., (2015). Through exposure to heterogeneous views, participants are 
able to appreciate alternative opinions.  
Contrary to the existing literature showing that random selection will reflect various 
segments of society in deliberations (Leydet, 2019), this study established a different situation. 
This study has demonstrated that random selection is likely to encourage more privileged 
participants, in terms of their socio-demographic composition, to join WhatsApp groups (see 
Table 7.2). Random selection is likely to bring together participants who have less affinity to 
the group’s ideological position and are less susceptible to the extreme positions leading to 
polarisation. This study’s findings suggest that participants in self-selected WhatsApp groups 
are more likely to achieve tolerance. This also implies that those with close ties are likely to be 
more tolerant of one another as opposed to those with weak ties as is the case in random 
selection. This has critical implications for group polarisation and contrasts with other studies 
on other SNSs platforms (Johnson & Bichard, 2010), suggesting that the anonymity of those 
with weak ties can aggravate intolerance. The group’s power dynamics determine whether the 
majority in randomly selected groups with a dominant view can tolerate the minority views 
during deliberations. 
 
7.4 The Quality of Deliberations and Polarisation on Governance Issues 
This study found that the quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups fails to meet the 
Habermasian ideals, and this may account for its contribution to polarisation (see Table 7.3). 
WhatsApp group discussion exhibits fairly low rationality, inconclusive discussions, and 
generally reflects underdeveloped arguments (see Table 7.3). Deliberations are characterised 
by disrespectful engagement, incivility, endless disagreements, and sharing of unrelated 
content. Specific responses suggest that deliberations in WhatsApp fall short of the 
Habermasian ideals of rational and reciprocated deliberations within the public sphere 
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(Habermas, 2005). This contrasts with other studies that consider deliberations in the public 
sphere to represent unifying process even in fragmented societies (Dahlberg, 2005; Dallmayr, 
2009; Jezierska, 2019b; Ofunja et al., 2018; Susen, 2018). WhatsApp groups have failed 
to meet the threshold for an inclusive, equal and open deliberative platform based on 
Habermasian ideals (see Table 7.3). The findings suggest that deliberations in WhatsApp 
groups lacks transformative capabilities, where participants are persuaded by objective 
arguments and evidence-based discussions. Deliberation in some WhatsApp groups fails to 
meet the definitive standards of deliberative governance in the public sphere which reflects 
similar findings to existing literature based on other SNS platforms (Baogang, 2018; Fischer, 
2006; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; He, 2018; Hendriks, 2009; Hoareau, 2012; Tang, 2015).  
The finding indicates that the quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups is affected 
by the inconclusiveness of discussions; this is related to the synchronous or asynchronous 
nature of deliberative platforms. Synchronous platforms necessitate that participants are 
together at the same time so that they can deliberate. The interaction is brief and often involves 
incomplete discussion of ideas due to time constraints. However, studies found synchronous 
interaction platforms to be persuasive, informative and relatively more interactive (Dylko, 
2017; Ellison & Boyd, 2013; Esau et al., 2017). However, WhatsApp groups fall under the 
category of both synchronous and asynchronous platforms which affects the quality of 
deliberations. As asynchronous platforms, WhatsApp group participants can leave or join the 
discussion at their convenience and this suggests a disjointed and fragmentary process of 
deliberation. Owing to its temporal (visual and interactive) design limitations, participants in 
WhatsApp groups as asynchronous platforms can engage for longer in chats, at their 
convenience. This means that they are able to write longer messages, weigh up and analyse 
their chats, and explain their perspectives in a much more coherent way. Further, they are able 
to seek and present evidence to support their claims which enriches the quality of deliberations. 
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The challenge of low-quality deliberations in WhatsApp groups is not confined to the 
platform’s features and affordances. 
The low quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups is compounded by the failure to 
comprehensively implement the access to information bill at the county level. Challenges 
around access to information have two implications. The first is that it leaves a vacuum that is 
often filled by misinformation and disinformation; the second issue is that it creates a chance 
for inequality in terms of access to information. Inequality in access to information suggests 
that few participants have relevant governance information to contribute to discussions in 
WhatsApp groups. These participants are also bound to dominate deliberations based on this 
advantage. This falls short of the Habermasian deliberative ideal of inclusivity of voices in 
deliberations and can lead to poor decisions due to groupthink (Effing et al., 2011; De Graaf et 
al., 2010). This study’s findings are consistent with the literature linking inaccessibility to 
credible information with increased polarisation due to misinformation and disinformation 
(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).  
Despite the arguments above challenging the effects of Habermasian deliberative ideals 
on polarisation, some positive responses were evident from the focus group discussions. Such 
findings indicate that some WhatsApp group deliberations have facilitated consistent exposure 
to cross-cutting, heterogeneous information leading to moderated opinions (see Table 7.3). 
Exposure to heterogeneous information and interactional threads in WhatsApp group 
deliberations have improved the logic and sense of other participants’ views and opinions (see 
Table 7.3). Some WhatsApp groups have expanded the participants’ ability to connect with 
diverse groups and enhanced opinion and ideological tolerance on county governance. These 
findings are similar to other studies which demonstrate that exposure to heterogeneous 
viewpoints can encourage participants to re-examine issues more critically (Wicks et al., 2014). 
It further confirms studies showing that exposure to heterogeneous content is likely to increase 
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tolerance and decrease polarisation (Harell, 2010). In contrast, when participants have pre-
existing positions and views on certain governance issues before deliberations, exposure to 
heterogeneous viewpoints may not translate into moderate opinions or less polarisation. 
In addition, some respondents suggested that their WhatsApp groups were able to 
realise consensus during deliberations through moderated opinions and the homogenisation of 
perspectives. Two issues can be inferred from the above findings. the first is that the aim of 
macro deliberative structures and any other public sphere such as WhatsApp groups is not 
necessarily the generation of consensus or binding decisions (Hendriks, 2006). According to 
Hendriks (2006), deliberations in the public sphere aim to sway public opinion, which he 
considers to be progressive (see Chapter Two, p. 35). The number of WhatsApp groups that 
claimed to realise consensus were notably few and should be considered as exceptional. 
Therefore, on a small scale, consensus due to moderated opinions can overcome partisanship 
in society and concurs with other studies (Bekkers et al., 2011; Chappell, 2010; Stockemer, 
2014). Secondly, achieving consensus by eroding opinion polarity is an iterative and dynamic 
process, especially when it is based on multiple rounds of deliberations. Based on this logic, it 
is possible that some WhatsApp groups have contributed to the realisation of soft consensus as 
opposed to complete consensus. Soft consensus is where the group discover their shared 
interests, characteristics, and goals which are then amplified instead of the ordinarily glaring 
areas of divergence (Dong et al., 2018; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2017).  
Further, achieving consensus in the public sphere can amplify the irreducibility of 
structural diversity that characterises most societies (Dahlberg, 2005; Habermas, 2005; 
Jezierska, 2019). Sometimes, deliberations leading to consensus in pluralist societies are not 
possible without the domination of certain interests or the exclusion of specific groups. It is 
possible that the consensus reported in WhatsApp deliberations is ‘false consensus’. This 
comes about through the dominance of certain positions, views, and understanding during 
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deliberations in a way that shuts down criticism and scrutiny of alternative positions (Dahlberg, 
2005; Habermas, 2005; Jezierska, 2019). WhatsApp group deliberations can lead to what 
Habermas acknowledged as ‘distortions’ that result in false consensus (Dahlberg, 2005). 
Nonetheless, deliberative governance in WhatsApp groups may generate consensual agreement 
from time to time. This is likely to be partial and fragmentary if and when it emerges. 
Consensual agreement can lessen the impact of group polarisation (Friberg-Fernros & Schaffer, 
2014). This is very critical, especially for WhatsApp groups that aim to translate deliberations 
into action, as evident in groups such as ‘Sauti ya wachuuzi’ and ‘The Nakuru Analyst’ (see 
Chapter Four, p. 147). 
In sum, the findings reveal a generally negative view regarding the quality of 
deliberative governance in WhatsApp groups and its impact on polarisation. However, the 
findings reveal instances where WhatsApp groups have influenced the evolution of opinion 
which describes a process whereby opinions are formed among a group of interactive 
participants (Dong et al., 2018). Opinion evolution requires participants to update their 
opinions based on new and diverse information. This demands openness to novel evidence and 
the willingness to be persuaded by factually discordant information. Opinion evolution can 
correct the impact of motivated reasoning and confirmation bias in polarised deliberation 
contexts (Dong et al., 2018; Zhao et al., 2018). However, trust relationships, which are defined 
according to the nature of the group ties, greatly impact on opinion evolution. This study’s 
findings suggest that deliberation in some WhatsApp groups can establish the credibility of 
disputed beliefs, values, and choices among diverse participants. However, this requires an 
instance where deliberation is rational and allows for extensive and logical arguments as 
advocated by Habermas. The implication of low quality deliberations is that some WhatsApp 
groups may have instigated context collapse which makes it difficult for users to engage 
constructively and conclusively on specific topics (Gil-Lopez et al., 2018). Context collapse 
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can produce self-censorship when participants realise that their participation in deliberations is 
not worthwhile, efficacious, or reciprocated (Winter & Rathnayake, 2017).  
7.4.1 Other Factors that Define the Quality of Deliberations in WhatsApp Groups 
Specific critical differences were evident from the results of this study as compared to existing 
research. Aside from Habermasian deliberative ideals, the study findings suggest that 
deliberation in WhatsApp has aggravated specific practices that have affected the quality of 
deliberation and polarisation. The findings have revealed the negative influence of trolls on the 
quality of WhatsApp deliberations (see Table 7.3). Trolls provoke partisan discussions in 
WhatsApp groups and exacerbate polarised behavioural tendencies such as confirmatory bias 
and motivated reasoning. Confirmatory bias means trolls in WhatsApp groups are likely to 
disagree just for oppositional reasons despite the presentation of evidence. The behaviour of 
trolls, including dismissing opposing arguments, focusing on minor issues, and incivility 
during WhatsApp deliberations are likely to trigger negative emotions (see Table 7.3). Similar 
to other studies (Smith et al., 2018; Sunstein, 2008), the role of negative emotions in 
heightening group polarisation is likely to be linked to incivility and intolerance in WhatsApp 
groups. The dedication of particular individuals to advocate, push for, or frustrate particular 
ideological positions during WhatsApp group discussions can heighten partisan polarisation. 
Further, the use of trolls to frustrate meaningful deliberations related to scrutinising county 
governance can significantly encourage extreme views against the county government and 
further lower the quality of deliberations. It can instigate the exit of certain individuals with 
implications for the group’s inclusivity and diversity. 
The findings also suggest that low quality deliberations in WhatsApp groups have 
enhanced the sharing of negative stereotypes that have fuelled polarisation. Stereotypes, based 
on partisan ideas, aid participants to frame discussions negatively and worsen confirmation 
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bias and motivated reasoning as well. This study’s findings further concurs with other studies 
on the influence of stereotypes in exacerbating intergroup polarisation (Rothschild et al., 2019). 
Equally, however, stereotypes help participants make sense of complex governance issues, 
though they can promote cognitive laziness in polarised contexts. Partisan stereotypes can 
translate into intense binary, polarised identities around contested issues in WhatsApp groups. 
Framing of discussions using stereotypes in WhatsApp groups is likely to reflect perceived 
polarising cues rather than the group’s factual ideological positions on governance issues. This 
is consistent with the literature based on other SNS platforms that has examined how partisan 
stereotypes can magnify perceptions of polarity during discussions and aggravate interparty 
disagreements (Rothschild et al., 2019; Tanczer, 2016).  
Stereotypes in WhatsApp group deliberation are likely to be based on ‘otherness’ as a 
conception of polarising in-group and out-group dynamics (see Table 7.3). The argument by 
some respondents that anonymity and the absence of non-verbal cues in WhatsApp groups can 
significantly reduce partisan stereotypes seems untenable. However, the concept of anonymity 
and disinhibition effect in WhatsApp groups is debatable considering that a participant’s profile 
has details including their phone contacts and other personal information (see Chapter Four, 
p. 136). Deliberations where participants have authentic profiles and use their real names tend 
to encourage rational, sincere, civil, and better quality deliberations. This, in part, supports the 
arguments by some scholars that discussions in online platforms are likely to persist over time 
when the participants are identifiable and recognisable among one another; suggesting a higher 
level of deliberation. 
Another aspect that reflects low quality deliberations, according to this study, is the 
increased sharing of conspiracy theories during WhatsApp group deliberations. WhatsApp 
groups have amplified the sharing and forwarding of conspiracy theories during deliberations. 
Conspiracy theories require sustained attention, consumption, and distribution by their 
300 
 
supporters to reach a critical mass; WhatsApp groups have provided a conducive environment 
for such ideas. The findings suggest that conspiracy theories provide a simplified way of 
understanding complex county governance issues in deliberations (see Table 7.3). WhatsApp 
groups have compounded the difficulty of establishing the origin and validity of governance 
information often shared alongside conspiracy theories in deliberations. Consistent with the 
existing literature, conspiracy theories may involve information filtering which is a subjective 
process that is dependent on selective exposure and confirmation bias (Gustafsson, 2012; Park, 
2015; Theocharis & Lowe, 2016). The effect of conspiracy theories in WhatsApp group 
deliberations is to create camps that define binary contests between participants.  
When conspiracy theories are shared alongside facts, as is often the case, it significantly 
affects the quality, polarity, and credibility of deliberations in WhatsApp groups. The previous 
literature has found that the credibility of conspiracy theories is more accepted if it favours the 
in-group and when it vilifies the out-group (Barbera, 2019; Borges-tiago et al., 2018). 
Therefore, the use of conspiracy theories is greater for groups that have historically experienced 
socio-political discrimination or oppression (see Table 7.3). This study’s findings partly 
support a growing number of studies indicating that conspiracy theories on SNS platforms have 
increased in tandem with affective polarisation and elite ideological polarisation (Barbera, 
2019; Borges-tiago et al., 2018). In connection with elite polarisation, conspiracy theories on 
platforms like WhatsApp have affected the credibility and trust in county government 
information (see Table 7.3). The absolute rejection of county information regardless of its 
credibility reflects a form of polarity characterised by confirmation bias. 
WhatsApp groups have aggravated the sharing of fake news, misinformation and 
disinformation in deliberations. Consistent with the previous literature in Kenya (Makinen & 
Kuira, 2008a), fake news, when shared among close ties, amplifies the content’s emotional and 
ideological value during deliberations (see Table 7.3). WhatsApp groups have facilitated rapid 
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diffusion of photo-shopped images and misinformation on county governance, worsening 
polarisation. The rapid diffusion of fake news in WhatsApp groups can be explained by the 
group’s affinity for emotionally-charged content, a trend that has been observed in other studies 
as well (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Fake news and sensational stories are amplified through 
the replication and embellishment of details from one chat group to another. WhatsApp group 
messages shared between groups can undergo what is known as the summary effect. This 
describes the distortion of messages as they pass through a chain of information forwarding 
and sharing (Ribeiro, Gligorić, & West, 2019). Therefore, WhatsApp groups do not have 
effective barriers for aggregating information and debunking fake news and partisan ideologies 
that cause polarisation. 
Consistent with the existing literature on other SNS platforms (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017), confirmation bias, selective exposure, and availability bias related to fake partisan news 
are potential drivers of polarisation in WhatsApp groups. The biases inherent in fake news, 
coupled with alignment to the group’s partisan views, creates a network supported by the 
group’s homophily. This reflects a pattern that has been established in the existing literature 
where participants exercise confirmation bias by accepting information from their peers 
regardless of its credibility (Tornberg, 2018). The homophily of WhatsApp groups is 
aggravated by the closeness, centrality, and influence of the peer-to-peer relationships within 
them. In homophilous WhatsApp groups, deliberators gradually attach more weight to their 
partisan biases and less weight to expert views and opinions. This reflects a form of motivated 
reasoning and may lead to low quality deliberations and decisions due to groupthink. 
WhatsApp group are likely to enhance peer-induced factors that promote specific biases 
inherent in fake news. The link between network homophily and polarisation in WhatsApp 
groups exhibits similar patterns and effects to those of other SNS platforms (Halberstam & 
Knight, 2016; Koiranen et al., 2019; Medaglia & Zhu, 2017). The findings partly imply that 
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WhatsApp groups are vulnerable to the manipulation of the group’s opinion through socially 
driven, organically spread fake news in homogeneous groups (Halberstam & Knight, 2016).  
 
7.4.2 The Polarising Nature of Governance Issues Deliberated 
The findings suggest that deliberative governance in WhatsApp groups has a negative influence 
on polarisation around deeply-rooted governance issues. As earlier noted, participants join their 
WhatsApp groups with pre-existing positions and views especially on issues they are interested 
in or passionate about. Nonetheless, WhatsApp groups have heightened perceived and actual 
polarisation, especially around contested county governance issues. Interacting in 
homogeneous groups has enticed participants to confirm their previous positions and take more 
inflexible positions on deep-rooted issues. The study found that polarisation in Kenya revolves 
around deep-rooted issues that are challenging to resolve through deliberation in WhatsApp 
groups (see Table 7.3). Polarisation is not a recent phenomenon in the Kenyan context 
(Kanyinga, 2014). As earlier noted, polarisation in Kenya is the product of current contentious 
issues that are based on the country’s structural diversity (Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). Based 
on the existing literature (see Chapter Three, pp 84-89), Kenya has experienced polarisation 
around its ethnic composition, ideologies, and historical injustices that have always been 
divisive (Ajulu, 2010; Carrier & Kochore, 2014; Khadiagala, 2017; Klopp, 2002; Omulo & 
Williams, 2018). This study’s findings suggest that participants in WhatsApp groups are 
influenced by pre-conceived ideologies and positions before joining the platform (see Table 
7.3). It is possible that the extremity of views and positions held by certain individuals 
motivates them to join certain WhatsApp groups for self-expression. This has profound 
implications for the effects of WhatsApp groups and polarisation because it partly supports the 
existing literature (Ishiyama et al., 2016; Makinen & Kuira, 2008) suggesting that SNSs are 
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not entirely responsible for instigating polarisation in contexts like Kenya but that they can 
worsen and deepen existing polarity. 
This point is illustrated in how the negative framing of historically contested issues has 
heightened partisan divides among participants in WhatsApp groups. Consistent with other 
studies (Sunstein, 2008b; Swol, 2009), deep-rooted issues can aggravate group dynamics that 
further amplify the perception of partisan differences and this has two critical implications for 
polarisation. First, that WhatsApp groups have enhanced certain socio-political inequalities and 
exacerbated the imbalances in access, voice, and representation during deliberations (see 
Chapter Six, p 225). Secondly, it substantiates previous findings showing a relationship 
between political inequality, marginalised views and polarisation in Kenya (Cheeseman et al., 
2016), demonstrating that inequality and exclusivity are further exacerbated when minorities 
groups are underrepresented on deliberative platforms like WhatsApp groups. Studies on the 
profiles of other SNS platforms in Kenya have reflected similar findings where the voices of 
the minority are minimal or lacking in political discourse (Kanyam et al., 2017).  
Further, deliberating on deep-rooted governance and grievance-causing issues is likely 
to be challenging if participants in WhatsApp groups adopt inflexible positions before 
deliberations. As was evident from the focus group discussions, inflexible positions refer to a 
situation when group members will not accept evidence that contradicts their pre-deliberation 
positions regardless of its validity. Evidence in the existing literature demonstrates that 
adopting inflexible positions can entice participants to practice selective exposure, motivated 
reasoning or confirmation bias  (Bright, 2018; Halvorsen, 2003; Kim, 2015). Such participants 
are prone to adopting extreme opinions in the direction of their pre-existing positions. 
Polarisation in WhatsApp groups is likely to worsen if participants identify strongly with 
specific issues through strong identity attachments. This, as was noted from the findings, is 
common in the context of deep-rooted and grievance-causing issues like ancestral land. 
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Whereas the governance issues that divide people at the county level are well known, the 
constant sharing, arguments, and discussion in WhatsApp groups enhance the salience of such 
partisan issues. The above findings also confirm the existing literature on the impact of salient 
and partisan issues on polarisation (Sigelman & Kugler, 2003; Wright & Graham, 2017). 
The polarising effects of WhatsApp group deliberations will more likely be heightened 
when a divisive issue becomes highly salient. When partisan governance issues become 
salient, the political elite and influencers in a WhatsApp group are most likely to frame it and 
declare their positions. Citizens are polarised by taking cues from their preferred political elite 
and only accepting information that relates to their partisan ideological stances. Groups 
deliberating on such matters will readily line up behind their leaders and support partisan 
positions. Another explanation is that as a governance issue becomes highly salient, WhatsApp 
groups participants are likely to attach more importance to such issues in deliberations. Similar 
to other studies on partisanship and polarisation in SNSs, participants are likely to defend their 
positions and practice motivated reasoning and confirmation bias (Sigelman & Kugler, 2003; 
Wright et al., 2017). The above also means that motivated scepticism can occur in WhatsApp 
groups if participants adopt extreme views even after exposure to discordant governance 
information.  
In sum, the findings suggest that the quality of deliberation in WhatsApp groups, 
regardless of the well-enforced deliberative norms, may not necessarily ameliorate polarisation 
around deeply-contested issues. This can be understood through a number of perspectives. The 
first of these is that participants with extreme views on certain contested issues are less likely 
to be ambivalent and uncertain after interacting with others of a different opinion. This is 
common when deliberating issues where a person’s conviction and identity strongly define the 
positions and views taken during deliberation (Dalton, 2008; Stroud, 2015; Baumgartner, 
2018). Secondly, when a person’s identity is salient, such as their ethnicity or religion, specific  
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norms attached to this identity are likely to guide the participants’ views and positions during 
deliberations. Further, when contested issues are salient in a WhatsApp group, isolated 
participants are likely to adopt positions that favour the in-group. Lastly, the findings suggest 
that WhatsApp has worsened polarisation by encouraging participants to argue for or defend 
their positions based on their group’s identity. The reasoning behind this is that when 
participants in a group become depersonalised, they are less likely to engage as individuals and 
more likely to engage in line with their group identity. 
7.4.3 Ideological Factions and Enclave Deliberations in WhatsApp Groups 
The low quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups has aggravated polarisation by 
facilitating the formation of ideological factions and alignments (see Table 7.3). The research 
here confirms that WhatsApp groups have also provided a platform where validation of in-
group identity occurs among participants, which concurs with other findings (Dubois & Blank, 
2018; Hong & Kim, 2016; Lee et al., 2018; Sturgis et al., 2014). The convergence of 
homogeneous participants exemplifies the formation of enclaves and potential echo chambers 
and is also evident in existing literature (Abdullah et al., 2016a; Bársony et al., 2019; Grönlund 
et al., 2017; Karpowitz et al., 2009; Maija, 2015). In heterogeneous groups, those with 
inadequate knowledge on governance issues are likely to remain silent, neutral or take no 
position. However, WhatsApp groups have allowed the convergence of participants with 
ideological similarities in a forum in which they feel more confident to express extreme views. 
This is especially the case for WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection. Groups formed 
by those with close ties through self-selection are likely to experience reputational pressures. 
Reputational pressures, driven by social comparison effects, mean that participants in a 
WhatsApp group will change their views or keep silent to avoid the disapproval of others. 
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This study’s findings further concur with social comparison effects noted in other 
studies (Sunstein, 2008b; Swol, 2009) showing that those with minimal knowledge adopt the 
group’s stance due to a desire for conformity and favourable consideration by the group. Social 
comparison lowers the quality of deliberations because the validity of claims on governance 
issues goes unchecked and unchallenged due to ideological conformity. Therefore, there is a 
strong association between social comparison, groupthink and echo chambers based on this 
study’s findings. The echo chamber effect means that the discussion within homogenous 
groups intensifies the impressions that the group’s views are widely shared and popular 
(Colleoni et al., 2014; Esteve & Valle, 2018; Tornberg, 2018). Such impressions can lead to 
groupthink making the group vulnerable to disillusionment and indignation when they are 
eventually exposed to contradictory information. This has profound implications for ethnic 
polarisation. Ethnic groups that have experienced discrimination perpetrated by a corrupt 
governance system are more likely to form enclave deliberations and gravitate towards an 
extreme position on the ideological spectrum. WhatsApp groups have provided a platform 
where participants from such ethnic groups can easily converge. This is consistent with other 
studies (Khadiagala, 2017; Lynch, 2014), showing that ethnic affiliation shapes ideological 
partisanship; both of which have a link with polarisation. 
When ethnicity shapes what sides participants take during WhatsApp group 
deliberations, it elevates ethnicity as a tool used to rationalise, simplify, and understand 
complex issues in a way that lowers the quality of deliberation and aggravates polarisation. 
This study found that WhatsApp deliberations sometimes involve the defence of specific 
leaders mentioned in corruption scandals based on their ethnic identity. This has various 
implications for polarisation. When the defence of particular ideologies or personalities 
happens regardless of the prevailing evidence, this is a form of confirmation bias (Stroud, 
2018). This study’s findings suggest a link between the ethnicisation of deliberations in enclave 
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WhatsApp groups and increased polarisation. Enclave WhatsApp groups are likely to include 
participants who share similar values, views and positions on county governance. However, a 
preference for engaging with homogeneous participants does not entirely eliminate 
disagreement in WhatsApp groups. The difference in disagreements within such groups is that 
it is less likely to be founded on deep ideological divergence. Further, the danger of 
homogenous WhatsApp groups is that new information is likely to be understood and 
interpreted using the group’s dominant ideology and viewpoints. While groupthink is possible 
in homogenous WhatsApp groups, cross interaction of content across other diverse news sites 
and multiple social networks can lessen its effects. As earlier noted, WhatsApp groups have 
specific affordances that increase the chances of encountering heterogeneous views in 
deliberations (Fiadino et al., 2016).  
The alternative perspective is that WhatsApp groups have facilitated enclave platforms 
where marginalised and minority groups can develop, compare, and share their unique 
experiences, and arguments. Such marginalised and minority groups may feel aggrieved and 
side-lined in governance policies, especially in polarised contexts like Kenya. Kenya’s 
background structural diversity makes the situation even more complicated. Whereas various 
studies have associated enclave deliberation with the amplification of consonant views, 
cognitive errors, and heightened polarisation (Abdullah et al., 2016a; Bársony et al., 2019; 
Grönlund et al., 2017; Karpowitz et al., 2009; Maija, 2015), this study’s findings make it 
apparent that it can have positive effects as well. As earlier demonstrated, deliberations in 
heterogeneous WhatsApp groups can easily draw marginalised and minority groups into a 
spiral of silence (see Table 7.3). This happens if such groups feel that their views on governance 
are unpopular or likely to be ignored. Enclave deliberation in WhatsApp groups offers a safe 
space where participants can gain the confidence to take positions that would otherwise be 
silenced, made invisible, or squashed in a heterogeneous deliberation context. The central 
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empirical idea is that high-status members in WhatsApp groups tend to engage more than 
others. Their ideas are more influential, partly because low-status members fear ‘retribution’ 
from the wider group. Due to the status-based hierarchies and power dynamics even in diverse 
deliberation contexts, it makes sense to form deliberating enclaves where the minority feels 
safe, recognised, and included.  
The implications for the wider deliberative process within the county governance 
structure are profound. Incorporating views from such enclave deliberations among minority 
groups within larger deliberative governance forums or processes can have a positive impact 
on polarisation (Barisione, 2012). It can help achieve inclusivity in deliberations which moves 
towards the realisation of a more substantive dialogue and decision-making processes in county 
governance. It is possible that marginalised groups need to confer in enclave contexts in order 
to contribute autonomously, confidently, and effectively to deliberations within the wider 
public sphere. Enclave deliberations in WhatsApp groups can counteract the negative dynamics 
of structural diversity and inequalities within the wider deliberation context. Studies have 
established the value of enclave deliberations when an organisation is centred on group identity 
(Abdullah et al., 2016a). Nonetheless, the advantages of enclave deliberations can work 
for organised community forums and citizen assemblies but they have not been proven to work 
for informal macro deliberative structures such as WhatsApp groups (Chappell, 2010; 
Hendriks, 2006).  
 
7.4.4 Information Cascades and Non-hierarchical Interaction 
The low quality of deliberation in WhatsApp group has intensified polarising information 
cascades, according to the findings. Information cascades in WhatsApp groups mean that 
participants are unable to challenge certain ideas, especially when in the minority (see Table 
7.3). When certain ideas go unchallenged or unquestioned, the ideas and views presented are 
309 
 
deemed to be accepted and valid. This is why the idea of information cascades is conceptually 
connected to the social comparison effect as earlier discussed (see section above). The 
arguments presented by specific group members, acting as influencers, are relied on in 
reference to the group’s position or decision making. Different from the existing literature, this 
study found that the influence of information cascades was more prevalent in WhatsApp groups 
aimed at translating deliberations into actions at the county level. Also apparent from the 
findings was that those who had the resources were more likely to influence the group’s 
decisions and drive the information cascades. This means that information cascades aggravated 
the power dynamics in a WhatsApp group where specific participants dominated the group’s 
narrative while the rest were tagging along. The governance perspectives of those who 
dominate deliberations define the group’s priorities, the terms in which such issues are 
discussed, and the group relations that frame those discussions. This is likely to be dangerous 
if it can lead the group to adopt more extreme and polarised positions.  
If participants from marginalised or minority groups must express their views and 
positions using the concepts and language of those who are privileged or empowered, it is 
likely to unfairly disadvantage them. WhatsApp group deliberation would then be an additional 
tool that empowers those who are already privileged or active. Further, some participants are 
better than others at articulating their views and arguments in rational, clear and reasonable 
ways, making their ideas more powerful, and respected and eliciting more responses. When 
deliberations fail to achieve civility and equality as a starting point, attempts at deliberation are 
more likely to be futile. In such groups, the collective opinion of the group, whether perceived 
or real, becomes a positional or informational reference point for new or other group members 
(Borges-tiago et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2019). Group polarisation is at the core of the cascade 
effects, especially when specific participants in the group have privileged information as so 
often happens within county governance structures. Those with privileged information are 
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likely to have significant influence on the group. Such influence can be projected negatively 
including through the development of intense and heightened concerns, fears and polarity about 
specific issues, policies or personalities at the county level. 
Despite the information cascades, respondents with an alternative perspective argued 
that WhatsApp groups have enabled citizens to imagine, invent and engage in non-hierarchical 
interaction with the county government. This argument refers to the affordances and 
networking features that WhatsApp has facilitated as a deliberative platform. Habermas argued 
for such a non-hierarchical deliberative platform in his idealistic conception of the public 
sphere (Habermas, 2003). The quality of deliberation and subsequent petitions in WhatsApp 
groups has opened the channels of interaction and enhanced the responsiveness of county 
governance leaders and institutions. Such engagement is positive because partisanship and 
ethnic polarisation in contexts like Kenya are sometimes fuelled by the unresponsiveness of 
governance institutions (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012). As relates to grievance handling, the 
findings suggest that some WhatsApp group deliberations have mediators or adjudicators who 
can help tackle partisan issues between opposing factions within the group. Whilst participants 
with neutral or moderate views exist in WhatsApp groups, the presence and effectiveness of 
mediators or adjudicators is characteristic of well-defined micro deliberative structures.  
 
7.4.5 Politicisation of Polarisation and Virtual Connectivity 
This study found that the low quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups means that 
partisanship and polarisation are harnessed for political expediency (see Table 7.3). It partly 
suggests that WhatsApp groups are a platform where elite polarisation can be translated into 
mass polarisation. Instead of facilitating deliberative governance, some WhatsApp groups have 
been hijacked by political elites and interest groups. The study found that some WhatsApp 
groups have specifically been established and sponsored to drive partisan narratives. The 
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propagation of polarising narratives in such WhatsApp groups takes advantage of the strong 
allegiance individuals may have to their ethnic, political, and ideological identities. The 
findings suggest that WhatsApp groups have equipped the political elite with a platform where 
they can heighten a sense of in-group solidarity while railing against perceived out-group 
political opponents (see Table 7.3). This supports the existing literature showing how the 
political elite have exploited the ‘us versus them’ narratives and identity in polarised contexts 
to gain political mileage (Antoci et al., 2016; Druckman et al., 2019). This is aided by the fact 
that it is easier for participants to cognitively process and understand such binary framing, 
especially in contexts where governance issues are contested. On the other hand, such binary 
framing provides quick, cheap, effortless mobilisation slogans, especially when the political 
elite lack any solid ideological manifestos to sell (Obala & Mattingly, 2014; Pattie & Johnston, 
2016).  
The role of paid political agents in sharing shock-value content in WhatsApp group 
deliberations was also evident from this study’s findings (see Table 7.3). Paid political agents 
mobilise by establishing contests in binary categories which are, in part, responsible for the 
increasingly polarised climate in WhatsApp groups. The challenge with defining contested 
issues in a binary format in WhatsApp groups is that it often intensifies ethnic polarisation. A 
good example, evident in the study, was in WhatsApp groups with Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic 
communities in Nakuru County. Binary framing when based on the participants’ ethnicity 
exploits the group’s insecurities and fears, and magnifies partisanship in deliberations 
(Barisione, 2012; Druckman & Bolsen, 2011; J. Han & Federico, 2018). The politicisation of 
WhatsApp group engagement is likely to intensify the perception of county governance issues 
as zero-sum contests. Politicians form WhatsApp groups to push divisive agendas including 
infiltrating other WhatsApp groups with misinformation and disinformation. Similarly, the 
county governments, with their public communication machinery, infiltrate public WhatsApp 
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groups to steer favourable discussions or defend unpopular county government policies. This 
implies that deliberations are likely to degenerate into personality-based contests rather than 
issue-based discussion. This is further compounded by WhatsApp affordances that enable 
participants to personalise ‘attacks’, feedback, and comments as one potential cause of 
polarisation.  
Findings to the contrary suggest that WhatsApp deliberations have facilitated a virtual 
connection between citizens and their county leaders. This concurs with other SNS studies 
demonstrating the positive effects on polarisation of a two-way symmetrical interaction model 
between the governed and the governors (Baogang, 2018; Ganuza & Francés, 2012; Park et al., 
2017a; Rosenbloom et al., 2017b). The implications of the convergence of citizens and their 
county leaders is twofold with regard to polarisation. The first is that the polarising 
misinformation among citizens and their leaders is potentially clarified via deliberations in 
WhatsApp groups. However, this is dependent on the extent to which discussions are rational, 
evidence-based, and logical; this is negated by low quality deliberations, as noted earlier. 
Secondly, the expectation that WhatsApp group engagement between citizens and their county 
leaders would be characterised by sophisticated discourse to tackle polarising issues seems 
unrealistic. If such discourse is challenging to achieve among the group participants, the same 
is likely to be the case when leaders are involved.  
In sum, regardless of the quality of deliberations in a WhatsApp group, any 
participation in deliberation has value. Deliberations are not entirely irrelevant or problematic 
in polarised contexts simply because they fall short of the normative standards of ideal 
interaction between citizens and their leaders. WhatsApp groups have encouraged the 
formation of spontaneous bottom-up groups which have amplified marginalised voices and this 
is critical in ameliorating polarisation. The amplification of marginalised voices has enhanced 
inclusivity and enriched the quality of deliberations. Nonetheless, it is impossible to 
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accommodate a large percentage of people in formal deliberative contexts especially in 
numerically limited platforms like WhatsApp. Spontaneous bottom-up groups have created a 
platform for informal deliberations in the public sphere to organise, mobilise and influence 
formal processes at the county level. Even for spontaneous bottom-up WhatsApp groups, 
recruiting participants who are interested, knowledgeable, and focused about governance issues 
increases the quality of deliberations. It is also possible that having specific political elites co-
participating in the deliberative process can elevate the quality of deliberations. Regardless of 
who participates, open, unthreaded, unmoderated deliberations that take place on WhatsApp 
groups may not support a conducive environment for good quality deliberations.  
7.5 Implication for Theory 
This study supports previous research suggesting that the Habermasian normative ideals are 
unrealistic and unattainable, especially in the online public sphere (Dahlberg, 2005; Dallmayr, 
2009; Jezierska, 2019a, 2019b; Ofunja et al., 2018; Thomassen, 2017). As proposed by 
Habermas, this study supports the concept that deliberative platforms, including online ones, 
should mediate public and private lives by raising attention to common problems of concern. 
WhatsApp groups have realised this role within the Kenyan counties (see Chapter Four, pp 
146-152). The study also concurs with Habermasian arguments that political institutions, such 
as county government, are capable of being influenced by an end process where citizens’ 
engaging in logical, rational, and critical deliberations. However, Habermas’s argument that 
deliberations can help citizens to construct unifying identities that mediate conflict and build 
cohesive communities is doubtful in the context of WhatsApp groups, as shown in this study’s 
findings. This further negates the optimism expressed by the Kenyan constitution regarding the 
role of online platforms in building a cohesive society (see Chapter Three, p. 104-108).  
The argument by Habermas that technology will transform and extend the confines of 
the public spheres to include diverse platforms with diverse participants is confirmed in this 
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study (Habermas, 2005). WhatsApp, like other SNSs platforms, tends to attract a privileged 
socio-demographic profile of participants (see Chapter Six, pp 230,231). It is critical to 
differentiate ordinary usage and active participation in deliberative governance in WhatsApp 
groups. This study on WhatsApp further contrasts the Habermasian normative ideals that 
engagement in the public sphere will be respectful, rational, inclusive, and diverse where 
arguments that are driven by the common good. This study’ findings reflect other studies that 
found the lack of reciprocity, representativeness, irrational discourse, unmoderated 
deliberations, context collapse, and absence of legitimate outcomes in deliberations as some of 
the reason for low-quality deliberations (Blau, 2011; Dallmayr, 2009; Filatova et al., 2019; 
Iosifidis, 2011; Jezierska, 2019a, 2019b; King, 2005; Ofunja et al., 2018; Thomassen, 2017, 
2006). The use of Habermasian normative ideals to gauge the quality of deliberations in digital 
platforms like WhatsApp has various implications.  
The first is that it overlooks and significantly undervalues less sophisticated and 
informal deliberations that occur in the digital platforms. The normative Habermasian ideals 
place an unrealistic expectation on deliberation participants to adhere to sophisticated 
deliberative norms with other heterogeneous discussants. It is possible that a less constrained 
and controlled deliberative environment will yield more tangible and legitimate results than 
those guided by deliberative norms. Habermas, for instance, recognised that defining the 
agenda in the public sphere sometimes requires confrontational and contested discussion tactics 
marked by incivility (Habermas, 1991). Secondly, this study found that achieving the 
Habermasian normative ideals are limited by several platform-specific factors such as the 
affordance of the platform, the composition of participants, the quality information sources, 
and the nature of the topic under deliberations. The design and affordance of WhatsApp groups 
imply that they can facilitate the formation of enclaves and polarised echo chambers. 
WhatsApp groups formed through random selection will have a diverse composition and 
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characteristics of participants implying more enriched deliberations. The composition of the 
WhatsApp group is likely to have an impact on the standards of tolerance and the moderation 
of deliberations based on normative ideals.  
Further, some topics under deliberations are deep-rooted, historical and inherently 
contentious in various contexts including in Kenya. Such topics are likely to encourage 
confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, and partisanship during deliberations in spite of the 
Habermasian deliberative ideals. Apart from heightening group polarisation, deep-rooted, 
historical, and inherently contentious topics are likely to result in more polarisation. Whereas 
the Habermasian deliberative ideals are critical in shaping the quality of deliberations, the 
provision of timely, reliable, and relevant information is critical. As relates to the quality of 
information, the study found that deliberations in WhatsApp groups seem more challenging 
due to a failure to comprehensively implement the access to information bill at the county level.  
While the Habermasian normative ideals will continue to inform the expected standards 
of deliberations, this study argues that the scope and depth of what is considered quality 
deliberations should be expanded beyond what Habermas proposed. This is based on two 
reasons. The acceptable standards of deliberation tend to vary based on the context, platform, 
and objectives of deliberations. Based on the understanding of micro and macro deliberative 
structures, the expectation and quality of deliberations in micro deliberative structures are 
likely to be higher than those for macro deliberative structures. For instance, while consensus 
can be used as a standard to determine quality in micro deliberative structures being one of its 
objectives, it would be unrealistic to use consensus to measure quality in macro deliberative 
structures. This is because the primary aim of macro deliberative structures is to shape opinion 
rather than establish issue-consensus.  
Another reason is that digital platforms such as SNSs have enhanced other factors that 
affect the quality of deliberations and polarisation. The viral distribution of fake news, 
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misinformation, disinformation, conspiracy theories, and stereotypes has been made much 
easier, faster, and with a greater impact through SNSs affordances. Sharing skewed information 
in SNSs has triggered high-arousal emotions that have worsened polarisation. Furthermore, the 
value of humour, personal experiences, and emotion, as part of online deliberations affects the 
quality of deliberations. Apart from attracting sustained interests in deliberative platforms, they 
help clarify specific perspectives, and also solidify group interactions. Further, WhatsApp 
groups fall under the category of synchronous and asynchronous platforms which affects the 
quality of deliberations. WhatsApp group participants can leave or join the discussion at their 
convenience, and this suggests a disjointed and fragmentary deliberations process. However, 
the asynchronous nature of WhatsApp groups means that they are able to write longer 
messages, weigh and analyse their chats, and explain their perspectives in a much better way. 
 
7.6 Implications for Practice 
Several implications for practice within the county governance setting are evident from this 
research. First, deliberative governance via WhatsApp groups may not be the panacea for 
Kenya’s polarisation. The quality of deliberations is not according to standards based on the 
Habermasian normative norms. The politicisation and use of such platforms to propagate fake 
news and spread conspiracy theories make them unsuitable to inform serious governance and 
policy discussion at the county level. Further, the framing of governance issues as binary 
contests coupled with their use of ethnic stereotypes during deliberations suggest that these 
platforms are insufficient to steer meaningful, depolarising deliberations. Furthermore, 
WhatsApp groups, while mostly diverse, are not inclusive in terms of representing a diversity 
of voices across all participants.  
Secondly, based on the deep-rooted nature of partisan and polarising governance issues 
in the Kenyan context, deliberations in WhatsApp groups may not provide holistic solutions. 
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It confirms the suggestion that whatever is tearing Kenya’s socio-political fabric and 
governance structures apart is deeper and more universal. It is also historical and may not be 
simplified and explained by digital filter bubbles, echo chambers, and selective exposure 
practices during deliberations. Hence, it is problematic to suggest that SNSs platforms can 
achieve what the Kenyan constitution has failed to realise (see Chapter Three, pp. 104-107). 
However, it is prudent to include SNSs platforms as part of an overall strategy of ensuring 
integrated and cohesive Kenyan counties considering that SNSs platforms have made both 
negative and positive contributions to the state of cohesion and integration in Kenya (see 
Chapter Three, pp. 126-130). 
Thirdly, despite the criticism that deliberative governance may not neccesarily resolve 
thie issues of polarisation among participants, it can still have some positive outcomes. Even 
in situations of ethnic and ideological polarisation or the majority domination, there is some 
evidence that participants can still learn new perspectives from others. They can develop 
moderate positions by empathising with others’ views. Specifically, the positive effects of 
deliberation governance on the participant's issue knowledge, efficacy, and interest in 
participation is tenable. Deliberative governance in enclave platforms has also enabled 
marginalised and minority groups to express themselves freely and confidently in their own 
spaces. Such enclave deliberations should be integrated into the formal deliberative governance 
structures in a way that supports more inclusive deliberations. This partly explains why 
platforms like WhatsApp have instigated the formation of spontaneous bottom-up groups 
where participants self-organise to participate in offline activities at the county level. 
Fourthly, online platforms, including WhatsApp groups that are used to collect, 
analyse, and integrate the views of citizens, can be systematically biased towards ideologically 
extreme opinions. This is based on this study’s findings that deliberations in some WhatsApp 
groups are not inclusive, dominated by a few individuals and, therefore, not representative. The 
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county governments need to design an online deliberative process that is diverse and inclusive 
enough to integrate a wide range of public opinion. Such platforms should also have 
moderation mechanism to shield the minority from the whims of participants with populist and 
extreme views. WhatsApp groups used to collect public opinions should be well managed in 
terms of recruiting participants to encourage representativeness and inclusivity. The fact that 
WhatsApp groups are characterised by both synchronous and as synchronous online chats is 
problematic for supporting quality deliberations. The short messages in WhatsApp groups 
often lead to under-developed arguments, lessen the comprehensiveness and coherence of chat 
messages, and can encourage a high level of personalised attack among participants.  
7.7 Conclusion 
The study found a variance in quality of deliberation based on WhatsApp group formations. It 
found that top-down WhatsApp groups have a comparatively higher quality of deliberations 
based on inclusivity and moderation. Whereas, bottom-up WhatsApp groups, on the other 
hand, have comparatively higher quality deliberations based on tolerance, diversity, civility, 
heterogeneity of viewpoints. However, the variance between top-down and bottom-up is not 
hugely significant. WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection were found to be more 
tolerant, moderated, and civil that those formed through random selection, which was more 
inclusive, had more heterogeneous viewpoints, were more diverse, and more polarised. The 
type of WhatsApp group formation and the method of recruitment affects the quality of 
deliberations, but the difference between them is not particularly significant. 
The study also sought to understand how deliberative governance in WhatsApp group 
influence polarisation. This study found that the quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups 
fails to meet the Habermasian ideals, and this may account for its contribution to polarisation. 
The quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups is also affected by fake news, widely shared 
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conspiracy theories and the framing of issues in binary categories. The presence of trolls and 
moles in WhatsApp groups have heightened polarised deliberations and increased the use of 
uncivil language. Whereas participants join their WhatsApp groups with partisan views, low 
quality deliberations have heightened actual and perceived polarisation around county 
governance issues. WhatsApp groups have heightened the formation of enclaves and echo 
chambers which have also increased the perceptions of polarisation. The findings suggest that 
the quality of deliberative in WhatsApp groups have strengthened group/ ethnic affiliation and 
further intensified partisan information cascades. Partisan and ethnic polarisation has worsened 
due to the politicising of polarisation which WhatsApp groups deliberations have worsened. 
 Contrary views are that WhatsApp groups have enhanced tolerance and issue 
consensus because of exposure to heterogeneous information. This has been possible because 
WhatsApp groups provide an interactional context allowing better discussion thread that 
supports more rationalised deliberations. As a digital platform, WhatsApp groups have enabled 
a virtual meeting of citizens and leaders where partisan issues are clarified and discussed. This 
is based on the argument that partisan positions are often a result of the in-group 
misunderstanding the ideological positions of the out-group. In some contexts, WhatsApp 
groups have facilitated the discussion of collaborative governance action between the governed 
and the governors. This has promoted a non-hierarchical interactive approach to common 
societal issues that enhance polarisation. Such a non-hierarchical interactive approach has also 
facilitated a holistic approach to divisive governance issues where the voices of the 
marginalised in society are included. Optimists argue that deliberative governance in this 








Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.0 Overview of the Study 
This thesis has sought to establish the impact of deliberative governance on polarisation in 
WhatsApp groups in four Kenyan counties. Deliberative governance is established in the 
Kenyan constitution and other subsequent legislation. The legislation mandates counties to use 
the mainstream and social media for deliberative governance to promote national cohesion and 
social integration. Based on this, deliberative governance is considered a prescriptive solution 
to polarisation in Kenyan counties. This study is based on the proposition that the outcomes of 
deliberative governance and its impact on polarisation depend on the quality of deliberations. 
The existing literature indicates that the quality of deliberations on SNS platforms are 
characterised by irrationality, incivility, lack of inclusivity, unmoderated deliberations, and low 
tolerance (Benson, 2019; Chambers, 2003; Corus & Ozanne, 2012; Davidson & Elstub, 2014; 
Öberg & Svensson, 2012; Ofunja et al., 2018; Park et al., 2017a). However, no study has looked 
at the influence of Habermasian deliberative ideals on group polarisation on online platforms 
in the Kenyan context. 
This study’s proposition is that the quality of deliberation is dependent on the 
deliberative structure of the SNS platform and the deliberative norms adopted in a group 
context. The deliberative structure and norms adopted in a group are also likely to influence 
group polarisation. Deliberative structures, according to this study, consist of key features, 
structural organisation, and composition of the deliberative platform. They include factors such 
as: socio-demographic composition, recruitment method, group size, and group ties. 
Deliberative norms are informal deliberative guidelines of behaviour and an agreed code of 
conduct that ensure orderliness in group discussions for better outcomes. Deliberative norms 
are derived from Habermasian deliberative ideals and include: diversity, inclusivity, tolerance, 
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civility, moderation, and heterogeneity of viewpoints (Habermas, 1996, 2003, 2005). This 
chapter presents a summary of the findings of this thesis based on four research questions that 
the study sought to answer. 
8.1 Summary of Study Findings 
Socio-demographic Profile of WhatsApp Groups in Kenya 
The first research question sought to establish the socio-demographic profile of WhatsApp 
groups in Kenya. The study found that WhatsApp groups participants are predominantly males, 
aged between 18 and 44 years with relatively high academic qualifications (diploma or 
undergraduate). These findings mirror the demographic profiles of participants on other SNS 
platforms in Kenya. A reinforcement effect theory can explain this similarity. It states that the 
use of additional SNS platforms is a result of pre-existing deliberative behaviours on other 
platforms. Further, age, education, and gender are key indicators of a participant’s socio-
economic and demographic conditions with regard to the (dis)advantages in resources and 
participation. This suggests that WhatsApp has reinforced existing socio-demographic 
inequalities in the access and use of SNS platforms for deliberative governance (see Chapter 
Six, p.230). WhatsApp has confirmed other studies showing that the lower socio-economic 
groups are more likely to be marginalised by emergent technology which bolsters the status 
quo (Arriagada et al., 2012). Another explanation for this study’s findings on WhatsApp 
profiles relates to a bias affecting the probability sampling method in SNS related surveys. 
There is a tendency to sample from and over represent a segment of respondents who are 
robustly engaged. Active participants in deliberative governance in WhatsApp groups are also 




8.2 WhatsApp Groups’ Deliberative Structure, Norms, and Polarisation 
The second research question sought to understand whether and how WhatsApp groups’ 
deliberative structure and norms influence polarisation. Overall, the study found that different 
variables that define the deliberative structure and norms in WhatsApp groups affect group 
polarisation. The link between deliberative structure and norms and polarisation was based on 
the seven indicators of polarisation (see Chapter Six, p.201).  
8.2.1 Socio-demographic Composition and Group Polarisation 
The study found no statistically significant difference between gender (whether participants 
were male or female) and polarisation in WhatsApp groups (see Tables 6.3 & 6.4). In contrast, 
the qualitative analysis suggests that the influence of patriarchal socio-political structures tends 
to define partisan and gendered dynamics in WhatsApp group deliberations. These structures 
encourage binary thinking based on gendered dynamics which can translate into binary 
positions in deliberations leading to group polarisation. This concurs with other studies that 
link binary thinking and group polarisation (Atlee, 2019; Wood & Petriglieri, 2005). The 
dominance of men in WhatsApp deliberations means that their views and opinions are likely 
to create groupthink. Similar to other studies on enclave deliberations (Abdullah et al., 2016a; 
Baldassarri et al., 2016), this study found that women are more likely to form enclave 
WhatsApp groups that reflect polarised echo chambers. The differences in personalities across 
both genders are likely to influence group polarisation. Women’s conflict-avoidance and 
ambivalence imply that they are more likely to be agreeable and adopt less extreme views. In 
contrast, men are perceived as more competent in governance issues meaning that they are less 
likely to have their ideas and views challenged. This study also found that men are likely to 
dominate deliberations and develop groupthink decisions, as has been noted in other studies 
(Karpowitz et al., 2009; Lindell et al., 2017). This study suggests that the inadequate 
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representation of women’s voices, due to existing digital divides, accentuates group 
polarisation. In concurrence with other studies on digital divides (Antonio & Tuffley, 2014; 
Brundidge et al., 2014; Galbreath et al., 2012; Min, 2010), this study found that the absence of 
women’s voices is likely to result in the amplification of male-centric ideologies; leading to 
groupthink.  
This study indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between age 
(younger or older) and polarisation in WhatsApp group deliberations (see Tables 6.3 & 6.4). 
In contrast, the qualitative analysis revealed various linkages between the two variables. The 
findings indicate that the digital divide affects the older age groups more, which explains the 
perception that they are less polarised in WhatsApp groups. This contradicts studies showing 
that older participants are more polarised (Boxell et al., 2017). In spite of the digital divide, 
this study found that the older socialised the younger age groups to adopt partisan ethnic 
ideologies as evident in WhatsApp group deliberations (Bright, 2018; Herne et al., 2019b; 
Spohr, 2017). Concurring with other studies on ethnic polarisation in Kenya (Obala & 
Mattingly, 2014), this study found that older participants are more likely to experience ethnic 
polarisation compared to younger participants. Young age groups were noted to be more liberal 
compared to the older groups who are more likely to be ideologically conservative. Words such 
as open-minded, diverse and accommodating were used to describe the young participants’ 
non-partisan approach to governance issues. In contrast, a form of dogmatism was noted among 
older groups due to their ideological consistency. In other studies, such dogmatism was found 
to drive affective polarisation (Iyengar et al., 2019).  
The study found a statistically significant difference between the level of education 
(higher or lower) and group polarisation (see Tables 6.3 & 6.4). The effects size analysis 
revealed that participants with a higher level of education are less likely to be polarised. In 
contrast, however, the qualitative analysis suggests that education has emboldened the 
324 
 
expression of partisan and polarised ideas in WhatsApp group deliberations. This suggests that 
those who are more educated are more likely to be dogmatic in their beliefs. The more educated 
are also likely to assume the role of influencers which reflects their role in elite polarisation. 
Participants with high levels of education are assumed to make more sophisticated deliberators 
because they are likely to consume heterogeneous content, as evidenced in other studies 
(Stroud et al., 2015). They are likely to possess better reasoning skills, and a higher subject 
knowledge level, meaning they have minimal susceptibility to motivated reasoning. The more 
educated are better at finding arguments that are congruent with their partisan positions which 
implies a higher propensity for confirmatory bias. In comparison, the less educated are more 
likely to be gullible and less confident about their partisan positions, hence more willing to 
change their views.  
8.2.2 Heterogeneity of Viewpoints and Diversity of Participants 
The study found a statistically significant difference between polarisation and the heterogeneity 
of viewpoints in WhatsApp group deliberations, and between polarisation and the diversity of 
participants (see Tables 6.3 & 6.4). The effects size analysis further revealed that WhatsApp 
groups with diverse participants and heterogeneous viewpoints were more likely to be 
polarised. In contrast, the qualitative analysis found that exposure to diverse information is 
possible in diverse WhatsApp groups. Diversity of content is likely to enhance inadvertent or 
incidental exposure which challenges the concept of selective exposure in group deliberations 
(Halpern & Gibbs, (2013). Unlike other studies, this study found that participants can still 
exercise content selection in WhatsApp. Further, selective exposure in WhatsApp groups is not 
singularly motivated by the avoidance of discordant information, as suggested in other studies 
(Bright, 2018; Halvorsen, 2003; Kim, 2015). Rather, participants were noted to exercise 
selective exposure based on other factors such as the content’s humour value, participants’ 
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mood, and time constraints as well. Nonetheless, exposure to heterogeneous content in 
WhatsApp groups does not necessarily actuate changes in viewpoints or positions in 
deliberations. This is because polarising governance issues can trigger dogmatic positions even 
before deliberations which encourage confirmation bias among participants.  
This study found a connection between the diversity of participants and the recruitment 
methods in WhatsApp groups. WhatsApp groups formed through self-selection are likely to 
consist of homogeneous participants hence result in enclave deliberations and echo chambers 
effects. Similar to other studies, homogeneous participants and enclave deliberations in 
WhatsApp groups can lead to groupthink where a limited number of arguments are discussed 
(Abdullah et al., 2016a; Lindell et al., 2017, 2017; Maija, 2015; Strandberg et al., 2019).  
Furthermore, the expulsion of participants who express discordant views creates more 
homogeneous WhatsApp groups where enclave deliberations are practised. Expulsion also 
implies that participants who wish to remain conform to the group’s dominant ideology. By 
doing so, they practice social comparison leading to extremely partisan polarisation. This 
study’s findings, therefore, reflect the findings of other studies on other SNS platforms 
(Messing & Westwood, 2014; Stroud, 2018; Wicks et al., 2014). Emphasis on group identity 
is likely to translate into group pressure for ideological conformity during deliberations, as also 
noted in the existing literature (Bimber & Copeland, 2013; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). Participants 
in diverse WhatsApp groups are more likely to develop moderated opinions than those in 
homogeneous WhatsApp groups.  
8.2.3 Moderation, Inclusivity and Group Polarisation 
The findings indicated a statistically significant difference between the moderation of 
deliberations and polarisation (see Tables 6.4 & 6.5). Moderated deliberations reflected less 
polarisation compared to unmoderated deliberation in WhatsApp groups. In contrast, the 
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qualitative analysis found that moderation creates a perception of gagging, which compounds 
the notion that some group administrators are biased. Perception of biased moderations was 
noted to heighten partisan polarisation and encourage confirmation bias where participants 
rejected evidence-based deliberations. The perception of moderation as a group’s responsibility 
was noted to achieve better results in terms of enforcing deliberative norms such as civility and 
tolerance. The findings suggest that well-moderated deliberations in WhatsApp groups can 
encourage open and free deliberations. In contrast, partisan contexts can encourage biased 
moderation, where the focus is on discouraging the expression of discordant opinions. This is 
necessary to debunk partisan narratives and encourage more inclusive deliberations. It was 
further apparent that moderating specific attitudes was challenging due to motivated reasoning 
founded on complex pre-existing beliefs. The marginalised and minority groups, influenced by 
binary perception, are likely to consider moderation as censorship.  
The quantitative analysis did not find any statistical significance between inclusivity 
and polarisation (see Tables 6.3 & 6.4). In contrast, the qualitative analysis established a link 
between the two variables. Despite diverse participants in a WhatsApp group, the voices of a 
pro-active few dominate deliberations which is likely to result in groupthink. Similar to other 
studies, lurking behaviour in deliberations was noted in this study and is likely to affect the 
inclusivity of voices in WhatsApp groups (Schneider et al., 2013). In line with existing 
literature on the spiral of silence (Chen, 2018; Sohn, 2019), this practice, especially by the 
minority groups in WhatsApp groups, affects inclusive deliberations and limits the 
heterogeneity of voices in deliberations. The lack of inclusivity was seen as a failure by the 
minority to take up opportunities to express their views during deliberations. This view seems 
to be driven by the perception of deliberation as a contest espousing survival of the fittest. 
Similar to other studies on SNS platforms, this evidence revealed the power dynamics at play 
in WhatsApp group deliberations (Barberá, 2014; Herne et al., 2019a; Singer et al., 2019). 
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Therefore, the dominant views are often considered to represent the entire group’s views, and 
can worsen partisanship.  
8.2.4 Group Ties, Group Size and Group Polarisation 
This study found a statistically significant difference between group size and polarisation (see 
Table 6.3). The effects size analysis revealed that larger WhatsApp groups are more likely to 
experience polarisation (see Table 6.4). The qualitative findings, however, demonstrate that 
participants in smaller WhatsApp groups are more likely to be homogeneous and hence 
agreeable. This implies, in a similar way to the existing literature, that smaller sized WhatsApp 
groups are more likely to be homogeneous echo chambers where amplification of consonant 
views, and thus polarisation, occurs (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Esteve & Valle, 2018; Garrett, 
2009; Rao et al., 2016; Szab & Matuszewski, 2019; Tornberg, 2018; Vaccari et al., 2016). 
Unlike in larger groups, participants in smaller sized WhatsApp groups are likely to be exposed 
to very few alternative views and perspectives. Limited views increase the chances of 
groupthink decisions. In contrast, large groups are likely to have weak ties, with more 
information sources, and an enhanced opportunity for inadvertent exposure to diverse 
information, as evidenced in the existing literature (Bright, 2018; Halvorsen, 2003; Kim, 2015). 
Self-selection of participants into smaller WhatsApp groups can encourage participants to 
adopt more extreme viewpoints as influenced by social comparison.  
The study found no statistically significant difference in polarisation for both weak and 
strong group ties in WhatsApp groups (see Table 6.3). However, the effects size analysis 
indicated an association between group ties and polarisation (see Table 6.4). The qualitative 
findings further revealed a link between group ties and polarisation in WhatsApp groups. 
WhatsApp groups with close ties make it easier for ideological enclaves to be formed, where 
homogeneous information is shared. Compared to weak ties, close ties are likely to mean that 
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self-identity among participants is understood in the context of the group’s identity. Ideological 
differentiation and groupthink mechanisms are likely to occur is groups with small ties as 
opposed to those with weak ties, as also noted in the existing literature (Karpowitz et al., 2009). 
Weak ties are likely to enhance exposure to heterogeneous views through incidental exposure. 
This means that weak ties can easily translate into weak attachment to partisan identity. Social 
comparison was suggested to be less prevalent within groups with weak ties which contradicts 
similar studies on other SNSs such as Facebook (De Vries & Kühne, 2015). Similar to other 
studies on SNS platforms, it was evident that participants in groups with weak ties are more 
likely to adopt moderate opinions due to incidental exposure to diverse information in 
deliberations (Karnowski et al., 2017; Kim, Chen et al., 2013; Weeks et al., 2017). Inadvertent 
exposure to heterogeneous information in groups with weak ties can also mean a lower 
likelihood of motivated reasoning.  
8.2.5 Tolerance and Civility in Group Polarisation 
The study found no statistically significant difference between different levels of tolerance and 
polarisation (see Table 6.3). However, the effect size measures found a significant association 
between tolerance and polarisation across all levels of tolerance (see Table 6.4). The qualitative 
findings revealed that self-censoring, misconstrued as tolerance, can encourage a spiral of 
silence in deliberations. Therefore, those with extreme viewpoints can refrain from expressing 
opinions in light of the group’s dominant positions. It was not clear from the findings if the 
diversity of WhatsApp groups heightens intolerance. However, it was evident that intolerance 
in WhatsApp group deliberations can lead to extreme positions and more partisan and polarised 
disagreement. Intolerance can deepen the impression that the differences between partisan 
groups in the WhatsApp group are unbridgeable and limit the chances of moderate opinions. 
Intolerance was further noted to encourage motivated reasoning and the practice of 
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confirmation bias. Socio-demographic factors can influence power dynamics that affect the 
level of tolerance in deliberations as noted in other studies (Barberá, 2014; Herne et al., 2019a; 
Singer et al., 2019). Politics and governance issues framed as contests are more likely to drive 
intolerance in WhatsApp group deliberations. This corroborates other findings on framing in 
deliberative governance (Barisione, 2012; Druckman & Bolsen, 2011; J. Han & Federico, 
2018). Close-knit, homogeneous WhatsApp groups can hold certain standards of tolerance for 
those in their in-group and contrasting standards for those in their out-group.  
The study found that incivility in deliberations is more likely to influence polarisation 
in WhatsApp groups (see Table 6.3). The effects size analysis between polarisation and civility 
suggests a strong association between the two variables (see Table 6.4). The qualitative 
analysis indicated that incivility is viewed as an attack on the in-group even though directed at 
an individual. This means that incivility is likely to trigger in-group defence mechanisms 
against the out-group in WhatsApp group deliberations. Incivility is also likely to increase 
negative labelling and reduce the modest interaction needed in deliberative governance (Stroud 
et al., 2015). Incivility increases the perception of partisanship and hostility based on the 
participant’s identity with the likelihood that it will lessen group deliberations. One critical 
finding from this study is that those who ignored any contribution accompanied by incivility 
in WhatsApp group deliberations excercised a form of confirmatory bias that is likey to lead to 
polarisation. Unlike in the existing literature, this study further suggests a link between binary 
thinking and incivility in WhatsApp group deliberations (see Chapter six, p, 249). Further, 
motivated reasoning occurs when participants avoid contributions accompanied by incivility 
(see Chapter six, p, 249).  
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8.3 WhatsApp Group Formation and Quality of Deliberations 
The study also aimed to understand if there is a variance in the quality of deliberations based 
on WhatsApp group formation. WhatsApp groups were classified into two types based on the 
manner of formation and recruitment method (see Chapter Seven, p. 263). This study found a 
variance in the quality of deliberations for top-down and bottom-up WhatsApp groups. Top-
down WhatsApp groups were found to be more inclusive and better moderated. Bottom-up 
WhatsApp groups were more tolerant, more diverse, more civil, and had a high heterogeneity 
of viewpoints (see Chapter Seven, p. 290). The variance in the quality of deliberation between 
the two WhatsApp groups is not hugely significant based on the Cramer’s V values for both 
WhatsApp group formations. Bottom-up WhatsApp groups were found to be slightly more 
polarised compared to top-down WhatsApp groups (see Chapter Seven, p. 290). The variance 
between the two formations can be explained by various factors such as the objective of 
formations, nature of ties, group size, and the group composition. On the other hand, WhatsApp 
groups formed through self-selection were found to be comparatively more tolerant, 
moderated, civil, and polarised than those formed through random selection (see Chapter 
Seven, p. 291). WhatsApp groups formed through random selection were more inclusive, had 
more heterogeneous viewpoints, and were more diverse. Both methods of recruiting 
participants are likely to define the group dynamics and polarisation. The recruitment method 
can also influence the deliberative structure and deliberative norms (see Chapter Seven, p. 291). 
The study found that self-selection is also likely to result in homogeneous WhatsApp groups 
that are likely to reinforce polarisation by creating in-groups vs out-groups. 
8.4 The Quality of Deliberation and Polarisation in WhatsApp Groups 
The study also sought to establish if and how the quality of deliberation in WhatsApp groups 
influences polarisation. The findings show that the quality of deliberations fails to meet the 
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Habermasian ideals and accounts for polarisation in WhatsApp groups. In addition, the study 
found that WhatsApp has enhanced or heightened trolling, fake news, misinformation, 
disinformation, sharing of stereotypes and forwarding of conspiracy theories around county 
governance issues, all of which have worsened polarisation (see Chapter Seven, pp. 300-302). 
For instance, trolls in WhatsApp groups are likely to take extreme positions and exhibit 
polarised behavioural tendencies such as confirmatory bias and motivated reasoning. The 
credibility of conspiracy theories is higher if it favours the in-group and vilifies the out-group 
and this heightens polarisation. The findings also suggest that the low quality of deliberations 
in WhatsApp groups have amplified the perceptive differences between participants on some 
deeply rooted, contested, and historical governance issues in Kenyan counties (see Chapter 
Seven, pp. 304,305). The salience of such issues means that the political elite and influencers 
in a WhatsApp group are likely to frame such issues as contests. These findings concur with 
the existing literature on the role of the political elite in mass polarisation and how they drive 
the adoption of more extreme positions (Enders & Armaly, 2019; Robison & Mullinix, 2016). 
The quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups have aggravated polarisation by 
facilitating the formation of ideological factions and alignments (see Chapter Seven, pp. 
307,308). This has resulted in a platform where validation of in-group identity occurs among 
deliberators through the convergence of homogenous groups. WhatsApp groups have allowed 
the convergence of participants with ideological similarities in a forum which allows them to 
feel more confident about expressing extreme views which Vicario et al., (2016) linked to 
group polarisation. WhatsApp groups have also enhanced the issue of social comparison where 
participants wish to be considered favourably as group conformers. The ethnicization of 
deliberations in WhatsApp groups means that ethnicity is used to rationalise, simplify, and 
understand complex issues in a way that aggravates polarisation. This is likely to push 
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participants into ethnically defined factions as noted in the previous literature (Flache & Macy, 
2011b). 
The quality of deliberations in WhatsApp groups has intensified polarising information 
cascades characterised by an inability to challenge certain ideas perceived as dominant in the 
group (see Chapter Seven, pp. 310,311). Informational cascades are polarising if the group 
adopts a dominant position regardless of discordant voices so as to achieve issue-consensus 
(Boomgaarden, 2019). The focus on consensus can silence discordant voices and allow the 
amplification of dominant voices (Dong et al., 2018; Herrera-Viedma et al., 2017). The pursuit 
of consensus implies that confirmation bias can occur to maintain group harmony and 
consensus at the expense of diverse voices. In contrast, the study found that partisanship and 
polarisation in WhatsApp groups are harnessed for political expediency (see Chapter Seven, 
pp. 312,313). Some WhatsApp groups are specifically established and sponsored to drive 
partisan narratives. WhatsApp groups have heightened a sense of meaning and purpose through 
in-group solidarity while railing against perceived political opponents. Politicising of 
polarisation means that deliberations in WhatsApp groups are defined as binary contexts of ‘us 
versus them’. Such binary perception and thinking in group contexts encourage more partisan 
views where participants consider other factions as the disliked out-group (Esteban & Ray, 
2007; Lee et al., 2014; Muste, 2014; Habermas, 1996, 2003, 2005). 
8.5 Implications of the Study Findings 
The study has a number of implications for research methodology, research theory, and practice 
considering that no study has combined and examined these concepts in the Kenyan context 
before. In addition, the study achieved general results that are not only applicable to Kenya but 
to other similar polarised contexts as well.  
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8.5.1 Implications for Research Methodology 
This study has critical methodological implications in the study of WhatsApp groups and 
polarisation. Given the complex nature of the research concepts, this study combined two 
complementary methodologies to examine and elucidate the relationships between the quality 
of deliberation in WhatsApp groups and polarisation. These implications are discussed below. 
WhatsApp: Despite its global reach, significant influence, and growing ubiquity in everyday 
life, thus far, WhatsApp appears to have attracted minimal research attention compared to other 
social media platforms (notably Facebook and Twitter). This is probabaly because Twitter and 
Facebook are widely used in western liberal democracies (North America and Europe), while 
WhatsApp is widely used in emerging economies such as India, Brazil and Africa. This was 
apparent during the formulation of this study’s research design because there were very few 
examples of similar research to guide or inform the current study. Also apparent in the 
formulation of this study’s research design is that the critical issues in WhatsApp research 
relate to the ethical and technical limitations of seeking respondents, scraping data, data 
collection and analysis of the platform (see Chapter Five, pp. 170,173). Studying WhatsApp 
raises various ethical challenges due to its security protocol such as its end-to-end encryption. 
Along with preventing interception of messages during transmission, the security protocols 
make data crawling and mining difficult or impossible. This means that researchers who wish 
to access a respondent’s meta-data will require access to the latest copy of a user’s daily backup 
as stored in their iCloud (Gudipaty and Jhala, 2015). The respondents’ consent is, therefore, 
needed and this makes it challenging to recruit research participants. 
It was further evident that WhatsApp has a quicker, interjected messaging, chat and 
response model that makes it challenging to trace coherent conversations for textual analysis 
(Anglano, 2014; Garimella and Tyson, 2018; Rashidi et al., 2016). This is compounded by its 
user-centred network formation model that makes it challenging to undertake and do network 
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analysis. This informed the alternative research methodology that was adopted in this study. 
Further, all these affordances complicated the possibility of logging meta-data from WhatsApp 
for this study. To overcome these challenges, this study used an integrated approach that 
combined conventional research methods using qualitative and quantitative designs and 
administered via WhatsApp (see Chapter Five, pp. 187). By combining the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, the sequential design from combining both methods provided a 
holistic view and understanding of the research phenomenon under study. The comparative 
dimensions involving results from both qualitative and quantitative research designs allowed a 
framework for assessing the different components of deliberative structure, norms, and 
polarisation (see Chapter Five, pp. 188,195). Due to ethical challenges, the study was limited 
to public WhatsApp groups which are comparatively more accessible and permissible based 
on respondents’ consent and ethical guidelines. Studying patterns of usage and interaction with 
a wider scope of objectives is possible in public WhatsApp groups. In contrast, studying private 
WhatsApp groups is also possible, but may experience a limitation of scope, sample size, which 
can affect other elements of the research study. 
 
Polarisation: The measurement and conceptualisation of polarisation in this study has specific 
implications for future research in this area of study. The majority of studies on polarisation 
are based on the Western context and specifically the US (see Chapter Two, pp. 24-28). 
Whereas the definition of polarisation reflects a divergence and extremity of views on specific 
issues, polarisation also has a historical context. Therefore, the conceptualisation of 
polarisation in contexts like the United States is prominently based on the ideological 
dichotomy between the two major political parties, Democrats and Republicans (Mccoy et al., 
2018). However, such a dichotomous understanding of polarisation around governance issues 
is less likely to characterise contexts like Kenya where various factors such as ethnicity, 
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regionalism, and resource distribution are at the root of polarisation (see Chapter Three, pp. 
94). This study, being based on a non-Western context, has three implications for the study of 
polarisation. The first is that the understanding of polarisation even among research 
respondents is likely to be influenced by the context of study. For instance, while affective 
polarisation is common between Democrats and Republicans in the US, ethnic polarisation is 
common in Kenya where the divergence of political and governance issues is more likely to be 
shaped by ethnicity rather than party affiliations. This understanding affected how respondents 
interpreted and gave their responses in this study. Based on the interview questions used in the 
pilot stage of this study, respondents generally misconstrued disagreements founded on ethnic 
differences as polarisation and this is likely to affect the validity and reliability of the study 
findings on polarisation. The study resolved this challenge by using the seven indicators of 
polarisation (see Chapter Six, p. 201). The use of polarisation indicators can help researchers 
to identify specific themes from research participants’ responses, and connect such themes to 
polarisation during qualitative analysis.  
The second implication of this study relates specifically to the conceptualisation of 
group polarisation. The study found that group polarisation is likely to encompass all other 
forms of polarisation such as attitudinal, ideological, affective, and perceptual polarisation (see 
Chapter Two, pp. 24-28). This is critical because the study of group polarisation is likely to be 
definitive and strategic in revealing all other forms of polarisation. In addition, the use of the 
seven pointers of polarisation revealed an interconnected influence that happens at the 
individual and group level. For instance, binary thinking as an indicator of polarisation is 
connected to partisanship, which is also linked to in-group, out-group identities. Connecting 
all the indicators within a research context means that the study of group polarisation is likely 
to be holistic and integrated as reflected in this study. This study’s contribution is also based 
on the fact that the majority of current studies on polarisation are focused on an individual as 
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opposed to the group perspective, and also focus on general political issues rather than specific 
governance issues as was the focus of this study. 
The third implication of this study relates to the role of WhatsApp as an instant 
messaging application and a social networking site. Just like other SNSs platforms, WhatsApp 
has facilitated the process of self-selection into homogeneous groups where individuals can 
avoid discordant content. Like other SNSs platforms, it has enhanced exposure to diverse 
content through a cross-medium, cross-network, and cross-platform information sharing (see 
Chapter Six, p. 255). However, this study reveals some unique factors in WhatsApp that are 
critical in the study of polarisation. One of WhatsApp features is the voice recognition function 
that eliminates the need to type and allows illiterate respondents to input voice messages in 
their local language. This presents an opportunity and a challenge in the study of polarisation. 
The combination of voice data and chat messages provides an opportunity for rich textual data 
analysis on polarisation even among the illiterate groups. Further, the interaction between the 
researcher and the respondents can happen via recorded voice messages instead of typed chats. 
This can help to include a critical group of respondents in studies on polarisation who would 
otherwise be left out due to illiteracy. However, this is based on the assumption that they have 
digital literacy. In addition, the use of coded and polarising language in recorded voice 
interactions in WhatsApp group deliberations was noted in this study. Understanding the 
influence of coded messages, language and chats in SNSs platforms in polarised contexts is an 
area of polarisation worth looking further into. This is especially because the use of coded 
language based on linguistic undertones and the ethnic characterisation of otherness was one 




8.5.2 Implications for Research Theory 
The study findings have implications for three theories related to polarisation and deliberation 
in the public sphere. Deliberations in WhatsApp groups partly invalidate the association 
between selective exposure and group polarisation. Selective exposure requires a situation of 
network/group homophily which is negated by the diverse composition of some WhatsApp 
groups. Further, controlling for homogeneity to achieve group homophily, which is one of the 
foundational constructs of selective exposure, is a challenge in WhatsApp groups (see Chapter 
Six, p. 255). Diverse participants and content shared in WhatsApp groups increase the chances 
of inadvertent exposure through forwarding, posting, commenting, and sharing across other 
platforms. Meanwhile, incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal ideas challenges the concept 
of selective exposure, and the study found that selective exposure is remotely possible in 
WhatsApp groups (see Chapter Six, p. 255). The difference between this study and the existing 
literature is that, in this study, it is recognised that selective exposure in WhatsApp groups is 
partly shaped by factors such as time constraints, humour content, and the participant’s interest 
in addition to the cognitive dissonance. Time constraints encourage selective exposure when 
WhatsApp group participants encounter an overwhelming trail of chat messages in their 
WhatsApp groups. They have to choose what messages to consume and this sometimes 
depends on factors such as humour content and the participant’s interest at that specific time 
(see Chapter Six, p. 255).  
The study suggests that WhatsApp groups are capable of creating ideological enclaves 
and echo chambers where homogeneous participants converge and deliberate on consonant 
content. Unlike the existing literature (Colleoni et a., 2014; Esteve & Valle, 2018; Tornberg, 
2018), the findings here established a link between the formation of WhatsApp groups and 
echo chamber effects. Self-selection, as opposed to random selection, is likely to result in 
enclave WhatsApp groups as echo chambers. The tendency for self-selection to create small, 
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close-knit, and homogeneous WhatsApp groups which result in enclaves is worsened by the 
expulsion of participants with discordant views (see Chapter Six, p. 256). However, contrary 
to the existing literature on other SNS platforms, enclave deliberations in WhatsApp groups 
can counteract specific negative dynamics of structural diversity and inequalities within the 
wider deliberation context. This means that interaction in enclaves and echo chambers may be 
essential or even necessary for marginalised and minority groups to converge and deliberate 
without the pressure related to exisiting power dynamics in diverse WhatsApp groups (see 
Chapter Six, pp. 307,308). Nevertheless, despite the advantages of enclave deliberations, they 
can elevate ethnicity as a tool to rationalise, simplify, and understand complex issues in a way 
that further aggravates polarisation.  
Overall, this study supports previous research suggesting that the Habermasian 
normative ideals are unrealistic and unattainable, especially in the online public sphere. Unlike 
existing studies that assessed the quality of deliberations in the online public sphere, the study 
went a step further to understand how the quality of deliberations affects group polarisation in 
polarised contexts. The use of Habermasian normative ideals to gauge the quality of 
deliberations on digital platforms like WhatsApp has various implications. The ideals are more 
suitable to establish the quality of deliberations in micro as opposed to macro deliberation 
structures. Being formal, it is easier to adopt deliberative norms such as inclusivity, rationality, 
moderation, and civility in micro deliberative structures. The application of Habermasian 
normative ideals in informal, macro deliberative structure such as WhatsApp groups is likely 
to undervalue the place of less sophisticated and informal deliberations.  
Whether in micro or macro deliberative institutions, this study suggests that the 
Habermasian normative ideals are affected by several platform-specific factors including: 
affordance of the platform, the composition of participants, the quality of information sources, 
and the nature of the topics under deliberation (see Chapter Six, p. 316). For instance, the failure 
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to comprehensively implement the access to information bill at the county level leaves a 
vacuum that is often filled by conspiracy theories, misinformation and disinformation in 
WhatsApp groups. This means that digital platforms like WhatsApp groups are not only 
transforming specific aspects of the public sphere but are also redefining the factors that shape 
the quality of deliberations and polarisation. The study found that WhatsApp has made the viral 
distribution of conspiracy theories, fake news, and ethnic stereotypes more impactful based on 
its affordances (see Chapter Two, p. 300). The findings further suggest that what constitutes 
quality deliberations can be contextual and may not necessarily reflect those advocated by 
Habermas (Habermas, 2005). For instance, the definition of civility as a deliberative norm is 
based on etiquette and politeness in discussion which can vary based on context (see Chapter 
Two, p. 60). The subjectivity of the factors that define the quality of deliberation in different 
contexts affects the generalisability of findings.  
8.5.3 Implications for Practice 
The study suggests that WhatsApp groups like other SNSs are not entirely responsible for the 
country’s polarisation and that participants converge and use these platforms when already 
polarised. This is compounded by the fact that polarisation in Kenya revolves around deep-
rooted, historical issues that have always been divisive, which respondents felt are extremely 
challenging to resolve through deliberation in WhatsApp groups. Similar to other 
administrative and legislative initiatives that have been implemented or instituted since 
independence in Kenya, deliberative governance via WhatsApp groups is less likely to 
ameliorate the state of polarisation unless a number of issues are addressed. The study found 
that deliberations in WhatsApp groups attract a diverse composition of participants in terms of 
structural diversity based on, for example religion, ideology and region of origin (see Chapter 
Six, p. 233). Despite their structural diversity, the study found that the socio-demographic 
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composition of the WhatsApp groups consisted of specific privileged segments of society made 
up of young males, who are highly educated. Hence, WhatsApp groups, while diverse, are still 
likely to lack a representation of specific voices in deliberations. It has reinforced existing 
socio-demographic inequalities in terms of access and use of SNS platforms for deliberative 
governance. In cases where minority and marginalised groups participate in deliberations, the 
dominance of the majority groups leads to spirals of silence among minorities. In a situation 
where the county government uses WhatsApp groups to collect views or gauge public opinion, 
the views of the privileged minority are still likely to be heard and adopted (see Chapter Six, 
p. 284). This is likely to skew county governance policies and worsen polarisation.  
Considering the dominance of male voices, as noted from the socio-demographic 
profile of WhatsApp groups, the inadequate representation of women’s voices due to digital 
divides is likely to result in the amplification of male-centric ideologies through groupthink. 
The county governments should devise more strategies to encourage the representation of 
minority and marginalised groups in county governance discourse. Further, regardless of the 
challenges faced by digital platforms such as WhatsApp groups, it is prudent to include SNS 
platforms as part of an overall strategy for ensuring integrated and cohesive Kenyan counties. 
Despite the finding that deliberative governance via WhatsApp groups can heighten group 
polarisation among participants, it can still have some positive outcomes. For instance, the 
study found that governance issues in WhatsApp groups that generated greater participation in 
deliberations are those that were framed as conflicts or those that created the perception of 
‘camps’ (see Chapter Six, p. 281). Habermas recognised that defining the agenda in the public 
sphere may often entail conflictual, confrontational, and contested discussion tactics marked 
by incivility (Habermas, 1991). This further connects with the findings in this study showing 
that unmoderated platforms are more likely to be perceived as more open and less biased which 
was noted to encourage more participation in deliberations (see Chapter Six, p. 259). 
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The study found that WhatsApp allows the recording of audio and video input for those 
who are illiterate in terms of writing. Further, the use of vernacular language in chatting was 
noted to be common in WhatsApp groups especially those that had a regional presence. This 
has various implications. Apart from enhancing enclave deliberations, it is likely to instigate 
the use of coded messages to describe and perceive otherness. As earlier noted, this is 
reminiscent of the role played by other SNS platforms in the 2007/8 polarisation and violence 
in Kenya (see Chapter Four, p. 131). This suggests that WhatsApp (formed in 2009) is likely 
to instigate the same level of polarisation through the use of coded language to vilify and 
highlight the otherness of specific individuals in society. Monitoring the millions of WhatsApp 
groups is logistically impossible and other solutions are needed to discourage the use and 
sharing of coded language (see Chapter Six, p. 278). However, the use of vernacular language 
in deliberations is important in reaching a critical segment of participants who are often 
marginalised or side-lined in deliberations which require the use of national languages only.  
WhatsApp groups were also found to have provided an arena where elite polarisation 
can influence mass polarisation. WhatsApp groups have been hijacked by political elites and 
interest groups, and some have been established and sponsored specifically to drive partisan 
narratives. The propagation of polarising narratives by the political elite in such WhatsApp 
groups takes advantage of the strong allegiance participants have to ethnic, political, and 
ideological identities. This is also a red flag with regard to efforts towards national cohesion 
and integration efforts in Kenyan society. WhatsApp, like other SNS platforms that were used 
to instigate the 2007/8 polarisation and violence in Kenya, has been misused to drive binary 
categorisation especially with regard to contested governance issues and ideologies (see 
Chapter Three, p. 92). With over 12 million users and its forwarding and sharing capabilities, 
WhatsApp groups have significant and strategic power in fuelling mass polarisation. However, 
WhatsApp has also recently introduced a number of measures to curb misinformation and 
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polarisation such as labelling of multi-media content as forwards and strictly limiting the 
number of forwards to five at a specific time (Marfianto & Riadi, 2018). This has limited but 
not eliminated the replicability and scalability of uncivil, hateful, and inflammatory content. 
Despite its negative role in polarisation, as established in this study, Uwiano Peace Platform 
takes advantage of WhatsApp affordances to obtain information on hate speech, tensions, 
incitement, threats and violence across the nation (Halakhe, 2013; Mutahi & Kimari, 2017). 
Information is then sent to analysts who map, verify, and forward the data to a multi-
disciplinary rapid response system for quick intervention. This is exemplary of how platforms 
like WhatsApp can be used to engage in creating solution models and tackle issues of 
polarisation and violence in society. 
 
8.6 Limitations of the Study  
Whilst this research has uncovered new original empirical material and fresh non-western 
perspective on deliberative governance and polarisation, there are a number of limitations 
which restrict its applicability in certain circumstances. The first limitation is that sampling 
was based on WhatsApp groups which means that the findings of this study are not 
generalisable in any way. This is because representative samples and generalisable findings 
would require more participants, a different approach, and a bigger scope of the research study. 
Further, representative samples are challenging to achieve in a social networking environment 
where the approach resembles that of a case study (Belair-Gagnon et al., 2018; Humphreys, 
2008; Vesnic-alujevic, 2012). This limitation narrows the applicability and generalisability of 
the study findings. This study is an exploratory study, and paves the way for future research 
where the impact of each deliberative structure and norms variable on polarisation can be 
explored separately.  
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The second limitation relates to the social desirability bias faced during the WhatsApp-
based focus group discussion. It was evident from the focus group data collection that social 
desirability can work both ways. Respondents were sometimes motivated to over-report or 
under-report their views, especially on deliberative norms in their WhatsApp groups. Informing 
respondents that their input would be considered verbatim may have heightened their sense of 
carefulness when responding to the study’s focus group discussion questions.  
The third limitation related to the comparatively smaller size of WhatsApp groups. 
WhatsApp groups are generally limited to 256 members per group. The study looked at 
WhatsApp groups with participants ranging from between 50 to 256. This affected the 
statistical results related to the third research question in this study. The third research question 
sought to establish whether there is a variance in the quality of deliberations based on 
WhatsApp group formation. The Cramer’s V values are not significantly different between the 
variables because the sample size affects the variance analysis. The findings might have been 
different if groups ranging from, say, 50 to 1,000 participants had been considered. Another 
limitation related to the methodology is that this study is based on cross-sectional data. The 
findings may have been different if a different research approach involving a longitudinal data 
collection method had been used. Further, although this study inferred some correlational 
associations between variables, this cannot imply causality. The aim of this study was not to 
establish causality; the study used data triangulation to further explore the assumptive findings 
from the quantitative data. However, future studies could employ panel data to delve deeper 
into a causal premise between deliberative governance and polarisation guided by a non-
recursive model. This study could have achieved more significant findings if undertaken with 
an enlarged sample size and coupled with strictly parametric tests.   
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8.7 Recommendations for Future Research and Practical Applications 
This study sheds light on a rapidly expanding but critical segment of deliberative governance 
and polarisation in the public sphere. The focus on four deliberative structure variables and six 
deliberative norms variables meant that the study merely scratched the surface of the 
relationship between these variables and polarisation. Future studies could explore in much 
greater depth how each variable affects the quality of deliberations and other forms of 
polarisation such as affective and perceptive polarisation. It would be interesting to find out 
how the results from this study differ from other studies through a comparative approach with 
other SNS platforms such as Facebook and in other contexts as well.  
Another area of study that can be looked at is a comparative dimension based on culture. 
There are very few studies focusing on a cross-cultural perspective and how different contexts 
shapes the nature of deliberation and polarisation. It would be interesting to understand how 
SNSs interactions shaped by western individualistic norms of interactions differ from the 
African and Confucian orientations of group identity interactions in view of group deliberations 
and polarisation. It would be interesting to also understand the reason why in spite of the 
structural diversity in a group’s composition, the socio-demographic profile of participants is 
similar across the diverse groups as was evident in this study (see Chapter Six, pp. 230-231). 
Such an understanding can shed more light on the nature of mobilisation needed to enhance 
the participation of different groups in deliberative governance.  
Further, this study was carried out in a polarised environment focused on the 
deliberation of deep-rooted, historical, and polarising governance topics. Future studies could 
replicate this study using similar research instruments but in different non-polarised contexts 
in a longitudinal study. It would be interesting to understand the influence of misinformation 
and disinformation in different deliberative contexts and platforms and how it shapes 
polarisation on governance issues. Future research could also examine the link between 
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selective exposure, echo chambers and the consumption of misinformation and disinformation 
in non-political contexts focusing on the group’s response to fact-checkers. In contexts like 
Kenya, the association between misinformation and polarisation in SNSs platforms, and 
political and religious extremism can be examined based on a groups interactive dynamics. 
Owing to the small sample size in this study study, an inter-county comparative analysis proved 
challenging, and this is an area which future research could explore as part of an inter-
contextual study. 
8.8 Contributions to Research 
This study made the following contributions to research. First, the study was based on an fresh 
methodological approach using WhatsApp-based focus group discussions. WhatsApp-based 
focus group discussions can be used to collect rich narrative data from online focus group 
discussions. Being online-based, it is a cost-effective method for gathering opinions, beliefs, 
attitudes, perceptions, behaviours and motivations on sensitive research topics. Researchers 
can take advantage of the end-to-end encryption of WhatsApp; however, this should still be 
done in line with appropriate ethical guidelines. This study successfully used this focus group 
discussion method that eliminates the need for data transcription and can, thus, save time and 
resources. Further, the use of typed WhatsApp contributions and comments as verbatim quotes 
enhanced the precision that is sometimes lost during data transcription.  
Secondly, the study also made a critical contribution by building on and going beyond 
existing research that has only explored the link between SNS platforms and the quality of 
deliberations guided by the tenets of Habermas. This study went a step further to explore the 
impact of deliberative governance on group polarisation and how the quality of deliberations 
mediates this relationship. The focus of this study in the polarised Kenyan context is a unique 
contribution considering that the majority of the current studies on deliberative governance and 
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polarisation are based on the Western context. Examining the root and nature of polarisation in 
the Kenyan context helped to create context to some of the responses from respondents in 
WhatsApp groups (see Chapter Three, pp. 81-121). 
Thirdly, this study’s findings have contributed concrete empirical findings on how 
specific WhatsApp groups have fostered real changes within county governance structures 
through deliberations and consequent actions. Some of the WhatsApp groups in this study have 
achieved policy-related results and managed to influence decision-making at the county 
governance structures. WhatsApp groups such as ‘Sauti ya wachuuzi’, ‘The Nakuru Analyst’, 
and ‘The County Watch’ have demonstrated how group deliberations, meaningful interactions, 
collective efforts, coordinated petitioning, and organised networking can achieve tangible 
results within governance structures. The attention that such WhatsApp groups have attracted 
from policy makers and the positive responses realised by such groups demonstrates a positive 
effect of SNSs platforms that is often missed in non-empirical studies. Such platforms have 
realised epistemic gains that are commonly associated with formal micro deliberation 
structures only. This study has strengthened the argument that in spite of the negative 
characteristics associated with SNSs platforms with regards to deliberation and polarisation, 
such platforms have realised various democratically desirable outcomes in governance. 
Fourth, this study suggests that the practice of selective exposure and the echo chambers 
effects challenges the quality of deliberations because when participants are not exposed to 
diverse opinions, they are less likely to be aware of others’ legitimate perspectives and 
rationales. This is likely to affect the realisation of tolerance, consensus, and inclusivity of 
views in polarised contexts. Whereas the influence of algorithms and information 
customisation largely lacks in WhatsApp, these platforms have made information filtering 
among participants pervasively strong. With absolute ease, WhatsApp users can sort out 
content according to their biases, prejudices, and selectivity. If WhatsApp group participants 
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exercise selective exposure and prioritise different issues, then it can become challenging to 
find consensus on governance issues based on shared priorities. 
Fifth, this study was able to link the formation of WhatsApp groups, and the method of 
recruiting participants into WhatsApp groups to the quality of deliberations. Further, the 
variance in the quality of deliberation as defined by the group norms can be explained by factors 
such as the group’s influencers, the group’s interactive dynamics, and the group’s social 
sanction (see Chapter Seven, p. 290). For instance, the study found that the method of recruiting 
participants determines the homogeneity or heterogeneity of participants in a WhatsApp group. 
Self-selected members of a WhatsApp group are likely to be ideologically homogeneous. 
Ideologically homogeneous groups are likely to have close ties which facilitate the compliance 
with the groups agreed deliberative norms (see Chapter Seven, p. 291). Such homogeneous 
groups are also likely to form enclave deliberations and echo chambers. Random-selection of 
members is likely to converge individuals with diverse views in WhatsApp groups, which 
means exposure to diverse viewpoints, incidental exposure, and less selective exposure.   
Lastly, the empirical examination of the constitutional assumption in the Kenyan 
context, regarding deliberative governance and polarisation, is a key contribution of this study. 
While this study was undertaken in an academic setting, it can inform other industry studies 
that seek to review the effects of lofty legislative assumptions on actual practice, especially in 
the area of deliberative governance. This study adds to the ongoing discussions on the role of 
SNSs in public participation and the attainment of administrative and legislative objectives 
within county governance structures. Worryingly, the study points to the potential misuse of 
WhatsApp group to instigate polarisation and violence just like other SNSs platforms were 
misused during the 2007/8 violence in Kenya. However, far from being a panacea for 
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1. Indicate your age bracket, (1) 18-24, (2) 25-34, (3) 35-44, (4) 45-54, (5) 55-64 
2. Indicate your gender: (1) Male, (2) Female 
3. Which WhatsApp group are you a member of:  
(1) Official: formed by the county government officials, their affiliates and representatives 
(2) Unofficial: formed by citizens on their own initiative and volition 
 
4. What is your level of education?  
(1) High school, (2) Tertiary level, (3) diploma, (4) undergraduate, (5) masters, (6) PhD 
5. How would you categorise the relationship among people in your WhatsApp group? 
(1) No Ties (members do not know each other personally and do not engage outside the 
WhatsApp group),  
(2) Strong Ties (members know each other personally and engage outside the WhatsApp group 
as well) and  
(3) Weak Ties (group members know each other from WhatsApp group but not personally),  
(4) Cordial Ties (members met in the WhatsApp group and have met in person), 
6. What is the approximate number of members in your group?  
(1) Btw 50-100, (2) Btw 101-150, (3) Btw 151-200, (4) Btw 201-256 
7. How did you join your WhatsApp group?  
(1) Self-Selection: Was added by a friend, colleague, or person who knew me 
(2) Random Selection: Joined through a public WhatsApp link 
8. How frequently do you discuss governance issues in your WhatsApp group?  
(1) Hourly, (2) Daily, (3) Occasionally (every other day), (4) Rarely 
9. How would you categorise the level of tolerance in your WhatsApp group discussions? (1) High 
tolerance, (2) Moderate tolerance (3) slight intolerance (4) High intolerance 
10. The use of demeaning or impolite language is prevalent in our WhatsApp group? 
(1)  Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (3) Undecided, (4) Disagree, (5) Strongly Disagree 
11. How would you rate the level of moderation in your WhatsApp group? 
(1) Well moderated, (2) Averagely moderated, (3) Poorly moderated, (4) Not moderated 
12. Indicate if the following type of diverse people exist in your WhatsApp group 
  1 2 3 
a Religion (i.e Muslims, Christians) Exist Not sure Does not exist 
b Ethnicity (i.e Luos, Luhyas, Kikuyus, kalenjins) Exist Not sure Does not exist 
c Ideology (People from different political parties) Exist Not sure Does not exist 
d Regional (People from different regions and part of county) Exist Not sure Does not exist 
e  Exist Not sure Does not exist 
 
13. Considering question 12 above on diversity, are the diverse contributions of these groups included in 
your WhatsApp group discussions? 
(1) Not inclusive at all, (2) Not quite inclusive, (3) Slightly inclusive, (4) Definitely inclusive 
14. Heterogeneity of Viewpoints 
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a How often are you exposed to different points of view on governance in your WhatsApp group 
(exposure) 
(1) Always, (2) Very often, (3) Sometimes, (4) Rarely, (5) Never 
1 2 3 4 5 
b My WhatsApp group consists of people with similar point of view on governance (composition) 
(1) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (3) Undecided, (4) Disagree, (5) Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
c Discussion in my WhatsApp group is based on information from different sources (information 
sources) 
(1) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (3) Undecided, (4) Disagree, (5) Strongly Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. Polarisation in WhatsApp group 
Indicate the extent to which;  Low Moderate High 
a ethnicity shapes the views and arguments people present in your group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b people take ethnic positions regardless of the facts presented on governance  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c group members in your whatApp group are divided into opposing camps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d people take certain positions because they want to be seen favourably by the group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e particular ideas and individuals dominate discussions on governance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
















List of WhatsApp groups Sampled in the study 
 WhatsApp Group Masthead Nature of group No of Members County 
1 The analyst Accountability 254 Nakuru 
2 County Watch Accountability 254 Kericho 
3 Accountability Demand Network Accountability 56 Nairobi 
4 Kuresoi county group Youth 200 Nakuru 
5 Islamic Shahadaa network Religious Advocacy 193 Nairobi 
6 Kericho young professionals Youth 256 Kericho 
7 Kericho URP grassroots wingers’ Politics 256 Kericho 
8 Ogiek Rights Group’ Human Rights 254 Bomet 
9 Kericho Renaissance Network Politics 208 Kericho 
10 Langas Nyumba Kumi Initiative Security 256 Nakuru 
11 Nairobi Taxpayers’ Association Budget 254 Nairobi 
12 Bomet County Government Politics 254 Bomet 
13 Tripple A Networks Politics 244 Nakuru 
14 Townhall Mobilisers Politics 239 Nairobi 
15 Kabete Crusaders Network Politics 201 Nairobi 
16 Kiamunyis Security Network Security 219 Nakuru 
17 The Nest  Accountability 245 Bomet 
18 Kenyawest Alliance Politics 98 Kericho 
19 Kericho Young professionals group Politics 113 Kericho 
20 Wamama wa Kazi  Politics 58 Nairobi 
21 Haki kwa Wote Network Human rights 126 Nakuru 
22 Kericho Power Group Politics 256 Kericho 
23 Bomet County Politics 256 Bomet 
24 Nakuru Sote Pamoja Politics 256 Nakuru 
25 The Wickets Politics 256 Nairobi 
26 Simama na Mama Politics 256 Bomet 













Thank you for agreeing to join this research WhatsApp group participate in this interview. I will be interviewing 
you to better understand and seek a clarification on some the responses you gave in the survey questionnaire. I do 
appreciate that you were able to provide good feedback. I am still looking at discussions and polarisation in your 
WhatsApp groups.  
This chat will pose a number of questions and you are simply requested to post your views and follow the 
discussions and make comments as and when you like. So there are no right or wrong answers to any of the 
questions, I am interested in your own experiences.  
Participation in this research is voluntary and your decision to participate and you are free to exit the group at 
your will. Please note that if you wish to participate in the group chats and do not have any data bundles, you can 
approach me for a facilitation.  
You are free to tag someone’s response to indicate what you are making your comments on. All responses will be 
kept confidential even if your chats are used verbatim. I will moderate the discussions and I request that we engage 
respectfully. Are there any questions or anything that need clarity? 
 
Establishing Rapport  
Before we begin, I would like to know how your WhatsApp group has changed your day to day life and if this 
experience is different from others like Facebook and Twitter 
Section A
 
1. Socio-demographic characteristics 
 How do you think the age, gender and level of education of the people in your WhatsApp group has 
affected polarisation in your county? 
 Let us start with age, are younger or older people more polarised in your WhatsApp group?  
Prompt: what is it that makes such a group more polarised than the other? 
Prompt: Why do you think age is or is not a polarising factors in your WhatsApp groups? 
 Between male and female, which do you think is the more polarised, and why? 
Prompt: What is the difference in polarisation between both gender? 
Prompt: Do you think gender is one of the most polarising factors in your WhatsApp groups, why? 
 Do the level of education in your WhatsApp group shape whether people are polarised? 
Prompt: Is there a difference in polarisation based on the level of education 
Prompt: Do you think the level of education is one of the most polarising factors in your WhatsApp 
groups? What is the reason for your response? 
2. Diversity of participants and heterogeneity of viewpoints 
 Considering the number of participants in your WhatsApp group discussions, do you think they make 
the discussion more polarised? 
Prompt: What in your opinion is the impact of diversity on partisan discussion in WhatsApp? 
Prompt: Why do you think diversity on governance issues is or is not polarising? 
 Whats do you think is the impact of different views and opinions expressed in your WhatsApp group 
discussion and polarisation? 
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Prompt: What would be the impact of exposing people to different opinions with regards to their 
polarisation? 
3. Group ties and Group size 
 Do you think that people with close connections/ties get more polarised that those who are not? 
Prompt: Why do you think the nature of ties affect the level of polarisation in WhatsApp groups? 
 Are WhatsApp groups with more people more polarised? 
Prompt: Based on your response, what is the relationship between the size of the group and the level of 
polarisation? 
4. Moderation 
 What do you think is the impact of moderating social media discussions as relates to a polarisation? 
Prompt: How would you describe the level of moderation in your WhatsApp group, how has it 
influenced polarised discussions? 
Prompt: What do you think is the effect of moderation on polarisation in your Whatsapp group? 
5. Tolerance 
 Is there tolerance in WhatsApp group discussions, how would tolerance in discussion impact on 
polarisation? 
Prompt: Whats is your opinion on the level of tolerance when discussing controversial topics in your 
WhatsApp group? 
6. Civility 
 Whats is your understanding of civil discussions in your WhatsApp group? 
Prompt: What do you think is the influence of civil or incivil discussions on polarisation in your 
WhatsApp group? 
Prompt: In what other ways does civility affect discussion in your WhatsApp group? 
7. Inclusivity 
Whats is the level of inclusivity in your WhatsApp group? 
Prompt: Do you think all voices are represented during the discussions in your WhatsApp group? 
Prompt: In whats ways does inclusivity affect poalrisation in your WhatsApp group? 
 
Section B 
1. How would you describe the quality of deliberations in your WhatsApp group on county governance 
issues? 
2. Does the quality of deliberations in your WhatsApp groups affect polarisation? 
3. Has polarisation increased or lessened in your WhatsApp groups and how has discussion contributed to 
this? 
4. How has your WhatsApp group discussion influenced contested county governance issues? 
 
Conclusion 
Is there anything else that you would like to comment or add based on our discussion? 









Cochran This is a formula for determining an ideal sample size given a desired level of precision, 
confidence level, and the estimated proportion of the attribute present in the entire 
population. 
Groupthink Groupthink occurs when a group of the people in the group make irrational or non-
optimal decisions in order to conform or the discouragement of dissent 
Lefting An act of withdraw one’s membership to a WhatsApp group 
Majimbo Majimbo is a swahili word that refers to the process of political decentralisation and 
devolution of power 
Mwananchi This is Swahili word to mean an ordinary citizen; a member of the public. 
Ushahidi Ushahidi is a platform empowering citizens to map out, expose and discuss issues like 
corruption and human rights violations. 
Uwiano  This is a conflict prevention strategy that enhances collaboration between peace actors in 
the country. 
  
  
 
 
